The Battle For Australia

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Apparently China and Manchuria don't count as part of the Pacific War.

Anyway I agree that Milne Bay was an important victory. Perhaps more important then the better known American landing on Guadalcanal during August 1942.

No...I believe that they were separate. China and Manchuria should fall under the Second Sino-Japanese War, not Pacific War.

 

[parsifal]

There was a conference by the army and navy in march or april of 1942. The purpose was to plan and resource what the japanese called their "2nd operational phase". Despite successes beyond their wildest dreams, the americans had not surrendered and overall allied resistance was continuing.

At this conference (and also at other more subordinate discussions, such as the meeting of 17 area Army and 8th fleet at Rabaul), the japanese considered a number of options. one was an attack into india and the middle east. Another was the invasion of Australia, another was to cut the lines of communication to australia, capturing Fiji, noumea and other islands in the south west pacific. Yammamoto was represented at these meetings, and rightly pointed out that the key to everything was the decisive defeat of the USN. These were the foundations of midway, and to a lesser extent Coral Sea. Ultimately these two battles blunted and eventually led to events that turned the tide, but had midway and coral Sea been whitewash victories for the japanese, they would have proceeded with some form of further conquest.

To undertake a direct invasion of australia, the Japanese calculated they needed at least 10 full infantry divisions, Armour, 500 aircraft, and more than 1 million tons of shipping. the army was very reluctant to pull that many troops out of China, and also would not release much of the home army reserves. The navy simply did not have the rserves of shipping to throw at the operation. The projected invasion of Australia dies before it got any further than that.

nobody knew that at the time, however. Nobody knew also that the japanese lacked the shipping to take and hold midway, or the southwest pacific for thast matter. Not even the japanese themselves. they were simply drunk with success and failed to realize they had reached the absolute limit of their logistics even before the 2nd operational phase began

 

[Shinpachi]

I have found no invasion plan against Australia in my local Google. Even if it had been taken place, IJA would have been less cooperative with IJN as they were busy enough in China, Russian border and had to be prepared for the coming invasion into India.

 

[pattle]

The mood in Australia in 1942 must have been similar to the mood in Britain in 1940 when invasion was threatened, I wonder though if the Australians realised this early on in the war exactly what occupation by the Japanese would have meant.

 

[syscom3]

The IJA were planning to invade Australia, although this was done as a planning exercise and not a full up detailed plan. It was seen as a natural follow on to the taking of Port Moresby. The events of the summer of 1942 altered this though.

 

[parsifal]

This link gives some outline of the japanese plan to invade Australia. it was a concept never fully embraced, especially by the army

Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

this link gives a somewhat better overview

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/battaust/AustInvasion/JapNavy_AustInvasion.html

 

[Shinpachi]

In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".

 

[pattle]

I would have thought that South Africa would of been completely out of the question for Japanese invasion, Ceylon would have been a better candidate.

 

[VBF-13]

In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".

Whatever the course in SE Asia, and beyond, the way I'm seeing it, now, is, if you could have taken Midway, you could have kept us bottled-up at Pearl, and that would have taken us out of your way. Pearl was our sanctuary, where we licked our wounds. San Francisco and San Diego were five-day drives from there. That was the significance of your putting whatever pressure you could on Pearl. You had a big Occupation Force coming into Midway, we also turned back. That's how I'm now seeing the bigger picture at Midway. I'm curious what you or anyone thinks of that.

 

[parsifal]

In early 1942, IJA seems researching not only Australia but South Africa, New Zealand and possibly others, to evaluate British endurance before advancing into India.
There are some confidential reports at National Archives of Japan and one of them clearly says "This report has been made for the purpose of invasion into India".

The way those links depict it, the Indian Ocean was not seen as a credible option because it did not force the USN into the "decisive battle". The incursions into SW Pacific struck at vital political interests for the US. Isolating Australia, or conquest of Australia was seen as one way of forcing the as yet elusive USN into battle before it was ready. So too was Midway. Historically, the Japanese undertook a spoiling raid into the Indian Ocean, undertook mercantile Submarine operations off Madagascar, attempted to capture Port Moresby (the MO operation) which was a precursor to the RY (Noumea), RO (Ocean and Nauru) and MI (midway operation). There was also an operation called FS which i think was the capture of Fiji and Samoa, but need to check its details.

All of these operations, and others, were designed to force the USN into battle, where it was expected the IJN would annihilate it. The projected invasion of Australia was put on the back burner until Naval supremacy had been achieved, and the army agreed to the commitment of forces needed. Neither pre-requisite presented itself. The Japanese were heavily defeated at midway and checked at Coral Sea. Thereafter all other operations requiring deep penetrations of enemy controlled seas were cancelled.

If Midway had gone the way as expected, the japanese might have gained a further year of unfettered offensive operations, and that may well have seen some form of invasion occurring. as it stood, the precursors were never achieved, so the invasion never went ahead

 

[parsifal]

This is a news story that I found, claimng that a map exists from a japanese source, detailing one of the invasion points for the proposed Army invasion plan. Its from the ABC (national broadcaster) with an image of the map, that can be magnified. Hard to tell its actual source but from the contents of the article, it does sound like its from a Japanese source.

There is admittedly strong debate as to whether the Japanese seriously considered invasion or not. But what is clear, is that the Japanese intended and set in motion various initiatives designed to force Australia to the negotiating table....in other words, surrnder.

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-24/did-japan-plan-wwii-invasion-of-coffs-harbour3f/4030716

 

[Shinpachi]

The Battle of Midway had shown inability of IJN Commander Nagumo. He should have flown more reconnaissance planes to find the US task force immediately and should not waste time for his decision. Nagumo was so ordinary in crisis.

IJN may have been aggressive about Occupation of Australia but IJA.

The ABC map looks an ordinary maritime one equipped with merchant ships.

 

[parsifal]

IJN may have been aggressive about Occupation of Australia but IJA.

I dont think either service ended up supportive of a direct invasion. the Navy were concerned about the shipping needed, which explains why they wanted a limited, small invasion. the army never liked the navy's proposal. I think they correctly deduced that a limited invasion would not cause the surrender of Australia, would not prevent US reinforcement and the build up of Australia as a major base of operations, and would be very likley to end badly for Japan. They favoured a large scale invasion, but were very relactant to provide the necessary troops

The ABC map looks an ordinary maritime one equipped with merchant ships.

I agree, it looks like a naval chart. But that is also what i wouold expect. the chart is too small to see any details on it, it may well have invasion details, like shipping lists and navigational issues written onto the chart. I would expect very little information on the countryside would have been available to either the IJA or the IJN. Dont forget, the Japanese had no maps on which to base their operation MO or the invasion of Tulagi either

 

[Shinpachi]

IJA researched the Commonwealth nations in early 1942 but not interested in invasion into any of them except India.

IJN asked IJA to deploy some troops toward Guadalcanal to cut connection between US and Australia.
IJA refused once, or more, but accepted finally as IJN insisted US Navy would not come till next year(1943).

To exclude western powers from Asia and build up "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was their, including IJN, first job.
Invasion into Australia might have come but it would not have been before it.

I don't deny invasion as any imperial nations in the history tried to expand their territory step by step.

 

[parsifal]

IJA researched the Commonwealth nations in early 1942 but not interested in invasion into any of them except India.

IJN asked IJA to deploy some troops toward Guadalcanal to cut connection between US and Australia.
IJA refused once, or more, but accepted finally as IJN insisted US Navy would not come till next year(1943).

To exclude western powers from Asia and build up "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was their, including IJN, first job.
Invasion into Australia might have come but it would not have been before it.

I don't deny invasion as any imperial nations in the history tried to expand their territory step by step.

All I can say Spinpachi san is that it is untrue that Japan had no interest in invading Australia. They had an interest, realized it was too hard, and came up with alternatives to isolate Australia, and thereby force her to surrender, and certainly to neutralize Australia as an effective base of operations. Events overtook the japanese to completely eclipse all those issues.

The AWM has a number of references and maps that clearly show the Japanese were considering invasion, and went even further to undertake some basic operational studies. One of them was produced by Peter Stanley, a naysayer of the invasion theorists and reproduced below, along with some others that provide a range of different viewpoints and assessments. I recommend you have a look. Even mr Stanley, only goes to the extent of denying that it was not feasible. He does not claim that it was never considered. in fact he shows that a number of options were considered, some of them in detail.

http://www.awm.gov.au/events/conference/2002/stanley_paper.pdf

Japanese Army rejects limited invasion and demands full control of Australia

https://cliojournal.wikispaces.com/Did+Japan+Intend+to+Invade+Australia?

http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bp/1992/92bp06.pdf

 

[Shinpachi]

Thanks for your interesting information, parsifal.

I am not reading all yet but this map was made by Chinese at least.
I find no Japanese there.

Page 6 of '"He's (not) Coming South": the invasion that wasn't'

 

[Shinpachi]

I have fully understood how nervous Australian government was in 1942 and I perfectly agree with Duncan Grey's analysis.
Japan had no intention to invade Australia or was unable to do so during the ww2.
Thank you very much.