Spitfire Combat Radius (range) evolution, limitations?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The secret decoder ring reveals its secrets.
 
Hi
Alfred Price's 'The Spitfire Story' also has useful information and photographs, including reference drag reduction:


Many ideas were tried out some introduced others rejected for various reasons, indeed I think nearly every idea on this thread turns up in Spitfire development during WW2.
It should also be noted that during 1942 the 'Type S finish' for camouflage paint was introduced, this was a smooth, slightly reflective glossy finish that with a spot of polishing could give an increase in speed of up to 10 mph. However, service use can diminish effectiveness due to weathering, damage to the skin and hand painting large black and white stripes on wings and fuselage for operational purposes. Everything was a compromise.
Another image from Price's book, that might be of interest, is the filler point for for a 75 gallon rear tank on a late production Mk. IX (RR228) in February 1945:

The various different marks of of Spitfire and the 'improvements' added at various stages did keep the Spitfire very competitive with both enemy fighters and newer allied designs. The Mk. IX and the Mk. VIII were both in operational service before the P. 51B arrived for use by the USAAF in Europe. The Mk. XIV was in operational service before the arrival of the P. 51D, and were shooting down enemy aircraft prior to the arrival of those fine aircraft. Range was very useful but so was performance when it was needed, and it was probably not a good idea to wait for a longer range development when enemy high quality fighters were the other side of the channel.

Mike
 
Being 60 years old it is hardly surprising that there are errors in that list. For example, there were at least 11 high backed FR.XIV and not all flew with clipped wings.
 
What tactics were adopted? I assume hit & run because of the Spitfire's speed advantages (particularly in dives).

Yes, the 49th FG in Dawin, operating under very similar, arguably even worse conditions than the Spitfire unit, and with less capable fighters (P-40Es) successfully adopted hit and run tactics using flights of four aircraft at a time, which kept the Japanese CAP busy and minimized losses as they would use an escape maneuver and dive away once they became engaged. They did pretty well with this. I don't know what happened in terms of a debriefing between the 49th FG and 1st RAAF Fighter Wing but it seems like they didn't exchange enough information, and this was something that kept happening during the early war all over the Pacific.

Anyway from my understanding, Spitfires used similar tactics later in the war (i.e. hit and run) though they may have also been able to escape / disengage with a shallow high speed climb the way P-38s did it.

 
How do you apply the correction factor then? I know this might sound stupid, but I'm seriously interested in better calculating the performance figures of WWII aircraft.

Yeah, the P-40 could pick-up speed decently in dives, retained aileron control more effectively at high-speed, and might have been stressed for higher airspeeds
Anyway from my understanding, Spitfires used similar tactics later in the war (i.e. hit and run)
I'm surprised it took as long for them to conclude this. Part of it probably had to do with the commanding officers (they dictate ultimately what can/cannot be done), since that seems like a form/function matter. The spitfire can dive very fast compared to the A6M.
 
I suspect they did figure out to dive away pretty quickly, including at Darwin. The issue was more the 'Big Wing' tactic which Caldwell was used to, but it wasted some fuel and they were covering a fairly wide area, so it exacerbated the fuel capacity issue they had.
 
How do you apply the correction factor then? I know this might sound stupid, but I'm seriously interested in better calculating the performance figures of WWII aircraft
Let me take a stab at it. You will first need the following (let's use the Spitfire Mk V vs. Mk IX example):

1) hp to develop 380 mph
2) new horsepower (speed unknown)
3) Cube root formula: ​3​

1) First take cube root of each horsepower:

3​√1470=11.37
3​√1720=11.98

2) Divide greater number by smaller number to get speed increase quotient:

11.98/11.37= 1.0537

3) Multiply original speed by the above figure to get new speed:

380 mph × 1.0537= 400.406 mph

So with an increase of 250 horsepower speed will likely increase from 380 mph to roughly 400 mph if other factors stayed the same such as altitude, drag, propeller type, ect.
 
No, I get that. I was talking about the correction factor needed to correct for mach number. drgondog listed it as 1/1-(M^2). When I asked him if I calculated this correctly, he said no.

I was merely confused about that.
 
the result is the same but the logic want
1) divide 1720/1470=1.17..
2) cube root of 1.17=1.05..
3) same as above
 
Somewhere on the internet . . . there is a very good write-up on the Mosquito using +25 lb boost operationally. IIRC it was mainly used in the anti-V1 (ie 'diver') and cross channel intruder roles. Unfortunately I do not remember where it is.

I recall a very long and detailed discussion on this topic on the Ubisoft Il-2 forums from about 2006 or 2007. Even though those forums are no longer around (they finally went offline earlier this year), you might be able to find it via the Wayback Machine.
 
An article I read a few years back said the Spit IX, used a fighter bomber after the Normandy invasion, with two 500 lb bombs, had a combat radius of 90 miles.
I have read that as well, but I always thought it was limited to 1000 pounds total and could only carry a 250 pound bomb on the wings? I also read that it was not a good ground attack platform for the same reason, and that the empty shell casings from the 20's would hit the bombs so deflectors had to be made to keep from potentially blowing it up.

I was reading the Royal Aeronautical Society's article on the Spit and they said it was briefly looked into about a long range variant and it was simply not suitable. It would need a new heavier duty landing gear, and a redesign of the wing to make it a semi wet wing based on the D yet having buns.

I guess none of these were acceptable, and in fact that when loaded the range gained was not allot more? This seems to be one case where you desing a plane to be the best at climbing and turning you make so many trade offs that it's pretty much a specific use plane with little adaptability to other uses.
It's been a while snce I read that so I may have forgotten or gotten it wrong.
 
I also read that they would land behind the intended target, so often the would have to bomb from behind, which placed them in AAA flying over and then back.
 
Didn't the British do that 1000 plane raid to show Hitler that the RAF was not down to almost zero planes? It also was made up of pretty
Much anything that would fly that far and overall it was a nuisance bombing and moral builder not unlike Doolittle's raid on Tokyo.
 
Three thousand buildings destroyed and 9,000 damaged with 2,500 fires started of which 1,700 were classed as large. Most planes were Wellingtons but Lancasters Halifaxes Whitleys and Manchesters, many were from training units but they were all flying bombers. The number involved was certainly propaganda, and letting Adolf know he had just got himself involved in a war on many fronts, the LW had never been capable of such a raid.
 

The reasons, according to the following excerpt from The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everett (p.269):
 
The reasons, according to the following excerpt from The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everett (p.269):
It was also the first use of the "bomber stream" tactic, if you are going to start using such a tactic, it makes sense to use the biggest number possible and scale back, though I have never read that as a reason, more an opportunity taken.
 
Bomber Command did three 1,000 bomber raids in 1942. Apart from the reasons already mentioned the raids were proof of concept, whether that many aircraft could attack a single target in the one raid in a short space of time with acceptable risks of collisions and friendly fire. Cologne, the first 1,000 bomber raid by Charles Messenger is a 64 page book on the first raid.

Bomber Command had around 600 to 700 aircraft on strength in operational squadrons during May 1942, which gave 400 to 500 serviceable aircraft and with around the same number of available crews, it translated to 300 to 400 serviceable aircraft with a crew. In the final week of May, by reducing operations (helped by days of bad weather) and probably juggling leave the aircraft strength figure did not change much but serviceable aircraft and available crews climbed to 633 and 644 on 30 May. On 2 June things were largely back to the May averages.

On 30 May, the night of a full moon, the regular units sent 645 aircraft, the Bomber Command training units 436 and 15 Army Co-operation Blenheims operated under Bomber Command, the Admiralty vetoed Coastal Command participation. Bomber Command reports aircraft sent/attacking by target was 1047/940 Cologne, 17/12 airfields in Germany, 0/10 other targets in Germany, 25/22 airfields in the low countries, 0/6 other targets in the low countries, 9/8 airfields in France. 564.7 long tons of HE and 999.3 of incendiary dropped.

The Bomber Command Summaries have 3 more Whitley and 3 less Wellington sorties than the Bomber Command War Diaries. Apart from the 43 aircraft classed as missing 9 more were written off.

The German raid report, (ARP = Air Raid Precautions, factories over a given size had ARP personnel)
COLOGNE, A.399 - Police President, E. 624 – Cologne Office of Min. of Pub. Inf. & Propaganda, CD1262 - Factory ARP Area Niedersachean. 30/31 MAY. The attack was obviously in great strength and carried out in a series of waves. H.E. and incendiary bombs were dropped over a period of about 1.5 hours, the H.E.'s following about a quarter hour after the first incendiaries. Some of the aircraft flew in low over the City. From the beginning of the raid bombs were dropped evenly over the whole City, this being repeated at short intervals. There was evidently no specific target, the residential areas being mainly hit, with numerous public buildings, hospitals, churches etc.

Bombs dropped: 9 mines, 959 H.E., 112,000 incendiaries, of which 565 were Phosphorus bombs or drums.

In addition there were dropped in ARP Area Cologne-Aachen a further 388 H.E, 11 mines, 38,713 Incendiaries killing 20 (including 16 service personnel) and injuring 47. In the Administrative Area of the Cologne Office of the Ministry of Public information and Propaganda a total of 1,347 H.E., 20 mines, 150,713 incendiaries were dropped, killing 494, and injuring 5180.

Damage; Houses: 3,330 destroyed, 9,150 damaged, about 1,200 by fire, and the rest by H.E.'s 13,010 dwellings destroyed and 29,130 damaged are accounted for in these figures.

Official Buildings and Installations: Police H.Q. severely damaged, the ARP Section being totally destroyed. County Court slightly damaged. 50% of the Transformer plant in the Fiusstrasse destroyed.

Tramways and Railways: Tramways services in the City centre interrupted for a week. Numerous instances of damage to railway tracks, rolling stock, installations and stations. Regional Offices and also the Goods Station Gereon, including 100 loaded trucks, partially destroyed. Meulheim Station destroyed. Locomotive sheds and a store at the repair works, Nippes, destroyed. Post and Teelgr; 3 Post Offices destroyed and 3 damaged. Maintenance depot for Post Office also damaged.

Shops: 6 large Stores severely damaged.

Harbour Inst. The Rheinau Harbour suffered considerable damage by H.E.'s and incendiaries in buildings, stocks and stores. 1 ship sunk, 1 burnt out and 2 others damaged. In Deuts Harbour 1 wheat silo severely damaged by H.E. and Corn Mill Leyseiffer and Lietzmann suffered damage by fire.

Military: Army Reserve Stores burnt down

Industrial: 1,505 works destroyed and 1,055 damaged. 328 concerns with factory ARP organisation were damaged with the following results, 36 – 100% decrease in production, 70 – 50-80% decrease in production, 222 - less than 50% decrease in production. The foundry, laboratory and telephone exchange of Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deuts A.G. destroyed. Hospelt Paint Factory hit by 4 H.E.'s and a number of phosphorous drums. Majority of buildings destroyed. Total loss of all raw materials and finished products. PW camp within the works also hit by H.E. Textile firms of F.W. Burggelmann & Sons and Biegans totally destroyed with all stocks. The workshops, stores and all fittings and stocks of the Accumulatorfabrik A.G. completely destroyed. Also a number of textile firms manufacturing items of uniform suffered damage.

17 water mains, 32 electricity cables, 12 telephone cables, 5 gas mains destroyed.

Casualties: 474 dead, 5061 injured and 45132 homeless, of which latter 14825 only temporarily. Those who found lodging with friends or relatives are not included.

In the Ministry at Public Information and Propaganda report dated 2nd June, it is stated that in addition in other ARP Areas, mainly Duesseldorf, 50 H.E. and 1700 incendiary bombs were dropped. "The number of bombs, particularly incendiaries, is according to experiences in reality is far in excess of that given."

In a Factory ARP report dated 9th June the number of attacking aircraft is given as "some 60". It further reports casualties in other towns as: Dusseldorf: 16 dead, 44 injured, Essen: 1 dead, 2 injured, Beur-Mitte: 7 dead, 30 injured. The last casualties mentioned were caused by the crash of an aircraft shot down.
 

Users who are viewing this thread