MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
As everyone knows, at the Battle of Midway the USS Hornet Air Group chose the wrong course to attack the IJN fleet. But the Commander of VT-8, John Waldron, after being unable to convince his superiors to fly a different course, took his men off on what he thought was the correct path about 30 min after launch. While the rest of the Hornet Air Group failed to engage the IJN on the most crucial day of the Battle of Midway, VT-8 hit the enemy fleet dead nuts and went in to attack, alone.
A book I just read, "From the Flight Deck" contains an explanation of what occurred with the ten F4F Wildcat fighters that the Hornet launched that day. The article is written by Bowen P. Weisheit, a WWII navigator on USMC PBJ's and PB4Y's.
VF-8 was flying at 20,000 ft with the Hornet's SBD dive bombers and the Wildcat's leader, Mitchell, had accidentally set his oxygen regulator to 100% at takeoff and then not set it to Normal after they reached altitude, giving them no more than 1.9 hours of oxygen (note: it was standard practice to set the regulator to 100% at night in the USAF). At 1.76 hours into the flight Mitchell realized his mistake and knew he would have to head back to the Hornet and descend to where he could breathe without oxygen.
VF-8 would have to rely on the YE-ZB radio homing system to find the USS Hornet.
The YE-ZB system used a UHF transmitter operating around 240 MHZ that was signal. As described in the article, the antenna on the ship turned and as it went through 12 different sectors, every 30 degrees, and the code transmitted was modulated at around 1000 KHZ and that could be varied a few hundred KHZ to either side. If you knew to tune in the right frequency you would not hear anything but the carrier signal. But if you took the 1000 KHZ signal coming out of a UHF receiver and put it into a receiver tuned to 1000 KHZ you would hear a Morse code letter, which changed for each sector.
So, the F4F pilot had to change the band on his RU-16 receiver from the communications band to the band that matched the modulation of the receiver. Then he had to tune it to the proper modulation frequency to get the signal. And since the control box was just marked 0-100, he would have to look at a chart to see that he had to tune the receiver to say, 50. Then he had to listen to hear what code letter he received. Let's say it was A (dit dah). So he turned toward the carrier based on what another chart told him the signal corresponded to, perhaps it might be for the sector 60 to 90 degrees. As described in the article, he would try to turn slightly left and find the beginning of the next sector, which might be for 90 to 120 degrees, say, with the coded signal H (dit dit dit dit). Then he would turn back to the right until he heard A again. That way he more or less followed a direct line to the carrier, with a slight zig-zag, rather like the AN system used for radio navigation in the US.
Now, the system was simple but it still was easy to screw up. The pilot could fail to turn to the correct band. The pilot could fail to tune in the signal on the control box. He could fail to look at the right chart. Or, of course, they could have failed to tune the UHF receiver to the correct frequency back on the carrier. And while he was doing all that, he could not talk to anyone, since the same RU receiver was used for communications. Normally this was not as big a problem as it sounds, since the USN emphasized radio silence and the use of hand signals by the pilots while in formation.
Mitchell was unable to pick up the YE-ZB signal and turned the lead over to Lt. Ruehlow. Gray was able to pick up the signal and then Ruehlow turned the lead over to him, but Mitchell did not realize it. Then Talbot tuned in the signal and thought he was taking over the lead.
McInerny and Magda got ahead and off to the right of the rest of the squadron and did not see something vital that the other pilots did. The rest of VF-8 flew over the distinctive wide wake of a carrier and sighted the Hornet but concluded that the wake and the ship was the enemy.
All ten airplanes ditched and two of the pilots were lost, Kelly and Hill. Those rescued had been in the water for 5 to 6 days.
A book I just read, "From the Flight Deck" contains an explanation of what occurred with the ten F4F Wildcat fighters that the Hornet launched that day. The article is written by Bowen P. Weisheit, a WWII navigator on USMC PBJ's and PB4Y's.
VF-8 was flying at 20,000 ft with the Hornet's SBD dive bombers and the Wildcat's leader, Mitchell, had accidentally set his oxygen regulator to 100% at takeoff and then not set it to Normal after they reached altitude, giving them no more than 1.9 hours of oxygen (note: it was standard practice to set the regulator to 100% at night in the USAF). At 1.76 hours into the flight Mitchell realized his mistake and knew he would have to head back to the Hornet and descend to where he could breathe without oxygen.
VF-8 would have to rely on the YE-ZB radio homing system to find the USS Hornet.
The YE-ZB system used a UHF transmitter operating around 240 MHZ that was signal. As described in the article, the antenna on the ship turned and as it went through 12 different sectors, every 30 degrees, and the code transmitted was modulated at around 1000 KHZ and that could be varied a few hundred KHZ to either side. If you knew to tune in the right frequency you would not hear anything but the carrier signal. But if you took the 1000 KHZ signal coming out of a UHF receiver and put it into a receiver tuned to 1000 KHZ you would hear a Morse code letter, which changed for each sector.
So, the F4F pilot had to change the band on his RU-16 receiver from the communications band to the band that matched the modulation of the receiver. Then he had to tune it to the proper modulation frequency to get the signal. And since the control box was just marked 0-100, he would have to look at a chart to see that he had to tune the receiver to say, 50. Then he had to listen to hear what code letter he received. Let's say it was A (dit dah). So he turned toward the carrier based on what another chart told him the signal corresponded to, perhaps it might be for the sector 60 to 90 degrees. As described in the article, he would try to turn slightly left and find the beginning of the next sector, which might be for 90 to 120 degrees, say, with the coded signal H (dit dit dit dit). Then he would turn back to the right until he heard A again. That way he more or less followed a direct line to the carrier, with a slight zig-zag, rather like the AN system used for radio navigation in the US.
Now, the system was simple but it still was easy to screw up. The pilot could fail to turn to the correct band. The pilot could fail to tune in the signal on the control box. He could fail to look at the right chart. Or, of course, they could have failed to tune the UHF receiver to the correct frequency back on the carrier. And while he was doing all that, he could not talk to anyone, since the same RU receiver was used for communications. Normally this was not as big a problem as it sounds, since the USN emphasized radio silence and the use of hand signals by the pilots while in formation.
Mitchell was unable to pick up the YE-ZB signal and turned the lead over to Lt. Ruehlow. Gray was able to pick up the signal and then Ruehlow turned the lead over to him, but Mitchell did not realize it. Then Talbot tuned in the signal and thought he was taking over the lead.
McInerny and Magda got ahead and off to the right of the rest of the squadron and did not see something vital that the other pilots did. The rest of VF-8 flew over the distinctive wide wake of a carrier and sighted the Hornet but concluded that the wake and the ship was the enemy.
All ten airplanes ditched and two of the pilots were lost, Kelly and Hill. Those rescued had been in the water for 5 to 6 days.
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