The Do-335

[KrazyKraut]

B][/B]
Once the allies wereat war (and not just britain alone), the allies did not produce new or additional fighters. Lets have a brief look at the main types for SE Fighters
First Flights
Hurricane I 11.35
Hurricane II: 6.40 (same basic airframe and engine...evolutionary development, no great dislocation to production)
Spitfire: 6.36, progressive improvements to airframe, armament and engine until MkXII

Spitfire (griffon Engine) Active in 1944 (major redesign of airframe and engine)
Typhoon: 10.39, Not operational until 5.41
Tempest: 9.42. A new design, to take advantage of the new Centaurus engine, for which development had begun pre-war

In the case of the british, therefore, ther were two designs that could be considered as "new" after the entry of the US. The Griffon engined Spits still made use of the spitfire airframe, and so was not a complete redesign. The Tempest, was a complete new design but was taking advantage of existing last generation engine technology.

Then of course ther was the meteor, which was a complete new design, but undertstandable due to its revolutionary nature.

Then there are the Americans



The main types that enterd, or were in production were

Hawk series, P-36, p-40,
Bell P-39
P-47
P-51

All of these airframes were developed prior to the entry of the US to the war

Then there were the carrier types,

F4F
F6F
F4U
Bearcat

The bearcat was a new development, the hellcat, and the F4U were both developed substantially pre-war

Now we need to look at the Axis and the new designs that were introduced

I believe the following were in production, or substantially under development pre-war

Me 109, FW 190, CR 32, CR 42, MC 200, G-050
I consider the following types to be wartime new designs

FW 190D, Ta 152, Do 335, Me 109K, Me 262, He 162, G-55, MC202, RE 2005
So comparing the two principal European Axis, to the two principal European Allies, the and disregarding the carier types (which were mainly for the pacific), one arrives at 6 allied types of pre-war vintage, to 6 Axis

In terms of the post US entry types, I would concede 6 main types introduced by the allies to at least 9 by the european axis, all of which, incidentally were used by the germans

Moreover, the allies had the economic muscle to afford this kind of diversity, whereas the Axis did not


So the short answer is that the allied fighter development was done on a much less lavish scale than that of the axis, and where possible tried to to use pre-existing technology. The great many marks and line changes, whilst disruptive to production, were not nearly so bad as the introduction of a whole new type

Except you a) blatantly "forgot" a few types, b) arbitrarily designate German fighters as "new" which are no more or less so than several Allied developments which you of course chose to see as "one" and c) try to cover up the indifference by including Italy

I will try to make a fair production comparison between RAF and LW based on daytime, landbased fighters with significant production numbers only. I will exclude conversions from bombers as I'm unsure about their overall significance in daytime operations and I think give or take they don't distort the numbers too much. Additionally I will exclude land-lease aircraft which would of course increase the RAF numbers significantly:

RAF 1940: Hurricane, Spitfire, Defiant, Beaufighter (limited) (4)
LW 1940: Bf 109, Bf 110 (2)

RAF 1941: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter (limited) (4)
LW 1941: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210 (very limited) (4)

RAF 1942: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter (limited) (5)
LW 1942: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210 (very limited) (4)

RAF 1943: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Beaufighter, Tempest (very limited) (5)
LW 1943: Bf 109, Fw 190, Bf 110, Me 210/410 (4)

RAF 1944: Hurricane, Spitfire, Typhoon, Tempest (limited and mostly nightfighters), Beaufighter, Meteor (6)
LW 1944: Bf 109, Fw 190, Ta 152 (extremely limited), Bf 110 (very limited and mostly nightfighters), Me 262, Me 163, Me 410 (7)

RAF 1945: Spitfire, Typhoon, Tempest, Beaufighter, Meteor (5)
LW 1945: Bf 109, Fw 190, Ta 152, Me 262, He 162 (5)

So that'd be 4-4-5-5-6-5 vs. 2-4-4-4-7-5 for 1940-1945.

There's probably some I forgot. I will get to developments later.

 

[Soren]

but at least some ex fighter pilots suspected that it would become difficult to control if one made harsh combat manouevres.
Juha

Well not the British test pilots. Eric Brown mentions that he loved throwing the He-162 into tight turns and that it was extremely maneuverable in all flight regimes. The only issue, and it was minor according to Brown, was the overly responsive rudder, but this was no problem what'so'ever as long as you knew about it - Some unfortunate French pilot didn't know about it and pushed the rudder to hard causing the aft fuselage structure to fail.

 

[drgondog]

Again the problems with the He-162 were caused because of a lack of proper materials Bill.

So you are saying a different rudder was not designed and installed, that the airplane did not have a serious dutch roll that they tried to fix by changinging the static margin and droop tips?

The wing design issue was solved with the droop tips as a quick fix, had there been enough time an increase in dihedral would've been made instead but the droop tips fixed the problem nonetheless.

Any fix, post production designe release, necessary to place the aircraft in operations is a 'development issue' - why would you argue that

In short the wing is the only thing which recieved a minor modification vs the original design blueprints, all other problems were caused by shortages in the right materials.

So, there was no modification to the tail prior to operations?

As for the glue, this was solved as-well with a new mix.

So, future aircraft using new glue went into operations, what about the earlier aircraft. Were they discarded? Would that be a development problem?


Now regarding the Me-262, around 100 were destroyed by Allied a/c true, but not all in the air. And as for the LW claims, well they were undoubtedly higher, the 509 figure is confirmed kills as far as I can tell. But Erich knows more about this so he's the man to ask.

The contention of 'award to actual loss' will always be a mystery but the 8th AF records are better than the LW records in this regard for both awards and losses.

The 105 awards is an actual count of the air to air claims (more than 105)reduced to awards, but there were far more destroyed on the ground. The 355th had 18 on one mission in 1944.

I am also fully aware than many burning Me 262s in combat film were in reality repaired so I won't dive down a rathole on what the count actually was in either category.

As Joe B. has mentioned, and I agree, getting grips on actual award/losses is very difficult. In just my research on April 24, 1944 and November 26, 1944 the LW awards for both bombers and fighter categories were 2x actaul losses of 8th AF for those days.. ditto May 12 - so it raised many question in my own mind about LW claim/award processes when they had the easiest job of all for most claims - go look and see what you find 'there'... as the wreckage of everything but an atomized aircraft should leave a trace.

I know now that many aircraft claimed by US fighters as 'destroyed' following a crash landing under fire was actually and frequently not in the LW rolls as destroyed if it was assessed as 60% for an example and later repaired.

 

[Juha]

Soren
Quote: "the 509 figure is confirmed kills as far as I can tell"

IIRC LW confirmation process broke down around Dec 44, not many claims were officially confirmed after that by the complicated confirmation process, so who confirmed the 509 Me 262 kills?

Now none of the French crashed because of after fuselage failure, one of the British/Commonwealth pilot did , Flt Lt Marks, according to Brown.

From Brown:" On the whole the result was surprisingly good, but the little humped monster with its engine on its back was tricky to fly, showing marginal stability, a strong tendency to side-slip, and an eagerness to spin." And "from the stability and control point of view, one of the finest aircraft I had ever flow." but "with its pygmy size and very limited range, was an impracticable proposition." So surprisingly good when one looks the situation in which it was created but far from perfect combat a/c.


Juha

 

[Soren]

Juha the Me-262 was in service long before Dec 44, so the confirmed kills would be from that period.

As for the He-162, as I recall a Frenchman crashed and died because of structural failure to either the aft fuselage or stablizer. But it could've been an Englishman as-well, I don't have my books or notes with me as I'm on vacation.

 

[Soren]

The contention of 'award to actual loss' will always be a mystery but the 8th AF records are better than the LW records in this regard for both awards and losses.

The 105 awards is an actual count of the air to air claims (more than 105)reduced to awards, but there were far more destroyed on the ground. The 355th had 18 on one mission in 1944.

I am also fully aware than many burning Me 262s in combat film were in reality repaired so I won't dive down a rathole on what the count actually was in either category.

As Joe B. has mentioned, and I agree, getting grips on actual award/losses is very difficult. In just my research on April 24, 1944 and November 26, 1944 the LW awards for both bombers and fighter categories were 2x actaul losses of 8th AF for those days.. ditto May 12 - so it raised many question in my own mind about LW claim/award processes when they had the easiest job of all for most claims - go look and see what you find 'there'... as the wreckage of everything but an atomized aircraft should leave a trace.

I know now that many aircraft claimed by US fighters as 'destroyed' following a crash landing under fire was actually and frequently not in the LW rolls as destroyed if it was assessed as 60% for an example and later repaired.

Claims were about as overblown by both sides, that's why the confirmation procedure was there, and the LW had the strictest here. It sometimes took up to a year for a kill to be confirmed, a pretty long wait...

Btw, any new progress with the spreadsheets Bill ?

 

[Juha]

Soren
"Juha the Me-262 was in service long before Dec 44, so the confirmed kills would be from that period."

Nope, checked Foreman's and Harvey's The Me-262 Combat Diary, not the most up-today book but anyway a good indicator, only 59 claims by Me262 pilots up to 31.12.44.

Juha

BTW, happy vacation!

 

[Kurfürst]

The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements.

Incredibly doubtful. Especially as the RAF was barely even up in the air to go against the Luftwaffe after 1940.. Its enough to take a look at the claims made by the 2nd TAF in the second half of 1944, which was supposed to be the vanguard of British efforts in the air (and in practice the only actual one, given the typical short range of RAF fighters operating from Britain). While the 2nd TAF was claiming 50, perhaps 100 or 150 aircraft a month, and perhaps actually destroying a half or third of that, the USAAF and Luftwaffe waged a literal Materialschlacht in the air with unprecedented amounts of aircraft lost on both sides.

The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers. They maintained some high quality units, and equipment, but at the end of the day, the allies realized that they needed the numbers more than anything.

Its difficult to see why are you are switching the subject to the 'Allies'. The subject was specifically the RAF lack of modern (fighter) equipment through the war.

The USAAF, and the VVS or the Luftwaffe for that matter had appearantly little problem in either capability or will getting the most modern equipment to the frontlines; Mustangs become widespread relatively fast. OTOH, the RAF appears to have been tradiationally incapable of matching enemy equipment quality in numbers.

Unless you wish to tell me that someone in Britain was in charge of these matters went funny in the head and willfully ensured that they would get Hurricanes instead of Spitfires in 1940, Mark V Spits instead of Mk IXs in 1942-43, Mark IX Spits and Typhoons instead of XIVs and Tempests in 1944 etc..

new technology is a "nice to have" advantage, but at the end of the day it s the number of aircraft that you can consistently put into the air that counts the most. The allies realized this. They also realized they needed to maintain quality, and did this as well.

Its starting to look like a pink rosy dream and you even start to contradict yourself. First you argue that 'the Allies' wanted the numbers game, and that they regarded quality as a sort of secondary issue; then you argue they maintained quality as well after all.

The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans.

Verifiable source please.

Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later.

That is a very interesting claim. Lets take a look at April 1944. That's early 1944.

Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%. Stop sprouting bull crap to support your arguments. I will spot it from a mile away

Speaking of, I call bull crap on this, provide the source please.

Overall it seems to me you put up some rosy pink glasses with superglue. Claim after claim is made by you, some very dubious, but it is not supported with facts or anything.

Its simply fiction. You have a pre-conceived idea, and just blend the facts around it.

 

[kool kitty89]

Except you a) blatantly "forgot" a few types

Including the P-38!

 

[drgondog]

If Dr Price is to be believed, he has the following for May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich

Unit Total Serviceable
JG1 135 58
JG3 144 44
JG5 87 72
JG11 101 55
JG27 118 86
JG53 31 14
JG 54 23 8
JG300 90 67
JG301 25 21
JG302 27 11
JG400 10 0
JG104 4 4
JG 106 5 3
JG 108 12 6
---- ----
782 449

According to Dr Price the 'serviceable to available' S/E day fighter ratio was 57%... the NJG totals were 807 and 374 respectively for 46% operational availability on 31 May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich Fighter strength.

I don't have any conclusings but would not be suprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts.

 

[drgondog]

Claims were about as overblown by both sides, that's why the confirmation procedure was there, and the LW had the strictest here. It sometimes took up to a year for a kill to be confirmed, a pretty long wait...

Btw, any new progress with the spreadsheets Bill ?

Yep - I made the changes to add inputs of a.) density at a specific altitude, b.) Bhp as recorded in flight tests for that altitude and c.) reference full ammo load and pilot weight as one factor and a fuel load as another. I will probably start comparing results to Gene's spreadsheets in a day or so.

I am debating adding to propeller thrust losses due to decreasing density altitude - I found an interesting 'rule of thumb' from a P&W Handbook I haven't looked at for 35 years but it is an approximation and it would apply to all the fighters at a given altitude across the board.. so in comparisons it should have no bearing in the outcome.

Gene's models are solely for Sea Level performance where SQRT(RHOalt/RHOsl) =1.

At 25,000 feet it = .6698.. This is only important if I wish to compare EAS for a 51 at 25000 feet against EAS for an 109G6 at SL.. but I do want that capability later.

More about this later

Ordinarily I would agree on LW claims process - at least through 1943 and for ETO. JG 77 and 27 claims in Africa are hugely suspect in many instances in MTO. But, if Tony Woods tables with referenced film are examples of LW awards processes for even early 1944 I have serious doubts that the process was as rigorous from early1944 forward based on detailed research of Allied losses for perhaps 20 specific days ranging from February 20-25 during Big Week.

The figures I have gotten from Drs Prien, Mueller and Caldwell are agreeing very well with Luftwaffe loss records by type loss - and 8th AF FC awards. The issue is that the bombers definitely got some of the fighters lost and it is difficult to estimate the percentage. At zero percent attributed to bombers the variations are small and grow as you assume increasing percentages going to the bombers.

I literally have looked at all (~98%) the 8th AF FC MACR's available from NARA for the last 20 years and feel that I have a very good insight on 8th FC loss by category. The stuff I sent you last fall is being updated as I am well on the way to finish a month by month compilation including the types of a/c 'awarded' as kills by 8thAFVCB.

 

[parsifal]

I don't have any conclusions but would not be surprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts.


I see this thread has gone absolutelybonkas, now that we are questioning German competency.

I agree with the above statement to the extent that the major limiter was pilots, followed later in 1944, by fuel shortages. However I do have sources to back up my claim about spares.

"Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45" Professor Williason Murray, Air University Press (University Of Ohio), 1983, Page 14

Goring's and Hitlers fascination with numbers also served to distort the maintenance and supply problem. The number of aero engines held in reserve never exceeded 4-5% of total production. The reason for this situation was Goring's refusal to follow recommendations made repeatedly by OKLto devote at least 20-30% of production to spare parts, to provide adequate inventories (of spares). Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength, because the outlook of the top leadership was a fascination with numbers, and not serviceability. This practice continued throughout the war. as a result the Luftwaffe was chronically short of spare parts, with a significant and direct negative impact on readiness rates.

Joel Haywards book reinforces this point of view. He points out that whilst readiness rates might be high at the beginning of a campaign, that serviceability fell away very rapidly in any sort of sustained operation. This was because there were just not the spares available to keep the air fleets at a high state of readiness for long. The reports from JG53 indicate that at the beginning of 1944, more 20 of its aircraft were unavailable due to "servicing difficulties" or "technical faults" So, I believe there is clear evidence to support the claim that the Luftwaffe mismanaged its logistic tail by failing to build or maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts.

 

[drgondog]

I don't have any conclusions but would not be surprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts.


I see this thread has gone absolutelybonkas, now that we are questioning German competency.

I agree with the above statement to the extent that the major limiter was pilots, followed later in 1944, by fuel shortages. However I do have sources to back up my claim about spares.

"Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45" Professor Williason Murray, Air University Press (University Of Ohio), 1983, Page 14

Goring's and Hitlers fascination with numbers also served to distort the maintenance and supply problem. The number of aero engines held in reserve never exceeded 4-5% of total production. The reason for this situation was Goring's refusal to follow recommendations made repeatedly by OKLto devote at least 20-30% of production to spare parts, to provide adequate inventories (of spares). Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength, because the outlook of the top leadership was a fascination with numbers, and not serviceability. This practice continued throughout the war. as a result the Luftwaffe was chronically short of spare parts, with a significant and direct negative impact on readiness rates.

Joel Haywards book reinforces this point of view. He points out that whilst readiness rates might be high at the beginning of a campaign, that serviceability fell away very rapidly in any sort of sustained operation. This was because there were just not the spares available to keep the air fleets at a high state of readiness for long. The reports from JG53 indicate that at the beginning of 1944, more 20 of its aircraft were unavailable due to "servicing difficulties" or "technical faults" So, I believe there is clear evidence to support the claim that the Luftwaffe mismanaged its logistic tail by failing to build or maintain an adequate inventory of spare parts.

entirely possible - but with such a low operations availability it seems like a lot of 'spares and hanger queens' were available to offset spare parts logistics.

 

[Juha]

Drgondog
IIRC LW kept record besides plane availability also pilot/aircrew capalities, ie how many pilots/aircrew there were in unit, how many of them were fully combat capable and how many were only limitedly combat capable, ie needed more training/experience to be fully effective combat pilot/aircrew.

So IMHO plane serviceably depended on availability of spares and on availability of enough mechanics and other service people. Also at least the Finnish AF suffered of lack of special tools for their Me 109Gs which significantly delayed maintenance work.

Juha

 

[Kurfürst]

If Dr Price is to be believed, he has the following for May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich

Unit Total Serviceable
JG1 135 58
JG3 144 44
JG5 87 72
JG11 101 55
JG27 118 86
JG53 31 14
JG 54 23 8
JG300 90 67
JG301 25 21
JG302 27 11
JG400 10 0
JG104 4 4
JG 106 5 3
JG 108 12 6
---- ----
782 449

According to Dr Price the 'serviceable to available' S/E day fighter ratio was 57%... the NJG totals were 807 and 374 respectively for 46% operational availability on 31 May, 1944 for LuftFlotte Reich Fighter strength.

I don't have any conclusings but would not be suprised that pilot availability was one of the root causes - not parts.

However if you look at the entire Luftwaffe, rather than just Luftflotte Reich, which was undergoing its most severe period of combat with the USAAF at the time, servicabilty rates were around 70%. Its also rather important whether these servicibility statistics refer to the status in the morning, before the battles, or were taken in the evening, when a lot of planes were around with a couple of holes in them, unservicable, but overall only having light damage that would repaired by the morning.

As such of the statistics above are misleading.

For example, JG3 has 144 present, 44 servicable.

But in my edition of Price it is also noted that the IV (Sturm) Gruppe of JG 3 was under re-organisation, and it had 54 aircraft but only one servicable - so certainly IV/JG 3 (with its 1,8% servicibility) are going to lower the readiness statistics of JG 3 as a whole.

Dig a little deeper and you will find that at the start of May 1944 IV/JG 3 had only Bf 109G-6s. During the month it lost some of them, and transferred most of the rest to other units. In the same month the Gruppe received some 64 FW 190A-7 and A-8, most brand new.
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, IV./JG3

In brief, during May the IV/JG 3 Gruppe was doing its transition from the Bf 109G to FW 190A which explains why its servicibility was so low.


Similiarly, II/JG 27, III/ZG 26, II/ZG 76, I/JG 400 was undergoing re-organisation at the time. Looking for example I/JG 400, which was just formed officially a few months ago as a Me 163, was only starting receiving its radically different aircraft in May 1944.
Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG400

Murray literally shines in making stupid conclusions from insufficent evidence, so unless he can offer so sort of verifiable source for his claims about lack of spare parts, I do not care about his comments much. They are far too often found to completely baseless and faulty in their analysis.

Phrases like 'Goring's and Hitlers fascination' certainly do not raise his credibility, as it only addresses the reader`s emotions but not his mind. Stuff like 'Instead the Germans assigned production almost exclusively to first line strength' is also funny and it is easy to disprove.

For example, just a quick check from the number available to me, in June 1943 the Germans produced 672 new Bf 109Gs; they issued 388 to frontline daylight fighter units. Some obviously went to recce units, for which I have no figures (yet), but overall those were only a fraction of Tagjagd`s size, so I doubt we are talking about more than a few dozen issued at best.

To switch to 1944, during March the Germans 859 new production fighters (FW 190, Bf 109 etc), and 387 from repair centres to the Tagjagd; in the same month, 804 new Bf 109s and 573 FW 190s were produced.

Yet Murray claims there were not enough spares.. it would seem to me that there were always plentiful of whole replacement aircraft around, which would appear to be a much more straightforward means of increasing servicibility than to perform repairs of damaged aircraft on site. The Germans appear to have relied a lot more on their home industry to perform repairs than Murray seems to realize. Of course Murray must be thinking in terms of the USAAF, where such, thousands of miles from the states, would be very difficult to perform and local repairs would the way to go.

 

[parsifal]

Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe

He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics. Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%), From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).

Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%

Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example

The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview.
The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2.
Hans attained the the rank of Obergefreiter in North Africa, later Corporal, and saw active service with the RAD and Luftwaffe for the full duration of the war (1939-45). He served in North Africa between March 1941 and May 1943 as a radio (wireless) operator.
Hans was stationed at various airfields within Libya, Egypt and Tunisia such as Tmimi, Martuba, Derna, Barce, En Nofilia, Agedabia, El Daba, Bir el Abd, El Quasaba, Gabes and Tunis.
In May 1943 he was one of the few lucky ones to be evacuated by air from Tunisia to Sicily. From here he participated in the gradual retreat movements northward through Italy until he finally surrendered to US Infantry in the Dolomites, Northern Italy in May 1945.

Which units did you serve with in North Africa?

Well, with the III./StG 3, II./StG 2, I./ StG 3 Ju 88 Aufklarer (Reconnaisance). With the Ju 88 we had first tries of some night-fighter training, leading the aircraft from ground by radio. My Stamm- Einheit (basic-unit) still was the 4./ Ln.Abt. Afrika until the end of 1942, when I was with the Ln.Rgt. Tunis ( 9./ Horch (reconnaisance)). On the 2nd May 1943 I was put under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring and could escape to Marsala/Sicily with a "Siebel-Fahre" (a special armoured type of pontoon ferry).

Was the supply of fuel and spare parts a major problem?

Supply of spare parts and fuel really was a major problem!


Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness. aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying. That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate. And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war.


Are all of these people unreliable as well???

 

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.

Juha

 

[drgondog]

kurfurst - I really don't have a problem with your primary points as the LW did, prior to D-Day ship a/c back to central locations for upgrades and repairs.

That strategy became less successful as more fighters were leaving the bombers following relief from escort and shooting up rail and barge traffic on the way home. This same tactic placed strains on Speers very sound decentralization of his a/c industry to lessen effect of strategic bombing.

Having said that a casual look at LufFlotte 3 on the Kanal front shows 357 on hand and 209 available S/E and T/E fighters for JG2, JG26, ZG1,NJG4,NJG5 and NJG6 - also about 58% at the end of May 31. A casual look at LF4 shows a much higher percentage 'availability' than the England facing JG's, ditto LF5 and 6.

I would speculate that the LW did not have the eqivalent Service Groups located close to airfields - which did the wing changes, major sheet metal or assembly replacements, etc. But I do not know.

Implication is a lot of sheet metal repair, new wings etc, not spark plugs, radios and engines... as well as a shortage of pilots to fly perfectly good ships.

BTW as I look at 8th AF strength in fighters I frequently see 60-70% available, sometimes less, between Feb and end of April, as the Mustang was ironing out issues with radios, mags, coolant leaks, etc.

In June there were severe strains on the ground crews because of Invasion activity but the availability was high (>70%) and pilots often flew two and sometimes three sorties per day in Area Patrols and Fighter Bomber missions.

 

[Kurfürst]

Murray is only considered one of the foremost experts in the world on the Luftwaffe

By whom...?

I would certainly not call someone so who

a, had done zero research in Germany and had appearantly very little understanding or willingness to understand how the Luftwaffe would operate during the war, instead he dispays the typical Anglo-Saxon reasoning that since we did it this way, and they did it in another way, they must be wrong. We`ve seen this nonsene with the four-engined bomber thing how many times exactly..? Well HELLO THERE, they were not the ones flying from Britain to Germany over France, so where is exactly the same pressing need?

b, uses demagogue arguements like 'the Luftwaffe lost the equivalents of two air forces by 1942' etc., then going into how this eroded the quality, somehow forgetting about the fact that all the other air forces went through this as well. An equivalent of the RAF`s Fighter Command was, for example, wiped out during the mere four months in the Battle of Britain - but of course it received replacements, and maintained the numbers. Yet somehow, Murray speaks of losses that if it would be some kind of demagogue 'proof' of the loss of quality, and naturally, it only effected the Luftwaffe... bah!

From what I`ve seen, Murray is very popular in certain circles, because he lends authority to bashing agendas.

He is supported by Hayward in his work, "The Luftwaffe and Hitlers defeat in the East", in which he also shows the The Luftwaffe as having a problem with logistics.

Having problems with logistics (which is fairly normal IMHO in any army of the size on campaign), and being run by retards is not quite the same thing.

Hayward reports that the operational readiness rate for the Luftwaffe reached a peak in June 1942, on the southern front, of 70%, but this had plunged to less than 31% by the time of Stalingrad. By March it had staged a partial recovery to 45%, and some further improvement again by the time of Kursk (IIRC it had climbed to something over 50%),

Hayward apparently picks certain periods of low serviceability rates, at certain times and certain locations to support his conception, instead of providing an overall picture how serviceability went through the war.

Cherry picking, however, is not convincing. To make some use of such figures, we would need to at least how many of these were non-operational because of

a, lack of spares
b, lack of maintenance personnel capacity
c, lack of transportation capacity
d, what was the duration of serviceability (ie. unserviceable for the duration of a night is fairly normal, the crew simply needs time to make the repairs)
e, what was the cause, heavy enemy action that naturally creates bottlenecks in the servicing chain or natural wear?

Without knowledge of the reasons, especially if we do not know the duration of serviceability and the cause, no valid conclusions can be drawn.

Guesses can be made with a high probability of error.

From there on, the readiness rate continued to drop, until by the end of the war, almost the entire Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had become non-operational (not due to spares, mostly to the fuel situation by then).

That`s a remarkable funny fiction, in view of the reported sorties flew over the Eastern front by Luftwaffe`s non-operational phantom planes. IIRC 10 000 or so fighter sorties were flown in the East in February 1945 alone. Over Berlin in April, a very high number of sorties (a few thousend a day, from memory) were flown.

I guess *IF* Hayward makes such a blatantly stupid claim that towards the wars end the Luftwaffe was non-operational on the East, I guess his book can go straight onto the lower shelf of the 'Fiction' shelf in remote book stores.

Ellis reports that by the end of June 1941, the readiness rate of the frontline aircraft had fallen to about 1000 A/C, or around 44%

Oh well I can cherry pick low serviceability rates too.

For example, Typhoon Squadrons can be showed at a service rate of 5 to 10 (five to ten) percent in late 1944 at 1-2-3 serviceable Typhoons per Squadron.

Do you think it was lack of spares, too...?

Finally there are some interviews of actual veterans, the following of which is an example

The interview has been made possible by the kind assistance and enthusiasm of his son, Uwe Wiedemann, who relayed my questions to his father and conducted the actual interview.
The subject, Hans Wiedemann, served in the Luftwaffe, primarily with 4./ Ln.Rgt. Afrika, III./Stuka Geschw. 3 and Stab StG3. He also served for a time with Stuka Geschwader 2.

[...]

- Was the supply of fuel and spare parts a major problem?
- Supply of spare parts and fuel really was a major problem!

I don`t think I need to detail why I find this a lame sweaty attempt. Keywords: lack of source, lack of details, lack of insight onto the whole picture we are discussion (the Luftwaffe, not the well-being 4th Staffel of Stukageschwader 3 in Africa).

Yet I still have to wonder how the Luftwaffe, despite your claims, maneged to keep up on avarage 60-70% servicibility with its fighter units late in the war, despite the railways, roads being regularly attack by medium bombers and fighter bombers, the airfields strafed by escorts and bombed by heavies.

Producing whole units instead of producing adequate spares...

PROVE first there were no adequate spares before you try to present it as a fact.

is a most innefficient way of maintaining readiness. aircraft, like any complex machine, will have certain pieces of equipment that fail more regularly than others. usually these areas of systemic failure will occur in the engine. Producing an entire airframe, so that you can have a spare engine is a most innefficient way of repairing an airframe. The best and most production efficient way to manage this problem is to maintain a relatively high reserve of engines (so as to return the airframe to service quickly), and then further, to maintain a higher than average stock of engine parts that are shown the most likley to fail. Say, for example the crankshafts are shown to need replacement after say 50 hours, but that the average engine life is 500 hours. It would make sense to produce 10 crankshafts for every one engine, rather than produce 10 separate engines, or worse, produce 10 complete airframes , just so the crankshaft can be replaced every 50 hours. Effectively, under the latter scenario, you will have 10 airframes sitting around, doing nothing, in order to keep just one airframe flying.

That is all well, but what does it have to do with the subject?

That is hardly good management, and very likely to lead to a low operational readiness rate.
And yet, this is precisely how the Luftwaffe was managed throughout most of the war.

Oh I see now. You describe a fiction, born a few minutes ago in your mind, and then say that this is how exactly it happened 60 years ago. No supportive evidence, nothing.

Because you want it to have been happening that way, because you argued earlier it did, then it must have happened that way.

Is that it?

PROVE first there was low operational readiness rate through the war before you try to present it as a fact.
of evidence offered.

Produce the evidence. This means numbers on spares, verifiable sources behind your claims.

Are all of these people unreliable as well???

You do know the analogue between opinions and a-holes, that everyone has them, these people included? The problem being, until proven, it just that, an opinion. So prove them. The burden of proof is on you, you make the claims here.

 

[Kurfürst]

Hello Kurfürst
there is one significant omission in Your analyse, the SGs, which were very significant user of FW 190s and in May 44 LW had something like 1050 serviceable sinle-engined fighters and some 550 serviceable ground-attack planes, almost all of the latter were FW 190s.

Juha

The reason being I did not take a look at the SGs, being not my particular interest; HoHun`s XLS table can be used to gather such data, but I noticed some - IT/excell related - errors in it and I do not trust if the details of losses, shipments etc. is reported correctly.

However, I have no reason to believe the trend was different with 190s than with 109s; in the case of the latters, simply a lot more 109 were built every month than issued. Thus I see no problem with spares/reserves.

It might be interesting to do a detailed study on 190s as well, but, I am not inclined to do so because of ill-supported theories that emerge every now and then, especially if they appear to be dogmatic; and, my available time is not endless either.

Besides anyone can do it in his free time if he is interested, and then share the results. All the material is available on the internet (USSBS and ww2.dk). It only needs processed.