Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German Oil Production

[syscom3]

'with Leuna a total of 6,552 bomber sorties were flown against the plant, 18,328 tons of bombs were dropped and an entire year was required.'

And?

Leuna was never completely destroyed. But the cumulative effects on it meant it never operated at full capacity. That in itself was just as effective. The German economy needed millions of tons of fuel and could only produce a fraction.

 

[Ratsel]

and nothing. the other guy wanted to know the number of sorties.. so I provide a number for one plant. thats all I could find.
6500 sorties 18,000 tons of bombs you'd figure 'Leuna' would be on the 'moon'.

 

[mhuxt]

Wouldn't mind seeing the operations table expressed in number of sorties - that would be a more telling statistic, I think.

Sorties against oil targets according to Davis. These exclude early returns I believe:

See my comments above re: August '44 and percentage effort, though according to HMSO BC was more heavily occupied in supporting the Armies in Normandy than 8 AF.

 

[mhuxt]

Davis' numbers for sorties (left) and bomb tonnage (right) for Synthetic Oil only.

Note that if you juggle the naming convention a wee bit (Merseburg / Leuna and Merseburg / IG Farben), the numbers tie up to Ratsel's 6,500 sorties and 18,000 tons of bombs.

 

[drgondog]

When Doolittle took over the 8th AF from Eaker in early 1944 he changed the role of the escort fighters - instead of close escort they were instructed to engage and destroy the Luftwaffe. To that end the routes taken by the bombers to target no longer contained diversionary tactics and they flew more directly to the target. The bombers became the bait, but they still had important missions to accomplish.

And the fighters were still assigned to 'close' escort. What changed was that fighters, when they spotted LW, engaged and pursued - rather than drive them off and return. The Fighter Groups however were not homogeneous in leadership. The 4th and 357th and 352nd were perhaps the 'most aggressive' with the 356th at the other end of the spectrum and the rest of the Groups falling in between. The 'Tweeners' like the 355th were parsimonious about sending forces to engage and pursue but favored leaving most of the escort force in proximity, or filling in behind the 4th for example, in a fight which drew most of their fighters away.

If the Luftwaffe didn't come to fight then the escorts were encouraged to go find them and destroy them on the ground, or otherwise destroy targets of opportunity.

True - but they left their escort duties only when relieved by another fighter group - then they went home at medium altitude until they spotted something worthwhile, like an airfield.

The initial results of the new tactics didn't change the number of losses of the 8th AF much, but it did have a greater effect on the losses of the Luftwaffe.

The losses were significant in the January-May timeframe but a far lower % of the force. The difference was that the LW still had opportunities to find un-escorted bombers and attack in force. This was the period when the long range escort force was starting from a low number of Mustang/Lightning groups to eight combined - or enough to put two groups to cover 300+ bombers each.

 

[wuzak]

The losses were significant in the January-May timeframe but a far lower % of the force. The difference was that the LW still had opportunities to find un-escorted bombers and attack in force. This was the period when the long range escort force was starting from a low number of Mustang/Lightning groups to eight combined - or enough to put two groups to cover 300+ bombers each.

Part of the effect on loss rates was the increased size of the raids in 1944.