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while presenting it as breaking news!And still quote the 2008 Rand report!
So, has the group reached a consensus?
Is the F-35 a winner or a loser?
Just imagine the amount of bacon, one can buy for one bird!
Just saying....
Got to love some of the quotes in that article. For example:
The single-mission A-10 is perfectly suited for the CAS mission in non-contested airspace, for instance in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia..."Can [the F-35] do close air support? Sure," Aboulafia said. "But there's nothing like an A-10 in a world where nothing shoots back."
I thought the whole point of the A-10 was to be survivable when people are shooting back. Now it's being lauded as a great platform in uncontested airspace?
Things that make you go "Hmmm?"
So I'm not sure where Richard Aboulafia is going with his statement...
... the A-10 is vulnerable to hits because its speed is limited. It's a function of thrust, it's not a function of anything else. We had a lot of A-10s take a lot of ground fire hits. Quite frankly, we pulled the A-10s back from going up around the Republican Guard and kept them on Iraq's [less formidable] front-line units. That's line if you have a force that allows you to do that. In this case, we had F-16s to go after the Republican Guard.
In the first Gulf War, the A-10 flew well over 8,000 sorties for the loss of 7 aircraft in an environment that could be considered actively contested airspace - 4 aircraft were downed by SAMs and 3 were written off after returning to base damaged beyond repair. This doesn't include the dozens of A-10 aircraft that suffered damage to a degree that would have downed any other aircraft(except for, perhaps, a P-47), and returned safely to be repaired and put back into service.
So I'm not sure where Richard Aboulafia is going with his statement...
I thought the whole point of the A-10 was to be survivable when people are shooting back. Now it's being lauded as a great platform in uncontested airspace?
However, like any ground attack aircraft, it requires air superiority to conduct it's missions un-molested.I wouldn't have described the areas the A10 operated in as contested as there wasn't any danger of fighters intercepting them. Also the majority of the AA weapon systems would have been under local control as the majority of the long range radars that close to the front line would have been knocked out.
If enemy fighters had been a threat you would have seen a marked reduction in the A10 activity or a marked increase in the losses
However, like any ground attack aircraft, it requires air superiority to conduct it's missions un-molested.
This has been the case since the Hs123, Ju87, SBD, IL-2, A-36, A-1 and so on...
Even the F-35, operating in a ground attack mode, will be at risk from a hostile bounce if it doesn't have top-cover. This is a basic rule of aerial warfare - if you're down low, your 6 is waving a big red flag at the bad guys above.
In the opening weeks of Desert Storm, the A-10 did operate in a heavy AA environment that did containan enemy aircraft, both fixed and rotory. None the less, the A-10 was operating in areas secured by with fighter assets and once the threat of enemy aircraft was eliminated (the Iraqi airforce ceased to exist within 72 hours), the A-10 gradually started to operate without direct cover.
It should be pointed out, though, that between 2 February and 27 February 1991, 6 A-10s were downed by Iraqi SAM hits. So while the Iraqi airforce didn't really have much of an impact (an Iraqi MiG-25 downed a F-18 on 17 January), the 23mm and SAM defenses remained a very real and dangerous threat.
Like I said, if you don't own the sky, you're ass is in a sling...Different horses for different courses. Warfare is not one aircraft doing a job extremely well, but rather a team working towards the goal. Aircraft doing CAS have to be protected from enemy fighters that might prey on them. Air superiority may not absolutely be required, but at least some measure of control of the airspace and an ability to warn the CAS aircraft of potential defensive fighters has to exist. The A-10 has been lucky enough to have never been used operationally in an environment where fighters might interfere with its tasking. Sure, in Desert Storm and in Iraqi Freedom there were a few days when enemy air were active, but by and large they never came close to most CAS aircraft. Even at its worst the airspace in Iraq was much more secure than was the planned operational environment in a European fight.