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I've read in a couple of places that two A-10s were lost on the 15th, any data there?
Like I said, if you don't own the sky, you're ass is in a sling...
The A-10 was obviously designed to operate in an east-west (cold war) style environment and is heavily armored and possesses a full ECM suite, but will still rely heavily on top-cover for survival.
Aside from the A-10s listed, there were 18 other U.S. aircraft downed by Surface to Air defenses in the same span of time (17 January to 27 February) not including other coalition losses. Had the Iraqi airforce followed Soviet training/doctrine and utilized it's Soviet and French air assets as trained, the U.S./coalition losses could have been much greater.
Did any A-10's return on one engine?
Of interest specifically to the A-10 losses. All of the A-10 losses you list were either confirmed or believed to be IR SAMs. You mention the aircraft having a full ECM suite. It had a fair RF countermeasures suite, but it had NO automated IRCM and no IR MWS (Missile Warning System). It's total defense with regard to IR SAMs relied on automated, timed, flare dispenses during a run (meaning it just kicked out flares at certain intervals during a run, regardless of threat presence) or the pilot had to detect the launch (either visually or be warned by someone else who saw it visually) and manually initiate defenses.
It was not until after the start of Iraqi Freedom that an emergency program was initiated to outfit the A-10 with an IRMWS. The program took 200 days to go from concept to testing, and the results were an AN/AAR-47 based solution that was available in kit form to retrofit all A-10's in the inventory.T!
So, after supplying the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War with Stingers, the US wasn't prepared for this type of weapon to be used against the A-10?!
Ug.
Hindsight is 20-20. How could one predict an ally in 1988 would turn agaiinst us in 2001?
It looks like issues were already occurring and anticipated:
In 1988, the last Stingers were supplied after increasing reports of fighters selling them to Iran.
In 1990, Operation MIAS (Missing in Action Stingers) was launched.
In 1993, the CIA approached Congress noting that they required an additional $55 million to buy back the weapons, noting that a failure to secure the missiles could result in attacks against American civil aircraft.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIM-92_Stinger#Soviet_War_in_Afghanistan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_MIAS
I work with several former A-10 drivers and many of them have spoken about losing an engine either due to ground fire or mechanical failure while deployed in Iraq/ Afghanistan. From what I understand the aircraft flies well on one engine.
So, after supplying the Mujahideen in the Soviet–Afghan War with Stingers, the US wasn't prepared for this type of weapon to be used against the A-10?!
Hindsight is 20-20. How could one predict an ally in 1988 would turn agaiinst us in 2001?
I gotta say that im doubtful that stingers are the last word in man portable SAMs. Whilst not man portable, some of the later Russian SAMs have very high kill probabilities....up to about 90% for some of the newer versions of the SA300 and SA400 systems, are claimed to be superior to Patriot or even American Standard systems. Very arguable, but not impossible that they (the Russians) are not making idle boasts.
Against newer up to date and fully integrated defence networks, an aircraft like the A-10 has to be considered as having low survivability. Where the defence network can be downgraded by pre-emptive strikes, usually by tomahawk strikes or some form of pre-emptive strikes, and the air umbrella is not left out on limb to fend for itself, aircraft like the A-10 have some level of survivability. but they can no longer be considered first line in terms of survivability
I recall about 25 years ago observing several simulation exercises at the LWC (Land Warfare Centre) involving some US military brass, and another nationality, which included some battle problems near Fulda gap and a couple of other likely points of advance in a fictional WP invasion of NW Europe. We were just observing, and I couldn't tell you all of the assumptions that were plugged into the simulations. but I do recall that the force structures were based on historical, or likely deployments using what we referred to as reforger strategies. A big part of the V Corps response to Soviet advances in the gap was a reliance on several wings of A-10s as well as Cobra gunships to try and peg back the marked soviet advantages in armour. These were responses bases on historically accurate planning at the time.