Tiger tank from aircraft thread;

parsifal said:

Arguing that the Tiger was justified on the basis of what the Russians might have in the pipeline is unsupportable. Russians, US and even the British all opted for standardised designs, churning out the same product for long production runs.

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Really?
for the British we have the the whole sorry litany of the cruiser tanks, Starting with the acceptable (for the time) A-9 and very good (for the time A-13) we go on to the standardized A 13 MK III which was built to the tune of over 1700 tanks, standardized (?) three major versions, all unsuitable for combat. Helping train British tankers was its contribution. Followed by the Crusader (A-15) which went through 3 major variations. Followed by the Cavalier (A-24) 500 built, never used in service as a gun tank, and the similar but not identical Centaur?Cromwell with 950 (?)of the Liberty engined Centaurs being built. (some of which were re-engined into Cromwells but that didn't waste any manufacturing capacity did it?) and 3,066 (?) Cromwells
4 marks of Centaurs and 8 Mks of Cromwells covering different guns but do not cover the .....ahem....6 different hull types, it was quite possible to have one MK type with several different hull types. and finally the A34 Comet.
for small production runs we can add the Avenger and the Challenger.

going over to the "I" tanks (those breakthrough/assault/infantry tanks that nobody needed) we have the A-9 with armor so thin it was shuffled over to the Cruiser classification despite it's 15mph top speed. The A 11 Matilda, the A12 Maltida I, The Valentine ( 11 Marks) and the A22 Churchill (10 or 11 Marks not including re-works?) were pretty much that branch of production tanks but with such prototypes as the Vickers Valiant, The A-33 (Cromwell with an extra 10 tons of armor, wider tracks and slower speed) and Black Prince the British can hardly escape the charge of "tinkering".

British tank production and the word 'standardized' barely belong in the same paragraph let alone sentence.

Compare this to the German effort. In the case of the Tiger, there were no less than 157 major changes to the design, most of them carried out whilst on the line. moreover the gradual improvements were not done in block production.....an instruction would be received, caling for such and such a change, forcing production to a halt whilst the changes in the production lines were worked out and in many cases retrofitted. 157 detail changes averages out at a change every 6th or 7th tank, ...

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was it 157 major changes or 157 detail changes or 157 of each?

changes like Sept 1942 when they added a track cable to the side?

One of the four changes given for Oct 1942,
a shovel was added to the glacis plate. That must have taken dozens of man hours per tank.

Or June of 1943 when they stopped fitting the smoke candle dischargers?

Yeah, I cherry picked.
But no such list seems to exist for allied tanks and as noted before, the Sherman was hardly the example of "standardization" some people think. A late 1944 Sherman had quite a number of detail changes from a 1942 Sherman (like the deletion of the two fixed .30 cal guns in the hull)

2nd Sherman off the production line

M4A3E8


same tank, right?
no major changes or even detail changes?

I will agree that the Tiger was expensive and difficult to produce. But I don't believe, based on what I have seen so far, that it was ever intended to be a general issue tank and was more of a special purpose tank, a bit like this tank.

up to 254 built? Mainly because they realized the M-26 wasn't going to be available for the invasion of Europe.

The British at one point had 8500 of these on order in the US, T14

weight 84,000lbs. Project was finally cancelled in Dec of 1944 after existing on the fringes since early 1942, of the two prototypes one did wind up in England.

The Tiger I was forced into role/s it was not intended for.
The German heavy tank program however was not at all well managed and encompassed a lot more that the Henschel Tiger. That Porsche was allowed to build about 90 competing tanks (with twin V-10 engines and electric drive) that were turned into the Ferdinand self propelled gun was a colossal duplication of effort that accomplished very little. The Tiger II should have been seen as taking all the bad points of the Tiger I and amplifying them. The even larger heavy tanks were a total waste.
And the Panther was larger/heavier than it needed to be.

Tanks a bit like aircraft, you can't wait until there is a crisis to come up with a new model. You do have to plan ahead as things like transmissions/steering gear and suspensions take a bit more work to get right than many people think.

watch the video and argue with Parshall. he is just one of the best experts on this verytopic


Even small changes to the design will bring the production line to a halt whilst the installation procedures are figured outgiven the way the Henschel plant was organised. The big players made changes using the block system, and incorporated multiple lines to ensure that there was never any disruption to production. this was not done in the case of the Germans

Regarding the british, they admittedly were less well organised than the American and the Russians. Despite this, with only 60% of the German production potential, they managed to turn out about the same number of tanks as the Germans. no-one was as disorganised as the germans.

With regard to Panzer Division TOE, even if you don't want to accept the planned addition of Tigers to each and every line division, surely you accept that by 1944,the planned TOE was at least half the division equipped with the Panther....a tank that whilst better than the Tiger, still suffered the same basic issues of over engineering, excessive complexity,, rushed development and poor reliability.

Here is a link that sets out the 'Type" TOE for 1944 Panzer Division\

Panzer-Division 1944

But the Germans certainly did plan to incorporate a heavy tank component into their standard divisional TOE. The Entwicklung series, dating back to 1943, was basically a rationalisation of Guderians reconstruction plan also dating back to 1943. The final draft of this plan, set out the parameters of the Type'45 division, and this included a plan to attach a heavy tank or tank destroyer bn equipped with E-100 chassis, basically replacing the planned Tiger attachments that had never eventuated. The E-100 was basically a strengthened Panther chassis with initially a long barrelled 88mm but eventually a 128mm gun.

Whichever way you want to digest it, the introduction of new types was going to affect availability. the constant tinkering with designs would slow down deliveries from an already inefficient production system. The reliance on experimental types, not properly worked up was always going to increase losses and decrease serviceability. In its favour, the introduction of heavier chassis, with bigger guns is going to increase lethality and onfield survivability. It is worth noting that Tiger Tanks and their associated TDs managed to destroy over 10000 enemy tanks whilst losing only 2000 of their own. Impressive, but still not worth the effort.

Regarding the changes to the Sherman and T-34, I am aware that changes were made to both tanks. In the case of the Sherman, there were never less than 5 plants building them, several with more than one line and plenty of room on the floor to move "special" tanks to one side to make changes to individual types. Moreover, as I understand it, both the Russians and US would "save up" the changes they wanted to make, applying those changes in block. It would be interesting to find out how many changes were introduced, how many blocks they were assigned to and work out the average run size between stoppages. I am willing to bet that no matter how many changes were made, there would be bigger gaps in the series between those changes as compared to the tiger. The Germans did not employ blocks in their production runs....an order for a change would be handed to the line and that change had to be made immediately. It took an already inneffieicient system and made it laughable really.. Because of the inherent cramped line design and limited floor space, there was nowhere to "shunt off" chassis whilst they were altered and mass production techniques adapted to suit the new change. because of this, even small changes like the addition of a spade could bring the line to a standstill .

In the case of the Tiger, there were no less than 157 major changes to the design, most of them carried out whilst on the line...........

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IMHO this means the Tiger I became a well sorted design, the Tiger I could destroy any tank and take a hit from most, Otto Carius's book on his Tiger experiences is very interesting and he praises the tank and says the later ones were better, especially with the horizontally pivoting commanders hatch that reduced height profile. The success of german tanks is mostly due these kind of practical combat refinements, something the US had to learn with the Sherman.

The Tiger II was a wunderwaffe along the wrong path, even the Panther was a very large and expensive solution rather than a clever one. To see how good a battlefield tank a PzIV was look at this for the profile difference! add to that high quality gunnery optics and a reliable crew intercom.

After 'encoutering' the Tiger in many of publications, some better reserached than the other, my humble conclusion is that Tiger's main shortcoming was that there was not enough of them.
For flawed German tanks, see Panther ( armor and gun of medium tank coupled with size and weight of heavy tank) and Tiger II.

parsifal said:

With regard to Panzer Division TOE, even if you don't want to accept the planned addition of Tigers to each and every line division, surely you accept that by 1944,the planned TOE was at least half the division equipped with the Panther....a tank that whilst better than the Tiger, still suffered the same basic issues of over engineering, excessive complexity,, rushed development and poor reliability..

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I don't accept the planned addition of Tiger Is to each and every line Panzer division because I have never read that was the intention, let alone it never happened.
I have never denied the intention to use the Panther as a standard tank. And from what I have read the mix of Panthers and MK IVs in the TOE that you provided was an admission that they were never going to get to their dream of all Panther divisions.

This argument gets a bit sideways in that some people are including all the German heavy tanks in one group and covering a span of years (5-6?) in German planning/intentions as to what kind of heavy tanks were needed and in what numbers. Size/weight of the tanks tended to go up with time to the ridiculous as the Germans ability to actually produce large tanks in large numbers dropped sharply.

I try to keep my arguments to the Tiger I, while it started that branch of German tank development (after several prototypes) and the order to start design work was given in May of 1941 so the requirements/characteristics had nothing to do with combat experience against Russian tanks. It also shows part of the lead time needed to get a new tank into production. It was based off an earlier prototype that was smaller and lighter but used the same transmission design (8 forward and 4 reverse) similar suspension and a much larger V12 engine than the standard German tanks. It was planned to use a taper bore 75mm to 55mm cannon for good armour penetration (truly lousy HE) but since it depended totally on tungsten carbide ammunition the gun was canceled and the much larger 88mm was substituted to keep the armor penetration required.

We have argued about it's role. My contention being that it was a breakthrough or assault tank and was never intended for long range, deeppenetrain operation. What it wound up being used for is another story. Often rushed from one operational area to another as a fire brigade to counter russian offensives. they racked up much higher mileage than intended with the associated break downs. I have include some of those heavily armoured Sherman variants to show that this breakthrough/assault tank idea was not limited to Germany but was considered and implemented by the other major tank powers. And in all cases they had similar problems with speed/range/mobility and breakdowns. Singling out th eTiger I for having those flaws seems a bit unfair.

As the war went on requirements changed, the tactical situation changed and the strategic situation changed. What made sense (or was at least understandable) in 1941/42 was no longer what was needed in late 1943 and 1944. This is where the German programs tended go of off track, Since the Tiger I worked (or appeared to work) the Germans didn't seem to take a long hard look at it but went with the more is better approach. 56 ton good, 75 ton tank must be better.

German production was also affected by those nuisance raids by the RAF and American bombers (sarcasm) in 1943/44.

But the Germans certainly did plan to incorporate a heavy tank component into their standard divisional TOE. The Entwicklung series, dating back to 1943, was basically a rationalisation of Guderians reconstruction plan also dating back to 1943. The final draft of this plan, set out the parameters of the Type'45 division, and this included a plan to attach a heavy tank or tank destroyer bn equipped with E-100 chassis, basically replacing the planned Tiger attachments that had never eventuated. The E-100 was basically a strengthened Panther chassis with initially a long barrelled 88mm but eventually a 128mm gun.

Whichever way you want to digest it, the introduction of new types was going to affect availability. the constant tinkering with designs would slow down deliveries from an already inefficient production system. The reliance on experimental types, not properly worked up was always going to increase losses and decrease serviceability. In its favour, the introduction of heavier chassis, with bigger guns is going to increase lethality and onfield survivability. It is worth noting that Tiger Tanks and their associated TDs managed to destroy over 10000 enemy tanks whilst losing only 2000 of their own. Impressive, but still not worth the effort.
.

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BY late 1944 and 1945 any idea of incorporating numbers of heavy tanks into a "standard' division was delusional, but so were a lot of German plans in the last year of the war.
However applying the thinking (or lack of it) in 1944 to what was going on in 1941/42 may not give a good picture.


I have seen comparisons of the MK IV to the Sherman and T-34 in which the MK IV is criticized for going through 16 (?)different models while the Sherman and T-34 are said to go through much less. This paints a rather distorted picture as the MK IV only went through 10 gun tank models and 3 of them were before the first T-34 ever came off the production line and 5 models were before the first M4 left a production line. And the Sherman was an M3 with a new upper hull and turret, not a completely new tank and we have seen the multiplicity of models that the M4 covered.

I am not saying that German tank production didn't have problems, it did. However a lot of the examples or explanations don't make sense.

The Sherman tank was a "good enough" tank. They were produced in huge numbers faster than the "superior" German tanks/AT guns could kill them. Many early Sherman 'kills' were due to poor (dry) ammo storage. When converted to 'wet' storage fires decreased by 75%, although many Sherman tank crews still kept rounds 'dry' on the tank floor in order to maintain a high rate of fire. Another factor seldom mentioned is the role played by poor US anti-tank doctrine as perpetuated by General Lesley McNair. In his opinion, tanks were not to be used against other tanks. Thus Sherman tank crews were issued old, out-dated armor piercing ammunition.

From 1943 onward, the US military had in its possession an extremely effective anti-tank round for the 75mm cannon called the M61 APCBC.

The APCBC could actually penetrate the Tiger tank from ALL aspects (though frontal penetration was problematic) as well as the Panther. It could penetrate nearly 100mm of enemy armor from 500 yards, and over 90mm from a thousand yards. This was enough to penetrate the rear or side armor of the Tiger from the longer distance, or at a distance of 500yds, penetrate the tiger from the front. Many critics of the M4 do note that the up-gunned tanks carrying the 76mm gun could take on a tiger, yet the armor penetration of the 76mm is only 5% better than the 75mm armed with the M61 APCBC ammunition. Sadly, due to McNair's orders, APCBC was not issued to tankers, and instead substituted with an inferior type of ammunition (The standard APC, which had 30% less penetration characteristics.

The Russians were quite a fan of the power of the Sherman's 75mm cannon. The difference between the way the USSR employed them and the way the US did was the fact that they actually issued the M61 APCBC to their troops.
This test was performed by the Russians firing a 75 mm M3 gun from an M4A2 Sherman with M-61 and M-72 rounds at an actual captured Tiger tank:
Side, shell type M-61, distance 400 m. Result: penetration, spalling inside in an area of 300 mm by 300 mm
Side, shell type M-72, distance 625 m. Result: penetration, minor spalling on entrance and exit.
Side: shell type M-61, distance 650. Result: Penetration. Shell knocked out a cork-like section of armour.
Turret: shell type M-61, distance 650 m. Result: dent 50 mm deep, 140 mm diameter. Penetration of the turret platform.
Turret: shell type M-61, distance 650. Result: dent 40mm deep, 120mm diameter.

While these are not fantastic results they do show that the 75mm was a reasonably effective weapon with the correct ammo. It is also important to note that it is not necessary to penetrate a tank's armor to "knock it out'. Shermans engaged Tigers and Panthers with M89 hexachloroethane smoke and M64 white phosphorus shells. The acrid smoke could be sucked into the tanks ventilation system and WP could and did start engine fires. The concussive effects of shells hitting the tank can also 'knock out' the crew. A number of Stuart tanks with 37mm guns defeated a Tiger in North Africa by pounding it to death with multiple hits. Tiger 131 was "killed" by a 6-pounder (57 mm) gun jamming the turret ring, making the crew abandon the tank.

the fact that the E-series was planned in 1943 as part of the overhaul of the panzer forces means that substantial resources were being diverted into the program from that date (1943), not 1944-45. So in reality the Germans were acting delusional as far as tank production was concerned not from 1944, but from 1942. . The E series was part of a rationalisation plan commenced after guderian was appointed the inspector generals role in 1943. the fact that you are denying it existed, despite me posting the link to show its final form makes it hard to make much progress. Buts there if you want to look at it.

The earlier version of the E Plan was to assign one medium and one heavy tank battalion to each division. Ultimately this ended up being the Panther as the heavy component ( at least in 1944. I should say that in practice TOEs for the panzer formations tended to be highly variable, with sometimes MkIII the main types, through to Stugs and a few with Tigers more or less permantly part of the tank park ). Ive taken more or less the opposite tack to you by including all the German heavies into the one pot, mostly because they were all tarred with the same brush.... overlapping roles and very similar problems . Saying "oh that's a Panther we shouldn't be talking about that" is a nonsense to me. Tiger and Panther were both more or less in the same class, and ended up with interchangeable applications and assignments. That's certainly recognised in the E Plan, which planned to terminate tiger production and replace it with a super heavy souped up Panther really. .

I agree that that all the nations involved in WWII engaged in uparmouring and upgunning of their tanks as the war progressed. But none to the same extent as germany, and the problem for germany is that their supporting industries were badly placed to fulfil those increases in sizes. German tank manufacture was severely affected by the poor structure of their factories and manufacturing processes. It was a bigger base than the US (by comparison) for tank manufacture in 1939, but German industry did not lay the groundwork to anywhere near the levels of efficiency that were done in the US. In the USSR the organisational processes that underpinned their wartime production began prewar, but they had a different wartime experience to the US. In 1941-2, more than 35% of their available tank manufacturing capabilities were overrun, but by ruthless adjustment to their design and manufacturing techniques, they were able to reduce the manufacturing costs and production lead times for their tanks by something like 50-80%. There were some improvements in German production as well, but nothing like what the US and USSR achieved. . Quite early the Germans realised the strategic blind alley they had driven down in 1942 and were planning a simplification process for their E series tanks. One of the models, the medium E-50, was meant to be the medium tank replacement, would have reduced man hours to build by half (compared to the standard Panther...or 4timnes less production cost to a tiger) by massive reductions in the amounts of drilling and machinng required.

Trying to say that bombing (sarcastically) affected German production, fails to take into account the much larger levels of dislocation inflicted on the USSR due to much of their industrial regions being overrun and also fails to acknowledge the risks being run to US efforts by their worldwide commitments and shipping crises. It fails to acknowledge that the US at the beginning of the war, through to about May 1941 had virtually no tank building capability. The differences between the US and Russia on the one hand, and how they concentrated on organising their AFV production, and the German on the other who paid virtually no attention to the limits and capabilities of their support industry for tank production is very striking. Passing this off as "oh Germany had a few problems but we don't need to talk about that" is another nonsense to me, because that is at the heart of the problem and the main reason why I consider the tiger to be a failure. It represented the total mismatch of production capability to the design complexities of the type and the worst of what was wrong with the German tank arm. At the end even the germans themselves were tacitly acknowledging that, with their plan to terminate all Tiger production in 1945, because the design was too expensive, and too unreliable

To give some idea of the vast disparity in vehicle weight, it is reasonable to generalise and say the germans were producing tanks in the 10-20 tonne bracket. In 1942-3 they were shifting to tanks in the 25-55tonne range. by 1945 they were By 1945 they had shifted to the 45-75 tonne range and were seriously contemplating tanks in the 200 tonne range.

By comparison, the US in the main were building in 1941, tanks in the 12-25 tonne bracket. in 1942-3, the overwhelming majority built were Shermans in the 30-35 tonne category. In 1944-5 it remained at that weight, with a handful of 40+ tonne tanks received

Soviet tank weights were generally in the range 30-45 tonnes. Even with the acceptance of heavier tanks like the t-34/85 and IS-2, that weight range hardly moved, perhaps even dropped a bit (because of the widespread use of the T-70 chassis).

Taking the German average weight in 1941 as the index mark, indices for each of the big three in the time frames 1941, 1942-3 and 1944-5 are: Germany: 100/280/440 For the US its 120/200/210. The SU was 250/250/250. So yes, all nations engaged in uparmouring and upgunning, but none to the same extent as the Germans (well, the Russians hardly moved in weight, but the gun size went up). And the massive increases attempted by germany was something their industry was not equipped to deal with. .

I would note in the video clip that the speaker (Parshall ?) makes the common mistake or repeats it, that the US didn't swing into action in terms of production until Dec 1941. (about 33:50 in the video) and he states earlier (32:40) that the US had no factories mass producing tanks in mid 1941. This last statement is true (somewhat). However Not only did the Detroit tank arsenal produce it's first pilot model M3 medium in April of 1941 so did American locomotive(685 M3s first order) and Baldwin Locomotive (545 first order M3s) and all three companies were building actual production models in Aug of 1941. What is mid 1941?
August 1941 also saw Pressed Steel and Pullman each receive a contract for 500 tanks M3 medium tanks from the British purchasing commission. Production started later but obviously the US was not starting at zero or even close to it in Dec of 1941.
American Car & Foundry had been producing the M3 Light tank since March of 1941. Obviously it takes time to hit peak production numbers. Other companies would join the light tank program later.

I would also note that in his talk he is sometimes referring to armoured vehicles and not tanks specifically. In that regard contracts were given to White and Autocar for M2 half tracks in Sept of 1940 and Diamond T got a contract for M3 half tracks at the same time. Production examples began to show up in May of 1941. He talks about US production ramping down in 1944, this is somewhat true. But the halt in half track production makes up a large amount of the decline. Production by all factories stopping in mid 1944.

The Americans did do a fantastic job of mass producing all sorts of things but that production wasn't done by flipping a Switch on Dec 8th 1941.

Tiger tanks were extremely rare. So, the chances of a Sherman actually meeting a Tiger were very slim. Only about 1500 Tiger I tanks were made. A large part was used on the Eastern Front. Probably not more than 500 Tigers would ever be in Western Europe and most likely even fewer. In comparison, some 50.000 Shermans were made. So there's at least 100 times as many Shermans than there are Tigers on the Western front. So the odds of seeing and/or engaging one had to be quite slim.
Then add to that the tactical considerations of the Germans and the American Sherman tanks were even less likely to engage Tigers.

The first Tigers were used in Tunesia and those were all knocked out by British forces. The British forces at that time were considered by the Germans to be more dangerous, as they were highly experienced, and thus the Tigers were used against them.

Two Tiger battalions were sent to Normandy. Both were again used against the British forces. In this case, because the northern region, where the British army was deployed, was relatively open, and thus suitable for tank warfare. The southern region, where the Americans were deployed, had the bocage landscape, (pastureland divided into small hedged fields interspersed with groves of trees) which was a natural barrier against tanks. It could be defended very efficiently with infantry armed with panzerfaust, with anti-tank guns, and by tank destroyers. Only a small part of the German tank force was used there, and no Tiger tanks were employed.

After the breakout of Normandy, the German tank forces got trapped in Falaize, and were destroyed by artillery and air bombardment. No Tigers left in the West, until the Tiger II appears in the Battle of the Bulge. And those mostly got stuck on the small roads in the valleys of the Ardennes. Very few ever had a chance to get into battle.

As a result, American Shermans would hardly ever have engaged Tiger tanks. There are only 4 confirmed engagements of the US Army with Tigers. (Of course, it is difficult to confirm everything, so there were certainly were more than four engagements… but it does give an indication of how rare they were.) And this is entirely consistent with the usage of the Tigers by the Germans. The few there were, were used against the British. The handful of Tiger IIs in the Ardennes, were used against the Americans, but they hardly saw any combat at all due to the terrain and lack of fuel.

So considering all those stories of American tankers engaging Tigers and the actual rarity of the Tigers, it is almost certainly a PzKpfw-IV that was actually engaged by the Shermans. The Tiger and PzKpfw IV look very similar from the front. It's just like all the anecdotal tales about '88mm guns, almost certainly they were Pak40 75mm guns.

The British Shermans certainly did engage a few Tigers. Luckily, they had the Sherman Firefly conversion, so they also had the ability to kill Tigers quite efficiently.

Which one is the Tiger??

tomo pauk said:

For flawed German tanks, see Panther ( armor and gun of medium tank coupled with size and weight of heavy tank) and Tiger II.

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Forgive my ignorance, can you be more specific as to the problem with the Panther? from what I have read, it evolved into perhaps the best all around tank of the war. Was it a similar case as the Tiger, as in too complex for its intended role?
As well, would a diesel engine have been an advantage for the Tiger and Panther? with easier to produce, and less volatile fuel?

parsifal said:

. Ive taken more or less the opposite tack to you by including all the German heavies into the one pot, mostly because they were all tarred with the same brush.... overlapping roles and very similar problems . Saying "oh that's a Panther we shouldn't be talking about that" is a nonsense to me. Tiger and Panther were both more or less in the same class, and ended up with interchangeable applications and assignments.

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I differentiate the Tiger I and Panther for two reasons.

One is the intended use. The Tiger I not being a general issue tank( replacement for the MK III & IV) and the Panther was a general issue tank.
Two is the timing. after several progressively larger/heavier prototypes the contracts for the design/development of the Tiger I were let pre Barbarossa and while the Russian experience may have played some factor in the design (some tweaks?) much of the design and characteristics were already decided, for better or worse.

The Panther on the other hand was a direct response to the Experiences of Barbarossa and the T-34 and KV tanks. Decision to build was take just about 1 full year after the decision to build the Tiger I and production was planned to start 6 months after the start of production of the Tiger I (which showed up in the crappy reliability of the early Panthers which used essentially the same engine to drive a tank that weighed 77% as much. Much of the trouble was with the new "simplified" transmission.)
By the time there were Tigers in any real numbers (more than handful in one or two experimental deployments) the tactical and strategic situation had changed.

Now please note that the MK III doesn't get the long 50mm gun until about Dec of 1941 7 months after the order to go ahead with the Tiger and the MK IV didn't get the long 75 until March of 1942, 10 months after the Tiger go ahead. Planning and tooling had started earlier of course. However the 5cm AT gun (towed) had only been issued in the fall of 1940 and the towed 7,5cm At gun had only been issued in Nov of 1941 so there was no combat experience with the 7.5cm gun during the first half of the Tigers design/development.
The Tank 7.5cm gun need some redesigning to fit it into the turret and the cartridge case had to be changed to a shorter, fatter one to allow manhandling inside the space of a tank/SP gun.
Also note that the early 1943 7.5cm tank gun was the shorter L43 version but since they used the same ammo the performance was only off by 3-5mm of penetration.

The Panther was an attempt to out T-34 the T-34 due to combat experience. The Tiger, while somewhat comparable to the KV was not developed in response to it but somewhat in parallel (staggered in timing)

parsifal said:

Taking the German average weight in 1941 as the index mark, indices for each of the big three in the time frames 1941, 1942-3 and 1944-5 are: Germany: 100/280/440 For the US its 120/200/210. The SU was 250/250/250. So yes, all nations engaged in uparmouring and upgunning, but none to the same extent as the Germans (well, the Russians hardly moved in weight, but the gun size went up). And the massive increases attempted by germany was something their industry was not equipped to deal with.

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Were the Russians really that clever or were they constrained by existing production facilities/designs? or a bit of both?
Unless the Russians can come up with a new engine going heavier than a KV just means a slower tank, see the progression from the up armored models and then the reversal to the KV-S, thinner armor in an attempt to restore mobility.
A heavier tank can sometimes use different transmission (more gears) to help performance but that increases size/weight and cost.
The simple clutch and brake steering system also becomes a bigger problem the heavier a tank gets.
The Russians may also have had a requirement about ground pressure for operating in snow, poor ground. I have read that either the t-60 light tank or T-70 was not popular because it, despite being a light tank could not keep up with T-34s on cross country moves.
There are always design choices. The Russian almost constant weight despite bigger guns was purchased with lower ammo capacity and lower rates of fire (cramped-poor ergonomics) which means you need more tanks involved in the battle to get the same target effect/firepower.

I am not saying the Germans were correct in the path that they took, especially once they go past the Panther. The Panther itself was iffy, Perhaps a 35 ton tank with a 7.5cm cannon part way between the L/48 and the L/70 would have been the way to go.
But if you compare the Panther to the M-26/M-46, the Centurion and the Russian T-44/T-54 tank you can see the direction tank design was going.

I suggest everyone read the following articles about the effectiveness of the 77 mm, 90 mm and 17 pdr vs German armor.
The Chieftain's Hatch: US Guns, German Armour, Pt 1
The Chieftain's Hatch: US Guns, German Armor: Pt 2

"In July there was shock and anger over how poorly US tank guns performed against German armour. By late August, when real test data showed just how badly US guns under-performed, no one cared any more. Independent tank battalions equipped with M4s were leading US infantry divisions into battle, and armoured divisions equipped with more M4s were leading the charge across France: It seemed nothing could stop them. It was not until the Winter, with the return of positional warfare, and then the German offensive in the Ardennes, that questions were once again raised about the performance of US guns and ammunition vs. German armoured vehicles."

Apparently the US weapons did not perform as well in the real world as their testing had promised.

Reluctant Poster said:

Apparently the US weapons did not perform as well in the real world as their testing had promised.

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Nothing ever does! I think that if you'll re-read my post #49 your question will be answered

Clayton Magnet said:

Forgive my ignorance, can you be more specific as to the problem with the Panther? from what I have read, it evolved into perhaps the best all around tank of the war. Was it a similar case as the Tiger, as in too complex for its intended role?
As well, would a diesel engine have been an advantage for the Tiger and Panther? with easier to produce, and less volatile fuel?

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Having diesel engine would've probably improved the mileage; main cause of tanks brewing up was ignition of the cannon's ammo, though.

As for the Panther - I've already tossed in my reasons. The cannon was firing too small a HE shell (2/3rds of Tigers or T-35-85), forgetting that not all the battlefield targets were other tanks/AFVs. Size & weight of a heavy tank, but not a protectiof of a heavy tank to cover the bulk. Big weight will mean that reliabiity can suffer, the bridging equipment need to be heavier & stronger, ditto for towing damaged tanks. The suspension was as complicated as it gets. All of this also meant that production will not amount to what was possible with 'real' medium tanks.
Granted, Panther eventually improved on details, the ride was smooth, it was able to kill other tanks/AFV as good as Tiger did it. However, Sherman Firefly and Comet were probably every bit as good, while lighter and far cheaper to make. The T-34-85 was offering a heavier HE shell vs. much better AT performance of the Panther, being lighter, smaller and much cheaper.

At the end of a day, I rate the M-26, Tiger and Centurion as being better all-around tanks (plus the small number of KV-85 and IS-1), and Comet, Sherman Firefly and T-34-85 being more or less equal to the Panther while offeing the key advantages of medium tanks when it is about size, weight and price.

mikewint said:

Nothing ever does! I think that if you'll re-read my post #49 your question will be answered

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It does refute your claim that the the US army had a very effective anti tank round that could penetrate the Tiger from all aspects.

Armour penetration tests can be all over the place for a variety of reasons.

Quality of the armor plate and quality of the AP rounds vary a bit from example to example for one reason.

Definition of penetration varies between countries. Can you see light through the hole/crack in plate?
Is 1/2 or 2/3 of the shot sticking through the plate but the shot is stuck in the plate?
Has the projectile completely penetrated the plate?

And different countries had different percentages for proving ground tests were were multiple shot tests instead of single or two shot tests like used against captured equipment.
standards like 70% of shots fired had to meet one of the above criteria (or a higher percentage. to eliminate fluke shots.

The US M72 projectile was uncapped. WIth it's blunt point it lost velocity faster with range.

But it had some use depending on the target plate being homogenous or face hardened.
The British also handicapped their AT and tank guns by sticking with cheap AP shot vs APCPC shot for quite some time.

Everything being the same (which it seldom is) penetration is dependent on the square of speed of impact.

At normal tank fighting ranges once you get to 75mm guns and above things don't change a whole lot. US M61 that was doing 2030fps at the muzzle is still doing 1700fps at 1200yds.
but that is 20 X 20 = 40 vs 17 X 17 = 289 (dropping the zeros to make it easy. The Us 3in and 76mm guns with their 2600fps at the muzzle would be 676 and even if lost 400fps over the same distance that the 75mm lost 300fps the merit figure would be 484.

any claims that the 75mm SHerman gun would have only been 5% behind the 3in/76mm if only it had the right projectiles seems to be highly suspect. Testswould have to be done using the same (or very similar) projectiles from both guns against targets of know quality and at the same angles of impact.

The US 3in (M-10 tank destroyer) and 76mm gun ( late Shermans and M-18 tank destroyers) used the same projectiles fired at the same velocity by different guns/cartridge cases/powder charges. Exterior ballistics and target effect should have been the same.

Reluctant Poster said:

It does refute your claim that the the US army had a very effective anti tank round that could penetrate the Tiger from all aspects.

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Go back two more posts to #46. Look at the Russian penetration tests on an actual Tiger. Note that the maximum range was 650m or 711yds. Now also keep in mind that the Tiger I's 8.8cm Kw.K. 36 L/56 rifled cannon had muzzle velocities of 600m/second (HE), 773m/second (AP) and 930m/second (AP/tungsten core). The effective range of these rounds was 3000 m with armour piercing and 5000 m with HE rounds. Couple that with the exceptionally fine optics of the Tiger's sights and you have a tank that could kill other tanks well beyond 1000yds.

Fortunately, the weakness of Sherman tanks in duels against German Panther and Tiger tanks didn't actually matter much in the grand scheme because duels between large groups of tanks were rare experiences for the U.S. Army during the war. German weapons such as the Tiger tanks and 88mm antitank guns only existed in relatively small numbers. More commonly the US Army faced German PzKpfw IV tanks, 75mm antitank guns, the StuG III assault gun, and German "panzerjager" tank destroyers. These could still kill Shermans from ordinary combat ranges of 1,000 yards or less, but Sherman tanks fought those foes on more equal footing. If anything, Sherman tank crews spent the vast majority of their battles shooting at non-armored targets such as buildings or enemy troops.
The technical superiority of German tanks also did not necessarily guarantee easy victories for the Germans in tank duels. U.S. and British military studies in the later years of the war found that the single most important factor in tank duels was which side spotted the other first, engaged first and landed the first hits. Such scenarios tended to favor defenders, which is why German tanks on the attack suffered about as heavily as Sherman tanks on the attack. But such situations also favored well-trained and experienced tank crews who knew how to ambush or surprise enemy tanks. Even Panther and Tiger tanks could easily fall prey to Sherman tanks striking from the side or rear.

AS a quick and dirty guide to max point blank range (range at which, with a center of mass aiming point, the projectile will neither pass over or hit under/short) of a tank sized (vague I know) target is the muzzle velocity + 10%. Beyond that you need some sort of range finding aid, more time and perhaps just firing the first shot and seeing (with tracer) where it goes.
This does give an advantage to the higher velocity guns even at ranges under 1000meters. it also gives advantages to fast turret traverse in non ambush situations and it gives and advantage to high rate of fire guns. If large caliber slow firing guns miss with the first shot it may have 2-3 incoming enemy shells before the big gun is ready to fire again.

Now the large, heavy high velocity gun is going to require a large heavy turret and that may mean that turret traverse is not as fast as one would like.

The best tank for fighting on the Russian steps might not be the best tank for fighting in western european forests and towns.

Original German tank specifications in the 1930s called for short guns that would not overhang the body of the tank when traversed to keep from hitting the barrels on obstacles (trees/ buildings) but if you can't kill the enemy tanks when you need to then the last thing you worry about is wacking the gun barrel against a tree.

on the other hand

mikewint said:

Even Panther and Tiger tanks could easily fall prey to Sherman tanks striking from the side or rear.

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And even an M8 Greyhound!

Shortround6 said:

But if you compare the Panther to the M-26/M-46, the Centurion and the Russian T-44/T-54 tank you can see the direction tank design was going.

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I agree, something even better than the tiger would have been required.....eventually. But before that crisis was dealt with the germans had to stabilize their front,, and to do that they needed numbers of reliable tanks. neither the Panter or the tiger could offer that until the latter part of the war. What made it worse, especially for the tiger was that it was a design totally unsuited to available production facilities in Germany at that time. numbers equals survivability, and the tiger did not offer that

Shortround6 said:

Were the Russians really that clever or were they constrained by existing production facilities/designs? or a bit of both?.

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Unquestionably yes. Despite its limitations, the T-34 and KV series of tanks were ruthlessly simplified and produced as a consumer item. they could them out like hotcakes and in that way vastly improve the survivability of their armoured formations. In war numbers count for everything. Even the germans knew that. they opted for the quality hi tech pathway and they lost the war because of that. they had greater industrial potential than the Soviets at the beginning of the wart. The Soviets suffered greater industrial penalties and losses during the early years but still managed to outproduce the germans by a wide margin. That was no accident. Because the Russians made great efforts to simply and streamline their production, and the germans the opposite, Russia won and Germany lost.

The war was won in the factories of the respective nations.