Some WWII Statistics from the U.S.A.

[GregP]

I posted some number a few days ago that I have discovered are a bit off in one area. I said we had 13,321 pilots who scored 15,865.852 aerial victories in WWII. But what we REALLY had was 13,321 records of victory awards, many to the same pilot. The total number of different pilots who scored a victory or at least a shared victory is 7,342. So, we have 7,342 pilots amassing 15,865.85 aerial victories. That's about 2.1 victories per pilot who scored a victory.


I was curious about the number of pilots we trained, so I checked the Statistical Digest of WWII. This is USAAF only, and does not include Navy or Marines. For Jul 39 through Aug 45, we graduated 102,907 single-engine pilots in the U.S.A. and we accepted 100,554 fighters from 1940 through Aug 45, so we have a ratio of just over 1 pilot per fighter during WWII. Some of these pilots stayed in the U.S.A and trained other pilots. I do not know the numbers.


So, just over 7.1% of the pilots who graduated as single-engine pilots scored all the U.S. aerial victories in WWII. Of course, when you subtract the pilots who stayed in the U.S.A. to train others (unknown number at this time), we are likely down to something like 4 or 5% of our pilots who scored all the aerial victories.


At any one time, the numbers of crews overseas in any single month between Jun 43 and Aug 45 amounted to the following:

1. P-38: 820 to 1,966. Averaged about 1,500 for 44/45. About 600 for most of 44 in ETO; about 250 and dropping in 45 in ETO. About 320 in 44 and 400 in 45 for MTO. These theaters had more than the rest of the theaters … until VE Day, anyway.

2. P-39: Unknown

3. P-40: Unknown.

4. P-47: 379 to 4,885. Averaged about 4,000 for most of 44/45. About 2,500 in 44/45 in ETO. About 450 / 500 in 44 and 450 and dropping in 45 for MTO.

5. P-51: 216 to 4,005. Averaged about 2,500 for 44 and about 3,800 for most of 45. About 1,500 in 44 and 1,800 in 45 for ETO. Started out at about 150 up to about 500 in 44 and about 550 and dropping in 45 for MTO.

6. F-4/F-5: 141 to 838.

7. F-6: 73 to 562.



Nothing startling in these data, and no conclusions, just passing along the statistics and hoping to get people interested in looking at the Statistical Digest of WWII. Find it attached as a pdf.

 

[Vincenzo]

So, just over 7.1% of the pilots who graduated as single-engine pilots scored all the U.S. aerial victories in WWII. Of course, when you subtract the pilots who stayed in the U.S.A. to train others (unknown number at this time), we are likely down to something like 4 or 5% of our pilots who scored all the aerial victories.

Actually, after you subtract the pilot who stayed in the USA, we are likely up to something, at example, 8 or 9%

 

[GregP]

You are correct.

Somebody read the thread ...

 

[Stig1207]

we have 7,342 pilots amassing 15,865.85 aerial victories. That's about 2.1 victories per pilot who scored a victory.

Oddly, because the StatsDigest gives the number of enemy aircraft destroyed in the air by fighters as 14.682 ( you have to add the numbers for each theatre manually; tables 167-172).

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

USAF STATISTICS for the USAF Statistical Digests. For things like Korean operations. Like all these compilations figuring out what the definitions are is key. The 8th Air Force reports it launched 341,744 heavy bomber sorties, which became 329,664 sorties after removing airborne spares and abandoned operations, resulting in 300,679 credit sorties and 276,365 effective sorties, of these bombing raids were 330,866 sorties, 318,793 sorties after removing airborne spares and abandoned operations 293,919 credit sorties, 266,872 effective sorties. Heavy bombers were also used in carpet bagger, trucking, night leaflet, RCM, "special", ASR, Scouting, Aphrodite/Batty and Weather reconnaissance. The statistical digest has 332,904 heavy bomber sorties airborne, 274,921 effective.

CARL, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library.
Fedden Mission Part_1
British Bombing Survey Unit World War II Operational Documents
US War Production Board report World War II Operational Documents
Advanced search CONTENTdm

 

[GregP]

USAF STATISTICS for the USAF Statistical Digests. For things like Korean operations. Like all these compilations figuring out what the definitions are is key. The 8th Air Force reports it launched 341,744 heavy bomber sorties, which became 329,664 sorties after removing airborne spares and abandoned operations, resulting in 300,679 credit sorties and 276,365 effective sorties, of these bombing raids were 330,866 sorties, 318,793 sorties after removing airborne spares and abandoned operations 293,919 credit sorties, 266,872 effective sorties. Heavy bombers were also used in carpet bagger, trucking, night leaflet, RCM, "special", ASR, Scouting, Aphrodite/Batty and Weather reconnaissance. The statistical digest has 332,904 heavy bomber sorties airborne, 274,921 effective.

CARL, Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library.
Fedden Mission Part_1
British Bombing Survey Unit World War II Operational Documents
US War Production Board report World War II Operational Documents
Advanced search CONTENTdm

They are merely breaking out sorties that didn't see the target and had to return to base or abort due to weather or mechanical or navigational errors in solid IFR weather. Spares were just launching more planes that the raid was scheduled for in order to have the correct numbers when aborts happened.

There is no mystery here. Effective sorties are sorties sent to a specific target that actually made it to that target and bombed it. If there was 100% cloud cover (very likely in Europe), then they hit an alternate (still effective) or returned to base and dropped bombs before landing in the channel (non-effective sorties). These things happen in each and every air force.

 

[GTX]

Some more - this time showing the ramp up in forces:

Year	Army	Navy	Marines	Coast Guard	Total
1939	189,839	125,202	19,432		334,473
1940	269,023	160,997	28,345		458,365
1941	1,462,315	284,427	54,359		1,801,101
1942	3,075,608	640,570	142,613	56,716*	3,915,507
1943	6,994,472	1,741,750	308,523	151,167	9,195,912
1944	7,994,750	2,981,365	475,604	171,749	11,623,468
1945	8,267,958	3,380,817	474,680	85,783	12,209,238

*Coast Guard listed only as wartime strength

These and other related facts can be found here:

Research Starters: US Military by the Numbers | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

See a breakdown of numbers in the US military, by branch and year, in World War II.

www.nationalww2museum.org

 

[jmcalli2]

I posted some number a few days ago that I have discovered are a bit off in one area. I said we had 13,321 pilots who scored 15,865.852 aerial victories in WWII. But what we REALLY had was 13,321 records of victory awards, many to the same pilot. The total number of different pilots who scored a victory or at least a shared victory is 7,342. So, we have 7,342 pilots amassing 15,865.85 aerial victories. That's about 2.1 victories per pilot who scored a victory.


I was curious about the number of pilots we trained, so I checked the Statistical Digest of WWII. This is USAAF only, and does not include Navy or Marines. For Jul 39 through Aug 45, we graduated 102,907 single-engine pilots in the U.S.A. and we accepted 100,554 fighters from 1940 through Aug 45, so we have a ratio of just over 1 pilot per fighter during WWII. Some of these pilots stayed in the U.S.A and trained other pilots. I do not know the numbers.


So, just over 7.1% of the pilots who graduated as single-engine pilots scored all the U.S. aerial victories in WWII. Of course, when you subtract the pilots who stayed in the U.S.A. to train others (unknown number at this time), we are likely down to something like 4 or 5% of our pilots who scored all the aerial victories.


At any one time, the numbers of crews overseas in any single month between Jun 43 and Aug 45 amounted to the following:

1. P-38: 820 to 1,966. Averaged about 1,500 for 44/45. About 600 for most of 44 in ETO; about 250 and dropping in 45 in ETO. About 320 in 44 and 400 in 45 for MTO. These theaters had more than the rest of the theaters … until VE Day, anyway.

2. P-39: Unknown

3. P-40: Unknown.

4. P-47: 379 to 4,885. Averaged about 4,000 for most of 44/45. About 2,500 in 44/45 in ETO. About 450 / 500 in 44 and 450 and dropping in 45 for MTO.

5. P-51: 216 to 4,005. Averaged about 2,500 for 44 and about 3,800 for most of 45. About 1,500 in 44 and 1,800 in 45 for ETO. Started out at about 150 up to about 500 in 44 and about 550 and dropping in 45 for MTO.

6. F-4/F-5: 141 to 838.

7. F-6: 73 to 562.



Nothing startling in these data, and no conclusions, just passing along the statistics and hoping to get people interested in looking at the Statistical Digest of WWII. Find it attached as a pdf.

Does your number "...102,907 single-engine pilots..." include P-38, P-61, and P-70 pilots?

 

[GregP]

I reported what the tables said for single-engine types. The types you mentioned are twin-engine types. They would be covered in Two-Engine pilots, likely in Table 47. There are tables for students and eliminees, too, who failed pilot training. I'd suppose if you took students and subtracted eliminees, you'd come up with Table 47.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

They are merely breaking out sorties that didn't see the target and had to return to base or abort due to weather or mechanical or navigational errors in solid IFR weather. Spares were just launching more planes that the raid was scheduled for in order to have the correct numbers when aborts happened.

The key for me is
The 8th Air Force reports 341,744 heavy bomber sorties, 266,872 effective sorties.
The statistical digest has 332,904 heavy bomber sorties, 274,921 effective.
So different definitions or sources.

 

[Dimlee]

So, just over 7.1% of the pilots who graduated as single-engine pilots scored all the U.S. aerial victories in WWII.

Years ago when I worked for large corporations, in the discussions about the qualities of the teams, I estimated that 7% was the share of people who could actively support new projects and big changes in a company, who were interested in something "risky" ,beyond the daily routine. It was not "scientific" , just based on personal experience and on some studies.
Not a magic number and a pure coincidence, of course. Yet I still keep that number in mind when I look for people for something extraordinary in our business.

 

[BiffF15]

Years ago when I worked for large corporations, in the discussions about the qualities of the teams, I estimated that 7% was the share of people who could actively support new projects and big changes in a company, who were interested in something "risky" ,beyond the daily routine. It was not "scientific" , just based on personal experience and on some studies.
Not a magic number and a pure coincidence, of course. Yet I still keep that number in mind when I look for people for something extraordinary in our business.

Dimlee,

Interesting view. I have a friend whose father is a businessman, and worth a considerable amount of money. A point that he made, that stays with me to this day, is new people make the biggest changes. He would talk to them after about 6 months to get their opinion on what needed to change. They had been there long enough to see and understand the operation, but not long enough to have absorbed themselves in the "this is the way we do it" corporate culture.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[GregP]

The key for me is
The 8th Air Force reports 341,744 heavy bomber sorties, 266,872 effective sorties.
The statistical digest has 332,904 heavy bomber sorties, 274,921 effective.
So different definitions or sources.

The Statistical Digest of WWII is the entire USAAF, not just the 8th AF in the ETO, and I'd believe the Statistical Digest of World War Two before 8th AF only reports. The people who made up the Digest for WWII took into account the definitions of the individual AF reports, and used their own definitions. I'd have to get the two reports side-by-side and compare definitions to make any kind of reasonable argument, so I have none to offer at this time, but there is a definite difference between reported numbers.

8th is reporting 78% effective sorties while AAF ETO numbers are reporting 82.6% effective sorties. Both seem high in light of European weather and WWII-level bomb-aiming technology, nevermind the fact that 8th reports more sorties and all of the ETO in the other report!

But, let's remember that an effective sorties means you bombed the target specified in the mission order, even if it was an alternate target instead of primary. Nothing is said or hinted about the numbers or percent of hits on the aiming point in the bombing raid. It would count as an effective sortie if they bombed the local horse park instead of the ball bearing factory if both were located within the same city area, but bombing the horse park doesn't help the war effort. All it does is piss off the local populace and injure horses and riders.

 

[GregP]

Years ago when I worked for large corporations, in the discussions about the qualities of the teams, I estimated that 7% was the share of people who could actively support new projects and big changes in a company, who were interested in something "risky" ,beyond the daily routine. It was not "scientific" , just based on personal experience and on some studies.
Not a magic number and a pure coincidence, of course. Yet I still keep that number in mind when I look for people for something extraordinary in our business.

Actual studies show people in general remember 10% of what they hear, 20% of what they read, and 80% of what they see.

I recall another saying from the corporate world, which says, "The road to wisdom is long and difficult, Grasshopper, which is why I've asked you bring sandwiches and change of clothing." ... which summarizes that you can lead them to water, but you cannot make them drink. Or, just because you want the people to embrace your new philosophy, it doesn't mean they will. Some will have to be taken, kicking and screaming, to the front door and forcibly hurled out in order to effect the desired change.

There are information sharers and information hiders. The sharers make change easy. The hiders learn something and refuse to change or share it because they are insecure and fear for their jobs. It makes them virtually unpromotable because they won't share what they are doing with anyone, even though they are generally good individual contributors. They refuse to change or play effectively on a team.

 

[Milosh]

The Statistical Digest of WWII is the entire USAAF, not just the 8th AF in the ETO

Doesn't the SD list by 'Total' and by 'Theater'?

 

[GregP]

Yes, it does. It also breaks everything out. I have found maybe 20 errors in addition in the Digest myself, and some of the totals don't cross-check. It's easy to find with Microsoft Excel, but difficult to correct because I / we don't have any of the records they used to compile the Digest.

Nobody much cares about 1 - 2 different, but missing 10,000 sorties makes a difference, with no real way to pursue the correct numbers.

At least, I am not aware of any way to pursue it, and I don't have records that I can enter and tally, nor would I make the effort to correct an error of 1-2 aircraft or sorties. But 10,000 would be worth pursuing, if I had the records.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

At least, I am not aware of any way to pursue it, and I don't have records that I can enter and tally, nor would I make the effort to correct an error of 1-2 aircraft or sorties. But 10,000 would be worth pursuing, if I had the records.

There are published works like Mighty Eighth War Diary by Roger Freeman, the heavy bomber raids spreadsheets by Richard Davis, and all the various bomb etc., group web sites that have lots of details, but they are not so active these days. After that comes the files at the US Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, for things like the daily, weekly, monthly etc. reports. Next is probably the British archives, as the US sent plenty of reports to the British (and vice versa), and the indexes there are more useful than the next choice, the US archives.

An example comparison, Statistical Summary of 9th Air Force Operations 16 Oct 1943 to 8 May 1945, medium and light bombers for 1944, 78,540 airborne, 54,218 effective sorties, 90,270.5 tons of bombs dropped, 318 aircraft missing, 221 written off, 42 kills claimed in the air. The Statistical Digest reports 79,461 airborne, 54,922 effective sorties, 93,623 tons of bombs dropped, 497 aircraft missing, 50 kills claimed in the air.

Richard Davis, 8th Air Force dropped 686,933.3 tons of bombs, 8th Air Force Statistical Summary 687,150.7 tons Statistical Digest 714,279 tons. The Statistical Digest only has HE and Incendiary bombs, no column for fragmentation.

 

[GregP]

OK.

And ... do you believe a modern researcher with perhaps unofficial documentation or the official government reports that come from primary sources? And why do you believe the way you choose, whichever way that is?

 

[33k in the air]

Yes, it does. It also breaks everything out. I have found maybe 20 errors in addition in the Digest myself, and some of the totals don't cross-check. It's easy to find with Microsoft Excel, but difficult to correct because I / we don't have any of the records they used to compile the Digest.

That should be expected, really, given the possibilities of record-keeping errors, typographical errors, mathematical mistakes, etc. The true numbers will never be known; the best one can do is cite the numbers as they exist as being close to the real, unknowable values.

 

[NTGray]

I posted some number a few days ago that I have discovered are a bit off in one area. I said we had 13,321 pilots who scored 15,865.852 aerial victories in WWII. But what we REALLY had was 13,321 records of victory awards, many to the same pilot. The total number of different pilots who scored a victory or at least a shared victory is 7,342. So, we have 7,342 pilots amassing 15,865.85 aerial victories. That's about 2.1 victories per pilot who scored a victory.

I was curious about the number of pilots we trained, so I checked the Statistical Digest of WWII. This is USAAF only, and does not include Navy or Marines. For Jul 39 through Aug 45, we graduated 102,907 single-engine pilots in the U.S.A. and we accepted 100,554 fighters from 1940 through Aug 45, so we have a ratio of just over 1 pilot per fighter during WWII. Some of these pilots stayed in the U.S.A and trained other pilots. I do not know the numbers.

So, just over 7.1% of the pilots who graduated as single-engine pilots scored all the U.S. aerial victories in WWII. Of course, when you subtract the pilots who stayed in the U.S.A. to train others (unknown number at this time), we are likely down to something like 4 or 5% of our pilots who scored all the aerial victories.

This comes close to answering a question I posted elsewhere, although it doesn't quite hit the nail on the head. You've got a number for how many pilots made it through training, but is there any way to find out how many fighter pilots took off on at least one actual combat mission? I would assume that this number is a bit smaller than the total number who completed training. Then, of all those who actually got at least one chance, how many never scored a victory?
After that we could ask which unlucky soul flew the most combat missions without ever scoring a victory, and then work down to how many pilots were shot down on their first mission and never got another chance.