Sure, glad to help. The 24 105mm guns
Ask for combat reports and receive the sales pitch for SP artillery, with pictures. With the evidence presented so far the invalid claim could be made the M7 Priest was not used at all. The claim was "significant difference", now "maybe a little more than 3%". One easy way they would make it to over 3% is the artillery of XIII corps was not used as much, making the units in X and XXX corps over represented in combat activity. There were probably more Bishops than Priests in the 8th Army but no reference so far says which units had them and when.
The things required to decide the effect are the actual combat records. 1st Armoured division had the 11th Royal Horse Artillery with its Priests under command, at the start of the battle the division had 4 artillery regiments, plus a fifth in Hammerforce but that was attached to 9th Australian division. Looking for a book that mentions the RHA unit leads to Alamein by C.E. Lucas Phillips, 11 RHA guns were in action the day after the offensive began, 24 October, while the infantry and armour commanders were arguing where the front line was, the artillery commander who offered to check things was told to stay out of it. The maps were interpreted as Kidney Ridge, it was Kidney Depression. "First successes" that day supporting the Australians, along with Shermans firing AP and HE, the artillery engaging enemy tanks over open sights, all the batteries of the regiment sustained anti tank gun hits on the priests. The 88mm guns were caught in a dilemma when an air strike occurred, raising the barrels to shoot at the aircraft gave their position away to the ground units. The description indicates the Shermans did not really need the useful local artillery support but the division had one regiment with Crusaders which clearly did. FOOs were being carried in the leading tanks. The German counter attack that afternoon "In the usual enemy manner, it was made at slow speed under cover of anti tank guns, in to which the enemy sought to entice our armour." On 27 October 11 RHA shell a British position called Snipe, which was out in front of the main line and in the path of Rommel's counter attacks. The post battle Committee of Investigation decided the unit in the Snipe position had destroyed a minimum of 31 tanks and 4 SPG, and knocked out at least another 15. 1st Armoured was pulled into reserve on 27 October, coming back into the line on 2 November as part of Operation Supercharge. 11th RHA was being used as part of the tank columns during the final attempts to break out. The unit shelled the bailed out crew of a mark III after the breakout, the shooting stopped when a tall and obviously important man started walking towards the British, General Ritter von Thoma. So the unit was in action for the first 4 to 5 days, in reserve for 5 days, then part of the final attacks. Yet without apparently knowing any of this the Priests were a "significant difference", now "maybe a little more than 3%". The unit was in combat for about half the total battle, the 25 pounder batteries of the infantry were there for the entire battle, along with various attached and corps artillery units. Please do not provide another opinion on Priest combat effectiveness without first adding factual material to their Alamein combat record.
Bobby Gibbes managed to obtain a Kittyhawk III for his use, the rest of the squadron stayed with mark I. Number 3 squadron records, what the RAAF calls History Sheets, like all RAAF squadron records, can be downloaded from the Australian Archives Web Site, but that was offline when I checked. The reality of air superiority, your older types can operate with acceptable losses, the detailed OOB presented shows an overall quality improvement but also the increase in numbers. Add the reality of the need of the need for reserves at the end of a long supply line and plenty of units were flying older types, like Kittyhawk I and even Tomahawk.
It was a timeline, summarized so it doesn't go into legalistic detail. The big reorganization seems to have taken place in mid 1942 during a series of meetings headed by Tedder. By this time he seems to have had enough allies and support to get what he wanted done.
Is this mid 1942 before or after Gazala? The theory and system developed in Britain was first used at Gazala via one of the new liaison units being in action, as noted it cut air support call times from 2 hours to 30 minutes. Reading the Australian, New Zealand and South African histories is useful as they are effectively divisional histories, the Australians report they received their new air support system on 8 July just after arriving at Alamein, showing wide spread adoption. The evidence from Gazala was the system worked. In addition with the Desert Air Force pushed back onto its supply bases plus new units arriving a reorganisation was worthwhile.
So to answer this specific question as to the timing of forward air controllers (or their equivalent, I have a feeling there may be a lawyerly 'gotcha' in some kind of distinction in the specific terminology here so I'll be very careful with my words). Under Tedder, the DAF was shifting toward a more coherent system of coordination between air and ground forces of the 8th Army. Tedder put Arthur Coningham in charge of this specific aspect. They first developed "Forward Air Support Links" (FASL) which was more for airborne spotter aircraft to direct intelligence to ground forces (sometimes called "tentacles"). Then came the "Air Support Control' (ASC) system "which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. This system included what was at the time called a "Mobile Fighter Controller" who was assigned to a vehicle traveling with the army columns. This was the beginning of what came to be called Cab Ranks.
There is no lawyer involved, it is simply that you keep announcing things that when checked do not properly pan out. The description you present is the same in outline to what I gave in message 25, tentacles, my explanation gave dates. Under Tedder is from mid 1941, so when did this move begin? Your description gives the credit to the Desert Commanders versus them adopting and building on something coming out of Britain. The thing to note about Cab Ranks is you require at least air superiority to do it, plenty of aircraft and low chance of your small, low, slow, loaded formation being bounced, the light aircraft came out as part of operation Torch.
Given the Wiki entry what happened to the trained Air Support unit that came out tentacles and all, from Britain and joined the army at Gazala, was it a complete waste of time? It contributed nothing at all?
As for the things like critical factors. Sunday Times Book of Alamein and the Desert War, in a quote the Australians would like, General Montgomery "But I must say this – we could not have won the battle in 12 days without the magnificent 9th Australian division." Len Deighton "The flimsy four gallon can had come close to losing the war for us. Auchinleck estimated that 30% of all petrol leaving base was lost due to punctures in them." The Priests "were very successful" during the African war and later.
No. You are wrong about the Mosquito
I presented the data, the Richard Davis raids spreadsheets coupled with the Bomber Command monthly summaries in AIR 14/931, with a check using the list in Sharpe and Bowyer. Once again you present an opinion.
My rather obvious point is that Hurricanes and Blenheims alone were not sufficient. It took the arrival better US fighters (Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks, especially once used with new fighter tactics) , Spitfires, and a bunch of mostly US strike aircraft (Boston, Maryland, Baltimore, B-25, B-17, and later B-24), plus some Beaufighters, to make the difference.
Out of curiousity what B-17 are you referring to the handful of 90 Squadron sorties, or the USAAF after Torch?
The trouble for me is the original claim of "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein"
It is widely known the Desert Air Force had other types in service in June 1942. So the interpretation is having Hurricanes in early July 1942 meant a lost battle. The Hurricanes were around for the both battles. Rommel had pushed so far so fast he had made it had for the Luftwaffe to mount sustained operations, far harder than the Desert Air Force, particularly for bombers. A significant factor seem to be most axis fighter sorties ran into allied aircraft, though how much of that is from reconstruction of events via combat reports is unclear.
The scale of effort the axis air forces could mount meant their impact was low, Andrew Arthy notes the fuel problem, both aviation and vehicle, the 4 July report of 22 serviceable Luftwaffe fighters. So the opinion is Hurricanes were so poor they could not operate with any success when there were maybe 14 allied fighter squadrons to 2 German, plus some Italian, on top of that 8th Army was so poor that the equivalent of 2 companies of tanks with similar weakened support in DAK were going to defeat the remnants of the army plus the fresh troops brought into the line. The comment on the on to Alexandria signal sent to Littorio, "To Alexandria 150 km, Littorio fuel – 20km" comes to mind. How did the Hurricane ever survive the Battle of Britain given it was outnumbered there?
Against the above Hooton in Eagle in Flame quotes Gundelach who references L'Aeronautica Italian nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale Volume 2 (Became Gundelach appendix 8), including convoy escort and cover, has the Luftwaffe in Africa flying 3,570 sorties in May 6,325 in June, 4,880 in July and 2,605 in August, monthly fuel requirements put at 1,400 tons. So there is a contradiction there.
90th Light war diary 1 July 1942 "Every twenty or 30 minutes 15, 18 and sometimes even 20 bombers, with adequate fighter protection, launch their attacks. Although their material achievements of these heavy and continuous bombing and low flying attacks are negligible, owing to the dispositions of the fighting and supply units, the morale effects on the troops is much more important." It goes on to note a wish for Luftwaffe fighters and how few appear. Trying to find histories of the July fighting where the axis air force was a persistent problem to the allied ground troops, there were certainly times it was. The New Zealand division notes at least one heavy attack, the Australian a day of dive bombing with little damage then on 18 July "In air support, artillery and also in infantry strength, Auchinleck had, over his enemy, a remarkable superiority." As far as I can tell Arthy is more correct that Hooton in terms of scale of effort.
von Mellenthin, in his book, notes on the morning of 4 July the position of Panzerarmee Africa was perilous.
The idea the Air Force was decisive at Second Alamein is incorrect, at best an unprovable opinion. Alamein was mostly an infantry artillery battle, tanks in support as per WWI, something the British usually had an edge in during the desert war. The Germans had decentralised their artillery to give rapid fire response but that meant no rapid heavy fire response, the British did both. The British also had lots more ammunition and probably spare guns.
One of the things you are missing is that the Axis supply lines were pushed to the breaking point in large part by the air power. They were losing 40% of their supplies going across the Med, and this only got worse, how much of that was to air power? We can dive into those numbers.
I posted the relevant supply tonnages including that many were to airpower, and losses, the ones you are now using, before you chose a surge month with low losses now the worst month for losses, it was 6.5% in July, 33% in August, 20% in September and 44% in October. July to October 1942, 24.8% of all cargo lost, or 88,156 tons. In November the losses were 25.9%, then they became worse percentage wise, 52.6% in December and 68.8% in January 1943, but only 13,468 tons were shipped in those two months.
Then they were losing another big chunk bringing supplies from ports to forward depots. Then more were being lost when those depots were hit.
Please post these losses since you must have them to make the claim, plus the supplies used by the supply system to move the supplies to where the supplies could be used in combat, at least 400 or so miles from Tobruk.
As it was, both battles of El Alamein were hardly cakewalks. They were in fact pretty close. I don't know how much of the Axis supplies were lost to bombing ships, bombing trucks, bombing supply depots, but it's a fair bet that in aggregate it was a good deal more than half. So that is a significant effect already.
Please provide the figures because all you are doing is piling opinions on top of each other and calling the pile fact. And what does pretty close mean when it comes to both battles?
Add to this that whereas in previous battles, the Germans had had a significant effect on Allied supplies and logistics,
When? Again please provide the figures. The histories I have make little mention of successful German interdiction and supply chain disruptions in North Africa. Dropping mines in the Suez Canal did disrupt things for a while
yes, they would have. Glad you seem to have grasped my actual point there.
My words were,
but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated. Assuming you are not trying to be funny, note the word apparently in my reply, if you interpret that as agreement then you are very much mistaken.
With just Hurricanes, fighter losses to the Allies would have bee much more severe, fighter operations would have been much more limited. Strikes would have been constrained to much shorter range (no deep hits to enemy supply lines, or much fewer - you could still do some maritime attacks with Wellingtons) and losses to strike aircraft would be much higher. Just look at the losses to Blenheims in the earlier months of the Desert War.
Your method of declaring opinions as facts has limits. Is this day or night strikes, and since none of the allied bombers could survive unescorted, day raids tended to be within allied fighter range. You declare lots of axis supply losses in Africa to allied raids, then declare the raids could not have happened and all completely opinion piled on opinion. No mention of the lack of axis airpower to actually do the intercepts for example.
If mass artillery alone worked then WW1 would have been over a lot quicker.
Does this mean the barrages in WWII were similarly ineffective, and is that except for SP 105mm guns? Given how good you rated them above? It had to be airstrikes?
one of Tedders mid 1942 innovations which I have mentioned several times is the targeting of Axis airfields with air strikes especially by Baltimores and later B-25s and still later, B-24s. These were very effective, as you can see in the numbers in Shores, and there is no doubt that they destroyed more aircraft this way than in air combat, probably 3-5 times as many. I can cite some specific cases if needed.
It is not specific cases, Schweinfurt in 1943 is a specific case, it is the horrible day to day cumulative losses. Andrew Arthy notes the Luftwaffe across the Mediterranean losses to enemy action March to October 1942 was 345 aircraft, plus another 403 to accidents. Removing the 69 in March and April to arrive at mid 1942 leaves 276, so the Luftwaffe in 5 months lost between 46 and 69 aircraft to allied aircraft and AA fire and over 200 to bombing raids to achieve the 3 to 5 losses on the ground to those in the air. Or as these are combat unit losses were there lots of non combat unit Luftwaffe losses to bombing? Andrew's table of allied fighter losses to enemy fighters in North Africa May to October is 546, admittedly the Italians are involved but you have to reduce the Luftwaffe losses to just fighters and remove non North Africa losses but 69 to 545 is about 8 to 1. Which brings into question whether the Desert Air Force was fit for purpose.
August DAF 65 fighters lost to enemy fighters, 24 Luftwaffe combat unit losses to enemy action in the Mediterranean, September 95 to 37, October 43 to 33. Take away a sizeable slice of Luftwaffe losses to the bombing successes and to operations over Malta, which are reported to be 7.5% of sorties in October, while in North Africa JG27 reporting 15 pilots killed or failed to return in September.
I'm sure weather, length of supply lines, better air bases on the Allied side etc. all had an impact in the outcome. So did the Allies outnumbering the Axis. But as noted already, both of these were fairly close battles. The Desert Air Force is what tipped it over into an Allied victory.
Another opinion about being close battles, so Supercharge was the last roll of the dice at Second Alamein? Rommel and his under 30 operational Panzers was really close as of 3 July to shifting a dug in infantry division with more than divisional artillery in support? Or bypassing it with adequate supplies and force to press on? To run into fresh troops further back. Von Mellenthin, being a staff member at DAK HQ is completely mistaken on 4 July?
Minor points, 19 Flak division was Rommel's main AA firepower, 174 88mm guns, nearly two thirds were lost at Alamein. The air transport used Ju52 and gliders to Tobruk, but the European end at least partially shifted from Greece/Crete to Brindisi. While Sonderkommando Dora had gliders for transport within Africa in July 1942.
Any chance on commenting on the supply information and tank reliability?
