The F4F / FM-2 alone would have won the war in the PTO

Broncazonk said:

...The Japanese could have been flying limited numbers of Mig-15's / F-86's and still lost control
of the air. A 100 Mig-15's against 1000 Wildcats and it's NOT EVEN CLOSE. The Wildcats
win in a matter of days...

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The Japanese were on the verge of deploying thier own combat jets...the KI-201 Karyu (The Nakajima Kikka was unarmed)...and that could have spelled disaster for the Wildcat.

Understand that in the European Theater, the P-51D was able to best the Me262 *if* it had the advantage. The Karyu was very similiar to the '262, and that meant superior speed and armament (cannon equipped). Had the Karyu encountered the Wildcat, it wouldn't have been a contest. Unlike the P-51D which had speed and manoverability on it's side, the Wildcat would have been dead meat as soon as the Karyu pilots adjusted thier tactics.

Don't dogfight a jet against a prop job...use your superior speed and firepower to thin 'em out. Shoot 'em up and climb out of trouble...you can pick and choose your fight with those odds.

The reason why the Japanese had 4 carriers at Midway instead of 5 is that they couldn't
come up with replacement pilots or aircraft for the undamaged Zuikaku. It's air-group was
decimated at Coral Sea. (Worse than decimated, which is only 10% - the loss was approaching
50%.) Between the Shōkaku air-group and Zuikaku's, they still didn't have enough.
(Read "Shattered Sword - The Battle of Midway" it's DEFINITIVE as to this point.)

The reason why the Shōkaku, Zuikaku and Junyo's air-groups were way under-strength at
Santa Cruz is because of Midway, the air battles over Guadalcanal and the battle of the Eastern Solomons.

The Japanese were having a hard time replacing pilots and aircraft in 1942 and it just got worse and worse in 1943 and it became a disaster in 1944.

BTW.. SYSCOM3... please just glance at my previous posts where I CLEARLY explain the 50% stat -and if you still can't figure it out, send me a PM...!

Bronc

Grau's got it right. 1000 wildcats are no match for your hypothetical Mig-15s.

Edit: read Shattered Sword, it goes into detail why the Zuikaku's air group wasn't replenished in time. Big hint, it wasn't because of a shortage.

The Japanese still had considerable land-based assets though...and while they may not have had enough Naval assets to stop the Allies at sea, the Allies still needed access to thier targets, which was over land...

The IJN and IJA were still able to field defenders against Allied bombers and fighter sweeps right up to the end of the war, so while they may have been down, they definately weren't out...

Page 10: "In addition to [the Midway carriers], two other carriers ought to have been sortied [Shokaku and Zuikaku.] Zuikaku was nominally operational, but her air-group was not and would not be fully reconstituted for months."

Page 90: "When the war had opened, Kido Butai's air groups had been full strength, although without as many spare aircraft as would have been optimal. But by June 1942, the situation had deteriorated. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Akagi had carried sixty-six aircraft; now she had just fifty-four. Kaga had been cut from seventy-five to sixty-three. Soryu and Hiryu had come down from sixty-three apiece to fifty-four apiece. Nominally, each squadron (fighter, bomber, and torpedo bomber) should have been allotted three spare aircraft, for a total of nine per ship. None were now carried by any ship in Kido Butai, and Kaga was the only ship that still retained an oversized squadron of twenty-seven torpedo bombers. The rest of the ships were all operating eighteen aircraft squadrons, with no spares. In a nutshell, each of the Kido Butai carriers had suffered a 16 percent decrease in their fighting power since December. Any casualties to the operating air groups, even damaged aircraft, would immediately impact the tactical cohesion of the air units, since there were no spare aircraft to feed into the formations. ... Nagumo thus had a grand total of 248 aircraft aboard his ships. By way of comparison, Kido Butai's six carriers had brought around 412 aircraft to the Pearl Harbor operation. Nagumo was thus fighting the decisive battle with only 60 percent of the airpower he might reasonably have expected as recently as May."

Page 91: "If the aircraft situation was threadbare in the frontline carriers, it was far worse in the second-line carrier divisions. They were scraping up pilots and aircraft in any way they could to try and cobble together air groups, yet in most cases were falling short. Junyo's case is illustrative. Recently comimssioned, she was designed to carry fifty-four aircraft. Her dive-bonber group seems to have been reasonably intact and was composed of fifteen Type 99 aircraft. Her fighter group, however, was another matter. It was still in the midst of being activated and was in complete disarray. Twelve of the eighteen Zeros on board ship were actually aircraft from the 6th Ku. Yet 6th Ku was itself three planes and several pilots short of its nominal thirty-six plane establishment (the remaining twenty-one aircraft being with Nagumo). Not only that but 6th Ku apparently didn't have enough aviators to man its own aircraft. Nor could Junyo's aviators fill all the gaps. Indeed, Junyo's air group for the battle contained only five of its own pilots. The remainder were four 6th Ku pilots, a trio of aviators (one of whom was fresh out of flight school) on temporary attached duty (TAD) from Shokaku, and two more TAD fliers from Ryujo!"

DEFINITIVE proof I would say ... and this was BEFORE Midway!!

Bronc

yes if you send hundreds of ouclaased men and equipment against fewer quality men and equipment you will win .
but can your conscience deal with the fact that you could have saved lives by using better equipment.It is the job of any person in the military to save lives that goes from the bottom to the top ,so if you as a commander have the chance to save lives by using newwer moire advanced hardware you have to take it to save the lives of your troops .It is not just about destroying the enemy you have to achieve that with as few losses to your own men as possible (unless of course your name is Stalin )

The F-4F came out of combats with the early Zeros about even in terms of kills, at least for the first few years of the war.

There was a saying though that when a Wildcat faced a Zero 1:1, it was outnumbered. The US managed to implement superior strategic control and developed tactics to limit the Zero's advantages, nullifying much of its early success.

It is possible to argue that the Wildcat alone may have been sufficient to ensure Allied victory in the pacific, at least as far as US carrier-borne fighters go. The Wildcat airframe/engine development was not pushed as hard as Zero development, but this is probably because the USN had better things coming, while the Japanese had little luck with their Zero replacements, the J2M and N1K1.

The FM-2 was decisively better than its opponents, but the most important contributing factor to success was pilot skill. Japanese pilot skill declined as the war pressed on, while US pilot skill only improved. A telling factor in this debate.

The quality vs quantity argument does have some abstract mathematical advantage, but when you are taking real soldiers into battle, and risking real lives, it quickly becomes meaningless.

There is no point in bringing just quantity, when the US had the luxury of bringing both quantity AND quality.

Mathematically, you could argue that the USN could of done the same job with the F2A, the FB or the FF. Ultimately you could argue in favour of the Wright Flyer armed with a .22 starters pistol. But, would YOU want to go up in combat like that? And, if you were in charge, could you send your troops into battle so armed, knowing there was better equipment out there?

Never discount the effect of morale in warfare.

Turning to the possibility of an all Wildcat USN, you see several major disadvantages:

Range: The F4F is outclassed by both the F6F and F4U in terms of range: Its 830 mile internal fuel range and 1,275 mile range with external tanks gives it a maximum combat radius of about 325 miles.

In comparison, the F6F has a max combat radius of about 375 miles, and the F4U and max radius of about 555 miles. Both can search further, longer for the enemy, an important fact given the distances involved in the Pacific War.

Time to height: The relatively underpowered F4F requires 12.4 minutes to get to 20,000 feet, almost five minutes longer than the F6F (7.7 minutes to 20,000 ft) and more than five minutes longer than the F4U (7.1 minutes).

This is a serious disadvantage in terms of interception potential. While the F4F is still climbing to 20,000 feet, the F4U has covered an additional 12-18 miles of distance in the climb (depending on load), then leveled out and done another 22-26 miles.

Fighter bombing: The F4F is limited to a minute 200 lbs bombload, and its range suffers immensely when carrying bombs. The later FM-2 can carry 2 x 250 lbs. The F4U and F6F were both rated for 2,000 lbs plus, with F4Us known to have conducted missions with 3,000 lbs of bombs, plus drop tanks.

Supporting the troops effectively in landings is going to be vastly more difficult with the Wildcat.

I'm sure you could add other stuff in, such as speed to intercept, better serviceability of the F6F ect, ect, buyt I hope I've added some talking points.

Some thoughs
As JoeB wrote, in fact FM-2 in real world could handle newer JAAF fighters, as it showed in Philippines but it lacked range of F6F and was slower, so USN carrier strikes would have been launched nearer to targets and also CAPs would have been less effective. But FM-2 was better than many seem to think.

Juha

Another thing is while with hindsight we KNOW that the Japanese didn't come up with a good replacement for the Zero or even a significantly improved Zero until late in the war, the American war planners could not have depended on that.
What if we had commited to an all F4F fighter force and the Japanese had decided to Stuff a larger engine in the Zero (see A6M8) and fit selfsealing tanks earlier?
Or what if the Japanese had come out with 1500hp carrier fighter in mid/late 1943 instead of trying to build land based interceptors?

Again, after reading Shattered Sword, Carrier Strike, Carrier Battles, Fleet Tactics (among others) I believe the US could have obtained complete air superiority over Japan (not mainland Japan) by the end of 1944 using the Wildcat / FM-2 exclusively. The central idea in all of this is the validity of the Lanchester Concentration Equation to aerial combat.

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/math/pdf/0606/0606300v1.pdf

(To a mathematical certainty: A commander is better off with twice as many units of force than with units of force with twice the rate of effective firepower.)[SIZE="2"][/SIZE]

Of-course we should have brought on the F6F and F4U and P-51, P-47, P-38, Spitfire etc. into the game.

However, the phenomenal effect and ramifications of the Lanchester equation explains how the Russians survived and won in the air and on the ground against the Germans, why Lee, Jackson and Longstreet never stood a chance, and why cancelling the F-22 was a good idea (if we will now buy four F-15E's for the price of a single F-22.)

Bronc [/SIZE]

Well, as far as the Russians are concerned, it wasn't as much about over-whelming the Germans with men and materials as it was the German's crappy supply system and equipment designed for European conditions and not soggy Russian terrain...

BZ - you want to apply your theory of mass versus quality and illustrate say Iraqi T-72's against M-1's, or delve into F-15 in hands of Israeli's vs Arabs..

Your thesis is absurdly simple - make your case for gaining air superiority over Truk, Rabaul, Japan, Okinawa, etc - with just F4-F in play.. literally no land based bomber can penetrate enemy airspace with CAP. The USN can Not gain NUMERICAL air superiority against land based fighters until well into 1944 - simply because there weren't enough carriers.

The losses for air campaigns either land or sea skyrocket, losing too many good pilots to capitaize on number superiority.

Your thesis is a reasonable analogy if say P-40/Spit I are only escort fighters in ETO. 8th BC disappears in a cloud of fertilizer long befor invasion and daylight bombing stops - because the fighters can't go past France and Holland - and will not compete well against LW's progressive development.

Bronc, your posts are almost entertaining. Do you have any idea how inaccurate some of your statistics are. Read Bloody Shambles and investigate the TRUE kill loss ratio of the SWPT and I think you might eventually float down to earth.

Because the book proves my point rather conclusively.

During the battle of Singapore, British air cover was intially provided by (only 1) RAF No. 232 Squadron, based at Kallang. Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery, Kallang was the only operational airstrip left and the other squadrons were withdrawn from Singapore by January. 232 Squadron performed well, but was outnumbered and it suffered severe losses, both in the air and on the ground during February. The only reliable aircraft left was the Hawker Hurricane, but only ten were left in Singapore when the Japanese invaded. 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters had been sent to Singapore with 24 pilots. The Buffalo squadrons having already been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron was formed and became operational on 20 January, destroying three Ki-43s that day for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes were out-numbered and began to suffer severe losses.

During the period 27 January–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes (Mk IIA) arrived with No. 226 Group (four squadrons) on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. The staggered arrival of the Hurricanes, along with inadequate early warning systems, meant Japanese air raids destroyed a large proportion of the Hurricanes on the ground in Sumatra and Singapore.

On the morning of 8 February, a number of aerial dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western areas. In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes of 232 Sqn were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 planes, flying from Johore to provide air cover for their invasion force. Air battles went on over the island for the rest of the day, and by nightfall it was clear that with the few machines Percival had left Kallang could no longer be used as a base. With Percival's assent the remaining Hurricanes were withdrawn to Palembang, Sumatra. No allied aircraft were seen again over Singapore and the Japanese had full control of the skies.

As to the nonsense from drgondog, during Operation Mole Cricket, the Israeli airforce launched 96 F-15's and F-16's. The Syrians lanched almost exactly the same number. The Syrians did not have numerical superiority.

How can this concept be so hard to understand and accept? Just put some variables in the equations and do the math. It's not like I invented Lanchester's equations! They have been around since 1914 and are pretty fundamental to military strategy.

Bronc

Broncazonk said:

Because the book proves my point rather conclusively.

During the battle of Singapore, British air cover was intially provided by (only 1) RAF No. 232 Squadron, based at Kallang. Tengah, Seletar and Sembawang were in range of Japanese artillery, Kallang was the only operational airstrip left and the other squadrons were withdrawn from Singapore by January. 232 Squadron performed well, but was outnumbered and it suffered severe losses, both in the air and on the ground during February. The only reliable aircraft left was the Hawker Hurricane, but only ten were left in Singapore when the Japanese invaded. 51 Hurricane Mk II fighters had been sent to Singapore with 24 pilots. The Buffalo squadrons having already been overwhelmed. No. 232 Squadron was formed and became operational on 20 January, destroying three Ki-43s that day for the loss of three Hurricanes. However, like the Buffalos before them, the Hurricanes were out-numbered and began to suffer severe losses.

During the period 27 January–30 January, another 48 Hurricanes (Mk IIA) arrived with No. 226 Group (four squadrons) on the aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable. The staggered arrival of the Hurricanes, along with inadequate early warning systems, meant Japanese air raids destroyed a large proportion of the Hurricanes on the ground in Sumatra and Singapore.

On the morning of 8 February, a number of aerial dogfights took place over Sarimbun Beach and other western areas. In the first encounter, the last ten Hurricanes of 232 Sqn were scrambled from Kallang Airfield to intercept a Japanese formation of about 84 planes, flying from Johore to provide air cover for their invasion force. Air battles went on over the island for the rest of the day, and by nightfall it was clear that with the few machines Percival had left Kallang could no longer be used as a base. With Percival's assent the remaining Hurricanes were withdrawn to Palembang, Sumatra. No allied aircraft were seen again over Singapore and the Japanese had full control of the skies.

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Ok - and how does that prove your point?!?!?!?

Dude, ur a fu*kin retard and about to get ur ass seriously bounced by the high cover....

Broncazonk said:

Maybe we should change the subject. Do you like the wings of an airplane or the horizontal stabilizers better?

Bronc

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Bronc, I'm giving you a time out - re-evaluate your Prozac dosage and then come back here when you're not going to be a moron

There is a thread over on Tanknet that talks about the "Lanchester's equations".

According to one poster they were designed to deal with liner battlefeilds (ancient battles) with hand weapons and don't work to well with ranged weapons (guns) lt alone 3 dimensional warfare.

Don't know if this is true, but misaplication of formulas does lead to bad resluts.