The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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From the lists made by comparing verified claims and known opposition loss reports the Hurricane is fourth on the allied list
after the Spitfire, Mustang, and I think the Hellcat.
For the first three years or the duration? The key thing about the Hurricane was its presence in numbers at a key place and time. Not the quality of the aeroplane itself, which was adequate but not outstanding for the time.
 
For the first three years or the duration? The key thing about the Hurricane was its presence in numbers at a key place and time. Not the quality of the aeroplane itself, which was adequate but not outstanding for the time.

I would also suspect that during the BoB the Hurricane pilots had far more experience on their aircraft and that experience was a significant factor in their better performance. Most of the Spit pilots would have had low hours on type and not been able to exploit its features.
 
I seem to remember a report from that era that found the very thing. Pilots were reluctant to turn as hard as the aircraft could turn because they feared stalling. Test pilots had determined that the Bf 109E could not sustain as tight a turn as the Spitfire or Hurricane, but could briefly turn inside them before falling out of the turn.
 
Going back on what has been said it's the Spitfire and Hurricane that did the most, without them the BoB wouldn't have been won so what the likes of the P51 P47 B17 etcetera did later doesn't matter, without those two the rest wouldn't have got into the fight. The fact that they are first and fourth on the overall list of kills speaks volumes on the impact they had on the war.
 
That was Winkle Brown, after flying the 109 he said he was annoyed he didn't tell RAF pilots to turn harder and hold the turn, likewise fight at higher speeds as the 109 couldn't hold the Hurricane and couldn't match the Spitfire in those situations.
 
This brings up a point that I have made in the past. It is often stated that the U-boats were defeated in May 1943 due to the closure of the "Mid-Atlantic" gap. In reality the gap was not "closed" although certainly air support was greater. The lions share of the credit for the victory of May 1943 goes to the surface vessels.
 
The Spitfire was already 2 years in RAF service by the time of the Battle of Britain, still not enough time? In any case that is surely a problem that all air arms must suffer when introducing new aircraft types - did pilots of the new Fw 190 suffer to RAF Spitfires in 1942?
 
I believe the reality was that when the BOB was being fought, the front line Hurricanes were 'New versions' and there were a good number of the 'older versions' for the OCU units. The Spitfire was slower to be introduced into service and as a result there were fewer for the OCU units. That is why you hear about pilots going to the front line with a handful of hours on type, almost certainly those are Spitfire Squadrons. Pilots going to front line Hurricane units generally had more hours on type, because of the increased availability of Hurricanes in the OCU.

Please note that when I say older and newer, they were the same mark, but may not have had the same updates. OCU aircraft were the last to be converted to 100 octane and the Constant Speed propeller, had more fabric covering, may not have the same IFF and radio's. They would have been longer in service with more hours on the engines and generally had lower performance.
 
When the Fw190 debuted in combat during summer of 1941, it caught the RAF by surprise.
That and the fact that the RAF continental offensive consisted of large unwieldly formations of fighters escorting small formations of bombers meant that the Luftwaffe nearly always had the tactical advantage. They could dive through the formations, generally with surprise, and easily flick roll to shake any pursuers.
 
The biggest problem with the Spitfire was the initial order was for only 300 of them, then the factory was bombed delaying production further.
 
I can't help but believe the old guards insistence on outdate V or line astern formations caused more losses than any other reason.
 
The biggest problem with the Spitfire was the initial order was for only 300 of them, then the factory was bombed delaying production further.

On the 15th July 1938 Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air, flew into Castle Bromwich to officially perform the ceremonial duty of cutting the first sod of turf for the new Spitfire factory. EDIT The initial order for 1000 Mk II Spitfires was placed with Castle Bromwich in April 1938, before construction of the factory had even commenced! The actual breakdown of production was as follows: 750 (or 751 depending on the data consulted) were completed as the Mk IIA with eight 0.303"machine guns; 170 as the Mk IIB with 2 x 20 mm cannon and four 0.303" machine guns; a further 80 machines were completed as the Mk V A/B.

AND, two years later in the summer of 1940 when Beaverbrook took up his post of Minister of Aircraft Production, the vital Spitfire 'shadow factory' at Castle Bromwich had yet to produce a single aircraft.

Beaverbrook telephoned Vickers-Supermarine, manufacturers of the Spitfire, and told them to take over Castle Bromwich from Lord Nuffield and the Nuffield Organization, which had been running it. Reputedly, when being interrogated by Beaverbrook on why nothing was being produced, Nuffield told Beaverbrook if you can do better then you can take the factory over to which Beaverbrook agreed.

The rest was history as they say and the factory very quickly became the major supplier of Spitfires, and later a significant supplier of Lancasters.

EDIT - for more info on Beaverbrook/Nuffield conversation see
 
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Castle Bromwich began producing Spitfires in increasing numbers starting in June 1940.

While the first air raid on Supermarine's Woolston, Southampton factory was recorded on 7 June 1940, it was in raids on 24 & 26 Sept that it was largely destroyed, but some work did continue until Dec before it was abandoned completely. Planning to disperse production had begun as early as March, with actual dispersal having already begun in mid-Sept before the Woolston factory was destroyed. While production seems to have fallen sharply, it did not cease altogether.


Further disruption to the dispersed facilities occurred during the night blitz on Southampton in Nov/Dec 1940.
 
The initial order was for 300 Mk I's.
The initial contract for Supermarine was for 310 dated 3 June 1936. The first Hurricane order was also in 1936 and was for only 600 aircraft. That was way back at the start of the rearmament programmes when war, if it happened at all, still seemed to be in the distant future.

And with the pace of aircraft development being what it was in the 1930s, how many do you order in 1936.The Spec for a successor to the Hurricane & Spitfire, F.18/37 to meet a requirement for a 400+mph fighter was issued in March 1938, just 5 months before the Spitfire first entered service with 19 squadron. While the competition was won by Hawker, who had already been working on a successor for some time that lead eventually to the Typhoon, submissions were also made by Supermarine, Gloster, Fairey & Bristol.

In 1936 war seemed a long way off. Planners in many nations were looking to 1942 or even 1944. It was only in summer of 1938 with the Munich crisis, that war suddenly seemed much closer.
 

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