The Do-335

[Soren]

I agree Henning that the innefficiencies of the Nazi system should not be overstated. The proof that the german R&D efforts bore fruit are everywhere. German equipment was superior to Allied, or Soviet in very many ways, so it would be innaccurate to try and portray the effort as totally without fruit. However, the Nazis were just unable to target their resources to anywhere near the same degree as the Allies. There was nothing comparable to the JCS in the German camp, nothing even to compare to the General Board (of the US armed forces)> basically someone would think of a bright idea, convince one of the power barons, and off they would go, spending money and research RM, like they were in limitless supply.

Barons ? Parsifal you seem to have a bit of a skewed view on this.

There was a board which needed be convinced if a new design or area of research was to be granted funding from the nation treasure chest, there werent any Barons needing to be convinced though. The aircraft companies had to convince the RLM first of all, and then Hitler for final approval. Hitler was the one who caused most of the problems, delaying crucial projects, funding completely unnecessary projects (The MAUS) and assigning new material the wrong roles such as with the Me262 which was designed purely to be a fighter but despite this was delegated the role of ground attack a/c by Hitler - you'd have to be on drugs to make some of the decisions Hitler did, and as we know he was.

And as for technology;

One of the reasons Germany was ahead technology wise was because of a huge investment in this area since the beginning of the 19th century and up until the end of WW2. Germany litterally became the worlds center of technology from then on, people coming from across the world to be taught and study in German universities. By the early - mid 20th century Germany boasted over half the worlds Nobel prizes. That coupled with the German culture of perfectionism is what kept the Germans ahead technology wise until the end, but was on the other hand also in part the reason for its defeat as it meant more cost time needed for every product.

 

[pbfoot]

IMHO one factor missing when talking about wonder weapons was the free labour that was provided by unwilling guests of the Reich if thwy had to pay scale wages for these projects far less of them would have achieved fruition

 

[kool kitty89]

Huh...? It actually lead to them, see Wasserfall... from this POV, the V-2 technology opened completely new technologies, which on the long term would have been the solution to Allied heavy bombers. The Wasserfall was close to being a usable weapon by the wars end.

I meant the prefrence toward the V-2 was a hinderance on Wasserfall development and deployment.

 

[Soren]

Not sure how much it payed off though, considering the excrutiating amounts of quality checks they made on such places. I mean it must have cost quite abit in time money for all those check ups. Ofcourse there were the simple production facilities where sabotage was very difficult and dangerous to attempt (Always was dangerous), and here it probably did pay off with slave labour as opposed to employing payed workers.

 

[davparlr]

As usually history is written by the victors. If the war turned out the other way we would be discussing why oh why there was the P-80 AND the Airacomet, the Meteor AND Vampire, the P-47M AND the XP-72, the F8F AND the F4U, the F9F, the B-29 AND the B-32 and probably a dozen other designs I don't remember.

The fact remains: At no point in the war did Germany have considerably more fighter designs in the air or in the pipes than any of its adversaries.

In 1944, the Allies had unlimited amounts of metals, fuel, manufacturing facilities, and workers, which allowed the luxury of variety. However, in spite of this luxury, they still made Sherman tanks, P-51s, P-47s, F4Fs, etc. because they knew production would win the war. The Germans, on the other hand, by 1944, was starting to generate shortages in just about all aspects of military support. When they really needed to simplify and produce, they continued to look at technology to save them.

 

[parsifal]

The Germans suffered from a badly disjointed procurement program, I am surprised that we are even having to debate this issue. Speer himself commented on it voraciously.

As for the comments about the multiplicity of allied types, I would point out that all the major types had been developed, or were at a significant stage of development before the formation of the joint chiefs, and the associated joint procurement machines.

I am not saying that the Germans did not achieve outstanding results with their wartime research, nor am I saying that production efforts were not impressive. What I am doing is to quote German sources, like Speer and Guderian and even Rommel, who all pointed to the poorly managed support machine that backed up the fighting forces at the front. Speer was critical of the non-standardization, and the non-accountability of the procurement machine. Guderian was critical of the bigger and heavier AFVs that came after 1943, Rommel wanted to scale back on AFV production altogether, and concentrate on ATGs and SPG production instead. All of these eminent German commentators are saying basically the same thing....the support and procurement machine of the German armed forces was badly managed. I would go even further and argue that of all the major powers Germany's procurement machine was about the worst run. And evidence of that is in the poor showing of certain vital statistics. The one that comes to mind is the AFV production, something like 25000, compared to over 85000 in the US. And Germany had a two year head start over the US, and enjoyed an economy that was about 40% as strong as the US productive capacity. On that basis they should have produced over 35000 units. Even the British, with only 17% of US productive capacity, managed to produce more AFVs than the Germans. In soft skinned vehicles, the Germans produced just over 300000 units, compared to over 2 million US. They should have been able to build about 800000. Why could they not? Partly because of resource shortages, partly because of bombing, but overwhelmingly because of poorly managed programs. Too many types, too elaborate types, production and component manufacture not thought out properly. A whole litany of failures that was the direct product of the Nazi system

 

[Kurfürst]

And evidence of that is in the poor showing of certain vital statistics. The one that comes to mind is the AFV production, something like 25000, compared to over 85000 in the US.
And Germany had a two year head start over the US, and enjoyed an economy that was about 40% as strong as the US productive capacity. On that basis they should have produced over 35000 units.

Careful with statistics, they are full of traps. For example the '25000 AFV' figure is really comparing tanks only, but in Germany apprx. the same number of assault guns and similiar were produced as well. Tanks and AGs amounted ca. 50 000.

Why could they not? Partly because of resource shortages, partly because of bombing, but overwhelmingly because of poorly managed programs. Too many types, too elaborate types, production and component manufacture not thought out properly. A whole litany of failures that was the direct product of the Nazi system

I would not say so, evidenced by the statistics the Germans simply intentially had one of their hands behind their back until 1943, when Goebbels announced the Totaler Krieg programme. Until then, and even after in some respects, Germany was running a peacetime economy. But after 1943, the figures suddenly go crazy. The other countries, which Germany defeated previously or were on the verge of defeat, mobilised their economy already, of course, but this makes a poor comparison.

They should have mobilized the economy in early 1942, after the first failures on the Russian front; there have been plans for this, but eventually the top brass has changed their mind and needed Stalingrad and Tunisia to happen to shake them up. You cant really blame them for not mobilizing before 1942, after all, it seemed to everybody back then they are winning the war even with a limited mobilisation of the economy. There is no point in waging a war at the cost of ruining the economy, see the UK`s example on that.

 

[KrazyKraut]

In 1944, the Allies had unlimited amounts of metals, fuel, manufacturing facilities, and workers, which allowed the luxury of variety. However, in spite of this luxury, they still made Sherman tanks, P-51s, P-47s, F4Fs, etc. because they knew production would win the war. The Germans, on the other hand, by 1944, was starting to generate shortages in just about all aspects of military support. When they really needed to simplify and produce, they continued to look at technology to save them.

Which is exactly why you have a He-162: Cheap, non-critical, resources, dispersed production. And it's not like the Germans "started to generate shortages" they were forced upon them and they had to respond. Which they did by basically focusing on a single piston fighter for further development and said jet fighter combo. As a matter of fact, of the He-162 a few hundred were available when the war ended. But not the fuel or the pilots to fly them.

Regarding production: In 1944 fighter production was at its peak in Germany, besides the detoriating situation and it increased until the collapse. All this thanks to standardization efforts and production optimization conducted by RLM and industry. And it showed: Take the Einheitstriebwerk for example: Effectively, it allowed Tank to build the Ta-152 with different engine than he had originally thought of. Without the need for any serious re-designs.

That efforts were made to keep the lead over Allied jets for example goes without saying. But these were drafts, drawings and wind tunnel models. They didn't interfere with the existing production.

The Germans suffered from a badly disjointed procurement program, I am surprised that we are even having to debate this issue. Speer himself commented on it voraciously.

The Germans suffered mostly from direct interference by high ranking party members into procurement. The thing is, branch by branch procurement was different and as was interference. You make vast generalizations over the whole military and assume because of obvious and well know mistakes, flaws must be present in every branch and every procurement process. More specifically you applied your logic to the case of the late war fighter developments in question, which simply doesn't hold.

 

[The Basket]

The V1 was a huge success as a weapon.

It did the job that was asked of it.

Dirt cheap and diverted rescouces away from other fronts.

The Allied air force lost hundreds of aircraft and men and used up fuel to destroy these things.

Paid for itself bigstyle.

Killed 6,148 people which is hardly a small figure. Yeah. top weapon.

Didin't win the war but no German weapon did.

 

[parsifal]

Which is exactly why you have a He-162: Cheap, non-critical, resources, dispersed production.

As Henning has pointed out, the problems associated with the introduction of yet another type to the LW inventory more than offset any savings in strategic materials that is might represent. Its a false economy that even the most elementary economic analysis will clearly demonstrate. I suggest you read Professor Overy's analysis on the management of the wartime economies as a starting point

And it's not like the Germans "started to generate shortages" they were forced upon them and they had to respond.

Ah, yes they did. To name just a few examples, pre-war, stocks of strategic materials were deliberately run down to dangerous levels, to enable more money to be spent in other areas, including non-military areas, like the beautification of Berlin. The Germans also made conscious decisions throughout the war to build "whole units" and not provide adequate spares for many major items of equipment. There were never enough spare engines, never enough gearboxes (and the like) for any items, including aircraft. The reason is, basically, to impress the Nazi leadership, Goring in particular, who were not interested in serviceability rates, as much as total units produced.

Which they did by basically focusing on a single piston fighter for further development and said jet fighter combo. As a matter of fact, of the He-162 a few hundred were available when the war ended. But not the fuel or the pilots to fly them.

Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

Regarding production: In 1944 fighter production was at its peak in Germany, besides the deteriorating situation and it increased until the collapse. All this thanks to standardization efforts and production optimization conducted by RLM and industry. And it showed: Take the Einheitstriebwerk for example: Effectively, it allowed Tank to build the Ta-152 with different engine than he had originally thought of. Without the need for any serious re-designs.

Yes, producing planes without spares, without fuel, and without pilots is an eminently sensible management of resources.......Even without too much allied interference the Germans managed to back themselves into a complete muddle, and sorry state of mismanagement. The Germans produced in excess of 40000 fighters in 1944, from memory, and just 8500 pilots to fly them. Even without allied interference with their petro chemical industry, there was an upper limit of about 5000 fighters that could be kept fueled and ready in 1944. In the Allied air forces, a P-51 had an average shelf life of 9 months (without combat attrition). So for the Germans, without combat attrition, if they have a similar shelf life, one could expect to maintain that force structure of 5000 with no more than 7000 fighters from the factories. On top of that, there is of course combat attrition, which for the Germans was running at about 1500 aircraft per month. That means to replace losses from combat, and maintain your maximum 5000 strong they would need another 15000 aircraft, roughly. All up, the Germans would have needed about 22000 aircraft to maintain their 5000 aircraft. They cant go past the 5000 mark, unless they find a way to increase pilot output, and fuel outputs. Neither of these were contemplated in the 1944 economic plans. So the result of this impressive production effort, was a whole bunch of useless airframes, sitting around airfields, waiting to be destroyed by the allies. Good management...yeah right.

That efforts were made to keep the lead over Allied jets for example goes without saying. But these were drafts, drawings and wind tunnel models. They didn't interfere with the existing production.

What about the efforts needed to set up the production lines. You make it sound that design resources are free and grow on trees for nothing. It cost six million dollars in the sixties for the Coca Cola company to design the ring pull opener, and they obviously saw that as a valuable piece of design work, because it is a fully patented system. if you statement was correct, people wouldn't worry about patents, because it costs nothing, according to you, to develop a new design. You have got to be kidding...... yourself, mostly

The Germans suffered mostly from direct interference by high ranking party members into procurement. The thing is, branch by branch procurement was different and as was interference. You make vast generalizations over the whole military and assume because of obvious and well know mistakes, flaws must be present in every branch and every procurement process. More specifically you applied your logic to the case of the late war fighter developments in question, which simply doesn't hold.


I would agree to this extent, the problem stemmed from the upper management echelons mostly, but their influence was such that all the good work done by the lesser managers at the middle and lower echelons was basically more than canceled out. The problem was at the top, but it was a massive, and overwhelming problem.

In terms of the late war errors, there were plenty of examples to demonstrate poor management, starting with Hitlers interference in the Me 262, moving to Goering's obsession with production numbers, at the expense of serviceability, moving to the proliferation of multiple types, which flies in the face of standardization principals. Then we can move onto the fact that the LW production program was not matched by any corresponding effort in fuel production, or to the numbers of pilots that might be needed,,,,,,,etc etc, The list goes on and on

 

[KrazyKraut]

So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.

Yes, producing planes without spares, without fuel, and without pilots is an eminently sensible management of resources.......Even without too much allied interference the Germans managed to back themselves into a complete muddle, and sorry state of mismanagement. The Germans produced in excess of 40000 fighters in 1944, from memory, and just 8500 pilots to fly them. Even without allied interference with their petro chemical industry, there was an upper limit of about 5000 fighters that could be kept fueled and ready in 1944. In the Allied air forces, a P-51 had an average shelf life of 9 months (without combat attrition). So for the Germans, without combat attrition, if they have a similar shelf life, one could expect to maintain that force structure of 5000 with no more than 7000 fighters from the factories. On top of that, there is of course combat attrition, which for the Germans was running at about 1500 aircraft per month. That means to replace losses from combat, and maintain your maximum 5000 strong they would need another 15000 aircraft, roughly. All up, the Germans would have needed about 22000 aircraft to maintain their 5000 aircraft. They cant go past the 5000 mark, unless they find a way to increase pilot output, and fuel outputs. Neither of these were contemplated in the 1944 economic plans. So the result of this impressive production effort, was a whole bunch of useless airframes, sitting around airfields, waiting to be destroyed by the allies. Good management...yeah right.

My numbers are very different (Christer Bergstroem):

7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.

Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

Already explained like three times now. You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM procurement.

 

[parsifal]

So in essence you just switched your point from "Germany had too many designs to produce" to "Germany produced too many planes" Really it's you who's kidding himself.

If you got detailed information about servicability rates, or more specifically: how often LW pilots found themselves grounded because of too few servicable planes (lack of fuel excluded), please post that.

Then of course you take post-war, partially civil programs which have absolutely nothing to do with the "total war" time production of the planes and the period in question, but you generalize them over the whole war anyway. Totally baseless of course.

And you continue by making nil points about how production for future fighter designs had to be set up... despite the fact that none of them made it past prototype stage and most not even that far. So there was no production set up for them in any way and their influence ,positive or negative, is NONEXISTANT. But hey let's take everything to push an agenda.
7500 Fw 190s
13,000 Me 109s
~5000 further fighters (incl. prototypes, night fighters and jet fighters)

So all in all ~25500 or, in other words, only ~16% more than the number you assume needed. A number which is very questionable since it didn't include night fighters nor the fact that German non-combat attrition was probably worse than that of Western Allies in '44.

I did actually check properly, after your reply, and found the actual production of Fighters was 24654 in total. So I have over-estimated the total fighter production. However, it seems that the force structure they were supporting was also over-estimated

In January the Luftwaffe possessed 3400 a/c in their frontline formations, of which approximately 2200 were fighters or fighter bombers. In late 1944, the frontline LW was 4700 a/c, of which just under 3000 were in the fighter. So the LW fighter forces hovered in that period from between 2000 to 3000 in that period

And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences.

With regard to Operational rates, well it was abysmal, to put it mildly.

According to Murray, who quotes the war diary of JG 53, the following is typical of the serviceability of the LW Fighters over the Reich in 1944

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . .

(D) Personnel losses—Killed or injured: seven killed, five missing, three wounded (two bailed out), seven injured (of whom five bailed out). Two more injured not through Allied action. Seventeen parachute jumps, two jumped with wounds, two jumped twice without injury.29

Quote:
Which does nothing to explain why there were at least two jet designs, and four prop designs that I know of, other than to create procurement madness and confusion

Already explained like three times now.

And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy).

You on the other hand have yet to provide any explanation why Allied countries also had two or more jet fighters in the pipes as well as two or more piston fighters, if that was what was so wrong about RLM


We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part

 

[KrazyKraut]

And the table of losses supports my earlier contention, that the LW concentrated too much on the production of whole units, at the expense of serviceability. In 1944, the Jagdwaffe lost 13854 aircraft from all sources, but received 24654 new airframes. There was never a shortage of aircraft, but the reserve of aircraft could neve be used, because the pilots received, just 8500, and the fuel received, (total receipt in 1943 were 7.9 million tons, in 1944 it was projected that Germany would receive something like 8.1 million tons, but in the end, as a result of the losses of Ploesti, and the US bombing campaign, the Germans only received about 5.5 million tons). Luftwaffe oil receipts were in proportion to the total amounts received, so on that basis, the maximum expansion for the Jagdgruppen could have been from 2200 to just 2250 planes in the force structure. Instead, the Jagdgruppen were receiving enough fighters to support a force structure of over 3900. They failed however, to provide either the pilots, the fuel, or the spares to support such a change in the force structure. This is a clear and unrefutable indictment of LW management. They failed to manage their expansion in a way that would maximise the number of aircraft in the air. If they had produced less airframes, and spent the saved resources on increased fuel production, spare parts and pilot training, they would have achieved a higher sortie rate and possed a higher frontline fighter force than they actually did. Instead, they ended up with a whoile lot of unlflyable airframes on the ground, that were never able to contribut materially to the Reichs defences.

Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds.
As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.

The laconic reports of II Gruppe/JG 53 indicate what happened to that unit in the months of May and August. In the former month the unit reported:

(A) Operations took place on thirteen days. Twenty-one scrambles, fifteen of which resulted in combats.

(B) Average aircraft strength thirty-four; average serviceability twenty.

(C) Fifty-three aircraft lost or damaged. Of these: (1) extent: thirty-four 100%, three over 60%, nine over 35%, seven under 35%, (2) reason: thirty-three through Allied action, four [through] technical faults, sixteen owing [to] servicing faults. . . .

(D) Personnel losses—Killed or injured: seven killed, five missing, three wounded (two bailed out), seven injured (of whom five bailed out). Two more injured not through Allied action. Seventeen parachute jumps, two jumped with wounds, two jumped twice without injury.29

So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.

And people have pointed out to you, including myself, the false economy and poor logic behind your explanation. The luftwaffe would have vastly improved its operational rates (which were appalling, incidentally, by 1944 they were down to an average daily availability of about 50-65% of total force structure. This was in part, because of the fuel situation, in part because of previous battle damage, but also because of a shortage of spare parts (I dont think cannabilzing the spare airframes was permitted either)). Planes were grounded because ther were too many different types in service, and too few spare available to keep them airworthy).

So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind.

We can discuss that a bit later, and compare the allied sortie rates, operational status etc, but for now I thought we were commenting on the Luftwaffe, and it overall poor level of management, of which the decision to produce the Do-335 is a part

Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.

 

[parsifal]

Operational fighter losses on westerm front in '44 were ~11,000 alone iirc (don't have the book present now but will check later this evening) and the rest of your numbers... well I have no source ready and I'm not going to take your word for it after the 40,000 stuff before. You are also completely ignoring that a large number of your new planes are in fact rebuilds.

You recall wrong. You may wish to have a look at the following

http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm

Attrition and the Luetwaffe


As for operational aircraft. You are not suggesting that 1944 Germany had any chance of reaching operational rates comparable to that of e.g. USAAF, are you? There are a lot of influence factors in this equation that IMO are so apparent: Fighter sweeps by P-47s and P-51s or bombing runs, inexperienced LW pilots, lack of personnel. Yet you assume it was all due to lack of spare parts due to too much fighter production (not too little, that was your argumentation before ), but you fail to show any evidence of this actually being the case here.

Actually, my argument was that the Luftwaffe suffered poor management, not just that it suffered from a lack of spares. I never said, or implied that it produced too few fighters....It overproduced fighters, that would never fly because of a lack of fuel, and a lack of pilots, and suffered a very low sortie rate, partly because of a lack of spares. The lack of fuel would have occurred, even if a single bomb had not been dropped on the german oil refineries. The average fighter availability for the day fighter force was 1364 in 1944, over the reich, yet the germans , with only 2% more fuel were producing aircraft that envisaged a near 200% increase in the force structure. mathematically, this is impossible, as is getting 8500 pilots to fly 25000 airframes, given that an average pilot is only going to survive 1.7 shoot downs.

So where did it say it was due to lack of spare parts? Especially interesting how only four losses were attributed to technical faults.
Also you should adjust the non-combat attrition in your equation if this is representative of overall LW losses.

Try reading the article again. Actually its 20 lost, due to technical and servicing faults. What do you think a servicing fault might be????


So many adjectives... and your proof that this is attributable to the He-162 is where? In your mind.

Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me.

Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....


Yeah, when it comes to facts instead of wild guesses and missing links in the chain of reasoning we can of course discuss that a bit later.[/QUOTE]

I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????

 

[KrazyKraut]

I'm well aware of Murphy's article. You forgot to mention btw, that he nowhere in his article mentions a lack of spares and any mentionable impact of that on overall fighter availability. Since his article is directly aimed at attrition and serviceability that makes you wonder, no? Servicing faults have a wide range of causes. And damaged due to servicing faults does not sound like grounded due to lack of spares to me.

Once again all you show is circumstantial evidence, which can be attributed to a wide range of reasons.
Ah, we are yet to see a single shred of supporting evidence for your case, so it does seem a bit rich to say my posts are full of adjectives. If you check back on the posts, you will find not a single statistic to support your own assertions. its all lights and mirrors. I dont know what they teach in germany, but it certainly does not look much like brains to me. Certainly manners, unlike in Australia apparently. So what kind of statistic do you want to have?
Introducing additinal types only adds to the servicing difficulties of a force already suffering from a poor sercicieability record. It should be obvious that having more than one type is poor practice. Perhaps we should ask the question in reverse, what evidence is there for you to make the claim that adding to the number of types was a good thing. Conventional wisdom says that it is not, but you seem to have a theory that it is (beneficial) to operational serviceability. I am intersted to know how you can show that.....
The evidence is obviously that a pilot in a jet fighter will be more capable than one in a Bf-109 G-6.

I am more than happy to discuss the allied efforts, but can you explain to me, what connection this might have to the thread??? We are supposed to be arguing the benefits of the Do-335. I say it was an example of poor LW management, you then want to argue the failures of the allies, how does that relate to the Do-335?????Very easy: You accuse the LW of gross mismanagement while Allied practice was very comparable. What little is left can be attributed to a certain degree of desperation from late '44 on. Much more so than by a overall faulty procurement program like you constantly accuse.

 

[Milos Sijacki]

I think that it would have been a really good interceptor.

 

[KrazyKraut]

It might have finally given the LW a good long range escort, but it came way to late for that. As an interceptor the Me-262 offered more imo.

 

[Soren]

The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air.

The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).

 

[drgondog]

The Ta-152H-1 already had the range needed for escort missions and was on top of that the best piston engined fighter in the air.

The Do-335 probably would've been an excellent nightfighter, fighter-bomber and bomber destroyer, but as a fighter its use was limited as Germany already possessed the two best figher a/c in the world at that point, both of which were far more capable in the role (The best no less).

I agree. Period.

The Do 335 in my opinion was a waste of further development $$, used two engines instead of one and worst of all, had no value I can think of approaching the Me 262 in any of those roles.

It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster - which does not much good if you are spotted entering a high density escort zone.

As good as the Ta 152 was, I see no reason that even it was produced in competition w/262. From my perspective the LW should have settled on the Fw 190 series and Me 262 from early 1944, forward. The Fw 190D-19 and D-12 were sufficently close to the Ta 152.. If you think about it, there was no significant value in a piston engine fighter with such great performance at 35-45,000 feet. The battles were at 28-15,000 feet.

As Parsifal pointed out, once Speer shifted production priorities to fighters in early 1944, German industry produced far more fighters than they had pilots to fly them, and the pilots were getting shot down in droves because of bad leadership/tactics and their a/c were not at or sufficiently greater performance levels than the escort fighters.

IMO - There was only one hope of defeating daylight strategic ops in time and that was a bomber destroyer with far greater performance than the P-51B in March/April 1944 before the Oil campaign started and before the Invasion.

 

[Soren]

It was faster than a 51B/D, Tempest, Spit XIV and P-47M - but a lot of 262s were shot down by those allied fighters and the Do 335 was only marginally faster

Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat. And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed. However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2.


Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.

Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.

The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...