Clay_Allison
Staff Sergeant
- 1,154
- Dec 24, 2008
I'd like to see the F4U carry the 8000 pounds that the A-1 could. The Skyraider was a beast that excelled in so many roles that they eventually rplaced it with 3 planes.
Stuka vs. Dauntless vs. Val vs. Skua vs. Il-2?
- Thread starter Lucky13
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parsifal
Colonel
How successful were the Corsairs and Skyraiders in the divebombing role. Was the Corsair used in the final destruction of the Japanese fleet in 1945. Wasnt the Yamato destroyed by Helldivers and TBFs, and not Corsairs. Sometimes to judge the success of a type you have to look at the operational history of a type, and the success it enjoyed in that role. The Skyraider was a very capable aircraft, and it would have been very interesting to see it in its intended first line role during the war. But its excellent service post war had more to do with miscalculations by the US procurement machine, than any outstanding qualities of the aircrat itself. Dont get me wrong, the Skyraider did very well, but not as a first line ship killer. It was primarily retained because of its cost effectiveness, and because it could undertake the COIN mission due to its low speed and relative inexpesive nature.
Whilst the Corsair was an effective Fighter Bomber/Divebomber, I seriously doubt it had the same capabilities, accuracy range (when loaded with offensive ordinance) as a dedicated attack craft. The Corsair is one of my favourite aircraft, but there are reasons why dedicated attack aircraft are retained and new designs rolled out. Multi-role aircraft are generally a "jack of all trades" and a master of none
Whilst the Corsair was an effective Fighter Bomber/Divebomber, I seriously doubt it had the same capabilities, accuracy range (when loaded with offensive ordinance) as a dedicated attack craft. The Corsair is one of my favourite aircraft, but there are reasons why dedicated attack aircraft are retained and new designs rolled out. Multi-role aircraft are generally a "jack of all trades" and a master of none
First, as we've covered before there aren't solid statistics to really say the F4U was equal as a dive bomber to purpose built a/c. That was an opinion of some Marine units bombing cut-off Japanese garrisons where you went back and bombed the same stuff day after day for months, and the bombings accomplished little anyway, not operations from which to make sweeping extrapolations IMO.
The majority of USN bomb sinkings of ships by carrier type a/c were by dive bombers, and many others by glide bombing TBF/TBM's, actual sinkngs of sizeable ships by bombing by fighter bombers (F6F and F4U) were not very common. In fact the largest number for any single type was by the SB2C, despite its mixed reputation, simply because it was the dominant dive bomber type when the number of operational carrier groups was largest and the groups achieved vast numbers of sinkings (when including merchant and minor warship types) in 44-45; and VB units specialized in dive bombing as their main reason to exist, not like VF/VBF and VT units of late war which tried to be proficient in a wider range of missions.
On AD v F4U, one big difference was vulnerability to AA, back to that old topic. The F4U's loss rate in Korea was far higher, and universally recognized as such. The AD was legendarily tough. In the F4U v F6F case the difference in loss rates to AA might be surprising when first seen in the stats, but for F4U v AD it shouldn't be surprising at all. The AD had, of course, no opportunity, to speak of, to prove itself a ship killer. But it was a true dive bomber, and when attacking big bridges in Korea with carrier groups, the AD's directly attacked them with 2000#, while F4U's did flak suppression with 500 or 1000; they couldn't practically carry 2000#'ers. No contest for true dive bombing of big tough target, and in general the AD had much more to offer plane for plane for the air-ground missions performed in Korea; although it was a substantially larger plane of course, took up more space, cost more, burned more gas, etc.
Joe
The majority of USN bomb sinkings of ships by carrier type a/c were by dive bombers, and many others by glide bombing TBF/TBM's, actual sinkngs of sizeable ships by bombing by fighter bombers (F6F and F4U) were not very common. In fact the largest number for any single type was by the SB2C, despite its mixed reputation, simply because it was the dominant dive bomber type when the number of operational carrier groups was largest and the groups achieved vast numbers of sinkings (when including merchant and minor warship types) in 44-45; and VB units specialized in dive bombing as their main reason to exist, not like VF/VBF and VT units of late war which tried to be proficient in a wider range of missions.
On AD v F4U, one big difference was vulnerability to AA, back to that old topic. The F4U's loss rate in Korea was far higher, and universally recognized as such. The AD was legendarily tough. In the F4U v F6F case the difference in loss rates to AA might be surprising when first seen in the stats, but for F4U v AD it shouldn't be surprising at all. The AD had, of course, no opportunity, to speak of, to prove itself a ship killer. But it was a true dive bomber, and when attacking big bridges in Korea with carrier groups, the AD's directly attacked them with 2000#, while F4U's did flak suppression with 500 or 1000; they couldn't practically carry 2000#'ers. No contest for true dive bombing of big tough target, and in general the AD had much more to offer plane for plane for the air-ground missions performed in Korea; although it was a substantially larger plane of course, took up more space, cost more, burned more gas, etc.
Joe
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
As JB says, the major damage done to IJN ships by air was done by the AC on the scene. The Helldiver comprised most of the dive bomber squadrons in the US Navy in the latter part of the war and it consequently was in on the kill of a number of IJN ships. Based on the Helldiver's record and this is pure supposition on my part, we are fortunate that the SB2C was not operational in 1942-43 in place of the SBD. We may not have had the success in the early carrier to carrier battles. To me, comparing the Corsair and the AD is a little like comparing Labrador Retrievers and Pit Bulls. One was designed for killing enemy AC and the other for killing enemy installations and personnel on the ground. The Corsair happened to be a pretty good air to ground AC but was not in the same class with the AD. The AD could be formidable in a dogfight, because of it's maneuverabilty with it's dive brakes and if it was light but was not in the class of the Corsair air to air. I know a former Navy pilot who flew both in Korea. All of his experience was air to ground. We were discussing the merits of the two, AD and F4U one day while playing golf and I mentioned that the F4U was about 100 mph faster than the AD and he looked at me as if "what does that matter and you don't know what you are talking about" which was most certainly true. He did tell me about a time that upon receiving a wave off in a Corsair he poured on the coal and found himself inverted. Obviously he survived.
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Lucky13
Forum Mascot
The Captain off USS Yorktown CV-10 said that the only good use for the "beast" would be as a anchor....and promptly swapped them for SBD's in '43.
SB2C-1's with plenty of serious outright bugs. Debugged a/c later had a more subtle variation in reputation. Some pilots liked the SB2C, two examples in autobiographies are Don Engen and Harold Buell but they were legendary and notable naval aviators, respectively. They agreed the SC2C was not easy to fly for the typical mass production WWII pilot. The SB2C's operational loss rate in carrier ops was around 1%, compared to around .8 for SBD, both for whole war, but operating practice and the general carrier aviation learning curve meant that operational loss rates early in the war were generally higher, so that understates the SBD's advantage. But SB2C's sank a lot of ships, the a/c was definitely capable of performing its mission. IMO its shortcomings are sometimes overstated as part of a sentimental story line featuring the SBD, which tends to be overrated in part based on claims of its supposed successes against enemy fighters few of which check out in Japanese records, and its genuine right place at the right time successes at Midway.
Joe
Glider
Captain
I am sure that I read somewhere that the SB2-C stood for Son of a Bitch 2nd Class
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
Another thing that understates the SBD's advantage is that the SBD was used a whole lot more when the IJN had effective CAPs. The Helldiver faced not nearly as much aerial opposition. I think I recall reading that during the Battle Of the Philipine Sea, one of the factors in the SB2C's high losses was that they were not as fuel efficient as the SBDs.
parsifal
Colonel
I am not sure about that. During the last year of the war, the US lost a lot of ships, because of the Kamikazes. But the Kamikazes were just a part of Japanese equation, there were still a lot of conventional operations occurring as well. It follows that the CAP and fighter elements in the IJN/JAAF would also be vastly thickened up as well.
The air flotilla that over-ran Malya and South east asia (excluding the Philipinnes), had just 25 Zeroes initially to undertake their operations. These were elite pilots, as their kill rates testify. But even if each pilot at that time was worth 5 pilots in 1944, the 5000 or so zeroes/other first line fighters they had at their disposal at that time were still a greater threat to US aircraft than the 25-50 put in the air in 1942. This of course omits tyhe aircraft attached to the carriers and the the main fighter force over the Phillipinnes.
Nevertheless, in 1941, the IJN had less than 1300 aircraft at their disposal. The average flying experience of their pilots was 500 hours. In 1944, roughly speaking, the IJN had over 5000 aircraft, and about the same for the JAAF. The average flying experience for their aircrew by thet time had dropped to about 150 hour. If there is a direct correlation between flying hours and effectiveness, then in 1944 terms, the 1941 IJN air wing was the equivalent to onlly 4300 1944 aircraft
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
If one reads Lundstrom's books about the Pacific war in 1942, the SBDs time and time again went up against formidable IJN CAPs with very small numbers of escort fighters of their own. At the Mariiana's Turkey Shoot Japanese fighter protection was minimal and the US strike force had good escort fighter protection. During attacks on Musashi and Yamato that ultimately sank them there was little Japanese fighter opposition. The SB2Cs flew 18808 action sorties in the Pacific from carriers and lost 18 to enemy AC. The SBD flew 6048 action sorties from carriers and lost 43 to enemy AC. The SBD had 106 EA kills and the SB2C had 43 EA kills. It looks to me that the SBD had substantially more enemy fighter oppositon than the SB2C. In fact, perhaps Churchill's praise of the RAF during the BOB could equally be applied to the SBD.
parsifal
Colonel
The claims for kills as always need to be treated with a great deal of circumpection. Usually, claimed kills are inflated four or five times those that are actually shot down. Moreover, Ive noticed that earlier in the war, these inflated claims weere actually far worse than the claims for later in the war.
It makes sense that the Musashi and Yamato were not provided with fighter cover. By the time these ships were lost, there were no Japanese carriers to help, and the land based air was being concentrated on other tasks. Protecting ships by that stage was not a priority for the IJN. They needed to concentrate their resources in defending the beachheads, and the cities of Japan.
Moreover the numbers are, what the numbers are. Whatever the claims about the strength of the japanese defences, they just were never there. Rabaul, for example, until well after the August landings on Guadacanal could only ever call on approximately 40 fighters at any given time. Kinda brings the massive superiority of the US into perepective when you find this out.
The key question is this.....are a few highly trained aviators better than a mass of half trained recruits? Its difficult to say, because by 1944, the Americans had two things in thgeir advantage....numbers and quality. In '42, their fleet based CAGS were about equal, as were their numbers, to the Japanese. So the balance of power had changed, making the equation hard to quantify
It makes sense that the Musashi and Yamato were not provided with fighter cover. By the time these ships were lost, there were no Japanese carriers to help, and the land based air was being concentrated on other tasks. Protecting ships by that stage was not a priority for the IJN. They needed to concentrate their resources in defending the beachheads, and the cities of Japan.
Moreover the numbers are, what the numbers are. Whatever the claims about the strength of the japanese defences, they just were never there. Rabaul, for example, until well after the August landings on Guadacanal could only ever call on approximately 40 fighters at any given time. Kinda brings the massive superiority of the US into perepective when you find this out.
The key question is this.....are a few highly trained aviators better than a mass of half trained recruits? Its difficult to say, because by 1944, the Americans had two things in thgeir advantage....numbers and quality. In '42, their fleet based CAGS were about equal, as were their numbers, to the Japanese. So the balance of power had changed, making the equation hard to quantify
It's true that SBD's faced more fighter opposition early in the war than SB2C's did later (or than SBD's did later for that matter), but the sortie loss rate of SBD's to enemy a/c was higher too, only naturally. So this is a true statement historically, more fighter opposition v SBD's, but I don't know if it really establishes anything solid in comparing the two planes.
But just taking the SBD, there's no question its reputation is inflated wrt actual success shooting down enemy fighters, which didn't actually happen very often. Also, the SBD's actually didn't face concentrated fighter opposition in that many cases. That was partly one of the inherent advantages of the dive bomber concept at the time, v. carrier groups without radar (Coral Sea and Midway) or relatively primitive radar and radar fighter direction doctrine (iEastern Solomons and Santa Cruz where the IJN TF's had radar but were less practiced in its use as a system with fighters than USN; the USN itself had a long way to go in that respect compared to later on). Remember in the 1930's some planners concluded radar-less carriers and their fighters could seldom hope to intercept attacks before it was too late, one reason the RN didn't emphasize carrier fighter performance pre WWII. In the carrier battles of '42 only the VS-8/VB-8 strike at Santa Cruz was really heavily engaged by Zeroes without escort (and did come off fairly well, actually downed a Zero in that case, while several SBD's were downed or disabled but they still completed the strike). The use of SBD's as defensive a/c at Coral Sea was a heroic story, but a disaster in terms of outcomes v Zeroes. And in the Guadalcanal campaign, Marine and Navy SBD's were more often than not going after Japanese ships outside the effective range of land based Zero CAP's, though not always. Also SBD scouts in carrier v carrier ops had some interesting run ins with Zeroes and proved often survivable (though again their own claims seldom check out). So in sum, in its 'golden year' of 1942 the SBD was relatively rarely subjected to concentrated fighter attack without escort. Still, losses to fighters were more common than ca. 1944-5 when concentrated fighter attacks on USN attack a/c had become highly exceptional.
Joe
But just taking the SBD, there's no question its reputation is inflated wrt actual success shooting down enemy fighters, which didn't actually happen very often. Also, the SBD's actually didn't face concentrated fighter opposition in that many cases. That was partly one of the inherent advantages of the dive bomber concept at the time, v. carrier groups without radar (Coral Sea and Midway) or relatively primitive radar and radar fighter direction doctrine (iEastern Solomons and Santa Cruz where the IJN TF's had radar but were less practiced in its use as a system with fighters than USN; the USN itself had a long way to go in that respect compared to later on). Remember in the 1930's some planners concluded radar-less carriers and their fighters could seldom hope to intercept attacks before it was too late, one reason the RN didn't emphasize carrier fighter performance pre WWII. In the carrier battles of '42 only the VS-8/VB-8 strike at Santa Cruz was really heavily engaged by Zeroes without escort (and did come off fairly well, actually downed a Zero in that case, while several SBD's were downed or disabled but they still completed the strike). The use of SBD's as defensive a/c at Coral Sea was a heroic story, but a disaster in terms of outcomes v Zeroes. And in the Guadalcanal campaign, Marine and Navy SBD's were more often than not going after Japanese ships outside the effective range of land based Zero CAP's, though not always. Also SBD scouts in carrier v carrier ops had some interesting run ins with Zeroes and proved often survivable (though again their own claims seldom check out). So in sum, in its 'golden year' of 1942 the SBD was relatively rarely subjected to concentrated fighter attack without escort. Still, losses to fighters were more common than ca. 1944-5 when concentrated fighter attacks on USN attack a/c had become highly exceptional.
Joe
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renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
The surprising thing to me about studying SBD versus SB2C is how few action sorties the SBD flew from carriers by Navy pilots. One thinks of the carrier war and the SBD stands out because of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, et al. But some 6000 carrier based sorties for SBD versus over 18000 for the SB2C. That is a huge difference. Of course, when the SBD was the dive bomber, the US had few operational carriers so with only two bombing squadrons per carrier, they could not fly too many sorties. The other surprising fact is that land based Marines flew more than 40000 sorties in SBDs while land based Navy flew more than 5000 sorties, almost as many as carrier based by Navy. I just have never thought of the SBD as a Marine piloted AC flying from land. One thing for sure the American taxpayer got his money's worth when he paid for carrier based SBDs in WW2.
Well this is interesting. Have you got the ful trials data. Number of trials, number of hits, gauss curves, mid-distance from the circle?
renrich
Chief Master Sergeant
My sources are from "The Great Book of WW2 Airplanes" and from "Corsair" by Barrett Tillman. The complete tests are not there. However, one of the sources mentions that the Corsair could dive even steeper than SBD, 85 degrees versus 70 degrees. The Corsair from several sources was a very steady diving AC. I am speaking from memory now but I remember reading that the P51, in a dive, had to be constantly retrimed. To a certain extent that may be true of all AC but I believe us "experts" on this forum often neglect the issue of controllability or control harmony in our learned debates about superiority of our "pet" fighter. Seems to me that aerial gunnery would be heavily influenced by those factors.
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Lucky13
Forum Mascot
Didn't it happen more often than not, that they dived at almost 90 degrees with the SBD or Stuka?
Thank you,
At the same time, slow divers were quoted as more accurate divers because they could launch bombs at lower altitude.
So the Stuka was diving from 5/6 km to 1 km, when it was lauching is bomb at 560km/h.
For the Pe-2, it was from 7/8 km to 2.5 km, and up to 870 km/h. The accuracy at that speed was extremly difficult to obtain even by the common work of 2 crew members.
So inceasing both speed and weight numbers, you're increasing also the lowest critical height (or minimal distance to recover from a dive) to launch the bomb. And difficulty to aim. It's why Corsair accuracy performance against the SBD is quite surprising.
Regards
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pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
Has anyone considered the Typhoon or better known to its crews as the Bombphoon its load was 2 1000lb bombs
Admiral Beez
Major
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