The Do-335 (1 Viewer)

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Haztoys

Senior Airman
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Dec 1, 2005
Prescott Arizona USA
Would the Do-335 German fighter have worked out as a good fighter if the timing and there had been more of them ...Or......???
 
Perhaps, but it would've proven more capable in the destroyer role, leaving the role of fighter to the true fighters, the Me-262 Ta-152.
 
There were plans of installing jet engines in the later versions. I wonder how their performance would've differed? I agree with Flyboy2 in the bomber destroyer role and I think it would've done well as a fighter-bomber.
 
Perhaps, but it would've proven more capable in the destroyer role, leaving the role of fighter to the true fighters, the Me-262 Ta-152.

Correct. If Germany had spent the time and money on the real weapon advantage they had, the Me-262, instead on the almost useless weapons such as the Do-335, the V-1, the V-2, etc., etc., they would have been far more formidable.

Flyboy2 said:
I think it would have been a little heavy, kinda like the P-38. However, i think it would have been an amazing bomber destroyer!

I think the aircraft was too heavy to be effective against possible escort fighters it could have been pitted against at bomber altitudes of 25 to 35k (B-17/29). The P-47M, which was selected as the best allied fighter above 25k ft. by the Joint Fighter Conference, was available and was slightly slower at 25k but much faster as altitude went from 25-35k ft, had more power available (2800hp to 32.5k, 2600hp at 35k) and almost 6000 lbs less airframe weight, giving a much better wing loading and power loading at these altitudes. Therefore, it would have been faster, much more nimble, and accelerated better. In addition, it had a higher ceiling. At these bomber altitudes, the Do-335 would have been at a disadvantage. So, see comment above.
 
I think as a mainstay bomber interceptor it was a waste of ressources. Ta 152 and Me 262 together fulfilled all the needs except for maybe range, which was less of a concern for Germany at the time.

It would've been great as a multi-role aircraft though: Reconaissance, fast-bomber and in limited numbers as "destroyer".
Correct. If Germany had spent the time and money on the real weapon advantage they had, the Me-262, instead on the almost useless weapons such as the Do-335, the V-1, the V-2, etc., etc., they would have been far more formidable.
This is always brought up when it comes to these superweapons, but it's hard to say how relevant it really was. V1/V2 was a whole different league than jet or prop fighters: The knowledge it took to develop isn't interchangeable with the resources needed to develop piston or jet engines, the fuel they burned was made from potatoes (I heard). Sure they were much too high on the Reich's prio list, but overall I don't think it made the tremendous (negative) impact many assume.

The Do 335 development was continued as a fallback for the Ta 152, which imo was very sensible (esp. considering they used different engines) and mirrors the development practice of nearly all the airforces at the time (and probably today). And it's not like you could just switch a factory and it's workers from DB 603 to jet engine production in a matter of days.
 
The Ta-152 was also a more practical aircraft. It was just a development of an already proven and effective aircraft. I don't know if the Do-335 was the wonder aircraft. It seems as though the engine arrangement would have been overly complicated. It actually kind of reminds me of the P-39
 
Hi Krazykraut,

>This is always brought up when it comes to these superweapons, but it's hard to say how relevant it really was. V1/V2 was a whole different league than jet or prop fighters: The knowledge it took to develop isn't interchangeable with the resources needed to develop piston or jet engines, the fuel they burned was made from potatoes (I heard).

Actually the V1 and V2 were quite different in that respect. The V1 was a cheap, easily mass-produced and not very advanced weapon, while the V2 was expensive high technology.

Ironically Milch considered the V1 a great success, and the V2 a critical failure. The V1 launch sites made a major strategical target for the Allied bombers, soaking up sorties that without their existence would have hit the German economy. (And as far as the Germans were concerned, they were convinced that strategic bombing worked.) Of course Milch had exaggerated expectations regarding the effectiveness of the V1 against its targets, but just for the decoy and flak trap value it had, he already considered it a success.

The V2 on the other hand he saw as a competitor to the Luftwaffe when it came to the allocation of critically needed resources. In his opinion, the V2 was a great waste of manpower and materials that would have better been used to strengthen the Luftwaffe's conventional fighter force.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
The V-2 also took away possibilities of SAM development.

Huh...? It actually lead to them, see Wasserfall... from this POV, the V-2 technology opened completely new technologies, which on the long term would have been the solution to Allied heavy bombers. The Wasserfall was close to being a usable weapon by the wars end.

As for the Do 335, it was IMHO how the whole Zestörer should have started. That plane would have been the ultimate Zestörer and multirole aircraft, equally useful for defensive (interception) and offensive (fast bomber or recon) roles. The Ta 152 o.t.o.h. was a very special weapon for high altitude and little good for anything else - a luxury in that situation IMHO.
 
The wasted R&D efforts in the third reich was endemic to the very regime. Nazi germany was run rather like a series of semi autonomous feifdoms, rather than a major nation geared for a major war. this was the fundamental difference with the allies. The allies were far better organized when it came to use of resources, including R&D resources. In Germany, because of the fractured efforts, lack of overseeing infrastructure (except the suppressive organizations like the gestapo) the lack of accountability, the R&D and production efforts were always going to be disjointed and haphazard. Trying to argue that they should have concentrated on this project or that, is like trying to make a lion go vegetarian....it is just impossible, except if the regimne were changed, if the regime were changed, peace would break out
 
Hi Parsifal,

>The wasted R&D efforts in the third reich was endemic to the very regime.

Roger that. The creation of poorly defined, overlapping responsibilities was a way of implementing the "divide and rule" principle because the competing factions would need the support of those higher up in the hierarchy to win in the turf wars that inevitably ensued.

However, it's my impression that the incompetence of the German institutions is often exaggerated because it makes a better story. Just think of the "Ural-Bomber" that was in fact canceled by General Wever himself before his accidental death, and rightly so because it would have resulted in a heavy bomber with poorer performance and payload than the Short Stirling ...

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
I agree Henning that the innefficiencies of the Nazi system should not be overstated. The proof that the german R&D efforts bore fruit are everywhere. German equipment was superior to Allied, or Soviet in very many ways, so it would be innaccurate to try and portray the effort as totally without fruit. However, the Nazis were just unable to target their resources to anywhere near the same degree as the Allies. There was nothing comparable to the JCS in the German camp, nothing even to compare to the General Board (of the US armed forces)> basically someone would think of a bright idea, convince one of the power barons, and off they would go, spending money and research RM, like they were in limitless supply.

It did not stop there. Say the RLM, or the Heer issued a specification for a new piece of equipment. There would be a spec issued, and contracts issued to the successful tender, just like every other western country. But unique to the German system was this belief that the losing tender should get some order for some of his equipment, to compensate that company for all the hard work they had put into their design development!!!! Why have a tender process at all, if there is actually no real loser!. This contributed enromously to German standardisation (and hence logistic) problems throughout the war. I know this appears to be a little off-topic, but the Dornier/Fockewulf/Messerschmitt/Heinkel solutions presented at the end of the war in the forms of the various designs (D 335, Ta 152, Me262, He 162) repesented a gross multiplication of effort that germany could simply not afford. If the Me 262 was the best of the bunch (as i believe it was), why were other designs accepted and allowed to enter production and service at the same time.....why wasnt Heinkel, for example, producing 262 components, instead of building yet another type to just screw up the front line logistics for the fighting forces. The allies had this multiplication of effort as well, but they were in a better position to enjoy this sort of frippery, and even though they did double up, it was nowhere near to the extent that the germans did the same thing.....
 
The He-162 used large amounts of plywood and a different engine than the Me-262. Its components could to a large degree be built by small dispersed workshops and only final assembly had to be done in the factory. There was ALL the reason to produce it.

The Ta-152 was a piston engined plane. That alone was reason enough to produce it. The complete switch to Me-262 production you suggest would've left the piston engine production capacity unused and would leave a lot of pilots with their outdated Bf-109 G-6s or without any plane at all. Like mentioned above: you can't just take the machinery and workforce for piston engines and switch them to jet engines.

Do-335: It again used a different engine than the Ta-152 (H). It wasn't exactly pushed hard by the RLM and can be considered a fallback (like mentioned before) to the Ta-152.
 
So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war.

I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces. People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn. Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity, and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous. Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs. And here we are, continuing that myth, that false economy, by trying to argue that four different fighters were needed to fulfill the same function

Bah, humbug I say.....
 
Hi Krazykraut,

Actually the V1 and V2 were quite different in that respect. The V1 was a cheap, easily mass-produced and not very advanced weapon, while the V2 was expensive high technology.

Ironically Milch considered the V1 a great success, and the V2 a critical failure. The V1 launch sites made a major strategical target for the Allied bombers, soaking up sorties that without their existence would have hit the German economy. (And as far as the Germans were concerned, they were convinced that strategic bombing worked.) Of course Milch had exaggerated expectations regarding the effectiveness of the V1 against its targets, but just for the decoy and flak trap value it had, he already considered it a success.

Henning (HoHun)

On further thought, this makes perfect sense. Both the V1 and V2 were worthless military weapons of WWII bound for greatness in later generations. However, the simplicity of the V1 made this weapon prolific and ingenious, and the complexity of the V2, wasteful.
 
So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war.
Obviously this is not at all what I was saying :rolleyes: What's with all the polemics, no offense but it's pretty obvious that you want to see this in the most negative light possible. Show me the airforce that was stupid enough to bet all its money on a single fighter development at any time in the war? RAF? USAAF? VVS? There is none. Not then, not today.

Just look at what happened when you bet all your money on a single horse: The Me-210.

And the most important point with all this: Besides the Ta-152 and the He-162 none was supposed to enter large scale production any time soon. So basically you have:
- one late piston fighter
- one rather expensive jet (due to the fact that design started and ended in less pressing conditions)
- one cheap jet that could be built in huge numbers in short time under worst conditions

Still sound megalomaniac?

I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces. People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn. Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity, and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous. Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs. And here we are, continuing that myth, that false economy, by trying to argue that four different fighters were needed to fulfill the same function

Bah, humbug I say.....
Nothing of this has to do with the fighter designs in question though.

As usually history is written by the victors. If the war turned out the other way we would be discussing why oh why there was the P-80 AND the Airacomet, the Meteor AND Vampire, the P-47M AND the XP-72, the F8F AND the F4U, the F9F, the B-29 AND the B-32 and probably a dozen other designs I don't remember.

The fact remains: At no point in the war did Germany have considerably more fighter designs in the air or in the pipes than any of its adversaries.
 
So essentially what you are saying is that the German aeronautical industry was in such a sorry state that it was unable to produce a single type that could fulfill all the fighter needs facing Germany in the latter half of the war.

I dont believe that, but is is a sorry apology to try and argue that all four types were needed, and justified. It continues the same sort of warped logic that drove the actual wartime Nazi procurement machine. What was needed, in all facets of the hardware procurement machine, was standardization, and a return to some sort of sanity in the produce ability of the items for all the armed forces.

Hmm.

Gladiator
Hurricane
Whirlwind
Spitfire
Typhoon
Tempest
Meteor
Vampire

All for the same role.

P-36
P-38
P-39
P-40
P-47
P-51
P-63
P-80
F4F
F6F
F8F
F4U

All for the same role.

I did not count but it appears to be more than just four.

People like Speer harped on this theme, again and again, but were overruled by the Hitlerian lackeys at every turn.

[/QUOTE] Speer for example held up the Sherman tank as the shining example of production sanity,[/QUOTE]

Hmm.

The Sherman alone had 3 types of suspension, 3 types of hull, 5 types of different guns with different ammunition and IIRC 4 types of different powerplants were used. One of them was actually five powerplants bolted together into 'one' engine' - save that it had five carburrattors, five water pumps etc. - five times of everything!

In comparison, 98% of German tanks in the second half of the war - when the Sherman appeared - used two (broadly similiar in construction) powerplants: the HL 120 and HL 210/230 series. Any German workshop was familiar with any of them. Same basic components, mostly.

I would say that German AFV production was far more standardized - a couple of basic chassis and two powerplants were found almost all of their tanks.

and then compared it to the sorry state of Germany's own efforts, where production always seemed to be ignored for bigger and better machines, to the point of the ridiculous.

That is simply not true.

Consider this....in AFV production, the Germans were considering the production of at least two monster tanks that I know of (one of which was the Maus) which whilst technological marvels, bore no resemblance to Germany's actual wartime needs.

Like if the Allies and Soviets didn't have a couple of ridiculus super-heavy tank projects - Tortoise, the American T-28, the Soviets had a whole series of completely dumb super heavy tank projects around 1940. Oversized KV-series, as I recall.
 
Hi Parsifal,

>If the Me 262 was the best of the bunch (as i believe it was), why were other designs accepted and allowed to enter production and service at the same time.....why wasnt Heinkel, for example, producing 262 components

Well, the RLM decided the Luftwaffe needed a cheap fighter, and pressed on with it. Not only Willy Messerschmitt, but also Kurt Tank who had no stakes in this pointed out that the single-engine fighter did not make sense, and while the Heinkel works provided a position paper outlining the expected advantages, I have to say that with the benefit of hindsight, Willy Messerschmitt's and Kurt Tank's more pessimistic stance was entirely justified, and Heinkel did not deliver on their promise. I'll admit that the He 162 was an astonishing little high-performance aircraft, but the Me 262 simply was the better fighter. The effort for getting another jet fighter into production outweighed the resource savings from that jet fighter's lower material demands, and the He 162 didn't have as much development potential as the Me 262 just because it was a very small aircraft.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
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