The Do-335
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drgondog
Major
No earlier than a.) first of next week, and b.) when we have reliable Bhp as f(altitude).. Williams has such for the 51B/D and for the 51B both for 1650-3 and 1650-7 as well as 75" and 67" Hg for several critical altitudes - but not a single chart.
We will need to same data as input to develop the Thrust Hp at each of those altitudes.
Roger. I've got the charts for the Jumo 213A E and the Jumo 004B-1 if you can add jet fighters to the chart ? I think Kurfürst has the charts for the DB605 versions.
Do you have charts for the RR Merlin and the PW R-2800 ? I think I have the BMW-801 charts needed, or Gene has them.
Do you have charts for the RR Merlin and the PW R-2800 ? I think I have the BMW-801 charts needed, or Gene has them.
Kurfürst
Quote: "To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the Tagjagd; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced."
my point was, that IIRC monthly production figures I have seen on Fw190 didn't separated ground attack and fighter versions, so without knowing how many of FWs went to SGs one cannot say was there any significant increase on reserve a/c. Secondly, at least almost all of those 109G6s which arrived to Finland in 1944 had some substandard parts which had to be replaced in VL (State Aircraft Factory) before they could be passed to combat units. That indicates bottlenecs in production at least from mid-44 onwards, some planes even lacked radios etc fundamental parts for a combat plane.
Juha
Quote: "To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the Tagjagd; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced."
my point was, that IIRC monthly production figures I have seen on Fw190 didn't separated ground attack and fighter versions, so without knowing how many of FWs went to SGs one cannot say was there any significant increase on reserve a/c. Secondly, at least almost all of those 109G6s which arrived to Finland in 1944 had some substandard parts which had to be replaced in VL (State Aircraft Factory) before they could be passed to combat units. That indicates bottlenecs in production at least from mid-44 onwards, some planes even lacked radios etc fundamental parts for a combat plane.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
Joel S A Hayward
(Source Wiki)
Joel S.A. Hayward (born 1964), is a New Zealand military historian and analyst who has worked in the United Kingdom since 2004. He is best known for his published works on the use of air power by the German military during World War II, his 2003 biography of Horatio Lord Nelson, and a controversy over his 1993 M.A. thesis on the historiography of Holocaust denial in which it was charged that he was a Holocaust denier. Hayward is Head of Air Power Studies at King's College London and, as of 1 April 2007, is Dean of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell. In August 2007 the Royal Air Force appointed him a Director of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.[1][2] He holds fellowships from the United States Air Force and the Federal Government of Germany.[1]
Hayward went on to pursue a Ph.D. degree, also at University of Canterbury, again under the supervision of Dr. Vincent Orange.[11] He initially considered to enroll for the Ph.D. with a biography of well-known Holocaust denier David Irving as a dissertion topic, apparently at Irving's suggestion,[12] but instead embarked on a study of German air operations during World War II.[11] In 1994, the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, located within the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, awarded him a research scholarship to conduct research for his dissertation in its archives; he subsequently received a research fellowship from the Federal Government of Germany which enabled him to conduct doctoral research in the German Military Archives in Freiburg, Germany.[13]
Hayward was awarded a Ph.D. in 1996. His thesis, Seeking the Philosopher's Stone: Luftwaffe Operations during Hitler's Drive to the East, 1942–1943[14] became the basis for his first book,[11] Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943.,[15] which was published in 1998.
Academic and professional career
Massey University
In June 1996 Hayward joined the History Department at Massey University (Palmerston North Campus) as a Lecturer in Defence and Strategic Studies,[16] receiving promotion to Senior Lecturer in August 1999.[4] He specialized in the theoretical and conceptual aspects of modern warfare, airpower, joint doctrines, and manoeuvre warfare.[16] He continued in that position until June 2002.[2]
While at Massey, Hayward in 1999 was organizer of New Zealand's largest defence conference, held 21-22 August at Massey University's Turitea campus. The conference, entitled "Coalitions and Conflict — The Transition of Warfare 1899 to 1999 and Beyond," focused on coalition warfare and was jointly hosted by Massey University and the New Zealand Army's Military Studies Institute.[17] Hayward was conference convenor of Massey's third annual defence conference in August 2000, again co-hosted by the New Zealand Army, with discussion focusing on the trend towards integrating the three armed services (army, air force, and navy) under unified command.[18] Hayward also acted as editor of the conference proceedings, which took its title from the conference's theme, Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and Its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force.[19]
From 1997 to 2004 he was also lecturer at the Officer Cadet School of the New Zealand Army[2], where he taught general military history from Alexander the Great to the Balkan War,[16] and at the Command and Staff College of the Royal New Zealand Air Force,[2] where he taught airpower history and doctrine and supervised advanced research in military history.[16] During the same period he also taught strategic thought at the Royal New Zealand Naval College.[16][2] He also wrote academic articles for general military and military history publications.[16]
This is a selected bibliography of peer-reviewed articles.
(1995). "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42." The Journal of Strategic Studies 18(4): 94-135. December 1995. Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 441–482.
(1997). "Stalingrad: An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift." Airpower Journal 11(1): 21–37. Spring 1997. Also published by the U.S. Air Force in a Portuguese translation as "Estalingrado: Um Exame da Decisão de Hitler a Respeito do Transporte Aéreo."
(1997). "The German Use of Airpower at Kharkov, May 1942." Air Power History 44(2): 18–29. Summer 1997.
(1997). "Von Richthofen's 'giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of Kerch, 1942." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10(2): 97–124. June 1997.
(1998). "A Case Study in Effective Command: An Analysis of Field Marshal Richthofen's Character and Career." New Zealand Army Journal 18: 7–18. January 1998.
(1999). "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis." New Zealand Army Journal 21: 1–17. July 1999.
(1999). "A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean Campaign of 1942." The Journal of Strategic Studies 22(4): 103–130. December 1999. Also in German translation as "Eine Fallstudie früher integrierter Kriegführung: Eine Analyse des Krimfeldzuges der Wehrmacht im Jahre 1942." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 483–510.
(2000). "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production." The Journal of Military History 64(3): 769–794. July 2000. Also in Spanish translation as "Demasiado Poco, Demasiado Tarde: Un Análisis del Fracaso de Hitler en Agos-to de 1942 de Dañar la Producción Pe-trolífera Soviética." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 511–536.
(2001). "Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm." Defence Studies 1(2): 15–37. Summer 2001.
(2002). "Prayers Before Battle: The Spiritual Utterances of Three Great Commanders." US Army Chaplaincy Journal (Winter-Spring 2002), pp. 32-40.
(2002). "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel." Australian Defence Force Journal 155: 39–45. July/August 2002.
Monographs
(2000). Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare. Military Studies Institute Working Papers Series No. 2/2000. Military Studies Institute, New Zealand Defence Force. (44 pp.)
Books
Military history
(1998). Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943. Modern War Studies series. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700611460.
(2000). (edited). A Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force. Massey University, Centre for Defence Studies.
(2003). For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591143519.
(2003). (edited with Glyn Harper). Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders. Auckland: Exisle Publishing. ISBN 0908988338.
(2006). Stalingrad. Pen Sword Battleground series. London: Millennium. ISBN 1844154742
(Source Wiki)
Joel S.A. Hayward (born 1964), is a New Zealand military historian and analyst who has worked in the United Kingdom since 2004. He is best known for his published works on the use of air power by the German military during World War II, his 2003 biography of Horatio Lord Nelson, and a controversy over his 1993 M.A. thesis on the historiography of Holocaust denial in which it was charged that he was a Holocaust denier. Hayward is Head of Air Power Studies at King's College London and, as of 1 April 2007, is Dean of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell. In August 2007 the Royal Air Force appointed him a Director of the Royal Air Force Centre for Air Power Studies.[1][2] He holds fellowships from the United States Air Force and the Federal Government of Germany.[1]
Hayward went on to pursue a Ph.D. degree, also at University of Canterbury, again under the supervision of Dr. Vincent Orange.[11] He initially considered to enroll for the Ph.D. with a biography of well-known Holocaust denier David Irving as a dissertion topic, apparently at Irving's suggestion,[12] but instead embarked on a study of German air operations during World War II.[11] In 1994, the U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, located within the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, awarded him a research scholarship to conduct research for his dissertation in its archives; he subsequently received a research fellowship from the Federal Government of Germany which enabled him to conduct doctoral research in the German Military Archives in Freiburg, Germany.[13]
Hayward was awarded a Ph.D. in 1996. His thesis, Seeking the Philosopher's Stone: Luftwaffe Operations during Hitler's Drive to the East, 1942–1943[14] became the basis for his first book,[11] Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943.,[15] which was published in 1998.
Academic and professional career
Massey University
In June 1996 Hayward joined the History Department at Massey University (Palmerston North Campus) as a Lecturer in Defence and Strategic Studies,[16] receiving promotion to Senior Lecturer in August 1999.[4] He specialized in the theoretical and conceptual aspects of modern warfare, airpower, joint doctrines, and manoeuvre warfare.[16] He continued in that position until June 2002.[2]
While at Massey, Hayward in 1999 was organizer of New Zealand's largest defence conference, held 21-22 August at Massey University's Turitea campus. The conference, entitled "Coalitions and Conflict — The Transition of Warfare 1899 to 1999 and Beyond," focused on coalition warfare and was jointly hosted by Massey University and the New Zealand Army's Military Studies Institute.[17] Hayward was conference convenor of Massey's third annual defence conference in August 2000, again co-hosted by the New Zealand Army, with discussion focusing on the trend towards integrating the three armed services (army, air force, and navy) under unified command.[18] Hayward also acted as editor of the conference proceedings, which took its title from the conference's theme, Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and Its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force.[19]
From 1997 to 2004 he was also lecturer at the Officer Cadet School of the New Zealand Army[2], where he taught general military history from Alexander the Great to the Balkan War,[16] and at the Command and Staff College of the Royal New Zealand Air Force,[2] where he taught airpower history and doctrine and supervised advanced research in military history.[16] During the same period he also taught strategic thought at the Royal New Zealand Naval College.[16][2] He also wrote academic articles for general military and military history publications.[16]
This is a selected bibliography of peer-reviewed articles.
(1995). "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941–42." The Journal of Strategic Studies 18(4): 94-135. December 1995. Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 441–482.
(1997). "Stalingrad: An Examination of Hitler's Decision to Airlift." Airpower Journal 11(1): 21–37. Spring 1997. Also published by the U.S. Air Force in a Portuguese translation as "Estalingrado: Um Exame da Decisão de Hitler a Respeito do Transporte Aéreo."
(1997). "The German Use of Airpower at Kharkov, May 1942." Air Power History 44(2): 18–29. Summer 1997.
(1997). "Von Richthofen's 'giant fire-magic': The Luftwaffe's Contribution to the Battle of Kerch, 1942." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10(2): 97–124. June 1997.
(1998). "A Case Study in Effective Command: An Analysis of Field Marshal Richthofen's Character and Career." New Zealand Army Journal 18: 7–18. January 1998.
(1999). "NATO's War in the Balkans: A Preliminary Analysis." New Zealand Army Journal 21: 1–17. July 1999.
(1999). "A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean Campaign of 1942." The Journal of Strategic Studies 22(4): 103–130. December 1999. Also in German translation as "Eine Fallstudie früher integrierter Kriegführung: Eine Analyse des Krimfeldzuges der Wehrmacht im Jahre 1942." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 483–510.
(2000). "Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production." The Journal of Military History 64(3): 769–794. July 2000. Also in Spanish translation as "Demasiado Poco, Demasiado Tarde: Un Análisis del Fracaso de Hitler en Agos-to de 1942 de Dañar la Producción Pe-trolífera Soviética." Reprinted in Jeremy Black, ed., The Second World War, Volume I: The German War 1939–1942 (London: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 511–536.
(2001). "Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm." Defence Studies 1(2): 15–37. Summer 2001.
(2002). "Prayers Before Battle: The Spiritual Utterances of Three Great Commanders." US Army Chaplaincy Journal (Winter-Spring 2002), pp. 32-40.
(2002). "Current and Future Command Challenges for New Zealand Defence Force Personnel." Australian Defence Force Journal 155: 39–45. July/August 2002.
Monographs
(2000). Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare. Military Studies Institute Working Papers Series No. 2/2000. Military Studies Institute, New Zealand Defence Force. (44 pp.)
Books
Military history
(1998). Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943. Modern War Studies series. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700611460.
(2000). (edited). A Joint Future? The Move to Jointness and its Implications for the New Zealand Defence Force. Massey University, Centre for Defence Studies.
(2003). For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591143519.
(2003). (edited with Glyn Harper). Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders. Auckland: Exisle Publishing. ISBN 0908988338.
(2006). Stalingrad. Pen Sword Battleground series. London: Millennium. ISBN 1844154742
parsifal
Colonel
Dr W Murray
Source
(Dr. Williamson Murray - Strategic Studies Institute)
Dr. Williamson Murray
Position: External Researcher WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the United States Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, the most recent of which is A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, published by Harvard University Press.
Source 2
( Source watch)
Williamson Murray
From SourceWatch
Dr. Williamson Murray (Wick Murray) is Professor Emeritus (History) at Ohio State University (Retired) and Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).[1]
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century / Hart-Rudman Commission Study Group Member[2]: "Dr. Williamson Murray, Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History, Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College
EDUCATION
B.A. Yale University, (1963)
M.A. Yale University, (1971)
Ph.D. Yale University, (1975)
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - HIGHLIGHTS
Charles Lindbergh Professor, Air and Space Museum, 1997-1998
Horner Professor of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, 1995-1997
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 1994-1995
Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University, 1995
Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, 1991-1992
Professor of History, Ohio State University, 1977-1995
Maintenance Officer, 314th TAL Wing, South East Asia, 1968-1969
HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS
Long Committee on Professional Military Education, 1989-1990
Second Andrew D. White Prize in European History, Yale University, 1963
From the Naval War College Review, Spring 2001: "Dr. Murray received his Ph.D. (after service in the U.S. Air Force) in military-diplomatic history at Yale University. He has taught at Yale, at the Air, Army, and Naval War Colleges, the U.S. Military Academy, Marine Corps University, the London School of Economics, the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, and Ohio State University, of which he is a professor emeritus. He is currently a consultant at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Arlington, Virginia. His numerous books include Air War, 1914-1945 (1999) and a number of works in collaboration with Allan Millett, including, most recently, A War to Be Won: Fighting World War II (1999)."
(Note: Professor Emeritus means One who is retired but retains an honorary title corresponding to that held immediately before retirement). It is usually reserved for academics who are held in particulalry high esteem or regard by his peers
Source
(Dr. Williamson Murray - Strategic Studies Institute)
Dr. Williamson Murray
Position: External Researcher WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson Professor of Military History at the United States Army War College. Dr. Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, the most recent of which is A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World War, published by Harvard University Press.
Source 2
( Source watch)
Williamson Murray
From SourceWatch
Dr. Williamson Murray (Wick Murray) is Professor Emeritus (History) at Ohio State University (Retired) and Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).[1]
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century / Hart-Rudman Commission Study Group Member[2]: "Dr. Williamson Murray, Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History, Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College
EDUCATION
B.A. Yale University, (1963)
M.A. Yale University, (1971)
Ph.D. Yale University, (1975)
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE - HIGHLIGHTS
Charles Lindbergh Professor, Air and Space Museum, 1997-1998
Horner Professor of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, 1995-1997
Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics, 1994-1995
Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University, 1995
Secretary of the Navy Fellow, Naval War College, 1991-1992
Professor of History, Ohio State University, 1977-1995
Maintenance Officer, 314th TAL Wing, South East Asia, 1968-1969
HONORS AND AFFILIATIONS
Long Committee on Professional Military Education, 1989-1990
Second Andrew D. White Prize in European History, Yale University, 1963
From the Naval War College Review, Spring 2001: "Dr. Murray received his Ph.D. (after service in the U.S. Air Force) in military-diplomatic history at Yale University. He has taught at Yale, at the Air, Army, and Naval War Colleges, the U.S. Military Academy, Marine Corps University, the London School of Economics, the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, and Ohio State University, of which he is a professor emeritus. He is currently a consultant at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Arlington, Virginia. His numerous books include Air War, 1914-1945 (1999) and a number of works in collaboration with Allan Millett, including, most recently, A War to Be Won: Fighting World War II (1999)."
(Note: Professor Emeritus means One who is retired but retains an honorary title corresponding to that held immediately before retirement). It is usually reserved for academics who are held in particulalry high esteem or regard by his peers
parsifal
Colonel
John Ellis
Could not find a concise biography on this author, however here is an intersting link on his general outlook. In summary he has been criticised as being far too pro-Axis in his outlook, but obviously not enough for some
Anyway, here is the link
Military History Online
Could not find a concise biography on this author, however here is an intersting link on his general outlook. In summary he has been criticised as being far too pro-Axis in his outlook, but obviously not enough for some
Anyway, here is the link
Military History Online
parsifal
Colonel
From the above three posts, I believe that the sources I have relied upon are fair and balanced. It is not up to me to provide further proof at this stage. It is incumbent on people to accept, or reject the information contained in those sources, as they see fit. If they wish to totally reject the information presented it is incumbent up[on them to present better source material, and not throw a neo-nazi style hysterical fit on line, just because that information challenges their pre-conceived ideas. Neither is it incumbent upon me to provide additional information to further support my case. Quite the opposite. I amintain that my sources are credible, and conclusive, despite being secondary, and historical, rather than primary, and scientific, in their presentation. The authors all have credible qualifications to comment. It is now up to their opponents to prepre,a ns present their counter arguments, backed up by whatever information they can scrape together, or see fit
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
After 3 pages of parroting the same dogma, we still do not have any evidence presented about the alleged lack of spares and mismanagement etc., instead we got two wiki-level quotes applying to our respect for authority instead of reason, bizarrely followed by the almost standard, but universally applicable, retarded accusation with Nazism, then some odd argument why the one making the dogmatic claim does not have to prove it at all.
The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.
It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.
'All of that would not be surprising, considering that earlier the same poster made the following ridiculous statements'
'The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.'
The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.
'Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.'
Statements for which verifiable source was asked for, and just like in the case of claims about lack of spares, none were given. Instead, a jump was made to the next claim at lightspeed.
If nothing else, the agenda is clearly identifiable.
The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.
It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.
'All of that would not be surprising, considering that earlier the same poster made the following ridiculous statements'
'The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.'
The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.
'Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.'
Statements for which verifiable source was asked for, and just like in the case of claims about lack of spares, none were given. Instead, a jump was made to the next claim at lightspeed.
If nothing else, the agenda is clearly identifiable.
parsifal
Colonel
May I ask what your credentials are? You have managed to denigrate a professor Emeritus, a professor specializing in military and who currently works, in part for the german Government, and an eminent author, in the space of less than a paragraph, and provided not a single shred of evidence to support your own outrageous claims. Your arrogance approaches, perhaps even exceeds that of the original peacocks that call themselves nazis. I cansee it as entirely credible that you would support the burning of books, the disenfranchisement of anyone who opposed you, and blaming and persecuting innocent minorities to support your position.
Let it be known that I have plenty of evidence to support my claims, and have supported some of them already, with quotes and observations by peoiple who have been acknowledged as experts almost univerally. Your dismisal of them is laughable, as are your outrageous claims, unles you have anything plausoible, and verifiable to back them up. I am not going to produce any evidence for you to so arrogantly an in such an aryan manner dismiss them without feeling the need to justify your own laughable and outrageous position yourself.
In other words, either put up, shut up, or expect the very worst
Let it be known that I have plenty of evidence to support my claims, and have supported some of them already, with quotes and observations by peoiple who have been acknowledged as experts almost univerally. Your dismisal of them is laughable, as are your outrageous claims, unles you have anything plausoible, and verifiable to back them up. I am not going to produce any evidence for you to so arrogantly an in such an aryan manner dismiss them without feeling the need to justify your own laughable and outrageous position yourself.
In other words, either put up, shut up, or expect the very worst
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
Outrageous claims, such as...?
As for your direct, open, repeated and uncalled accusations with nazism which severely violates the rules of civilized discussion and the very fundamental rules of this particular discussion board, I shall let it be dealt with by the moderation team here, hopefully with similarly severe means.
As for your direct, open, repeated and uncalled accusations with nazism which severely violates the rules of civilized discussion and the very fundamental rules of this particular discussion board, I shall let it be dealt with by the moderation team here, hopefully with similarly severe means.
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
To provide perspective on dogmatic arguements, and how they are 'supported'.
It is claimed that Hayward 'supports' Murray. Naturally it is the addition of parsifal that that this support is in proving (parsifal's claim) about 'The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics.'.
It is little surprise to find, that Hayward, who 'supports' Murray's (read: parsifal's) is merely quoting some statistics provided by Murray - compare the similarity.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/attachment.php?attachmentid=66807&stc=1&d=1216201598
The picture painted by Murray is in contrast with the way it is painted by parsifal: during the winter of 41/42, the servicibility reached an all time low of 39% on avarage; less with bombers, and a bit higher with fighters at 44%. Considering the circumstances of the period this is not particularly surprising. Despite the allaged 'lack of spares', this somehow reached the typical wartime avarage of 69% (75% fighters, 66% bombers) by June. The remainder of the year, in direct contrast to parsifal`s extreme claim of 31%, had a minimum servicibility of 59% and up to 65%, ie. quite steady servicibility rates with minor variations, as opposed to the winter of 1941: the Luftwaffe`s supply chain was now established in Russia.
It would appear that those statistics were also manipulated by parsifal, and then some cinematic license was taken to the story, and the blanket claim was added that it just got worse later in the war (already disproved by checking against serviceability figures provided by Price, showing higher serviceability rates in mid-1944 than in the East, probably due to less severe air combat activity, despite the more difficult logistical situation compared to the West).
The name of Murray was borrowed to lend authority, despite Murray not making such claims himself: checking the Murray-quote posted earlier in this thread, dealing with 'Gorings fascination with numbers', claimed to have been applied to the entire war; in reality, it is found in one of the first chapters of Murray`s book, describing the pre-1939 birth and development of the Luftwaffe..
This is nothing else than wanton misrepresentation, lately peppered with ad hominem iattack, that are persifal's Ersätz-arguments.
Attachments
parsifal
Colonel
Still no credential I see, I don't think that you have any, including any brains, morals, manners, or education
Outrageous claims by Kurfurst….lets have a look at just few from this thread alone.
I would say that German AFV production was far more standardized - a couple of basic chassis and two powerplants were found almost all of their tanksSources, supporting information, oh I forgot we are talking about things german, we don't need to do that do we
Its difficult to see why are you are switching the subject to the 'Allies'. The subject was specifically the RAF lack of modern (fighter) equipment through the war.
Incorrect. My position was this…the Do335 was unnecessary, and an example of poor German management of their resources. German technical research was impressive, and produced some amazing pieces of equipment, but failed to be co-ordinated. The examples I quoted was the relative overproduction of fighters, the relative underproduction of pilots, the total lack of co-ordination with oil output and force projections for the luftwaffe, and finally, the lack of spare parts production, which exacerbated the relative lack of sustainability in german operations, and their relatively low serviceability rates, particulalry after 1942. The reaction of you, and your mate the Idiot Gerry was to try and attack the british, for some reason, as if that was relevant to the thread, or in some way vindicated german stuff ups
They should have mobilized the economy in early 1942, after the first failures on the Russian front; there have been plans for this, but eventually the top brass has changed their mind and needed Stalingrad and Tunisia to happen to shake them up. You cant really blame them for not mobilizing before 1942, after all, it seemed to everybody back then they are winning the war even with a limited mobilisation of the economy. There is no point in waging a war at the cost of ruining the economy, see the UK`s example on that.
This is breathtakingly innaccurate summary of why the germans did not mobilize earlier, and a patently outrageous claim to make. Anybody with any academic training would immediately realize that this sort of comment needs to be supported with expert opinion, but this is evidently not required if it is a german propaganda piece
Especially as the RAF was barely even up in the air to go against the Luftwaffe after 1940.
Any evidence thought necessary to make such an outrageous claim, no of course not, because there isnt any, is there. Just more Kurfurst Bullshit
However if you look at the entire Luftwaffe, rather than just Luftflotte Reich, which was undergoing its most severe period of combat with the USAAF at the time, servicabilty rates were around 70%. Its also rather important whether these servicibility statistics refer to the status in the morning, before the battles, or were taken in the evening, when a lot of planes were around with a couple of holes in them, unservicable, but overall only having light damage that would repaired by the morning.
As such of the statistics above are misleading.
You then launch into an apology based mostly on fantasy and irrelevant fictions, and DON'T tackle the issue at all. None of the credible sources that are available support the claim of serviceability rates of 70%, an absolutely outrageous claim, but one that just effortlessly rolls of your tongue. Anybody else would feel it necessary to very carefully document suchg a claim, but not you….we others are exepected to just accept such lies as gospel truth…yeah right
Phrases like 'Goring's and Hitlers fascination' certainly do not raise his credibility, as it only addresses the reader`s emotions but not his mind. Stuff like 'Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength' is also funny and it is easy to disprove
It would perhaps help if you actually read a little, like Murray for example, because if you did, you would see he has some very credible sources. You then launched into an unsubtantiated claim about the numbers of aircraft produced, and truied to claim that whole units wa more efficient than having a proper spares reserve, obviously ignorant of the fact that OKL itself had repeatedly recommended that the spares reserves be built up, for precisely the reasons explained in Murray. You decide that Gorings approach was superior to that of his own air staff. Increadibly stupid, and totally lacking in any sort of understanding of the problem
Yet Murray claims there were not enough spares.. it would seem to me that there were always plentiful of whole replacement aircraft around, which would appear to be a much more straightforward means of increasing servicibility than to perform repairs of damaged aircraft on site.
If you read a little more widely, and were a little better informed, you would know that Murray is referring to comments that originated from the german air staff, not making any opinionated observations. But then, that doesn't matter, does it. I suspect, that anyone, including german, that make disparaging remarks against the glorious third reich is going to attract your ire.
Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war.
Cherry picking, however, is not convincing.
You obviously have not read Hayward either. I suggest you learn to read, then once you have mastered that, actually read the books first before making any comments about them. If you did, you would know that Hayward has quite detailed accounts of serviceabilty rates, is quite pro-german in his biases, and certaihnly does not cherry pick. There is some cherry picking going on here, but its neither of these gentlemen
That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so fighter sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend a day, from memory) were flown.
I guess *IF* Hayward makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores.
Not a shred of evidence to support this outrageous claim, particularly since no other source would support this. You yet again feel no great need to support a statement that most would find quite ridiculous
Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies.
What about a source??/ This is a claim most people would see as quite outrageous, and certainly deserving of some supporting information. But yet again, you blithely believe you are a member of the master race, and don't need to worry about such petty things as factual support
Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing.
Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way.
Didn't seem to register that I had produced three separate sources, which you chose to discredit, without having actually read them first, and then even had the temerity to poo bah an actual veterans observations. And all of this without any evidence of your own. It was me who had provided any supporting argument, it was you, yet you attempt to post the fiction that I had personally dreamt the case against you all by myself, when in fact the case was presented from three sources, to which you provided not the slightest rebuttal in evidence, just bullshit opinion
The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here
Well, actually, if you had any education, and could actually read, you would know that I had presented a case, and some supporting evidence. You would also realize that in order to rebutt those arguments, you should start presenting some supporting evidence of your own. But this fails to register for you does it, because of your lack of education and knowledge. All you can see are the swastikas marching through your head, and the glory days of the third reich, as the cheers of the crowd sweep you away
The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.
It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.
Yet again youo pass judgement on creditable secondary sources, without having actually read them. Evidence is evidence. If you have better, produce it. These guys are considered creditable and authoritative, yet you continue to dismiss them, without havuing read them, and worse, without bothering to produce reduttal authority yourself.
There is one thing we do agree on, though the end point is vastly different. I agree with you the matter is concluded IMO. Evidence has been presented from internationally recognized and well respected sources, to support my position. Not one piece of evidence in rebuttal has been presesented by yourself to oppose that, making you look incredibly stupid, dogmatic, and very ill informed
Outrageous claims by Kurfurst….lets have a look at just few from this thread alone.
I would say that German AFV production was far more standardized - a couple of basic chassis and two powerplants were found almost all of their tanksSources, supporting information, oh I forgot we are talking about things german, we don't need to do that do we
Its difficult to see why are you are switching the subject to the 'Allies'. The subject was specifically the RAF lack of modern (fighter) equipment through the war.
Incorrect. My position was this…the Do335 was unnecessary, and an example of poor German management of their resources. German technical research was impressive, and produced some amazing pieces of equipment, but failed to be co-ordinated. The examples I quoted was the relative overproduction of fighters, the relative underproduction of pilots, the total lack of co-ordination with oil output and force projections for the luftwaffe, and finally, the lack of spare parts production, which exacerbated the relative lack of sustainability in german operations, and their relatively low serviceability rates, particulalry after 1942. The reaction of you, and your mate the Idiot Gerry was to try and attack the british, for some reason, as if that was relevant to the thread, or in some way vindicated german stuff ups
They should have mobilized the economy in early 1942, after the first failures on the Russian front; there have been plans for this, but eventually the top brass has changed their mind and needed Stalingrad and Tunisia to happen to shake them up. You cant really blame them for not mobilizing before 1942, after all, it seemed to everybody back then they are winning the war even with a limited mobilisation of the economy. There is no point in waging a war at the cost of ruining the economy, see the UK`s example on that.
This is breathtakingly innaccurate summary of why the germans did not mobilize earlier, and a patently outrageous claim to make. Anybody with any academic training would immediately realize that this sort of comment needs to be supported with expert opinion, but this is evidently not required if it is a german propaganda piece
Especially as the RAF was barely even up in the air to go against the Luftwaffe after 1940.
Any evidence thought necessary to make such an outrageous claim, no of course not, because there isnt any, is there. Just more Kurfurst Bullshit
However if you look at the entire Luftwaffe, rather than just Luftflotte Reich, which was undergoing its most severe period of combat with the USAAF at the time, servicabilty rates were around 70%. Its also rather important whether these servicibility statistics refer to the status in the morning, before the battles, or were taken in the evening, when a lot of planes were around with a couple of holes in them, unservicable, but overall only having light damage that would repaired by the morning.
As such of the statistics above are misleading.
You then launch into an apology based mostly on fantasy and irrelevant fictions, and DON'T tackle the issue at all. None of the credible sources that are available support the claim of serviceability rates of 70%, an absolutely outrageous claim, but one that just effortlessly rolls of your tongue. Anybody else would feel it necessary to very carefully document suchg a claim, but not you….we others are exepected to just accept such lies as gospel truth…yeah right
Phrases like 'Goring's and Hitlers fascination' certainly do not raise his credibility, as it only addresses the reader`s emotions but not his mind. Stuff like 'Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength' is also funny and it is easy to disprove
It would perhaps help if you actually read a little, like Murray for example, because if you did, you would see he has some very credible sources. You then launched into an unsubtantiated claim about the numbers of aircraft produced, and truied to claim that whole units wa more efficient than having a proper spares reserve, obviously ignorant of the fact that OKL itself had repeatedly recommended that the spares reserves be built up, for precisely the reasons explained in Murray. You decide that Gorings approach was superior to that of his own air staff. Increadibly stupid, and totally lacking in any sort of understanding of the problem
Yet Murray claims there were not enough spares.. it would seem to me that there were always plentiful of whole replacement aircraft around, which would appear to be a much more straightforward means of increasing servicibility than to perform repairs of damaged aircraft on site.
If you read a little more widely, and were a little better informed, you would know that Murray is referring to comments that originated from the german air staff, not making any opinionated observations. But then, that doesn't matter, does it. I suspect, that anyone, including german, that make disparaging remarks against the glorious third reich is going to attract your ire.
Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war.
Cherry picking, however, is not convincing.
You obviously have not read Hayward either. I suggest you learn to read, then once you have mastered that, actually read the books first before making any comments about them. If you did, you would know that Hayward has quite detailed accounts of serviceabilty rates, is quite pro-german in his biases, and certaihnly does not cherry pick. There is some cherry picking going on here, but its neither of these gentlemen
That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so fighter sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend a day, from memory) were flown.
I guess *IF* Hayward makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores.
Not a shred of evidence to support this outrageous claim, particularly since no other source would support this. You yet again feel no great need to support a statement that most would find quite ridiculous
Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies.
What about a source??/ This is a claim most people would see as quite outrageous, and certainly deserving of some supporting information. But yet again, you blithely believe you are a member of the master race, and don't need to worry about such petty things as factual support
Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing.
Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way.
Didn't seem to register that I had produced three separate sources, which you chose to discredit, without having actually read them first, and then even had the temerity to poo bah an actual veterans observations. And all of this without any evidence of your own. It was me who had provided any supporting argument, it was you, yet you attempt to post the fiction that I had personally dreamt the case against you all by myself, when in fact the case was presented from three sources, to which you provided not the slightest rebuttal in evidence, just bullshit opinion
The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here
Well, actually, if you had any education, and could actually read, you would know that I had presented a case, and some supporting evidence. You would also realize that in order to rebutt those arguments, you should start presenting some supporting evidence of your own. But this fails to register for you does it, because of your lack of education and knowledge. All you can see are the swastikas marching through your head, and the glory days of the third reich, as the cheers of the crowd sweep you away
The matter has been concluded IMHO. It appears neither the original poster nor the two unquestionable authorities he calls upon to support to dogma has anything to offer as evidence.
It is of course also possible that Hayward, with whom I am not familiar with, is only used selectively to support the dogma, and the way he is being quoted here by some is not representing Hayward`s actual opinions.
Yet again youo pass judgement on creditable secondary sources, without having actually read them. Evidence is evidence. If you have better, produce it. These guys are considered creditable and authoritative, yet you continue to dismiss them, without havuing read them, and worse, without bothering to produce reduttal authority yourself.
There is one thing we do agree on, though the end point is vastly different. I agree with you the matter is concluded IMO. Evidence has been presented from internationally recognized and well respected sources, to support my position. Not one piece of evidence in rebuttal has been presesented by yourself to oppose that, making you look incredibly stupid, dogmatic, and very ill informed
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
Enough is enough guys.... Stop with the personal attacks and stick to the facts...
And no more Nazi calling!!!!
And no more Nazi calling!!!!
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
I like when people claiming silly things discredit themselves, and I do not even have to move my little finger. 
parsifal
Colonel
24 hours ago you had not read either source, now all of a sudden you are purporting to quote them. The link you provided is not an extract from Hayward, I will check to see if it is from Murray, but I doubt it. And the numbers you quote as coming from Hayward are not from Hayward. If you are going to quote him like that, quote4 page numbers, and I will check whether you are telling yet more porkies. To read and absorb either of the quoted references, it would take at least a week for each. yet youo are suddenly an expert on both of them in less than twenty four hours...amazing, from someone i consider to barely literate further more
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
At least he's putting up some sources Kurfurst.... Urs are what exactly?? Some of Parsifals beiefs may be off some, but the shoe fits on both of ur feet.....
Act civilized guys, enough personal attacks...
Act civilized guys, enough personal attacks...
parsifal
Colonel
I am prepred to back off from the personal attacks, but this has got to be a level playing field. I am absolutely tired of being abused, assaulted because i dont follow a pr-german line. If people disagree with the arguments i have presented, let come at me with considered argument, not racist f*cking bullshit. Finally I have gotten my temper going, and wont back off unless this happens for the other side as well. Close the thread and warn or ban me if youo must, but this crap has got to stop
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
I did not see this... Could u please quote it for me Parsifal... If that is the case, Im gonna get pissed....
parsifal
Colonel
Sorry, i lost my temper, and wasnt making much sense. No racist stuff, but plenty of personal attacks, and real put downs. i resisted for a while, then broke, and started to open up myself.
I dont mind heated debate, and try not to denigrate people,. If a person puts up n uncorroborated opinion, Im okay with that, usually, but when the replies are derogatory, AND unsupported, I get P*ssed. eventually.
Im no saint, and am not afraid to take whatever is going to ber dished out, but i absolutely hate bullying inall of its forms, and do have my limits.
If this guy wants to present his counter argument in a balanced, non-derogatory way, perhaps I will learn something, which is why I am here. If not, then the thread is going to be closed for sure, and other things are going to happen. I am offering a chance to get back on thread, with some decorum, and respect. If not...well, I dont know what will happen
I dont mind heated debate, and try not to denigrate people,. If a person puts up n uncorroborated opinion, Im okay with that, usually, but when the replies are derogatory, AND unsupported, I get P*ssed. eventually.
Im no saint, and am not afraid to take whatever is going to ber dished out, but i absolutely hate bullying inall of its forms, and do have my limits.
If this guy wants to present his counter argument in a balanced, non-derogatory way, perhaps I will learn something, which is why I am here. If not, then the thread is going to be closed for sure, and other things are going to happen. I am offering a chance to get back on thread, with some decorum, and respect. If not...well, I dont know what will happen
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