South American Air Forces

The FAB has its headquarters in La Paz and comprises about 4500 personnel. The Bolivian Air Force is divided into four Brigadas Aéreas. They are located at El Alto, near the capital city La Paz, Cochabamba, Tarija and Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In addition to these bases the air force uses a number of small airfields located throughout the country. Most of these, such as Ribaralta, Robore, Trinidad and Cobija, house small Grupo Aéreos, which are equipped with a few light transport and liaison aircraft.

Bolivia's landscape and infrastructure make transportation of goods and people one of the major tasks of the Bolivian Air Force. Therefore, nearly half of its inventory consists of (light) transport and liaison aircraft. The hub of transportation activities is concentrated on El Alto, where Grupo Aéreo de Transporte 71 is located. The greater part of GAT-71 is formed by the semi-military airline Transporte Aéreo Militar. TAM provides regular air services throughout the country and is a cheap alternative to Bolivia's national carriers Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano and Aero Sur. GAT-71 consist of three squadrons; Escuadrón Aéreo 710, Escuadrón Aéreo 711, Escuadrón Aéreo 712, respectively operating the Lockheed C-130, Fokker F.27 and Convair CV-580T.

At the moment a total of 18 T-33s are divided among two different units; Grupo Aéreo de Caza 31 at El Alto and Grupo Aéreo de Caza 32 at Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In May 2001 the FAB announced that an additional 8 T-33s had been bought from the Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana. The Ecuadorian T-33s have been in open storage at Manta Air Base since 1996. The first T-33s were expected to be ferried to Bolivia in June 2001. It is still not certain if a third unit, GAC-33 based at Tarija, will be equipped with the T-Bird again, once all updated T-33s and the additional aircraft arrived in the country.

The major part of the flight and military training syllabus for aspirant pilots is conducted at the Colegio Militar de Aviación (COLMILAV) based at Base Aérea El Trompillo in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The primary flying course is flown on the Aerotec A.122 Uirapuru, locally designated T-23. Nineteen of these aircraft were bought in Brazil and the first one arrived in Bolivia in 1974. The primary course comprises a total of 120 hours. After this the cadet continues with the basic course, comprising a total of 130 hours divided among the Beech T-34 Mentor (80 hours) and the Cessna Ce.152 Aerobat (50 hours). The Aerobats are part of Grupo Aéreo de Entrenamiento 22 located at Robore. The cadets that finished the basic course successfully will be appointed to the different operational units to receive type conversion. Those who are selected to fly the T-Bird will move to Cochabamba to be trained on the Pilatus PC-7, that belongs to Grupo Aéreo de Caza 34.

The Fuerza de Tarea or Task Force, better known as the Diablos Rojos or Red Devils, is the FAB unit that is the most actively involved in the anti-narcotics policy of the Bolivian and American governments. The unit is paid for and under command by the Americans. Initally the unit operated 16 Bell UH-1 Huey helicopters which were officially owned by the U.S. Department of State. Nowadays the FAB have purchased 15 Hueys and these are completed with 6 US examples. All helo's wear Bolivian markings and are flown and maintained by FAB personnel. The five fixed winged aircraft are all confiscated during anti-narcotics operations and belong to the FAB. The unit works closely together with local police forces and DEA agents and is based in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Most of its operational missions are flown from an airstrip near Villa Tunari on the edge of the Chapare region, the centre of Bolivias coca production.

The Chaco War (1932–1935) was fought between Bolivia and Paraguay over control of the northern part of the Gran Chaco region (the Chaco Boreal) of South America, which was incorrectly thought to be rich in oil. It is also known as La Guerra de la Sed or "War of Thirst". It was the bloodiest military conflict fought in South America during the 20th century. Though the region was sparsely populated, control of the Paraguay River running through it would have given one of the two landlocked countries access to the Atlantic Ocean. This was especially important to Bolivia, which had lost its Pacific Ocean coast to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1883).

In international arbitration, Bolivia argued that the region had been part of the original Spanish colonial province of Moxos and Chiquitos to which Bolivia was heir. Meanwhile, Paraguay had begun to colonize the region. Indeed, both Paraguayan and Argentinian planters already bred cattle and exploited quebracho woods in the area, while the small indigenous population of Guaraní-speaking tribes was related to that country's own Guaraní heritage. Furthermore, the discovery of oil in the Andean foothills sparked speculation that the Chaco itself might be a rich source of petroleum. Foreign oil companies were involved in the exploration: companies mainly descended from Standard Oil backed Bolivia, while Shell Oil supported Paraguay. Standard was already producing oil from wells in the high hills of eastern Bolivia, around Villa Montes. Paraguay had lost almost half of its territory to Brazil and Argentina in the War of the Triple Alliance and was not prepared to see what it was perceived as its last chance for a viable economy fall victim to Bolivia.

Border skirmishes throughout the late 1920s culminated in an all-out war in 1932, after the Bolivian army, following orders of President Daniel Salamanca, attacked a Paraguayan garrison at Lake Pitiantuta in June. They later occupied another garrison further south, called Fortín Boquerón. This stronghold would later become the scene of one of the bloodiest and protracted battles of this war, when some 600 Bolivian soldiers resisted a 22-day siege, against 14,000 Paraguayan troops before surrendering (7-29 September 1932). Paraguay had a population only a third as large as that of Bolivia (880,000 versus 2,150,000), but its guerrilla style of fighting, compared to Bolivia's more conventional strategy, enabled Paraguay to take the upper hand. In June 1932, the Paraguayan army totaled about 4,026 men (355 combat officers, 146 surgeons and noncombatant officers, 200 cadets, 690 NCOs, and 2,653 soldiers). Both racially and culturally, the Paraguayan army was practically homogeneous. Almost all of the soldiers were Spanish-Guarani mestizos. In Bolivia, however, most of the soldiers were Altiplano Indigenous Indians (90% of the infantry troops), the lower-ranking officers were of Spanish ancestry, and General Hans Kundt was German. In spite of the fact that the Bolivian army had many more soldiers, the Bolivian army never mobilized more than 60,000 men, and never more than two-thirds of the army were on the Chaco at one time, while Paraguay mobilized its entire army. City buses were confiscated, wedding rings were donated to buy rifles, by 1935 Paraguay had widened conscription to include 17 year-olds and policemen.

Paraguay received military supplies and intelligence from Argentina, and the Paraguayans took advantage of their ability to communicate over the radio in Guaraní, which was not intelligible to the typical Bolivian soldier. Paraguay had little trouble in mobilizing its troops in large barges on the Paraguay river right to the frontlines, whilst the majority of Bolivian soldiers came from the western highlands, some eight hundred kilometers away and with little or no logistic support. In fact, it took a typical Bolivian soldier about 14 days to traverse the distance, while a Paraguayan soldier only took about four. The heavy equipment of Bolivia's army made things worse. The supply of water, given the dry climate of the region, also played a key role during the conflict. There were thousands of non-combat casualties due to dehydration, mostly among Bolivian troops.

A key battle of the Chaco war took place at Fortín Nanawa, about 60 miles (97 km) Southeast of Boquerón. This stronghold was considered by the Paraguayans to be the backbone of their defenses. Former Imperial Russia's officers Ivan Belaieff and Nicolas Ern (who were anti-communist Russians under the service of the Paraguayan army as the Head of the General Staff and frontline commander respectively) had focused greatly on the fortification of this fortín. It had zig-zag trenches, miles of barbed wire, and many machine-gun nests (some in the trees). On January 20, 1933, Kundt, in personal command of the Bolivian force, launched six to nine aircraft and 6,000 unhorsed cavalry, supported by twelve Vickers guns. The cavalry unit's horses had previously died because of dehydration. Under Kundt, three frontal assaults failed. The Bolivians succeeded in capturing a few of the outer trenches, but heavy rains forced them to abandon the attack, which allowed Paraguayans to reoccupy the entire complex. By the end of January the Bolivians suffered 2,000 casualties without making much progress. The Paraguayans lost only 248 men. The defeat seriously damaged Kundt's prestige. This fortín was later nicknamed the "Verdun of South America." Partly due to costly frontal assaults of this nature, partly to the loss of the southern area of the Chaco by the end of 1933, Kundt was taken out of command and replaced by General Peñaranda. Moreover, Bolivia deployed at least three Vickers 6-Ton tanks during the war, in what was the first time case of cross-border armoured warfare inside the Americas. These machines proved to be ill-suited to the terrain and climate of Gran Chaco, when compared with the lightly-armed Paraguayan forces.

The Chaco War is also important historically as the first instance of large scale aerial warfare to take place in the Americas. Both sides made use of obsolete single-engined biplane bombers; despite an international arms embargo imposed by the League of Nations, Bolivia in particular went to great lengths in trying to import a small number of Curtiss T-32 Condor II twin-engined bombers masqueraded as civil transports, only to be halted in Peru during deliveries. At Ballivian, the last ever dogfight between bi-planes took place. The limited deployment of these "advanced" weapons caused enormous strains on both countries' impoverished economies, already stretched to the limit by war expenses.

The Paraguayan navy played a key role in carrying thousand of troops and supplies to the frontlines through the Paraguay River, as well as in providing antiaircraft support to transport ships and port facilities. 2 Italian gunboats, the Humaita and Paraguay ferried troops to Puerto Casado though they didn't join the fighting. On 22 December 1932, three Bolivian Vickers Vespa attacked the riverine outpost of Bahía Negra, killing a Paraguayan army colonel, but losing one of the aircraft, shot down by the gunboat Tacuary. The two surviving Vespas met another gunboat, the Humaitá, while flying downriver. Paraguayan sources claim that one of them was damaged. The Paraguayan navy air service was also very active in the conflict, harassing Bolivian troops deployed along the northern front with flying boats. The aircraft were moored at Bahía Negra Naval Air Base, and consisted of two Macchi M.18. These seaplanes carried out the first night air attack in South America when they raided the Bolivian outposts of Vitriones and San Juan, on 22 December 1934. Every year since then, the Paraguayan navy celebrates the 'day of the Naval Air Service' on the anniversary of the action.

While the military conflict ended with a comprehensive Paraguayan victory, from a wider point of view it was a disaster for both sides. Bolivia's European elite forcibly enlisted the large indigenous population into the army, though they felt little connection to the nation-state, while Paraguay was able to foment nationalist fervour among its predominantly mixed population. On both sides, but more so in the case of Bolivia, soldiers were ill-prepared for the dearth of water or the harsh conditions of terrain and climate they encountered. The effects of the altitude had maimed the Bolivian army: most of the indigenous soldiers lived on the cold Altiplano at altitudes of over 12,000 feet (3,700 m). They found themselves at a physical disadvantage when called upon to fight in sub-tropical temperatures at almost sea level. In fact, of the war's 100,000 casualties (about 57,000 of the total were Bolivian), more died from diseases such as malaria and other infections than from the actual fighting. At the same time, the war brought both countries to the brink of economic disaster. On November 27, 1934, Bolivian generals, frustrated by the progress of the war, arrested President Salamanca while he was visiting their headquarters in Villa Montes and replaced him with the vice-president, José Luis Tejada.

The Gran Chaco War, 1928-1935

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Brazilian military aviation began on 13 January 1913, when the Brazilian School of Aviation was founded. On 2 February 1914, the school began operations at Campo dos Afonsos near Rio de Janeiro with three Farman biplanes and five Blériot monoplanes that it had purchased from Italy. Organized under the Minister of War, the school was to train aviators for the Army and Navy. The Brazilian Navy, apparently not happy with this attempt at joint operations, established the Naval School of Aviation in August 1916. No longer a "joint service school," the Brazilian School of Aviation became the Military School of Aviation on 11 July 1919. For the next two decades, Brazilian military aviation would follow an Army/Navy dual track.2

Military aviation in Brazil remained a rather low-key operation for several years. No aviation units were formed, and the majority of aeronautical activities centered around the school at Campo dos Afonsos. On 13 January 1927, the Directorate of Military Aviation was formed. The director reported to the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, the Military School of Aviation came under his authority, and officers in the grades of lieutenant, captain, and major were transferred from other branches of the Army to the Aviation Directorate. It is interesting to note that this reorganization of Brazilian Army aviation came less than a year after the United States Air Corps Act of 1926 and contained several similarities; however, any direct correlation is only speculative. Organizationally, Brazilian Army aviation remained concentrated at the Campos dos Afonsos school. On 2l May 1931, the first operational unit was formed, drawing equipment and personnel from the aviation school. Designated the Mixed Aviation Group, its commander was Major Eduardo Gomes.

In early 1933, reorganization and expansion of military aviation was begun when the Mixed Aviation Group became the First Aviation Regiment. On 29 March 1933, three Military Aviation Zones were formed. The headquarters for the 1st Zone was located in Rio de Janeiro and consisted of the First Aviation Regiment at Rio, the Sixth at Recife, and the Seventh at Belém. The 2d Aviation Zone, with headquarters at São Paulo, contained the Second Aviation Regiment at São Paulo and the Fourth at Belo Horizonte. The 3rd Aviation Zone had its headquarters at Porto Alegre in the southern part of the country and included the Third Regiment at Porto Alegre and the Fifth at Curitiba. Through the 1930s, the Brazilian Army aviation units concentrated on training and expanding their capabilities. Like their U.S. Army counterparts, they also participated in the air mail service, but the results were decidedly different. In fact, carrying the mail became a principal function of Brazilian Army aviation, and the mission was accomplished safely, efficiently, and effectively.3

Brazil is a huge country, larger than the continental United States. At the beginning of the 1930s, transportation posed a real problem as Brazilians sought to tie together their large and diverse nation. Rail and ship transportation were available but inadequate: railways were few and not interconnected, and ships were slow and insufficient to the country's needs. Especially vexing was the problem of communications with the interior. Major Eduardo Gomes, the Mixed Aviation Group commander, approached the War Minister in 1931 with a possible solution: use the military aircraft to link the various parts of the country with an air mail system. The first flight occurred on 12 June 1931, when a Curtiss "Fledgling" piloted by Lieutenants Casimiro Montenegro Filho and Nelson Freire Lavenére-Wanderley carried two letters from Campos dos Afonsos to São Paulo. By July, thrice-weekly service between Rio and São Paulo was established and the Military Air Postal Service was in business. Shortly thereafter, the name of the system was changed to the Military Air Mail.

On 12 October 1911, an unsuccessful attempt was made to open service to Goiás in the interior when Lieutenant Montenegro crash-landed his Curtiss shortly after takeoff, due to bad weather. However, on 19 October, Lieutenant Lavenére-Wanderley launched the second attempt and successfully completed the mission on the twenty-first. Expansion of the aviation organization into the three air zones in the spring of 1933 provided the necessary infrastructure, and equipment began to be improved in 1934 with the arrival of several Waco EGC-7 aircraft in the inventory. Also, in 1934, the Brazilian Navy initiated an air mail route from Rio south to Florianópolis. Other routes were established by both the Army and Navy so that, by 1938, the services were delivering mail to more than seventy cities throughout the country. In January 1941, with the creation of the Air Ministry, the Army and Navy systems were combined into the National Air Mail––a system that exists to the present––utilizing military and civilian aircraft to provide mail and cargo service to every part of the country.

Brazilian Army aviators may have been proud of their achievements, but––like their U.S. counterparts––they believed aviation should be separate and independent from the surface components. A "campaign" for the creation of an air ministry and a separate air force began in the 1920s. On 11 November 1928, the Sunday edition of the Rio de Janeiro newspaper 0 Jornal published an article by Major Lysias that outlined the need for a new and separate Ministry of Aviation. Two weeks later, a follow-up article by Major Lysias expanded on the ideas presented. These articles launched what was to be a continuing, albeit low-level, campaign for component "independence." Never reaching the level of the furor in the United States, the advocacy for a separate Air Ministry continued until, on 20 January 1941, the Brazilian Air Ministry was created. Six years "senior" to the U.S. Air Force, the Brazilian Air Force incorporated not only Army aviation but Brazilian naval aviation as well. Indeed, the Decree-Law No. 2961 of 20 January 1941 specified that the Air Ministry would include the Military Air Army, the Fleet Air Arm, and the Department of Civil Aviation. Initially known as the National Air Forces, the Brazilian Air Force per se came into being on 22 May 1941.

No doubt internal "agitation" played a part in the creation of a separate and independent air arm, but external events (particularly U.S. moves linked to security concerns about hemispheric defense) certainly had an impact on the Brazilian government and military. By 1938, the United States, particularly within the Air Corps, had begun to look toward the defense of the nation in real and practical ways as the events in Europe became more ominous. In October of that year, the Air Corps Board produced a study titled "Air Corps Mission under the Monroe Doctrine."4 Primarily designed to show the importance of aviation in providing defense, the report nevertheless made it quite clear that hostile occupation and resultant operational capability from some Caribbean islands or the northeast area of Brazil would present a serious danger to the Panama Canal and the southern United States.

As early as January 1938, President Roosevelt, in making a request for additional money for the Army and Navy, included a warning that any potential enemy must be kept "many hundreds of miles from our continental limits."5 Subsequently, late in 1938, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pushed for a declaration of "hemispheric foreign policy" at the Inter-American Conference of Lima, Peru.6 In the United States during late 1938, the joint Planning Committee studied what the United States might do in case of a German or Italian attempt to secure bases in Latin America. In February 1939, General George C. Marshall, the Assistant Chief of Staff, directed the Army War College to examine in secret what force would be necessary to make Brazil (and Venezuela) safe against assumed German designs to take them over.7 Thus, by the spring of 1939, the United States not only was worried about possible hostile intentions but was taking the first steps in planning counter or preventive moves.

Meanwhile, in December 1938, the German Army had extended an invitation to the Brazilian Chief of Staff to visit Berlin. Given the U.S. concern over possible hostile moves in the area, this overture must surely have been "unwelcome" news in Washington. Apparently, there were those in Rio de Janeiro who felt the same way, for, in January 1939, in an effort to forestall the Berlin visit, Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha proposed that the U.S. Chief of Staff come to Brazil and then reciprocate with an invitation for the Brazilian Chief of Staff to visit the United States.

When General Marshall's appointment as the new Chief of Staff was announced at the end of April, it was decided that Marshall would make the trip.9 He and his party departed New York on 10 May 1939 aboard the USS Nashville and arrived in Rio on the twenty-fifth. Their itinerary for twelve days included visits, dinners, receptions, and discussions with the Brazilians. On 6 June, the Nashville departed for the United States with the Brazilian Chief of Staff General Góes Monteiro and his party aboard. General Góes Monteiro was given an extensive tour of the United States, which must have impressed him, for he never made the visit to Berlin. The process of bringing the Brazilians "into the fold" had begun. Beginning in 1940, the United States made military equipment and assistance available to the Brazilians. A United States Military Mission was established in Brazil, surplus coast defense material was sold to Brazil at bargain prices, and training aircraft, light tanks, scout cars, and various other types of vehicles were supplied.10 All of this generosity was designed not only to enhance Brazilian capability but also to draw the Brazilians into a confidential relationship and onto the "side" opposing the Axis powers. What the United States really needed was access to air bases in northeastern Brazil that would allow its forces to cover the South Atlantic shipping lanes and concurrently deny the area to the Germans or Italians.

Getting U.S. military personnel actually into Brazil and acquiring base rights were not easy matters. There was a large German and Italian population in Brazil, authority for stationing U.S. troops in Brazil did not exist unless "specifically requested" by the Brazilian government, 11 and Brazilian officials felt that their government would not survive if it did "invite" the Americans.12 In any event, stationing of significant U.S. combat forces did not become necessary, and the bases in the northeast were acquired by a bit of sleight of hand. Pan American Airways was operating throughout Latin America, and its subsidiary, Panair do Brasil, had been granted rights to construct and improve airfields in Brazil. A secret contract (W1097-eng-2321) between Pan American and the War Department provided funds for the facility construction. The War Department obtained the funds from the President's special fund and transferred them through the Export-Import Bank after certification of Pan American's vouchers by a representative of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. In return, all privileges enjoyed by Panair do Brasil were extended to U.S. military aircraft––extended by Pan American, that is. The rights granted by the Brazilian government to Panair do Brasil contained no provisions for military use of the airfields. However, in July 1941, General Robert Olds and Brigadier Eduardo Gomes (the former commander of the Mixed Aviation Group at Campo dos Afonsos and then commander of the Northeast Air Zone) negotiated an agreement whereby the Brazilian government permitted military use of the airfields, construction of military housing, and occupancy by USAAF technicians.13 As a result, airfields and facilities were improved or enhanced at Arnapá, Belém, São Luis, Fortaleza, Natal, Recife, Maceió, Salvador, and Caravelas.14 Thus, the United States acquired air base facilities from which it could provide air cover over the South Atlantic. More important, access to this strategic region was effectively denied to the Axis. Additionally, the string of airfields from the northern Amazon basin to just north of Rio de Janeiro provided a vital link in the eventual South Atlantic air-routes between the United States, North Africa, and southern Europe. On 23 May 1941, a political-military agreement between the United States and Brazil was signed, but it was broad and general in nature: no specific permission was granted for any particular installations. Practically all negotiations and agreements continued to be verbal between USAAF/USN personnel and Brigadier Eduardo Gomes, the Northeast Air Zone commanders.15 Finally, in June 1941, a formal agreement for U.S. bases in Brazil was signed by the two nations.

Stationing of large contingents of U.S. forces never occurred, but in 1941 and early 1942 there was serious consideration to implement the idea. On 13 June 1941, the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War forwarded to the President a report of the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Army and Navy Board recommending that immediate consent of the Brazilian government be obtained to move Army and Navy security forces to northeast Brazil. The Army contingent would consist of one "triangular division" and an air force of two bomb groups, one pursuit group, one transport group, one observation squadron, and two reconnaissance squadrons. This air force component would comprise some 10,000 personnel and 226 aircraft.17 On 7 January 1942, Air War Plans Division recommended to the Chief of the Air Staff that this force be sent––prepared, if not invited, to seize the installations "by force at once." The German Navy provided the impetus to preclude direct U.S. combat entry "by force" when it stepped up submarine activity in the South Atlantic and attacked several Brazilian ships. On 28 January 1942, Brazil broke diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan. By the second half of 1942, U.S. Navy PBY-5 Catalinas and PV-1 Hudsons were operating from Brazilian bases, and Brazilian Air Force crews were actively training to take over the mission. In April 1944, the U.S. Navy began to withdraw, and by the end of that year the Brazilians assumed the mission. Until the end of the war, the Brazilians carried out maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare operations, using B-25 bombers, PBYs, and Lockheed Hudsons and Venturas.

In the meantime, Brazil had declared war on the Axis. On 18 December 1943, its military established the First Fighter Group to accompany a Brazilian infantry division to Italy.20 Training initially on P-40s in Florida and Panama, the group moved in June 1944 to Suffolk Air Base, Long Island, New York, to transition into the P-47. On 10 September 1944, the First Fighter Group departed Newport, Virginia, on the French ship Colombie and traveled in convoy to Livorno, Italy, arriving 6 October 1944. Its first mission was flown eight days later. The Brazilian unit was assigned to the 350th Fighter Group, USAAF. Beginning combat operations on 31 October, the Brazilians flew initially with USAAF squadrons in order to gain combat experience. On 11 November, they began operating in formations that were exclusively Brazilian. Employed as fighter-bombers, the Brazilian P-47s provided close air support and flew interdiction missions. By the time the war ended in May 1945, the First Fighter Group had flown 2546 sorties and 5465 combat hours. The group destroyed 1304 motor vehicles of various types, 13 railway engines, 250 railcars, 8 armored cars, 25 rail and highway bridges, and 31 fuel and munitions depots, shooting down 2 aircraft and damaging 9 others en route.

The combat achievements of the Brazilians did not come without losses. Of the forty-eight pilots who flew with the First Fighter Group, there were twenty-two casualties. Five pilots were killed by antiaircraft fire, eight were shot down but bailed out successfully over enemy territory, three died in flying accidents not related directly to combat operations, and six were "grounded" due to "combat fatigue." Those killed were buried initially in the Brazilian cemetery at Pistoia, Italy. Subsequently, their remains were returned to Brazil and interned in a crypt in the Monument of the Dead of the Second World War, located in Rio de Janeiro. Two months after the war ended, the First Fighter Group returned to Brazil. Thus ended the Brazilian Air Force's combat operations. From its meager beginnings at Campo dos Afonsos in 1913, the Brazilian Air Force achieved independence from the Army (and Navy) and became an equal partner in its nation's defense organization. Born of the necessities of impending war in the early 1940s, the Brazilian Air Force "won its spurs" in World War II. It continues today as a well-organized, competent member of Brazil's armed forces.

Interesting reading....

Good stuff!

Very good work Gekho. the Bolivia Air Force has been historically lame, incompatibleif you realize the enourmous natural resources the country has.

Interesting stuff here. Thanks for sharing.
Just wondering, is there some country in the world that didn't operate C-47/DC-3?

The Fuerza Aérea Mexicana was founed during the revolutionary period, when different revolutionary factions used aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and bombings on ships as well as enemy positions. The majority of the pilots being American mercenaries. The first naval air combat on the American continent occurred in 1914 in Mexico. The Air Service, later known as the Mexican Air Force, established its first airfield at Balbuena, just outside Mexico City. Aviation workshops producing aircraft of national design as well as engines were also established. The Air Force participated in many campaigns through the 1920's and 1930's in support of the army in putting down many rebel factions and armed bands, flying a number of Mexican, American, French, English general purpose aircraft (DH DH-4B, Douglas O-2M, Farman F-50, Bristol F2B, Chance Vought Corsairs O2U-2M, TNCA Serie B etc.)

During WW II the FAM undertook anti-submarine patrols using armed AT-6 Texans and Vought Kingfishers. During the second half of the war the 201st Mexican Fighter Squadron of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force, fought in the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, flying Republic P-47D Thunderbolt fighterbombers, that would later serve in the post war air force as the sole pure fighter of the FAM. During the 1960s the FAM received its first jet aircraft in the form of the Lockheed T-33A and the DH Vampire Mk3, forming the first jet squadrons. The seventies saw the beginning of the phase out of the majority of the lend-lease aircraft that served the FAM.

In recent years the FAM has undergone a major reorganization to meet the needs in the war against drugs and in humanitarian roles. In the late nineties many Russian built helicopters were procured. A decision concerning the fate of the Northrop F-5E/F fighters and the surviving T-33s has yet to be taken. Recently six Hercules transport aircraft were bought and delivered from either the United Kingdom and Israel, boosting the FAM's heavylift capacities. Two additional Arava transports were also bought in 2002. On the helicopter front, four Bell 412EPs were delivered during the same year. A recent order for four ex-Israeli CH-53-2000 marks the switch from Russian to American equipment. With the arrival of three EMB145s the FAm now has a considerable airborne early warning capacity, demanded in its ongoing counternarcotics battle.

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The birth date of military aviation in Uruguay is 17 March 1913 when the Escuela de Aviación Militar was formed on a small airport 50 km from Montevideo. As with many other Latino countries the first instruction was performed by a European, a French instructor using Farman biplanes. Ten army officers formed the select group chosen to be the first Uruguayan military aviators. Among this first group were Juan Manuel Boiso Lanza (the first martyr of the FAU dying in a plane crash 10 August 1918) and Alférez Cesáreo L. Berisso (the future commander of the aviation school).

Along with two other young officers, Adhemar Saenz Lacueva and Esteban Cristi, they gained their military aviator status in Argentina and Chile and formed the Escuela Militar de Aviación (EMA) on 20 November 1916. This school exclusively performed military aviation in Uruguay until 1935. Several European aircraft types were used in fairly large numbers during the twenties, among which were about sixteen Avro 504K, up to thirteen Breguet XIV, at least five Castaibert 80, about 28 Nieuport 27, and various other aircraft in smaller quantities. These pioneering years saw many air routes opened and an overall increase in interest in flight and its military potential.

The first significant boost in capability occurred 21 December 1949 with the arrival of ten TBM-1C Avengers that were flown from Fort Worth to Laguna del Sauce by Aviación Naval personnel. Three SNJ-4 Texans and six more Avengers followed in April and May 1950. All aircraft were delivered through air, no mean feat for this fledgling air arm. This year also saw the first naval aviators trained in Uruguay graduate from the Escuela de Aviación Naval. Further aircraft that were taken on charge during the fifties include the PT-26, ten F6F Hellcats, two PA-18 and three Martin PBM Mariners. The first helicopter also arrived in this decade in the shape of two Bell 47G. This exciting period also had its bleak moments, for example on 20 June 1957 when a SNJ went missing during a search mission for an Argentinean ship and the PT-26 sent out to find it crashed also.

The sixties saw further development and the first of a long lasting string of international exercises called UNITAS was held in 1960 with participation of the Uruguayan Navy, the naval air arm participated with two Mariners. More aircraft arrived with three TC-45J, the first three S-2A Trackers, a single T-34B Mentor and two SH-34J (followed by two CH-34J later), and two TH-13T helicopters continuing the bonds with the United States. In 1971 the Uruguayan navy performed their first operation from an aircraft carrier when S-2A 851 flew from the Argentinean carrier 25 de Mayo. Neighboring Argentina also provided aircraft, for example some SNJ-4 Texans in the sixties and three TC-45H along with nine T-28S Fennec in 1979 were obtained from that source.

From the eighties onward the current inventory of the Aviación Naval was incorporated. With the Beech 200T arriving in 1980, the three T-34C followed in 1981, and three S-2G in 1982 and 1983. Also a Bell 222 was used temporarily in the early eighties. They traded their two remaining Texans for a single air force T-34B (originally from Chile) in 1985, a single Bell 47G-5 arrived in 1988. Three Ce182 joined the force in 1990, a single PA-34-200T and two Wessex were taken on charge in 1992, followed by a single Bell 47G in the same year. Two more T-34A were obtained, again from the Air Force (this time former Spanish aircraft). More Wessex were to be incorporated, a series 60 example arrived in 1994 followed by five Wessex HC2 in 1998 that were included in a comprehensive deal with Great Britain. Under this deal the Uruguayan navy was also provided with two Jetstream aircraft in 1999. The nineties also saw the delivery of the second PA-34 in 1995 and another lone Bell 47G arrived in the same year. Laguna del Sauce remained the main operating base throughout this period and is still very much the focal point of Naval Aviation today. The wish list of the Aviation Naval includes a new patrol aircraft, Orions have been offered but proved to costly to operate.

http://www.pilotoviejo.com/os2uhistoria.htm
http://www.pilotoviejo.com/hellcathistory.htm
http://www.pilotoviejo.com/images/avenger/avengerhistoria.htm
http://www.pilotoviejo.com/memoriasna1.htm

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