some F35 info

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Got to love some of the quotes in that article. For example:

The single-mission A-10 is perfectly suited for the CAS mission in non-contested airspace, for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia..."Can [the F-35] do close air support? Sure," Aboulafia said. "But there's nothing like an A-10 in a world where nothing shoots back."


I thought the whole point of the A-10 was to be survivable when people are shooting back. Now it's being lauded as a great platform in uncontested airspace?

Things that make you go "Hmmm?"
 
Got to love some of the quotes in that article. For example:

The single-mission A-10 is perfectly suited for the CAS mission in non-contested airspace, for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia..."Can [the F-35] do close air support? Sure," Aboulafia said. "But there's nothing like an A-10 in a world where nothing shoots back."


I thought the whole point of the A-10 was to be survivable when people are shooting back. Now it's being lauded as a great platform in uncontested airspace?

Things that make you go "Hmmm?"

It's funny - years ago there was a flyoff between the A-7 and the A-10. LTV was offering an enhanced version of the A-7 for the CAS role. One of the selling points of the A-10 was its ability to take ground fire and keep flying. One of the proponents of the A-7 was saying he'd rather fly in an aircraft that's fast enough so it won't take ground fire at all. If one understands all the moving parts of an aircraft, the fluids and electrical wiring that makes the thing work, it's obvious you 'd rather not have bullets hitting your aircraft period, no matter how much armor is under, inside or around you!
 
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In the first Gulf War, the A-10 flew well over 8,000 sorties for the loss of 7 aircraft in an environment that could be considered actively contested airspace - 4 aircraft were downed by SAMs and 3 were written off after returning to base damaged beyond repair. This doesn't include the dozens of A-10 aircraft that suffered damage to a degree that would have downed any other aircraft(except for, perhaps, a P-47), and returned safely to be repaired and put back into service.

So I'm not sure where Richard Aboulafia is going with his statement...
 
So I'm not sure where Richard Aboulafia is going with his statement...

Me neither...very strange. It seems as soon as the term "F-35" is included in an internet article, everyone suddenly jumps through the looking glass into a parallel universe where talking bollox is par for the course (or maybe it's just me!).
 
A good little read:

Gen. Horner

... the A-10 is vulnerable to hits because its speed is limited. It's a function of thrust, it's not a function of anything else. We had a lot of A-10s take a lot of ground fire hits. Quite frankly, we pulled the A-10s back from going up around the Republican Guard and kept them on Iraq's [less formidable] front-line units. That's line if you have a force that allows you to do that. In this case, we had F-16s to go after the Republican Guard.
 
In the first Gulf War, the A-10 flew well over 8,000 sorties for the loss of 7 aircraft in an environment that could be considered actively contested airspace - 4 aircraft were downed by SAMs and 3 were written off after returning to base damaged beyond repair. This doesn't include the dozens of A-10 aircraft that suffered damage to a degree that would have downed any other aircraft(except for, perhaps, a P-47), and returned safely to be repaired and put back into service.

So I'm not sure where Richard Aboulafia is going with his statement...

I wouldn't have described the areas the A10 operated in as contested as there wasn't any danger of fighters intercepting them. Also the majority of the AA weapon systems would have been under local control as the majority of the long range radars that close to the front line would have been knocked out.

If enemy fighters had been a threat you would have seen a marked reduction in the A10 activity or a marked increase in the losses
 
I thought the whole point of the A-10 was to be survivable when people are shooting back. Now it's being lauded as a great platform in uncontested airspace?

Combat airspace comes in three basic flavors, permissive airspace, contested airspace, and denied-access airspace. The combat airspace that the A-10 has performed in for the past 20+ years has been mostly permissive and occasionally contested. It has faced no electronic warfare, no real communications jamming, no opposing aircraft, and occasionally moderate levels of antiaircraft (surface guns and missiles). Of course it could only be called moderate if you are not the one being shot at, if it is you in the seat any level is heavy ;) I add that in part because I do not want to make light of the activities of the A-10 community, those men and women have my utmost respect for the job they do and the aircraft has performed admirably. I have often interacted with the community and I do not mean to downplay their activities in the least.

Aircraft operating in contested airspace face three threats, aircraft (fighters), anti-aircraft (surface guns and missiles), and electronic (jamming). The only one of these three threats the A-10 has dealt with since 1991 has been the anti-aircraft aspect. While Iraq did indeed have one of the largest integrated air defense networks at one time, the A-10 did not, in general, have to deal with that. Other assets have been, rightly, tasked with shattering the IADS and any airborne threats. This results in the A-10's having mostly had to deal with generally uncoordinated individual unit level defenses, sometimes well equipped, and other times piecemeal.

The A-10 was originally designed to survive in the contested airspace over the forward edge of the battlespace during a Cold War modeled engagement. It was expected to face high levels of anti-aircraft fire from guns and missile. ZPU, ZSU, and MANPADs being supplied and used by front line, well equipped, symmetrical fighting forces. It was expected to face significant electronic warfare activities, including comm and radar jamming and deception. It could be argued that since 1991 the A-10 has faced a few days of such activity, others would argue it has never faced the level of opposition it was envisioned to encounter in a battle in Europe.

The F-35 will be more survivable than the A-10 in many ways. While it certainly will not be mechanically more robust, in an integrated and strongly contested or denied-access environment it will have advantages over the A-10. In a strongly contested or even denied-access combat environment the F-35 will carry out missions, including CAS, that the A-10 could have no hope of completing.

T!
 
I wouldn't have described the areas the A10 operated in as contested as there wasn't any danger of fighters intercepting them. Also the majority of the AA weapon systems would have been under local control as the majority of the long range radars that close to the front line would have been knocked out.

If enemy fighters had been a threat you would have seen a marked reduction in the A10 activity or a marked increase in the losses
However, like any ground attack aircraft, it requires air superiority to conduct it's missions un-molested.

This has been the case since the Hs123, Ju87, SBD, IL-2, A-36, A-1 and so on...

Even the F-35, operating in a ground attack mode, will be at risk from a hostile bounce if it doesn't have top-cover. This is a basic rule of aerial warfare - if you're down low, your 6 is waving a big red flag at the bad guys above.

In the opening weeks of Desert Storm, the A-10 did operate in a heavy AA environment that did containan enemy aircraft, both fixed and rotory. None the less, the A-10 was operating in areas secured by with fighter assets and once the threat of enemy aircraft was eliminated (the Iraqi airforce ceased to exist within 72 hours), the A-10 gradually started to operate without direct cover.

It should be pointed out, though, that between 2 February and 27 February 1991, 6 A-10s were downed by Iraqi SAM hits. So while the Iraqi airforce didn't really have much of an impact (an Iraqi MiG-25 downed a F-18 on 17 January), the 23mm and SAM defenses remained a very real and dangerous threat.
 
However, like any ground attack aircraft, it requires air superiority to conduct it's missions un-molested.

This has been the case since the Hs123, Ju87, SBD, IL-2, A-36, A-1 and so on...

Different horses for different courses. Warfare is not one aircraft doing a job extremely well, but rather a team working towards the goal. Aircraft doing CAS have to be protected from enemy fighters that might prey on them. Air superiority may not absolutely be required, but at least some measure of control of the airspace and an ability to warn the CAS aircraft of potential defensive fighters has to exist. The A-10 has been lucky enough to have never been used operationally in an environment where fighters might interfere with its tasking. Sure, in Desert Storm and in Iraqi Freedom there were a few days when enemy air were active, but by and large they never came close to most CAS aircraft. Even at its worst the airspace in Iraq was much more secure than was the planned operational environment in a European fight.

Certainly, in symmetrical warfare the A-10 would have to operate with the threat of enemy air present much of the time. Fighters would have to try and keep the enemy off the strikers, but the situation would be much more fluid.

Even the F-35, operating in a ground attack mode, will be at risk from a hostile bounce if it doesn't have top-cover. This is a basic rule of aerial warfare - if you're down low, your 6 is waving a big red flag at the bad guys above.

And this is where the lines blur a bit. The F-35 will be providing both cover and doing CAS, although typically differently configured aircraft, of course. Still, even in CAS configuration the F-35 retains some ability to defend itself from airborne threats, something many past CAS specific aircraft did not have.

Of course, this is not really new. F-18's (and other platforms) have been doing this for some time. The strike package can consist of similar / like aircraft configured for both CAS and also for FastCAP, FORCAP, CAP/Strike, and Strike/CAP.

In the opening weeks of Desert Storm, the A-10 did operate in a heavy AA environment that did containan enemy aircraft, both fixed and rotory. None the less, the A-10 was operating in areas secured by with fighter assets and once the threat of enemy aircraft was eliminated (the Iraqi airforce ceased to exist within 72 hours), the A-10 gradually started to operate without direct cover.

It should be pointed out, though, that between 2 February and 27 February 1991, 6 A-10s were downed by Iraqi SAM hits. So while the Iraqi airforce didn't really have much of an impact (an Iraqi MiG-25 downed a F-18 on 17 January), the 23mm and SAM defenses remained a very real and dangerous threat.

As I said in my other post, the Iraqi air defense network was one of the densest in the World at the time. In the first 24 hours of the fight the C2 aspect of that network went down the drain. and all of those defending resources became stand alone nodes, still deadly but much less affective.

6 ... 4 .... whatever the count was (If I remember right 2 of the 6 aircraft made it back to KKMC, although they were then written off). All 6 of those were hit by IR guided SAMs. Several other A-10s not in that count of 6 shoot downs were also hit and damaged by IR SAMs. This caused a rethink of some important aspects of combat, and a rather detailed report that showed that the vast majority of US losses since the end of Vietnam were either to Mk 1 Mod 0 eyeball guided weapons or to IR weapons. Caused quite a stir for a while, and also caused some scrutiny of how defensive systems were tested.

T!
 
Different horses for different courses. Warfare is not one aircraft doing a job extremely well, but rather a team working towards the goal. Aircraft doing CAS have to be protected from enemy fighters that might prey on them. Air superiority may not absolutely be required, but at least some measure of control of the airspace and an ability to warn the CAS aircraft of potential defensive fighters has to exist. The A-10 has been lucky enough to have never been used operationally in an environment where fighters might interfere with its tasking. Sure, in Desert Storm and in Iraqi Freedom there were a few days when enemy air were active, but by and large they never came close to most CAS aircraft. Even at its worst the airspace in Iraq was much more secure than was the planned operational environment in a European fight.
Like I said, if you don't own the sky, you're ass is in a sling...

All the aircraft I mentioned excelled in ground attack but if the big blue above was not secured, they were dead meat.

The same goes for ANY aircraft that is down low...I don't care if it's a Fokker DR.1 or an F-35. An enemy that has altitude, has the advantage.

Even the P-47s scouring the French countryside were at risk by a bounce from Fw190A-8s...no matter how badass you are, climbing up to engage puts you at a disadvantage.

The A-10 was obviously designed to operate in an east-west (cold war) style environment and is heavily armored and possesses a full ECM suite, but will still rely heavily on top-cover for survival. ANY dedicated ground attack aircraft will need this, as I had mentioned - doesn't matter if it's WWI or WWIII.

As far as losses for Desert Storm:
February 2 – A-10A (SN 80-0248) Ground fire: Igla-1 (SA-16) SAM - Cpt. R. Storr captured.
February 5 - A-10A (SN 78-0722) AAA ground fire: SA-13 SAM - Lt. R. Sweet captured.
February 15 – A-10A (SN 79-0130) Hit by ground fire: SA-13 SAM - Cpt. S. Phyllis KIA.
February 19 – OA-10A (SN 76-0543) Downed by Strela-1 (SA-9) SAM - Lt Col. J. Fox POW.
February 22 – A-10A (SN 79-0181) Struck by SAM - Cpt Biley returned to KKMC FOL1. Airframe stricken.
February 27 – OA-10A (Serial Number : 77-0197) Struck by SAM - Lt. P. Olson returned to KKMC FOL. Crashed on landing, killing pilot.

Aside from the A-10s listed, there were 18 other U.S. aircraft downed by Surface to Air defenses in the same span of time (17 January to 27 February) not including other coalition losses. Had the Iraqi airforce followed Soviet training/doctrine and utilized it's Soviet and French air assets as trained, the U.S./coalition losses could have been much greater.
 
I've read in a couple of places that two A-10s were lost on the 15th, any data there?
 

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