The turning point in the air war probably began over the Kuban, more specifically phase III or the so called assault on the blue line. On May 26th, 1943, the Soviet ground offensive was renewed along the fortified German "Blue Line" with a powerful armored infantry thrust. Within hours of the Soviet assault, the Germans launched a determined counterattack that soon stalled the Soviet drive. As a result, more than 100 Soviet tanks were lost on the first day. In the air, the response from both sides was immediate and uncompromising. The VVS had launched a preparatory raid of 338 aircraft. The Germans responded with up to 1,500 sorties on the same day. German sources state that the VVS lost 350 combat aircraft on May 26th alone, but overall air losses to the Luftwaffe were so severe that they discontinued active air engagements in the area on June 7th. This was the first time that the LW had thrown the towel in because of soviet air activity. During this third phase of the campaign many reputations were made: the Glinka brothers, Dmitrii and Boris, scored 21 and 10 victories respectively in the Kuban , A. L. Prukozchikov-20, V. I. Fadeyev-15, N. E. Lavitsky-15, D. I. Koval-13, V. I. Fedorenko-13 and P. M. Berestnev-12.
However, parity was far from achieved for the remainder of the front. at Kursk, the average hours for VVS airmen was about 20-40 hours, compared to the LW 250+. but the LW was heavily outnumbered and overworked, and from Zitadelle to the end of the year, VVS kept up tremendous pressure on the LW despite the most horrendous losses. Importantly it was at about this time that the Soviets realised they couldn't, and didn't need to, achieve air superiority over the LW in order to win the air battle. The qualitative superiority of the LW was such that this was never an achievable goal. But they could prevent the LW bombers from having much effect, whilst keeping the LW fighters at bay whilst the VVS went to work with its sturmoviks.
It never was about winning air superiority. The frontages were just too great for that to make much difference to the air battle. It was always a question of numbers, serviceability rates and mobility, and by 1943 the scales in these respects had tipped firmly towards the VVS. It has been estimated that by December 1943, the average hours per VVs pilot was about 100 hours, to about 150 hours in the LW. By the end of 1944 LW hours had dropped to about 50 hours, whilst Soviet hours had increased to about 150. After that it becomes academic aas the LW was shot at like target practice and so overwhelmed as to be irrelevant even on the eastern front.