some F35 info

[Token]

I've read in a couple of places that two A-10s were lost on the 15th, any data there?

There has been some erroneous reporting on the Internet (say it ain't so...).

GrauGeist's list shows 78-0722 being shot down on Feb 5, and 79-0130 being shot down on Feb 15. This is repeated in many sources, both online and in print. However these two aircraft were shot down the same day, Feb 15.

There is also confusion online as to which aircraft was associated with which pilot. My recollection was that 79-0130, and not 78-0722, was piloted by Lt. Sweet. His aircraft was hit by the SAM and he ejected. Cpt Phillis was in 78-0722 and defending Lt Sweet on the ground when -0722 was hit by a SAM and Cpt Phillis killed.

T!

 

[Lucky13]

Did any A-10's return on one engine?

 

[Token]

Like I said, if you don't own the sky, you're ass is in a sling...

Yeah, we are saying the same thing, just using different descriptors.

The A-10 was obviously designed to operate in an east-west (cold war) style environment and is heavily armored and possesses a full ECM suite, but will still rely heavily on top-cover for survival.

Of interest specifically to the A-10 losses. All of the A-10 losses you list were either confirmed or believed to be IR SAMs. You mention the aircraft having a full ECM suite. It had a fair RF countermeasures suite, but it had NO automated IRCM and no IR MWS (Missile Warning System). It's total defense with regard to IR SAMs relied on automated, timed, flare dispenses during a run (meaning it just kicked out flares at certain intervals during a run, regardless of threat presence) or the pilot had to detect the launch (either visually or be warned by someone else who saw it visually) and manually initiate defenses.

It was not until after the start of Iraqi Freedom that an emergency program was initiated to outfit the A-10 with an IRMWS. The program took 200 days to go from concept to testing, and the results were an AN/AAR-47 based solution that was available in kit form to retrofit all A-10's in the inventory.

Aside from the A-10s listed, there were 18 other U.S. aircraft downed by Surface to Air defenses in the same span of time (17 January to 27 February) not including other coalition losses. Had the Iraqi airforce followed Soviet training/doctrine and utilized it's Soviet and French air assets as trained, the U.S./coalition losses could have been much greater.

Early strikes on the C2 nodes insured that even if the Iraqi's had wanted to follow doctrine it was not going to succeed. This doctrine was something that the US was ready to face, and the less than perfectly executed Iraqi implementation of it simplified the task.

T!

 

[Token]

Did any A-10's return on one engine?

Going to do something I don't like to do here, rely on hear-say without documentation to back it up.

I don't have any hard facts on if any did or did not return on one engine. However I have talked with folks who were there about a few instances when this did happen.

One of the Battle Creek A-10's, ( internet search would suggest 80-0258 ), was hit by a MANPAD and the starboard engine badly damaged. I understand the engine was still turning but making very little power after the hit.

81-0967 supposedly took similar damage in Kosovo, but I have heard no details. I have seen the pictures.

I was told that an unidentified A-10 completely lost the port nacelle to a SAM hit, but I have never found pictures or data to back it up.

T!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I work with several former A-10 drivers and many of them have spoken about losing an engine either due to ground fire or mechanical failure while deployed in Iraq/ Afghanistan. From what I understand the aircraft flies well on one engine.

 

[Lucky13]

Much obliged gentlemen!

 

[gjs238]

Of interest specifically to the A-10 losses. All of the A-10 losses you list were either confirmed or believed to be IR SAMs. You mention the aircraft having a full ECM suite. It had a fair RF countermeasures suite, but it had NO automated IRCM and no IR MWS (Missile Warning System). It's total defense with regard to IR SAMs relied on automated, timed, flare dispenses during a run (meaning it just kicked out flares at certain intervals during a run, regardless of threat presence) or the pilot had to detect the launch (either visually or be warned by someone else who saw it visually) and manually initiate defenses.

It was not until after the start of Iraqi Freedom that an emergency program was initiated to outfit the A-10 with an IRMWS. The program took 200 days to go from concept to testing, and the results were an AN/AAR-47 based solution that was available in kit form to retrofit all A-10's in the inventory.T!

So, after supplying the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War with Stingers, the US wasn't prepared for this type of weapon to be used against the A-10?!
Ug.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

So, after supplying the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War with Stingers, the US wasn't prepared for this type of weapon to be used against the A-10?!
Ug.

Hindsight is 20-20. How could one predict an ally in 1988 would turn agaiinst us in 2001?

 

[gjs238]

Hindsight is 20-20. How could one predict an ally in 1988 would turn agaiinst us in 2001?

It looks like issues were already occurring and anticipated:
In 1988, the last Stingers were supplied after increasing reports of fighters selling them to Iran.
In 1990, Operation MIAS (Missing in Action Stingers) was launched.
In 1993, the CIA approached Congress noting that they required an additional $55 million to buy back the weapons, noting that a failure to secure the missiles could result in attacks against American civil aircraft.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_MIAS

 

[FLYBOYJ]

It looks like issues were already occurring and anticipated:
In 1988, the last Stingers were supplied after increasing reports of fighters selling them to Iran.
In 1990, Operation MIAS (Missing in Action Stingers) was launched.
In 1993, the CIA approached Congress noting that they required an additional $55 million to buy back the weapons, noting that a failure to secure the missiles could result in attacks against American civil aircraft.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_MIAS

All overshadowed with the fact that the US had a faction fighting against and killing Soviets which at the time took priority in foreign policy.

 

[Token]

I work with several former A-10 drivers and many of them have spoken about losing an engine either due to ground fire or mechanical failure while deployed in Iraq/ Afghanistan. From what I understand the aircraft flies well on one engine.

I have heard the same thing from former and current A-10 folks, however I was trying to quote specifics.

T!

 

[Token]

So, after supplying the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War with Stingers, the US wasn't prepared for this type of weapon to be used against the A-10?!

When the A-10 was proposed, when the project was funded and procurement started, and until well after the flight of the YA-10 prototypes, the Russian MANPADS threat was the SA-7 and the vehicle mounted IR threat was the SA-9. The turbofans of the A-10 would have been very difficult to track with the SA-7 or 9, the engagement range would have been very short, a small fraction of the weapons maximum range of ~3.7 - 4.2 km, and it would only have been able to engage from behind the aircraft.

In short, the threat to the A-10 from the SA-7 was very, very, small. The planned technique of timed flare releases in high threat areas was more than adequate. There was no need include a system to detect and defeat a virtual non-threat.

In 1974 the Russians came out with a new system, the SA-14 (the SA-9 replacement, the SA-13, came out in 1976). They now had a much higher probability of tracking the engines of the A-10 in all aspects, not just tail shots. However, it was still relatively easily defeated by tactics as planned for the SA-7.

It was not until 1981, well after the A-10 had been in production and only a couple years before the last A-10 was produced, that the Russians introduced the SA-16. And the SA-18 in 1983.

Basically the threat matured after the aircraft was designed and already in production.

Hindsight is 20-20. How could one predict an ally in 1988 would turn agaiinst us in 2001?

There is no indication that a US supplied Stinger (as part of Operation Cyclone) has ever been used against US forces. There have been a few suspected Stinger shots and in general no one can say for sure where those weapons came from (see an exception at the bottom of my post here). But the vast majority of the MANPADS shots on US forces have been non-US missiles. Looking at the videos that are released I can't ever recall seeing a Stinger in use. "Stinger" has kind of become the catch-all media phrase for a MANPADS, however the videos I see with yells of "Allahu akbar" in the background all seem to show non-Stinger types, regardless of what the talking heads and banner captions may say.

Some, I would say many, sources state that the Stingers supplied as part of Operation Cyclone were old stock, how old has never been confirmed. The missiles themselves have a limited shelf life, but they don't all turn into pumpkins on their check dates. By 2001 they were all probably well past that shelf life but most were probably still usable. More importantly, the BCU's, Battery Coolant Units, have a much shorter life, and they would have been well beyond that life. Indications are that the BCU also has a higher failure rate and is much more likely to actually fail within a relatively short time after that shelf life is reached.

All of that means that while a very few old Stingers, vs other types of MANPADS, may have been fired on US or Coalition forces, it is very, very, unlikely that any were from units supplied by the US to fight the Russians.

On a more sobering note, and unrelated to Stingers provided to fight the Russians in the 80's, other Stingers have, indeed, been fired at US forces.

On July 25, 2012, a US CH-47 was fired on and struck by a MANPADS. The debris revealed that it was a Stinger. A serial number indicated it was of recent manufacture, and may have been supplied by the US to the Qataris in 2011.

How the Taliban got their hands on modern US missiles | New York Post

This image is indeed of Stingers, and at least one source claims these are ISIS combatants:
http://www.dailystormer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/stinger1.jpg



T!

 

[gjs238]

RE: A-10
So if the A-10 had been deployed in a "Red Storm Rising" scenario (pre 1991), I wonder how it would have fared in an environment with SA-16's and SA-18's operated by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

RE: Stingers
Sobering indeed.
Maybe if we had sold, no, given, F-22's to the Qataris they wouldn't have committed such a dasterdarly act

 

[parsifal]

I gotta say that im doubtful that stingers are the last word in man portable SAMs. Whilst not man portable, some of the later Russian SAMs have very high kill probabilities....up to about 90% for some of the newer versions of the SA300 and SA400 systems, are claimed to be superior to Patriot or even American Standard systems. Very arguable, but not impossible that they (the Russians) are not making idle boasts.

Against newer up to date and fully integrated defence networks, an aircraft like the A-10 has to be considered as having low survivability. Where the defence network can be downgraded by pre-emptive strikes, usually by tomahawk strikes or some form of pre-emptive strikes, and the air umbrella is not left out on limb to fend for itself, aircraft like the A-10 have some level of survivability. but they can no longer be considered first line in terms of survivability

 

[Torch]

http://theaviationist.com/2015/09/07/first-international-f-35-makes-first-flight/

 

[Token]

I gotta say that im doubtful that stingers are the last word in man portable SAMs. Whilst not man portable, some of the later Russian SAMs have very high kill probabilities....up to about 90% for some of the newer versions of the SA300 and SA400 systems, are claimed to be superior to Patriot or even American Standard systems. Very arguable, but not impossible that they (the Russians) are not making idle boasts.

Stinger is a family of US missiles, the family has been improved over time. The original Stinger might be old hat by now, but there is no reason to think the current generation is not extremely capable. Performance is, of course, not well advertised, but I would be willing to bet the latest Stinger RMP Block 1 upgrades can compete with any MANPADS operationally deployed in the World.

There is a lot of hype out there on the S300 and S400 systems, how much is real and how much is fantasy is of course hard to tell….and a person who knows the real answer can't post about it here There is no doubt that these systems are World class. There is little or no doubt that these, and the Chinese versions of them, are potentially the biggest threat to enemy aviation forces in the arsenal of anyone so equipped. But they are a different world from MANPADS, different application, and threats to different platforms. For example, one would seldom think of the S400 as a threat to helicopters. Although I am sure it is perfectly capable of hitting one, the system should never really have line-of-site to one in a combat situation. By the same token, a MANPADS is no threat to a B-52.

Against newer up to date and fully integrated defence networks, an aircraft like the A-10 has to be considered as having low survivability. Where the defence network can be downgraded by pre-emptive strikes, usually by tomahawk strikes or some form of pre-emptive strikes, and the air umbrella is not left out on limb to fend for itself, aircraft like the A-10 have some level of survivability. but they can no longer be considered first line in terms of survivability

The A-10 has had a fair RF self protection suite for some time. The ALQ-213 it uses is also in use on the F-16's and the C-130J's. But then the A-10 was never, nor is it today, intended to work in the environment you describe.

The A-10 was meant to work on the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) and more specifically to engage targets around the Forward Line of Enemy Troops (FLET). What it would have faced, in addition to visually aimed guns (both small arms and ZPU / SPAAG) and IR missiles, would have been ZSU-23-4, SA-8, and possibly SA-6. These are highly mobile systems that would keep up with, or slightly behind, the FLET. As time went on the Russian built systems improved, and the more current threats would probably be along the lines of 2S6, Pantsir S-1, upgraded SA-8, SA-15, and possibly SA-11/17.

While undoubtedly integration is still part of the equation, in this situation we are not talking about a tightly controlled IADS. This is potentially a much more fluid, dynamic, environment. The A-10 would be low, fast (although typically one does not think of the A-10 as fast), and hard to hit. Unless you are fighting on a billiard table there would be direct and indirect masking and the engagement windows for RF systems would be very short.

Don't take the following as a slam on the F-35, I do think it will end up being a good weapons system.

Of course, it can be argued that this kind of thing is what the F-35 is built for….more or less. Its stealth advantage should increase its survivability in this RF intensive battle space, but what happens to stealth when you start hanging external stores on the aircraft, as would be done in a CAS role? For all we know the aircraft slick might have the RCS of a bumble bee, but with pylons and 12000+ lbs of external stores how reduced will the signature be?

How much more survivable over the FLET will the F-35 be than the A-10? I bet not much, if at all. However, in every other environment it faces I bet it will be much more survivable, and the battle the A-10 was designed to fight is less likely all the time.

T!

 

[GrauGeist]

It seems to me that one of the items overlooked is that the A-10 would be operating as part of a component system. The A-10 has had the luxury of operating virtually stand-alone in recent deployments, but in the environment it was designed for, there would be layered assets working in conjunction with the A-10 (AH rotaries, fighters, AWACs, etc).

At the time the A-10 was on the drawing board, the Army was working up the M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley and M3 Sergeant York along this same concept (M3 cancelled, components restructured to covered it's absence). Layered above were the AH-64 Longbow and OH-58D Kiowa, etc.

Recent conflicts have changed the way the components are deployed, but by and large, the hardware we have today was designed and intended for a bigass showdown with the Soviet Union, not chasing Toyota trucks across a desert crewed by people wearing Adidas gym clothes.

 

[parsifal]

I will probably get laughed out of this place, but what the hell. I recall about 25 years ago observing several simulation exercises at the LWC (Land Warfare Centre) involving some US military brass, and another nationality, which included some battle problems near Fulda gap and a couple of other likely points of advance in a fictional WP invasion of NW Europe. We were just observing, and I couldn't tell you all of the assumptions that were plugged into the simulations. but I do recall that the force structures were based on historical, or likely deployments using what we referred to as reforger strategies. A big part of the V Corps response to Soviet advances in the gap was a reliance on several wings of A-10s as well as Cobra gunships to try and peg back the marked soviet advantages in armour. These were responses bases on historically accurate planning at the time.

The A-10s were devastating against the Soviet spearheads but once their defences were established around these spearheads, the A-10 wings always copped it in the neck eventually. im not a tech guy, just a grunt whose observed tactical planning here and there. a-10s were always an asset but you had to be careful with them.

I might say that years later I got really nerdy and got involved in the commercially developed sim (a map exercise, not a computer based sim......still a game but more accurate than the playstation versions kicking around these days). Cant draw too much from this, but the commercial sim always produces the same or similar outcomes to the military map exercises.

The players have changed, the threats have changed since then. I daresay the technology has changed. My opinion, based on not a lot, is that aircraft like the A-10 are approaching obsolescence in many situations, but the question for me is once the F-35 is in service, will the balance be restored back to manned assets?

Over Iraq and Syria, the current conflict, this is all superfluous. The IS rabble don't have any capability we need to worry about, and in that environment assets like the A-10 make perfect sense. but what if we have to fight a competent enemy?

 

[Token]

I recall about 25 years ago observing several simulation exercises at the LWC (Land Warfare Centre) involving some US military brass, and another nationality, which included some battle problems near Fulda gap and a couple of other likely points of advance in a fictional WP invasion of NW Europe. We were just observing, and I couldn't tell you all of the assumptions that were plugged into the simulations. but I do recall that the force structures were based on historical, or likely deployments using what we referred to as reforger strategies. A big part of the V Corps response to Soviet advances in the gap was a reliance on several wings of A-10s as well as Cobra gunships to try and peg back the marked soviet advantages in armour. These were responses bases on historically accurate planning at the time.

Reforger was an exercise that many civilians had no real concept about. They heard the term, they knew vaguely that it had to do with the Russians, and they saw on the news that about once a year it was practiced. Of course, the basics of it were well known in the open source and anyone with an interest could find out almost anything they wanted.

But in general it was not realized by the public that in the event of Reforger activation the forces already in Europe were a speed bump, there to slow Warsaw Pact forces until Reforger could marry the troops from the US with their prepositioned assets in Europe. And to do this a large portion of the civilian commercial aviation fleet would have to be commandeered by agreement under the CRAF.

Even though Reforger is no longer an anticipated need the CRAF still exists, and over 500 commercial aircraft can be called into service as needed.

T!

 

[Lucky13]

Like the A-10, how well would the F-35 fly on.....no, wait....silly me, it's only got one engine!