Stretching German Gasoline Supply.

[Shortround6]

A really big problem with steam turbines as aircraft engines is that while the turbine it self may be small and light compared to a gasoline engine, once you add the boiler and condenser the weight and bulk go up considerably. The second problem is that the efficiency of a steam turbine plant will not match an equivalent internal combustion engine. Efficiency as in pounds of fuel per hp hour. Please do not quote efficiency's of stationary power plants weighing 10s of pounds per HP.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

GENTLEMEN - IF THIS THREAD CONTINUES TO GO "POLITICAL" I AM GOING TO CLOSE IT!

 

[wuzak]

Actually the steam turbines would have proved more efficient than the piston aero engines.

The 6000hp turbine had a target of 190g/hp/hr (0.42lb/hp/hr), which was as good as the best piston engine of the day - and considerably better than those at max power. It was also said to be able to have an overload capacity of 100% (ie, I presume, could go to 12,000hp) for extended periods (not continuous, but considerably longer than 5 minutes). The target weight was 0.7kg per hp ie an all up weight of 4200kg for 6000hp.

 

[wuzak]

Found some data on the Junkers steam turbine

The data on a drawing shown in Luftwaffe Secret Projects, Ground Attack Special Purpose Aircraft, by Dieter Herwig and Heinz Rodem is:

Power                2238kW         3000hp
Turbine Speed        8000rpm
Propellor speed       950rpm
Turbine Pressure      100atm        1470psi
Temperature           550°C         1022°F
Exhaust pressure      0.15atm        2.2psi
Weight                800kg         1764lb

And here is the data for the proposed system for the Me 264 (compared to the Jumo 213 and BMW 801).

Steam Turbine			Jumo 213	    BMW 801	
power	6000	hp		1725	hp              1600	hp
weight	4200	kg		940	kg              1065	kg
	9240	lbs		2068	lbs             2343	lbs
					
w/p	0.7	kg/hp		0.545	kg/hp         0.666	kg/hp
	1.54	lb/hp		1.199	lb/hp          1.464	lb/hp
p/w	1.429	hp/kg		1.835	hp/kg         1.502	hp/kg
	0.649	hp/lb		0.834	hp/lb          0.683	hp/lb

The Jumo 213 is calculated without radiators, etc.

The piston engines' max power is WEP - so restricted in length it can be used. 6000hp the steam turbine can do, to borrow a phrase from Shortround, until the fuel runs out.

 

[Shortround6]

Target goals and results actually achieved are not the same thing. The Napier Nomad had some rather impressive target goals for fuel consumption, actually achieving them proved a bit more difficult.

There is a real problem with trying to evaluate steam engines (both piston and turbine) in that the "power section" can often stand up to much more power than the "nominal" power rating. The catch being that the steam generator (boiler and burners/grates, etc) has to be able to generate the required amount of steam for the time in question. For closed loop systems like power plants, marine and aircraft systems (as opposed to 99% of the rail road locomotives), the condenser system also has to be able to handle the quantity of steam back to water needed. In an aircraft situation there is no large quantity of reserve feed water to tide things over for a while.

For a 6000hp nominal turbine to make 12,000hp for any amount of time, even 5 minutes, you need a boiler that can make 12,000hp worth of steam for 5 minutes and you need a condenser than can handle that volume of steam. If the condenser isn't big enough it is like welding a washer in the tailpipe of a car engine. Power is going to go way down.


Another problem is that Steam turbines do not throttle down real well and keep efficiency. Ships often had 2 sets of turbines and sometimes 3 sets. The high powered ones and low speed cruising turbines with sometimes a 3rd intermediate set. Granted using constant speed propellers in an aircraft can keep turbine speed up compared to ships with fixed pitch props.

 

[parsifal]

another possibility might have been methane gas derived from effluent. Its used today in light commercial vehicles like fork lifts and bobcat excavators. There are of course some disadvantages in a wartime environment, but it could perhaps have been used for non military purposes and training to conserve fossil fuels for the frontline activities. The technology of making fuel out of methane was known in the early 20th century. Sources of the fuel could have been landfill sites, biowastes, there were I believe also some naturally occurring sites in Europe itself. The resulatant fuel was cheap, easy to gather and placed little strain on the German war economy, because it used waste products and would require very little manpower to harness. Its big drawback was the need to pressurize the fule to get an efficient fuel. Riding around the battlefield with a pressurized bomb in the vehicle might not be a good idea, but for non-frontline duties it might have been useful

I just dont see the building of more Hydrogenation plants as a viable answer to German fuel problems. In the end they were a proven failure....expensive to build and maintain,, easily knocked and a honey pot for allied bombing efforts. Germany needed de-centralised cheap, manpower neutral sources of fuel, that were less vulnerable to air attack

 

[Shortround6]

Considering that the Germans were using "producer gas" to a considerable extent on the home front and in training establishments by the end of the war Methane isn't a bad idea. It is no magic bullet but then nothing the Germans could try would solve the problem alone.

See; Low-tech Magazine: Wood gas vehicles: firewood in the fuel tank

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

It is very interesting how Parsifal agrees with moderators about the thread returning on topic, immediately AFTER presentig ,in lengthy posts ,his opinions about anything irrelevant.

I find it interesting that after several moderators tell everyone to get back on topic and quit the bullshit, you ignore them and continue to throw fuel on the fire. What is your damn problem? Grow up...

Next person to ignore the warnings, will go to the beach with the thread.

This childish kindergarten behavior is very old and annoying.

 

[parsifal]

Considering that the Germans were using "producer gas" to a considerable extent on the home front and in training establishments by the end of the war Methane isn't a bad idea. It is no magic bullet but then nothing the Germans could try would solve the problem alone.

See; Low-tech Magazine: Wood gas vehicles: firewood in the fuel tank

So, we do have at least some common ground. not 100% but I think we are saying similar things.....Germany needed a cheap, easily produced, low cost easy to maintain fuel source. And that seems to be best derived from organic biowastes of some description. Do you agree? if so, why did Hitler initially reject these alternatives. Or is his 1936 an un-adopted edict. maybe the technology was beyond his understanding. i dont know. What is apparent is that germany pursued the high end of the industry.....the big hydrogenation plants, that were expensive, produced expensive product, and a honey magnet to being bombed. Why did Hitler support that option and not the lower cost organic fuels????

 

[Njaco]

So, we do have at least some common ground. not 100% but I think we are saying similar things.....Germany needed a cheap, easily produced, low cost easy to maintain fuel source. And that seems to be best derived from organic biowastes of some description. Do you agree? if so, why did Hitler initially reject these alternatives. Or is his 1936 an un-adopted edict. maybe the technology was beyond his understanding. i dont know. What is apparent is that germany pursued the high end of the industry.....the big hydrogenation plants, that were expensive, produced expensive product, and a honey magnet to being bombed. Why did Hitler support that option and not the lower cost organic fuels????

Hitler was a vegitarian. He could stand veggies going to waste.

 

[Shortround6]

While producer gas, methane and alcohol can all help with powering vehicles and stationary power plants on the home front and free up quantities of fuel they are pretty much useless for combat vehicles/aircraft or even tactical supply vehicles. Much like horses and horse fodder the alternative fuels are heavier and much bulkier per 1000/10,000 BTUs and need a higher percentage of transport capacity the longer the supply lines are. While not technically difficult to switch an existing engine from one fuel to another it does require a few parts and a mechanic. Not something done in a few minutes but a few hours.

 

[davebender]

3 September 1939. First RAF Bomber Command operation against Germany.
12 May 1944. First effective RAF Bomber Command attack on hydrogenation plants.

If hydrogenation plants were so easy to bomb then why did the RAF require 56 months to seriously impair production of German aviation gasoline?

 

[wuzak]

Perhaps because initially they couldn't hit anything and then the oil installations weren't a primary target objective for a while?

 

[mhuxt]

Perhaps because initially they couldn't hit anything and then the oil installations weren't a primary target objective for a while?

Reading through the official history, oil was identified almost from the start as a critical bottleneck, but as wuzak says, the early RAF raids couldn't hit it. By the time Oboe came along, BC was being run by Harris, who saw oil as just another "panacea target." Even after the heavies did better than he believed they could in attacks on French railway targets, he wanted to go back to city attacks, and Portal didn't have the cojones to force the change comprehensively.

 

[davebender]

They why not build a couple more during the late 1930s?

 

[wuzak]

Early RAF raids couldn't hit hydrogenation plants

They why not build a couple more during the late 1930s?

That would require the Germans forseeing that a) the RAF would be forced to bomb at night and b) that night bombing would be woefully inaccurate.

Remember that most of the bombing theorists in the mid-30s held that the bomber would always get through, no matter what the opposition. So they would be coming during daylight nd would have better accuracy.

It would also require Germany moving towards a war economy earlier. The extra capacity cannot possibly be for domestic use, the only purpose being for future military action.

Building more plants would surely signal to their enemies that here is a very important target. It may have led to the Briitish not giving up on oil as quickly as they did, and may have signalled the US that this was rather more important than ball bearings.

I'd also ask, how long did a plant take to build and become operational? I would guess years.

And when did the existing plants become operational?

There were plans to move the plants to underground installations, but that would be difficult and time consuming. Had they built them underground from the start, or moved them underground from the beginning of hostilities, they may have been more difficult to disrupt.

 

[davebender]

Sure it can.

WWI wrecked the world economy. By the 1930s a multitude of trade barriers prevented nations from freely importing and exporting. 1930s Germany could not take importation of petroleum products for granted. But they could always count on petroleum products produced from domestic coal which Germany had plenty of.

If Britain and France don't start a general European war during September 1939 the German hydrogenation plants will produce gasoline for VWs driven by civilians. The new Wolfsburg facility was supposedly the largest automobile factory in the world during 1939. So there should be millions of VW Beetles parked in German driveways by 1945.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... VWs driven by civilians. The new Wolfsburg facility was supposedly the largest automobile factory in the world during 1939. So there should be millions of VW Beetles parked in German driveways by 1945...."

Yeah sure, and I have a bridge in Brooklyn that you'd like too ....

Have you actually read Adam Tooze's "Wages of Destruction", Dave ...? The most damning indictment of the Nazi economy was the VW dream .... Opel, Ford and other German car manufacturers wouldn't touch the Nazi idea of a Volks Wagen (for the specified price) .... but lots of German tool and die makers - and the like - paid out their 10DM month by month for the their future car .... none was delivered.

Volkswagen was an utter disaster of consumer-based enterprise.

The quest to build a VolksRadio ... so folks could listen to Der Feuher's broadcasts ... was equally disastrous.

MM

 

[parsifal]

3 September 1939. First RAF Bomber Command operation against Germany.
12 May 1944. First effective RAF Bomber Command attack on hydrogenation plants.

If hydrogenation plants were so easy to bomb then why did the RAF require 56 months to seriously impair production of German aviation gasoline?[/

QUOTE]

In 1939 germany did not suffe from critical shortages of oil. it had large prewar reserves, access to Rumanian Oil, some access to neutral oil and the hydrogenation plants.

There was an embargo on strategic bombing until after the invasion of france, and for much of the summer the RAF was fully preoccupied with bombing targets thought to be of immediate impact to the battle of france. BC was concentrating at that time on communications....a poor choice of target but legitimate.

The real bombin effort against strategic targets in Germany did not begin until november 1940, and then at a miniscule level and at night . for that first year of the campaign, to november 1941, the night bombing campaign was undertaken on the assumption that night bombing could be undertaken as a precision bombing campaign. Oil was a legiti
mate target but was not the priority......main focus of this early campaign was still communications, followed by u-boats there was also some priority given to electrical generation from memory. As is well known, there was a spectacular lack of success in precision targets, moreover oil was still not the priority for the RAF.

1942 was the first oil crisis suffered by the German army and air force....brought on by a shortage of certain kinds of fuels and a shortage of transport to the front rather than a shortage of actual crude oil. the shortages were real enough and had a tangible effect on Axis strategy and war potential. The italian fleet and to a lesser extent the german heavy fleet were severely constrained by oil shortages, the luftwaffes ability to train and exapand wa limited, the ability of Rommels army to exploit local successes was also constrained by fuel limits, the ability of the armies on the east front to undertake a front wide offensive was constrained, and lastly german strategic decisions were by now being greatly influenced by fuel shortages. i dont know how much effect british actions were affeecting this shortage, but it is at least arguable that the naval blockade, the diplomentic isolation of germany and of course the effects of bombing were all playing some part in that strangulation of the german war effort. it certainly wasnt doing it any good.

it was, however, the US decision to concentrate their daylight offensive on oil from January 1944 with fully escorted raids all the way to the targets that proved decisive. germany by then, in terms of oil reserves had staged a partial recovery, though not without cost. She had severely curtailed bomber production, reduced training for aircrew to dangerous levels, curtailed and cut back on the size and usage of her fleet. sure, all these things were also due to other issues, but oil shortages were playing their part as well into this descent.

So, ther are two things to say in response to your claim. the first is that far from being made fireproof from oil shortages prior to 1944, germany had an ongoing and chronic problem that appears to have been exacerbated by the activities of the allies (which for practical purposes were the activities of the british and the CW rather than the Us up to that time). The second is that once the hydrogenation plant became the focuss of a credible threat from a properly protected and sizable precision daylight force, it folded very rapidly. German resistance was shortened by at least a year as a result of US precision bombing of oil targetes (joined belatedly by the RAF from about September)

 

[stona]

In 1938, the last full year of peace, only about 30% of Germany's 7.5 million tonne consumption of oil was produced domestically. About 5 million tonnes was imported from Venezuela, USA and Iran with 451,000 tonnes from Romania.

In 1939, before the start of the war the Germans imported 5,165,00 tonnes, nearly 200,000 tonnes more than in 1938.
In 1940 this fell to just 2,075,000 tonnes and all of this was from continental Europe, 619,000 tons from the USSR. The Germans started to suffer a shortage of oil as early as 1940. This was partly due to a failure to meet pre-war targets for reserves. The Germans started the war with a reserve of 492,000 tonnes of aviation fuel against a planned reserve of 1.5 million tonnes and 1,118,000 tonnes of diesel and fuel oils against a planned reserve of 2.8 million tonnes. Despite fortuitous supplies of aviation fuel like the 250,000 tonnes captured in France, the Germans never really had enough fuel.

This did not become a crisis until Barbarossa because early war successes were so fuel efficient. One source reckons that all Germany's successes of 1940 used 12 million barrels of oil, equivalent to just three days US production!

As early as March 1941 General Thomas warned both Keitel and Goring that reserves would be exhausted by October that year and that it would be impossible to offset the critical shortage in supply. He urged that it was critical that the Germans 'seize quickly and exploit the Caucasus oil fields'.
On 26th August, as his prognostication came true, he wrote another report for the OKW noting that current production was insufficient and that 'even if production was pushed to its limits it would be impossible to supply all the required oil. Accordingly our only option is to cut consumption in accordance with the availability of supplies'.
Four days later Thomas met with Generalmajor Wagner who explained that Army Groups South and Centre on the eastern front were experiencing critical fuel shortages (partly due to transport problems), but that he believed requirements could be met with further rationing of domestic and non-operational supplies (this would have a dire effect on Luftwaffe training in 1942) and cuts in supplies to occupied territories. Nonetheless he felt that supplies would be exhausted by early 1942 and that 'new oil fields would have to be captured'.

A lack of oil was the elephant in the conference room as the OKW planned its campaigns as early as 1941. This was without any useful intervention from the RAF. Towards the end of the war the fatal, not critical, shortages experienced by the Germans were as much to do with the loss of territory as they were due to Allied bombing.

Cheers

Steve