The Pilot Factor

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Yep, I was thinking the exact same thing whilst reading the first part - great anecdote indeed Greyman. That's pilot factor.

One example that springs to mind is when the RN went to war with Sea Harriers against the Argentine Mirages, before the war, few thought the Sea Harrier could do the job, but in the right hands with the right training and tactics, it could. Although the Sea Harrier was a terrific mount and ideal for what the Brits needed, I'm also certain that had the British had Mirages and the Argies had Sea Harriers, the result would have been the same.
Wasnt the latest version of the sidewinder decisive in the Falklands?
 
It was. The Mirage had better altitude performance and all-out speed, but the British pilots worked the Argentine pilots to the Sea Harrier's area of expertise, medium to low altitude slow manoeuvring, so tactics played a big part in their advantage. Argentine situational awareness was not as attentive as the British pilots, it appears - although no disrespect to them; they fought the good fight. Trials conducted after the Falklands War revealed that there was little that could out manoeuvre a Sea Harrier. Sharkey Ward recounts stories of getting into dogfights with USAF F-15 pilots based at Lakenheath and coming out on top every time in the Sea Harrier.
 
I REALLY don't think the situation would have been the same had the aircraft been reversed at all. The Sea Harrier could not GET from Argentina to the Falklands and back, and the Mirages could not have operated from the ships the Sea Harroers operated from.

Had the two countires swapped equipment, personnel and geographic locations, then the results might have been the same. I KNOW what you meant but, technically speaking, neither side could have engaged in combat at all had they just swapped aircraft.
 
I REALLY don't think the situation would have been the same had the aircraft been reversed at all. The Sea Harrier could not GET from Argentina to the Falklands and back, and the Mirages could not have operated from the ships the Sea Harroers operated from.

Had the two countires swapped equipment, personnel and geographic locations, then the results might have been the same. I KNOW what you meant but, technically speaking, neither side could have engaged in combat at all had they just swapped aircraft.
Swap aircraft but not ships or soldiers....game over
 
YOU are missing the point.

You could have swapped aviators and the results might have flopped ... but not aircraft. The British could not have launched Mirages and the Argentinians could NOT have attack the Falklands with Sea Harriers from Argentina.

If you disagree, tell me how these things could have been accomplished. The islands are at the extreme edge of possible Sea Harrier range ... if they get to cruise at best speed and altitude with external tanks and no weapons other than a gun. The Mirages could not have been launched from any British ship that participated, not could they have landed.

Duhhhh ...

Still, I understand what was said and basically agree ... just not with the statement as said.

Picky, picky ... I know ...
 
Not starting an argument, just saying they could have swapped pilots and had the results change ... perhaps ... but not planes. Not sure the results would have changed either, given the range constraints.

The Argentinians are pretty good ... or they would not have scored what they did score.

The conflict was NOT a given, and wasn't lost by all that much. A couple more successful Exocets and the tide might have swung the other way ... even WITH the aircraft involved, including A-4's.

I think Argentina did WELL ... but didn't win the day in the end. Might have, though. Probably depended on losses. The threshold wasn't reached whereby withdrawl was the order to fight another day.
 
The conflict was NOT a given, and wasn't lost by all that much.

No one's saying it was. In fact the Brits went in with much more trepidation than many actually are aware. But organisation, tactics, training and equipment conspired against the Argentine forces. A difference in point is the overall use of helicopters in the conflict. Britain used them as often and in as many roles as possible, including combat; British helicopters managed to sink a submarine and a patrol boat, as well as air strikes against dug in positions, aside from the usual spotting, recon, supply loading etc, whereas the Argentine forces did not use their helicopters for much more than as mules.

General Menendez, the Argentine commander on the islands relied heavily on the concept of the strong hold at Stanley as his means of defence, thinking that where ever the British landed they'd have such a heck of a time getting through the defences at Stanley that an attack would end in Argentine victory, but he didn't count on the British walking across the islands, since many of their helos were sunk on the Atlantic Conveyor. He also miscalculated where the British landed, but did nothing about it. Menendez paid no attention to British movements; there was little reconnaissance or even any real effort to hinder the landings at San Carlos apart from the sorties by the Argentine Navy pilots. The Argentine Army put up little resistance at all, excpt for a few attacks by MB 339s, Beech Mentors and Pucaras, which were repelled and halted once 2 Para captured the airfield at Goose Green and Stanely came under attack by Harriers. It's also worth remembering that Argentine troops out numbered British troops on the island by a wide margin.

Also, regarding the Argentine navy pilots, they received orders to attack warships, so they did and many were damaged and some sunk, but by and large, supply ships and troop carriers were ignored. The ocean liner Canberra was the largest that was involved in the British assault, but it was not attacked directly. Had it been so, it would have been a sitting duck and the results would have been disastrous for the British. As it was, the attack against the assault ship Sir Galahad caused many deaths among the Welsh Guards, but it was the exception, rather than the rule. Although the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, demonstrating that had they concentrated on this type of vessel, the results would have been very bad for the British, the Argentine pilot was aiming for the aircraft carriers and for some time afterwards, they claimed the Invincible as sunk. One of the aircraft on display at the air museum outside Buenos Aires has kill markings for the Invincible on it.

The British also had their weaknesses, by far the worst was its early warning at fleet level. The lack of any means ships were used as radar pickets, which their vulnerability was demonstrated once the Sheffield was attacked - it's worth noting that the Argentine Navy only had 5 air launched Exocet rounds. The Glamorgan was hit in the hangar by a mounting removed from one of the Argentine Type 42 destroyers and mounted on a truck, very resourceful. This lack of early warning also meant that Sea Harriers were flying standing patrols, which was wasteful fuel wise. Close in defence of its warships was singled as a big weakness also and it led to CIWS being subsequently fitted to British warships. The AEW variant of the Westland Sea King was developed as a result of the lessons learned from the Falklands. It was certainly not one sided, but it could have been far more bloody and longer than it was. That it wasn't, we have to be thankful.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Luckily for Britain the Argentinian officer class were with exceptions exceedingly poor at there job. When most of your experience and training has been concentrated on torturing students to death and throwing Nuns out of Helicopters over the Rio Plata and you come up against a well trained proffesional military then its no surprise you dont do very well.

Some of the equipment the British had was apalling like the Rapier SAM. Anyone who had any practical knowledge of the system knew it was frighteningly delicate just towing it down a bumpy track could put it out of action for hours, so putting it on a ship sailing 10,000miles then transferring it to a landing barge then dragging it up a hill wasnt going to go well.

It should have been a lot closer run thing but the men were as always the main thing not the tactics or weapons.
 
It should have been a lot closer run thing but the men were as always the main thing not the tactics or weapons.

Yep, and the men determine the tactics and how effectively the weapons are used. Better technology does play a role, however. The Rapier did manage to shoot down aircraft during the Falklands and despite its serviceability problems actually proved effective. British Aerospace were surprised to find that it was able to track targets whilst looking down into the bay from high positions during the San Carlos landings once a bridgehead had been established.
 
Now here we have two mock combats with everything remaining constant except for the pilot of one of the aircraft - and we get completely opposite results.

Something to keep in mind.

The P-38 pilot had to fly two mock combats.
Did the 1st combat warm him up or leave him lacking for the 2nd?
 
The Argentinians are pretty good ... or they would not have scored what they did score.
The conflict was NOT a given, and wasn't lost by all that much. A couple more successful Exocets and the tide might have swung the other way ... .

Or connected a few more iron bombs with their A4's.
 
Perhaps we are drifting away from the thread but, just to mention, the 1982 war was going to be a certain UK victory even if the task force was initially repelled with losses. With a 6 month lead it would have returned with 5 carriers, at least 2 more helicopter carriers, properly converted container ships, more and improved air defence and warning, heavier guns and a whole host of lesson learned from AEW to waterproof boots. Fortunately it was kept to a restricted palette (not restricted if you were a poor cold b*gger there of course) and losses were far less than they might have been on both sides. But all losses are sad ones.

Argentinean pilots had few opportunities to use their skills. Operating at the limits of range, especially when approaching the task force itself so they could ill afford any maneuver that could waste fuel. I did note (IIRC) that RAF/RAAF crews sent to attack the Japanese task force approaching Malaya were told to ignore the naval vessels and go for the troopships. A more professional choice than the willy waving of sinking naval vessels. A parade of Japanese naval vessels cruising along the eastern coast of Malaya would have been a painful nuisance but battalions of Japanese soldiers landed there was the real threat. The sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor was more of a hindrance to the assault to retake the islands than the loss of the destroyers. However, as much time has passed since 1982 as had passed previously since WW2 so one hopes that we have all moved on.
 
I haven't seen anything about Saburo Sakai flying a KI-84, although it's possible.

Are you perhaps mixing the KI-84 with the A7M that he flew and had nothing but praise for?

I think you are correct, Graugreist. He had a lot of superlatives for the plane, and the one that I thought that could meet these superlatives was the KI-84.

Good for us and bad for the Japanese that their army and navy operated as two separate forces and did not co-operate. A KI-84 made carrier able (if possible) would have made for some formidable opponents by late 43 or 44. By this time though it may have been too late anyway, as the pilot calibre had deteriorated substantially by this point.
 
there were actually several very formidable aircraft the Japanese had by the later stages of the war that would have meant serious trouble for the Allies if:
They had resources for mass production
They had capable support (i.e.: fuel, oil, spare parts, etc.)
They had a suitable pilot base - not only experienced pilots, but enough pilots to replace losses and slow the attrition rate.
 
I saw programme about a MD-11 crash. Is the MD-11 safe?
Dunno. Since I will never fly one I will only be able to read the usual guff on the web.
I remember reading a pilots opinion about the MiG-23. As long as you fly the aircraft safely its a safe aircraft.
Pilot skill is important because in a 2 second do or die moment, only the pilots training experience will save them as they will have no time to think. Poor training and no experience will lead to disaster.
 
They had capable support (i.e.: fuel, oil, spare parts, etc.)

Other than the pilot issue, this seems to be as big of a problem as anything for the late war Japanese. I've heard of planes almost falling apart due to either faulty manufacture, poorly made parts or lack of parts.

Poor fuel quality too, what there was of it. My cough syrup may has been as good of fuel as some late war Japanese fuels :D

Funny when you read about the performance of say the KI-84 as tested vs the performance the Japanese got out of it. IIRC, about an extra 40-50 mph on american fuel.

The A7M could have been formidable as well. The land based interceptor prototypes had 6 x 30mm cannon, could have caused some havoc with the B-29 raids.
 
I've heard of planes almost falling apart due to either faulty manufacture, poorly made parts or lack of parts.
I'd like to know the specific source for that!

Japanese manufacturing had many poor traits, interchangeability was one of them, but just like any other combatant, new aircraft were test flown after production to identify and correct any defects. It takes a lot for an aircraft to "fall apart."
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back