The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

[yulzari]

From the lists made by comparing verified claims and known opposition loss reports the Hurricane is fourth on the allied list
after the Spitfire, Mustang, and I think the Hellcat.

For the first three years or the duration? The key thing about the Hurricane was its presence in numbers at a key place and time. Not the quality of the aeroplane itself, which was adequate but not outstanding for the time.

 

[Warspite63]

From the lists made by comparing verified claims and known opposition loss reports the Hurricane is fourth on the allied list
after the Spitfire, Mustang, and I think the Hellcat.

Interesting analysis here: Which Allied Fighter scored the most victories in World War Two? I believe I know the answer

 

[MiTasol]

For the first three years or the duration? The key thing about the Hurricane was its presence in numbers at a key place and time. Not the quality of the aeroplane itself, which was adequate but not outstanding for the time.

I would also suspect that during the BoB the Hurricane pilots had far more experience on their aircraft and that experience was a significant factor in their better performance. Most of the Spit pilots would have had low hours on type and not been able to exploit its features.

 

[Greg Boeser]

I would also suspect that during the BoB the Hurricane pilots had far more experience on their aircraft and that experience was a significant factor in their better performance. Most of the Spit pilots would have had low hours on type and not been able to exploit its features.

I seem to remember a report from that era that found the very thing. Pilots were reluctant to turn as hard as the aircraft could turn because they feared stalling. Test pilots had determined that the Bf 109E could not sustain as tight a turn as the Spitfire or Hurricane, but could briefly turn inside them before falling out of the turn.

 

[PAT303]

Going back on what has been said it's the Spitfire and Hurricane that did the most, without them the BoB wouldn't have been won so what the likes of the P51 P47 B17 etcetera did later doesn't matter, without those two the rest wouldn't have got into the fight. The fact that they are first and fourth on the overall list of kills speaks volumes on the impact they had on the war.

 

[PAT303]

I seem to remember a report from that era that found the very thing. Pilots were reluctant to turn as hard as the aircraft could turn because they feared stalling. Test pilots had determined that the Bf 109E could not sustain as tight a turn as the Spitfire or Hurricane, but could briefly turn inside them before falling out of the turn.

That was Winkle Brown, after flying the 109 he said he was annoyed he didn't tell RAF pilots to turn harder and hold the turn, likewise fight at higher speeds as the 109 couldn't hold the Hurricane and couldn't match the Spitfire in those situations.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I would agree that it was the land based VLR aircraft that played a more significant role in closing the "Atlantic Gap", but would point out that not all Liberators in CC service were considered VLR due to their equipment & fuel tank fits.

On 31st May 1943 AOCin C CC issued instructions about the standard fits he was trying to achieve on Liberators in each squadron. He broke them down into various "classes". 15 Group was to have 3 squadrons (53, 59 & 120) "flown for range with a maximum depth charge load at the expense of anti-aircraft defence". 19 Group was to have 3 squadrons (86, 224 & 311) with aircraft "to carry sufficient armament to defend themselves against air attack and here range and depth charge load are of lesser importance". Due to their existing fits it was to take some time for squadrons to get an entire complement of aircraft for their designated roles (120 for example didn't begin to receive its Mk.V until Sept 1943).

So there were Class A, B (with 3 different sub-classes) & C Liberators Mk.III/V with different fuel tank fits and armaments plus a handful of surviving Liberator I in 120 squadron. While class A & B were to achieve a range of 2,300 miles, class C were to have a range of 1,600 miles. Class A were to be Mk.V while B & C were to be Mk.III or V. So 53, 59 & 120 were to become Class A equipped while 86, 224 & 311 were to get aircraft interchangeable between Class B & C. The GR.V with various types of centimetric radars didn't begin to reach the squadrons until Feb 1943.

A further reorganisation took place in Nov 1943 with another set of instructions issued about fuel & armament fits for each squadron.

53 squadron traded its Whitleys for Liberator GR.V in May 1943.
59 finally became Liberator GR.V equipped in March / April 1943
120 had had Liberators since 1941

86 had begun to receive Liberator III in Sept 1942
224 converted to Liberator III between July & Sept 1942
311 converted to Liberator GR.V betweeen June & Aug 1943.

Often forgotten are the 2 Fortress squadrons, 206 & 220, that had been the mainstay of the CC long range effort from Sept 1942 to March 1943 when Liberators became more numerous. The Fortress IIA/II had a range of around 1,825 miles. They were moved from the Western Isles to the Azores in late 1943 after an airfield was opened at Lagens.

This brings up a point that I have made in the past. It is often stated that the U-boats were defeated in May 1943 due to the closure of the "Mid-Atlantic" gap. In reality the gap was not "closed" although certainly air support was greater. The lions share of the credit for the victory of May 1943 goes to the surface vessels.

 

[Ovod]

I would also suspect that during the BoB the Hurricane pilots had far more experience on their aircraft and that experience was a significant factor in their better performance. Most of the Spit pilots would have had low hours on type and not been able to exploit its features.

The Spitfire was already 2 years in RAF service by the time of the Battle of Britain, still not enough time? In any case that is surely a problem that all air arms must suffer when introducing new aircraft types - did pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?

 

[Greg Boeser]

[D]id pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?

Of course not! They had black crosses on their planes!

 

[Glider]

The Spitfire was already 2 years in RAF service by the time of the Battle of Britain, still not enough time? In any case that is surely a problem that all air arms must suffer when introducing new aircraft types - did pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?

I believe the reality was that when the BOB was being fought, the front line Hurricanes were 'New versions' and there were a good number of the 'older versions' for the OCU units. The Spitfire was slower to be introduced into service and as a result there were fewer for the OCU units. That is why you hear about pilots going to the front line with a handful of hours on type, almost certainly those are Spitfire Squadrons. Pilots going to front line Hurricane units generally had more hours on type, because of the increased availability of Hurricanes in the OCU.

Please note that when I say older and newer, they were the same mark, but may not have had the same updates. OCU aircraft were the last to be converted to 100 octane and the Constant Speed propeller, had more fabric covering, may not have the same IFF and radio's. They would have been longer in service with more hours on the engines and generally had lower performance.

 

[GrauGeist]

did pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?

When the Fw190 debuted in combat during summer of 1941, it caught the RAF by surprise.

 

[Greg Boeser]

When the Fw190 debuted in combat during summer of 1941, it caught the RAF by surprise.

That and the fact that the RAF continental offensive consisted of large unwieldly formations of fighters escorting small formations of bombers meant that the Luftwaffe nearly always had the tactical advantage. They could dive through the formations, generally with surprise, and easily flick roll to shake any pursuers.

 

[PAT303]

The Spitfire was already 2 years in RAF service by the time of the Battle of Britain, still not enough time? In any case that is surely a problem that all air arms must suffer when introducing new aircraft types - did pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?

The biggest problem with the Spitfire was the initial order was for only 300 of them, then the factory was bombed delaying production further.

 

[PAT303]

That and the fact that the RAF continental offensive consisted of large unwieldly formations of fighters escorting small formations of bombers meant that the Luftwaffe nearly always had the tactical advantage. They could dive through the formations, generally with surprise, and easily flick roll to shake any pursuers.

I can't help but believe the old guards insistence on outdate V or line astern formations caused more losses than any other reason.

 

[MiTasol]

The biggest problem with the Spitfire was the initial order was for only 300 of them, then the factory was bombed delaying production further.

On the 15th July 1938 Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, flew into Castle Bromwich to officially perform the ceremonial duty of cutting the first sod of turf for the new Spitfire factory. EDIT The initial order for 1000 Mk II Spitfires was placed with Castle Bromwich in April 1938, before construction of the factory had even commenced! The actual breakdown of production was as follows: 750 (or 751 depending on the data consulted) were completed as the Mk IIA with eight 0.303"machine guns; 170 as the Mk IIB with 2 x 20 mm cannon and four 0.303" machine guns; a further 80 machines were completed as the Mk V A/B.

AND, two years later in the summer of 1940 when Beaverbrook took up his post of Minister of Aircraft Production, the vital Spitfire 'shadow factory' at Castle Bromwich had yet to produce a single aircraft.

Beaverbrook telephoned Vickers-Supermarine, manufacturers of the Spitfire, and told them to take over Castle Bromwich from Lord Nuffield and the Nuffield Organization, which had been running it. Reputedly, when being interrogated by Beaverbrook on why nothing was being produced, Nuffield told Beaverbrook if you can do better then you can take the factory over to which Beaverbrook agreed.

The rest was history as they say and the factory very quickly became the major supplier of Spitfires, and later a significant supplier of Lancasters.

EDIT - for more info on Beaverbrook/Nuffield conversation see

The Castle Bromwich Aircraft Factory | WIAS

This paper briefly describes the history of the Castle Bromwich Aircraft Factory and its significant contribution to aviation, particularly during the Second World War.

warwickshireias.org

 

[EwenS]

Castle Bromwich began producing Spitfires in increasing numbers starting in June 1940.

While the first air raid on Supermarine's Woolston, Southampton factory was recorded on 7 June 1940, it was in raids on 24 & 26 Sept that it was largely destroyed, but some work did continue until Dec before it was abandoned completely. Planning to disperse production had begun as early as March, with actual dispersal having already begun in mid-Sept before the Woolston factory was destroyed. While production seems to have fallen sharply, it did not cease altogether.

The Dispersal (1940-1941)

Although a partial dispersal of Spitfire production had begun before the German raids of 24th and 26th September 1940 this had been limited to a few locations in Southampton. Following the raids th…

supermariners.wordpress.com

The Spitfire Society - Luftwaffe Raid on Southampton - 26 September 1940

www.spitfiresociety.org

The Spitfire Society - Luftwaffe Raid on Southampton - 24 September 1940

Luftwaffe Raid on Southampton - 24 September 1940

www.spitfiresociety.org

Further disruption to the dispersed facilities occurred during the night blitz on Southampton in Nov/Dec 1940.

 

[PAT303]

EDIT The initial order for 1000 Mk II Spitfires was placed with Castle Bromwich in April 1938,

The initial order was for 300 Mk I's.

 

[EwenS]

The initial order was for 300 Mk I's.

The initial contract for Supermarine was for 310 dated 3 June 1936. The first Hurricane order was also in 1936 and was for only 600 aircraft. That was way back at the start of the rearmament programmes when war, if it happened at all, still seemed to be in the distant future.

And with the pace of aircraft development being what it was in the 1930s, how many do you order in 1936.The Spec for a successor to the Hurricane & Spitfire, F.18/37 to meet a requirement for a 400+mph fighter was issued in March 1938, just 5 months before the Spitfire first entered service with 19 squadron. While the competition was won by Hawker, who had already been working on a successor for some time that lead eventually to the Typhoon, submissions were also made by Supermarine, Gloster, Fairey & Bristol.

In 1936 war seemed a long way off. Planners in many nations were looking to 1942 or even 1944. It was only in summer of 1938 with the Munich crisis, that war suddenly seemed much closer.

 

[33k in the air]

The initial order was for 300 Mk I's.

Well, that's a relief. If the initial order had been for 300 Mk XIV's I would have to have called time travel shenanigans.

 

[PAT303]

Well, that's a relief. If the initial order had been for 300 Mk XIV's I would have to have called time travel shenanigans.

Well technically the MkXIV used the MkVIII airframe which was based on the MkIII so the MkXIV is kinda a 1940 airplane.