The Do-335

[parsifal]

I agree. The LW had two very potent fighters in the 262 and the Ta 152. Other companies should have been used to manufacture components of these two planes rather than complicate the logustic network, by introducing yet another model to the inventory, and one not as good as those already in the works

 

[drgondog]

Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat.

Soren - I'm not sure that is true with respect to all air to air scores. Of the 6-1-2 air shot down by 355th/2SF none were downed in the pattern, although one damaged at altitude blew up at low altitude. No Mustang losses to 262's in the 355th or 2SF.

I would be interested in you data on air to air scores for the 262, particularly with respect to categories of fighters, bombers and recon. This is an interesting research item since the LW records are so poor for the last 6 months of the war. As near as I can tell the 8th AF FC had about 105 Me 262Awards plus 15 more Ar 234's and Me 163's - no He 162's.

I am still researching the month by month breakout of 8th FC losses but the 8th AF FC lost ~ 638 fighters air to air and very few proportionately after September 1944. Even if the number of Allied fighters downed is low, that is a reflection again of 'evade the fighters and go after the bomber' philosophy not the Me 262 superiority.

I do know a lot of the 262's were shot down close to an airfield - either after being chased or while gaining speed and altitude after take off, so I'm not disputing the vulnerability in that mode - nor am I debating the clear superiority of the 262. Nor am I debating that it should have the best ratios even in contrast to the Ta 152 - which is statitistically insignificant.


And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed.

This is true for 4 of the six cited above. Two were caused by engaging the Mustangs and not capitalizing on its advantages ('pilot stupidity' not inferior performance). The 4 were nailed in one engine from long range and chased to closure

However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2.


Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.

Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.

The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...

Soren - I agree all your points except the one I can't find reliable data on - namely those shot down in landing pattern versus 'other conditions' - as 90%.

Many of the other 262 awards I have researched were a result of the 262 entering a heavy escort 'density' and one or more fighters got a medium to long range burst taking out an engine - then chasing and closing.

 

[parsifal]

B]I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me.[/B]

Suggest that you read his book, along with with Joel Haywards "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers Defeat In the East". These will make very clear the poor showing of the LW in the logistics area


Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons.

I disgree that its circumstantial. These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.

For the record, the failure of the LW was multi dimensional. They produced too many fighters, not enough fuel, not enough pilots, and not enough sparea. This was not a late war phenomena. It was the reult of decisions and usage of the LW stretching right back to the beginning of the war

Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?
Manners are given to those that deserve it. You try a little civility, yourself, and you will be quite surprised.

Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision. It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained. In other words, all the ingredients that go into making a workable air force operating at peak efficiency were there, in just the right balance. If you can produce evidence to prove that, then maybe you will be given the respect you are now demanding

The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.

That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.

Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.


The allied model has nothing to do with the thread, however, for the record, the allies had plenty of problems and managerial issues. The worst one I can think of are the unescorted deep penetration raids into Germany in 1943.

But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war

 

[Soren]

Bill,

I can't be specific about the Me262's kill/loss ratio for the same reason (Incomplete LW records), but I'm relying mostly on what vets and the books tell me. According to my research by far the majority of Me-262's were shot down while trying to land, and Galland wanted to form a protective squadron for that very reason. There really were VERY few incidents of Me-262'a shot down in combat, and of the few who were, most were when trying to turn on back to attack the bombers for a second attack run, allowing diving escorts to get a split second burst.

As for the two Me-262's who challenged the P-51's you talk about, well the most common mistake by rookie 262 pilots was to think that the Me-262 could dogfight the piston engined fighters at low speeds on equal terms - it couldn't, the jet engines didn't provide enough acceleration at slow speeds. Experienced pilots however knew that maintaining speed was the key, and that high G turns, zoom climbs and dives was the effective way of tackling the piston engined fighters. Esp. a high G turn with the nose pointing slightly down was effective, as this enhanced the Me-262's already large advantage in speed retention in tight turns. But in short the key was to stay fast and take advantage of the Me-262's superior handling and acceleration at high speeds.

 

[KrazyKraut]

I disgree that its circumstantial.

"Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."
Sounds very fitting to me.

These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.

For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44.

On the other side of the channel the RAF struggled two times to get the latest Spitfire into widespread service. How often is it said that the introduction of the Mk.IX eliminated the advantage of the Fw-190, but a lot of squadrons still operated on outdated Mk.Vs for a long time afterwards. The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter. And not to even mention the various subtypes of high-mid-low altitude engines and clipped-long-50cal-cannon-303cal wings throughout the Spitfires history: a logistical nightmare. Then there's the Bristol Centaurus. Arguably one of the worst cases of a missed opportunity in fighter development: The engine was mature by late 1942, yet it never powered any operational WW2 fighter. The Tempest II was seen as superior to the V but a very faulty planning with manufacturers switching back and forth doomed what could've been the best radial-engined fighter of WWII to a footnote. All this is directly attributable to a mismanaged fighter procurement.

I say directly attributable because regarding Germany you like to ignore a few things:

Germany fought on three high intensity theatres, one of them being very dynamical in the sense switching back and forth between various airfields. German squadrons had to fly several times the number of sorties per day than the Western Allies had to. Germany was on the defense in the West thus had to react, whereas the Western Allies had the initiative and could plan and forecast their replacements much easier. Not to mention that their major fighter force was conveniently placed within a radius of a few hundred miles and not scattered throughout entire Europe.

All these things contribute to the logistical situation a lot more than the He-162 ever could.

Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision.

According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.

It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained.

None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might aswell argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons?

That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.

Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.

The Me-262 serial production was ~1200 from january (?) '44 until april '45. Meaning 75 aircraft per month. Despite the worst possible conditions under which an aircraft could've ever been designed and developed, around 330 He-162s were completed from february to april 1945: or around 110 per month.

German metal manufacturing capacity was absolutely exhausted, the wood industry wasn't. The He-162 used one BMW 003, the Me-262 used two Jumo 004. I want to see the author who seriously claims ditching the He-162 would've increased Me-262 production significantly.

The allied model has nothing to do with the thread,

Oh yes it does. Because "poor management" is relative. So without a relation that statement is useless. We've been argueing this back and forth for several pages now and you still haven't provided any answer to the two most significant, objective and undisputable facts regarding the whole procurement subject:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?

But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war

The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome.

 

[Juha]

KraztKraut
Quote: "The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter."

What had more Spit XIVs changed? IIRC British army wasn't badly hindered by LW in ETO or in MTO in 1944-45 and I cannot recall many German daytime air attacks on UK in 44-5. On the other hand Heer often complained the lack of air support and unhindered Allied air attacks against it. It was Germans who asked: "Where are our fighters?" not British. Conclusion, RAF had enough air-superiority fighters, LW didn't have. So RAF didn't have urgent need for more Spit XIVs.

Clipped or long wing was not a logistical question it was a simple conversion. 0.5 vs .303 was a question of availability which shows how hard pressed UK economy was during the war.

Quote:" Germany fought on three high intensity theatres."

Now Eastern Front was almost entirely Germany-Soviet show, but against whom Germany fought in ETO and MTO? So Allied had those fronts to worry about and Germany being in centre it had clearly easier to move units between those 2 theatres than Allies. And allies had one major theatre, or actually two very far away, PTO and CBI.

Quote: "According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100"

Actually Wikipedia says "509 claimed Allied kills" which is different thing than 509 kills. Claims and real things are not the same.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

"Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."
Sounds pretty much just like that.
For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44.

Good management is not about the promotion of one or two of the variables. Its about the management of the whole. the bringing together of all resources relevant to a given system that will enable the maximum to be extracted from that system. Thats why it is necessary to bring together all the diverse pieces of the puzzle, to understand the whole. You can call it a collection of circumstantial evidence if you like, but if you know anythjing about good management, then you would understnad the principles of Total Quality Management, a little better than you do. Its not about just one part, its about all the parts and thats why its necessary to look at a diverse range of issues, so as to understand the whole

The allies won, not just because they were the greatest economic and manpower sources of the time. They won because they had the management structures in place to ensure that the available resources were delivered in the right balance, and at the right times to ensure victory. The allies, for example knew that at some point numbers were important. they knew that they needed a high aircraft availability, they knew that they needed the pilots to fly the vast number of machines they were producing.

At the beginning of 1944, the Germans still commanded something in the order of 25% of the worlds industrial potential. They commanded the most experienced and tactically well led ground and air forces in the world. yet they failed miserably in the battle with the allies. And as i said, it was not a given that the allies were always going to win the battle. though by 1944, victory was indeed slipping from Germany's grasp. But this was because the Germans had led the ball slip from their fingers, , whilst the Allies had never lost sight of their goals.

Lets compare the German efforts to those of the Allies just for th year 1944

Overy advises that in 1938, the Germans controlled 28% of the worlds industrial potential By 1944 the USS BS estimates that the German economy had been degraded in performance by about 10% so that it was down to 25% due to the effects of the war, including bombing (on the one hand they had suffered losses in manpower, but on the other they could utilize the resources of the occupied territories. The fact that they tended to misuse these resources was again a function of German mismanagement. Still the potential and contribution of the occupied territories cannot be denied. The Citroen motor company, for example, built over 40000 military vehicles for the wehrmacht, more than 10% of total vehicle production for the Germans). Taking into account the additions and subtractions of the war, the USS BS estimates that at the beginning of 1944, the Germans still commanded more than 25% of the worlds military industrial potential. With this approximate 25% capability, they were able, for their air force, able to achieve the following

25000 fighters
8500 pilots
a theoretical (ie, before bombing) oil production of 8.1 million tons of oil
Operational readiness was running at about 45% at the beginning of 1944, but by the end it was down to less than 30%, although by that stage, allied actions were having a big effect. Axis losses were running at about 6-8 times those suffered by the allies at the end of 1944. From January through to May 1944, the crucial period, they were running at approximately 4 losses for every allied loss

These results were more or less inevitable, however the question is whether or not the Germans could have done better or lasted longer than they did....

By comparison, just to look at the USAAF, with access to about 40% of the worlds industrial potential produced the following

38873 fighters
38500 pilots
approximately 80000000 tons of petroleum products

The UK , with about 12% of the worlds military potential, produced the following

10700 fighters
17900 pilots
Approximately 24000000 tons of petroleum products from her middle eastern refineries (Iraq and Saudi Arabia mostly).

Therefore, with 52% of the worlds economic power, compared to to Germany's 25%, the allies, if they had only been as efficient as the Germans, would have produced in very rough terms 2.1 times everything. In fact they produced

1.99 times the aircraft
6.5 times the pilots
12.8 times the fuel


Now, as you can see, the Germans achieved a proportional parity in terms of numbers produced (however, the allies were also spending a much larger proportion on strike aircraft) but the Germans got the proportions of oil fuel and pilots needed completely wrong. They also suffered abysmal sortie rates, even before the fuel famine from bombing took effect, which as Murray points out, was at least partly due to a low serviceability rate (which was due to shortages in spares parts, despite your denials)

So, in my opinion, the decisions made in 1942-3, concerning the proportion of resources for pilots, spare parts, and new airframes was completely misunderstood and misread by the Germans, and led to a force structure, whereby the number of airframes produced did not correlate to the available pilots, nor to the projected availability of fuel.

Why is it that the Allies were able to get the proportion so right, and the Germans so wrong. Most historians agree it was because the Allies planned for a long war from the start, and put far more resources into the "tail" of their force structure....more trainers, vast resources into pilot training. Very detailed analysis of combat tactics, and where the enemy was weakest (backed up by very good Signal intelligence). But above all, once the battle was properly joined, the Allies, from the very top down, adopted a proper management structure, exemplified by the joint Chiefs Of Staff, which was never emulated by the Germans. Every major decision, every war aim, every operation, every strategy was passed by the joint chiefs, to whom not even Winston, or Roosevelt could bypass, try as they might. There was nothing comparable to this organization in the German camp, and its poor strategic direction and management of its resources showed as a result of that lack of co-ordination.


On the other side of the channel the RAF struggled two times to get the latest Spitfire into widespread service. How often is it said that the introduction of the Mk.IX eliminated the advantage of the Fw-190, but a lot of squadrons still operated on outdated Mk.Vs for a long time after wards. The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter. And not to even mention the various subtypes of high-mid-low altitude engines and clipped-long-50cal-cannon-303cal wings throughout the Spitfires history: a logistical nightmare and directly attributable to procurement.

The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements. The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers. They maintained some high quality units, and equipment, but at the end of the day, the allies realized that they needed the numbers more than anything. new technology is a "nice to have" advantage, but at the end of the day it s the number of aircraft that you can consistently put into the air that counts the most. The allies realized this. They also realized they needed to maintain quality, and did this as well. In the end, the numbers won. And this was not just a straight comparison of industrial potential, as the quick analysis done above hints at. It was more than that. It was because the strategic leadership of the western allies was so far superior to that which existed in Germany that mattered as well. target war




I say directly attributable because regarding Germany you like to ignore a few things:

Germany fought on three high intensity theatres, one of them being very dynamical in the sense switching back and forth between various airfields.

Thats interesting. You forget that the western allies were fighting a war on a truly global scale, far more so than the Germans. For the British, and the commonwealth, there were major fronts in the med, Burma, the SW pacific. There were massive material commitments to the Soviet Union to be met. In the Atlantic, the British were fighting a truly life and death struggle for survival, that soaked up a huge percentage of her resources.

For the US there were commitments also in the med, and SW PAC, as well as the central pacific. Even more so than the British, the US had lend lease commitments (which soaked up more than 17% of her productive capacity). The Germans had the priceless advantage of fighting from interior lines (which you perversely try to portray here as some kind of disadvantage, which shows a profound lack of understanding of military strategy) , which was something not available to the Allies. if the Germans could wrest the initiative for even a short while, they could have concentrated on one front, and caused an upset in the balance in that theatre. It was only through the most horrendous determination and dogged pressing home of the attacks that the allies were able to maintain the vital initiative. truly

 

[KrazyKraut]

What did the Tempest change? What did the P-51H, P-47M/N or the P-80 change in WW2. Next to nothing. Yet they were all still introduced at a point when the war was basically won. So there must've been a need afterall.

And I'm very aware that kills aren't claims, it was obviously only an illustration of the relative effectiveness of the old and new fighters.

 

[parsifal]

German squadrons had to fly several times the number of sorties per day than the Western Allies had to.

This is utter crap. The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans. Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later. Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%. Stop sprouting bull crap to support your arguments. I will spot it from a mile away

Germany was on the defense in the West thus had to react, whereas the Western Allies had the initiative and could plan and forecast their replacements much easier.

This is true, but it had gotten to that point for reasons that included poor strategic direction, and overuse of her air forces in support of operations that had stretched them to breaking point, particularly over Stalingrad, and Tunisia. the Germans had arrived at their point of military bankruptcy as much by their own hand as by the efforts of the allies. Yet another example of poor management of resources

Not to mention that their major fighter force was conveniently placed within a radius of a few hundred miles and not scattered throughout entire Europe.

The allies were not just concentrated on one front, they had global commitments. It was the Germans who were concentrated in open area by the latter part of 1943. From mid 1943 onward, the were virtually no LW fighters in the Med, and only 24% of the total force on the eastern front. nearly all the others (about 70%) were concentrated in the Reich defences. By contrast, only 33 of the 97 (IIRC) fighter groups available to the US were concentrated in England at the beginning of 1944, and this number was the same at the end of 1944.

 

[parsifal]

All these things contribute to the logistical situation a lot more than the He-162 ever could.


No, adding the he 162 was a technological success, but a managerial disaster. The type should never have been produced. instead the Germans should have concentrated on producing the 262, and possibly the Ta152, or the 109K (whichever is more producible, take your pick). introducing another aircraft to the already inefficient factories was going to slow delivery rates down, not speed them up. Operational rates were going to suffer, not improve, because of the he 162, because it was an additional, and new type which inevitably was going to suffer a high grounding rate as these problems were being ironed out.

According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.

So long as it could get airborne. The problem is in the operational rates. I dont know if the 500 wiki quotes is accurate or not, but i do know the 262 suffered a very low operational rate until 1945, when it slowly began to pick up in readiness levels. And it was way ahead of the He162 in this regard. What would have happened, if the war had dragged on, would be a whole lot of resources diverted away from the 262 (either pilots, or fuel, or factory space, or a combination of all of thee above) for no immediate gain. The result would be an actual drop in the operational rates for the LW.


None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might as well argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons?

No, a better mix of required resources to get the maximum force into the air, and able to fight more effectively. Also an equivalent of the Joint Chiefs, ao as to manage Germany's economic, training/re[placement, and front line needs more effectively, rather than having a series of disjointed, and un-coordinated efforts being run more or less independent of the other.


Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.

"Axis Aircraft Of WWII", David Mondey, Chancellor press 2002

"Despite its rapid development, many problems persisted that remained unsolved by the end of the war...." So there is at least one source that challenges your assertion that it was combat ready. It was not fully ready, and suffered very low (even by the LW standards) operational readiness rates as a result

The Me-262 serial production was ~1200 from January (?) '44 until April '45. Meaning 75 aircraft per month. Despite the worst possible conditions under which an aircraft could've ever been designed and developed, around 330 were completed from February to april 1945: or around 110 per month.

Err no, this is not true. Actual production figures for completed units was 116, of which just over 50 had been delivered, all with problems, and a further 880 in various incomplete stages of production. Mondey says that the lines had been brought to a standstill, because of structural problems in the wing and undercarriage. Some aircraft had to be sent back to the factory to exchange the original 30mm cannon for 20mm types, because the airframe was unable to absorb the recoil of the 30mm guns. There were several failures in operational types with the undercarriage literally tearing away, and the wooden construction caused problems on the leading edges at high speeds. Sounds like a whole lot of solvable, but nevertheless developmental problems to me.


Mondey completes his assessment of the type with these words "An unusual design, with numerous unsolved developmental problems. The He 162 was a foolhardy and ill-considered attempt to address Germany's air defence problems.


The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome.

It was only part of Germany's problem. The Germans exacerbated this allied advantage by misusing their own resources, and mis-ordering there priorities. If they had managed their resources more intelligently, the result would have been the same, but the Germans would not have been massacred quite so quickly as they were.

 

[Juha]

KrazyKraut
just becouse they had also Tempest they didn't have urgent need for more Mk XIVs. And if there had been urgent need for more XIVs easy way to increase production would have been cut back Firefly production. The other fighter which was powered by Griffon.


Juha

 

[KrazyKraut]

Since this consumes way too much of my time now I will ignore your second attempt at insulting and belittling and repeat what I believe to be the most important questions regarding procurement management:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?

This is utter crap. The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans. Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later. Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%.

This is true for late 1943 and onwards but can be attributed easily to the bombing campaigns on infrastructure that were stepping up. And unlike most Western pilots the Germans had usually been in constant fighting since they were drafted and as a result there was no rotation which seriously effected combat readiness of the pilots themselves.

This is true, but it had gotten to that point for reasons that included poor strategic direction, and overuse of her air forces in support of operations that had stretched them to breaking point, particularly over Stalingrad, and Tunisia. the Germans had arrived at their point of military bankruptcy as much by their own hand as by the efforts of the allies. Yet another example of poor management of resources

Yes strategic direction was flawed, not fighter procurement.

The allies were not just concentrated on one front, they had global commitments. It was the Germans who were concentrated in open area by the latter part of 1943. From mid 1943 onward, the were virtually no LW fighters in the Med, and only 24% of the total force on the eastern front. nearly all the others (about 70%) were concentrated in the Reich defences. By contrast, only 33 of the 97 (IIRC) fighter groups available to the US were concentrated in England at the beginning of 1944, and this number was the same at the end of 1944.

Yep, I misjudged the proportions. But let's get this straight: How large were the individual fighter strengths of RAF, USAAF and LW on the channel front in mid 43 and early and late '44?

No, adding the he 162 was a technological success, but a managerial disaster. The type should never have been produced. instead the Germans should have concentrated on producing the 262, and possibly the Ta152, or the 109K (whichever is more producible, take your pick). introducing another aircraft to the already inefficient factories was going to slow delivery rates down, not speed them up. Operational rates were going to suffer, not improve, because of the he 162, because it was an additional, and new type which inevitably was going to suffer a high grounding rate as these problems were being ironed out.

What in the end matters is not whether it is a technological or managerial success, but whether it's an operational success. In the end it of course wasn't as it was introduced when the war was long lost. The decision to produce and introduce it was nevertheless the right one as what little resources could've been saved in the metal industry would've never led to significantly more Me-262s. While if the war had been for some reason prolonged it could've replaced a large portion of outdated piston fighters much faster than the Me-262. Regarding the logistical situation you have the induced complication of another type vs. the reduced complication of a much simpler aircraft than the Me-262.

"Despite its rapid development, many problems persisted that remained unsolved by the end of the war...." So there is at least one source that challenges your assertion that it was combat ready. It was not fully ready, and suffered very low (even by the LW standards) operational readiness rates as a result

One opinion that is in contrast to what the pilots who actually flew the type say.

Err no, this is not true. Actual production figures for completed units was 116, of which just over 50 had been delivered, all with problems, and a further 880 in various incomplete stages of production.

I disagree with those numbers as more than 40 were delivered to Erp.Grp. 162 alone. Not that it really matters. The point was, that the He 162 was much faster and cheaper to produce than the Me-262. Enough to outfit a considerable part of JG 1 only weeks after production started.

The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements. The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers.

I am not disdainful of them, I merely pointed out that they were very far from logistically easy to handle.

 

[Soren]

"An unusual design, with numerous unsolved developmental problems. The He 162 was a foolhardy and ill-considered attempt to address Germany's air defence problems. "

Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.

The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.

 

[drgondog]

KraztKraut
Quote: "The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter."

What had more Spit XIVs changed? IIRC British army wasn't badly hindered by LW in ETO or in MTO in 1944-45 and I cannot recall many German daytime air attacks on UK in 44-5. On the other hand Heer often complained the lack of air support and unhindered Allied air attacks against it. It was Germans who asked: "Where are our fighters?" not British. Conclusion, RAF had enough air-superiority fighters, LW didn't have. So RAF didn't have urgent need for more Spit XIVs.

Clipped or long wing was not a logistical question it was a simple conversion. 0.5 vs .303 was a question of availability which shows how hard pressed UK economy was during the war.

Quote:" Germany fought on three high intensity theatres."

Now Eastern Front was almost entirely Germany-Soviet show, but against whom Germany fought in ETO and MTO? So Allied had those fronts to worry about and Germany being in centre it had clearly easier to move units between those 2 theatres than Allies. And allies had one major theatre, or actually two very far away, PTO and CBI.

Quote: "According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100"

Actually Wikipedia says "509 claimed Allied kills" which is different thing than 509 kills. Claims and real things are not the same.

Juha

I agree Juha - The 8th AF FC awarded 105+ Me 262 kills alone. We know even awards are different from claims but I suspect the LW lost a lot more 262s in the air than 100 to the combined 8th/9th/15th FC, BC and RAF. We will never know because of the incomplete LW records and the imprecision of the claim/award processes.

 

[drgondog]

What did the Tempest change? What did the P-51H, P-47M/N or the P-80 change in WW2. Next to nothing. Yet they were all still introduced at a point when the war was basically won. So there must've been a need afterall.

And I'm very aware that kills aren't claims, it was obviously only an illustration of the relative effectiveness of the old and new fighters.

Of course there was a perceived need when the contracts for design and production were awarded for all of the above aircraft. Had the war in Europe not drawn to a conclusin in May - all would have been deployed there as next gen capability to counter new German capability.

In fact all of them would have been used as front line fighters had the Atomic bomb not been available.

 

[parsifal]

B]

Since this consumes way too much of my time now I will ignore your second attempt at insulting and belittling and repeat what I believe to be the most important questions regarding procurement management:

Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?

[/B]
Once the allies wereat war (and not just britain alone), the allies did not produce new or additional fighters. Lets have a brief look at the main types for SE Fighters
First Flights
Hurricane I 11.35
Hurricane II: 6.40 (same basic airframe and engine...evolutionary development, no great dislocation to production)
Spitfire: 6.36, progressive improvements to airframe, armament and engine until MkXII

Spitfire (griffon Engine) Active in 1944 (major redesign of airframe and engine)
Typhoon: 10.39, Not operational until 5.41
Tempest: 9.42. A new design, to take advantage of the new Centaurus engine, for which development had begun pre-war

In the case of the british, therefore, ther were two designs that could be considered as "new" after the entry of the US. The Griffon engined Spits still made use of the spitfire airframe, and so was not a complete redesign. The Tempest, was a complete new design but was taking advantage of existing last generation engine technology.

Then of course ther was the meteor, which was a complete new design, but undertstandable due to its revolutionary nature.

Then there are the Americans



The main types that enterd, or were in production were

Hawk series, P-36, p-40,
Bell P-39
P-47
P-51

All of these airframes were developed prior to the entry of the US to the war

Then there were the carrier types,

F4F
F6F
F4U
Bearcat

The bearcat was a new development, the hellcat, and the F4U were both developed substantially pre-war

Now we need to look at the Axis and the new designs that were introduced

I believe the following were in production, or substantially under development pre-war

Me 109, FW 190, CR 32, CR 42, MC 200, G-050
I consider the following types to be wartime new designs

FW 190D, Ta 152, Do 335, Me 109K, Me 262, He 162, G-55, MC202, RE 2005
So comparing the two principal European Axis, to the two principal European Allies, the and disregarding the carier types (which were mainly for the pacific), one arrives at 6 allied types of pre-war vintage, to 6 Axis

In terms of the post US entry types, I would concede 6 main types introduced by the allies to at least 9 by the european axis, all of which, incidentally were used by the germans

Moreover, the allies had the economic muscle to afford this kind of diversity, whereas the Axis did not


So the short answer is that the allied fighter development was done on a much less lavish scale than that of the axis, and where possible tried to to use pre-existing technology. The great many marks and line changes, whilst disruptive to production, were not nearly so bad as the introduction of a whole new type

 

[parsifal]

Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.

The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.

There is nothing wrong with the design. But it suffered from problems in the undercarriage, in the armament, and in the laminate on the leading edges, which in the production types hasd a tendency to lift at high speeds.

There is a difference between design faults, and development faults. Development faults could be a QA problem in the production line, it could be a shortage in a certain component. It could be an unseen design issue. The fact that 880 (with a further 60 not yet accepted) had been halted on the lines because of various faults is strong evidence of developmental issues. by comparison the 262 had largely overcome its development propblems that had cause such delays in 1944

 

[drgondog]

Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.

The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.

The glue was a problem, it had stability issues with pronounced dutch roll, it had to substitute 20mm for the Mk108 30's because of recoil caused structural failure. IIRC the vertical stabilizer had to be redesigned and 'droop tips' were added to assist in low speed stability..

It was a remarkable fighter which probably would not have encountered those problems (except perhaps the dutch roll) had the development process not been under such tight time constraints. Nevertheless the above problems resulted in design and manufacturing changes, which in turn slowed operation deployment.

If you reflect on the gestation of the Mustang as an example, the first flight tests revealed no problems requiring immediate design and manufacturing changes although changes to lower radiator intake geometry was made later to eliminate the turbulent flow rumble at high speeds, and still later the rudder strake, the gear uplocks, horizontal stabilizer incidence, were changed after the B/C/D were in production three years later after a major engine mod performance boost imposed unanticipated structural issues.

So, it smells like a close enough approximation of development issues for the He 162.

 

[Juha]

Soren
"nothing was wrong with the design at all"
Now the flight time was very short and the engine blocked the view behind. At least the second was probably unavoidable because of very short design time but a problem anyway. And from an amateur viewpoint the fuselage wing junction seemed to be less than ideal probably leading to unnecessary high local air speeds at the lower wing/fuselage joint.

French seemed to think that He 162 was very nice plane for pleasure flying with very light controls but at least some ex fighter pilots suspected that it would become difficult to control if one made harsh combat manouevres.

Juha

 

[Soren]

Again the problems with the He-162 were caused because of a lack of proper materials Bill.

The wing design issue was solved with the droop tips as a quick fix, had there been enough time an increase in dihedral would've been made instead but the droop tips fixed the problem nonetheless.

In short the wing is the only thing which recieved a minor modification vs the original design blueprints, all other problems were caused by shortages in the right materials.

As for the glue, this was solved as-well with a new mix.


Now regarding the Me-262, around 100 were destroyed by Allied a/c true, but not all in the air. And as for the LW claims, well they were undoubtedly higher, the 509 figure is confirmed kills as far as I can tell. But Erich knows more about this so he's the man to ask.