Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Especially in war games/computer games, sometimes unlimited ammo, doesn't need to reload, sets up and breaks down in seconds. Towed stuff is even worse, nobody wants to spend 15-20 turns setting up.
View attachment 701673
In some games you could drive up with this and fire the next turn

In that game Wespes had six or seven shots before reloading, no unlimited ammo, but the fact it was mobile meant in game rules it could provide defensive fire immediately for any directly adjacent unit. No need to uncork the gun, made it really nasty on the offensive where they could pile up against you and have immediate arty support. You'd better have air.

Panzer General game engine, same basic rules.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ok so Squadrons! No. 18 "The Curtiss Kittyhawk Mk II" has the following info:

260 RAF first operational sortie with Kittyhawk Mk II was Sept 1, 1942

They made 32 claims while flying with this aircraft and lost 19 on operations and 3 in accidents.

James "Stocky" Edwards RCAF made no less than 7 of his 18 claims while flying Kittyhawk Mk IIs. Wiliam Cundy RAAF (5 victories) made all 5 in the Kitty II.

3 RAAF first operational sortie with Kittyhawk Mk II was November 3, 1942, and they flew Kitty Mk II until April 1944

It also mentions that Bobby Gibes the CO was flying a Kittyhawk Mk III already at that time, serial number FR 305, with which he led six Kittyhawk IIs on their first sortie. 3 RAAF was pretty quickly fully transitioned to Kitty II though shortly after that and didn't fly any other type until 1944.

Bobby Gibbes made two of his ten claims in the Kitty II

The book notes that originally 230 P-40F were assigned to the British via Lend Lease (serials FL 219 to FL 448) but the last 80 of these were basically stolen by the USAAF, so they got 150 of them (I guess this would be up to FL 368).

The book also notes that 100 P-40L were delivered via Lend Lease to the RAF (serial numbers FS 400 to FS 499)

One other point to be made is that in these two units P-40L were referred to as Kittyhawk IIA (though maybe not always consistently).

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Since both the P-40K and the P-40M were known as Kittyhawk IIIs we have to be very careful figuring out who actually got what.
Now somehow the British decided that P-40Ls would be called both KIttyhawk IIs and IIIs, but since the first P-40L left the factory in Jan 1943 it doesn't show up for El Alamein either.

Curtiss records show where the planes were shipped but what happened to them once they got there may be lost. The US got planes that were originally allocated a and shipped to the British at times.
For El Alamein forget the P-40Ms. Didn't happen, now way, without a time machine.

For Alamein you have P-40E Kittyhawk Is and Kittyhawk IAs (P-40E-1s)
You have the P-40Fs operating with the US forces.
The British only got a few P-40Ks.

Something of note is that the US Army gave the British 47 modified Allison V-1710-73 engines with a unique oil line from a breather cap to the and special adapter to the oil pump drive for installation on RAF P-40E and E-1 aircraft which would turn them into ersatz P-40Ks. This was done on Aug 11th 1942. I have no idea if they relabeled them.

Now for the first 600 or so P-40Ks which starting leaving the factory May 20th 1942.
The British commonwealth got at least 182
The Soviet Union got at least 87, from the factory.
At least 86 went to code name Cheroke (India) while 64 went to Hazel (India) and at lest 74 were diverted to Pact (Chungking China)
At least 92 went to Hawaii and 24 of them were passed to Midway. Some these later returned to to the US
Bronze (Alaska, 11th Air Force) got 47
Pewter (Iceland) got 11.
Africa/mid east got 59, 13 of which went to Cairo. Others went to China
Small numbers went to Australia, New Guinea, New Caledonia and other places in the area.

The First P-40K-5 came off the line in Sept 1942 (or Aug 31s?) and it is getting rather tight to get the planes from Buffalo to Egypt in time for El Alamein.
162-192 of this batch (K-5s, K-10s, K-15s) went to the British Commonwealth, 40 more to Australia, 10 more to New Zealand, Canada got 15 starting in Jan 1943.
Small numbers went to China, Brazil and other places and at least 37 were lost in training accidents in the US.

Ok well as for Kittyhawk III, it's really not so mysterious because I already told you when they were in action in a previous post and Shores gives the details including serial numbers.

Oct 9 1942, Flt Sgt. A.E. Roberts Flying Kityhawk III FR898 claims a BF 109F near Fukaa at 1020 (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942, Sgt. A. Orr flying Kittyhawk III FR287 claims a Bf 109E near Daba at 1320 (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942, pilot officer D.W. Cairns flying Kittyhawk III FR285 'Y' claimed a Bf 109 near Daba at 1700 (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 292 shot down by Bf 109 pilot officer G.R. Rodney PoW (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 287 badly damaged by MC 202 Sgt A. Orr WiA (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 238 damaged by MC 202s crash landed at base, Flt Officer C.W. Tribken safe (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942 Kittyhawk III (no serial given) crash landed at based Flg Officer E.Y. Miluck (250 Sqn)
Oct 9 1942 Kittyhawk III FR239 shot down by Flak Sgt. R. O. Holoway PoW (450 Sqn)

Oct 13 1942 Kittyhawk III Al 103 damaged, landed safely, Pilot Off A.B. Taylor safe

(P-40Fs from US 57th FG Sqns 64, 65, and 66 FS all made claims that same day for 2 Bf 109 destroyed and 2 damaged - actual losses were 3 Bf 109s)

Oct 19 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 284, pilot officer G.w Troke claimed a Bf 109G damaged (250 Sqn)

Oct 20 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 251 Flt Off H.F. Marting claimed an MC 202 over Fuka betwen 0831-1014 (450 Sqn)
Oct 20 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 245 'B' Sgt. J.M. MacAuley claimed an MC 202 damaged near Fuka between 1140-1315 (112 Sqn)
Oct 20 1942 Kittyhawk III FR 263 'X' Flt Sgt. R.C.C. Smith claimed a Bf 109 probable over El Alamein between 1540-1655 (112 Sqn)

And they lost 3 Kittyhawk III (FR 248, FR 265, and FR 284, to 112, 250 and 250 Sqn respectively) and two were damaged (FR 250 and FR 300, both with 450 Sqn)
260 RAF also lost 1 Kittyhawk II shot down and three damaged.
(Luftwaffe lost 4 x Bf 109F-4, one Bf 109E-7, two f the F-40 say shot down by P-40, one by Spitfires. RA lost 2 MC 202 and 4 MC 202 crash landed).

Oh and as a bonus, Bobby Gibbes claimed a Bf 109E damaged in his Kittyhawk III FR 305 'V'. This may have been Bf 109F-4 trop WNr 8611 listed as "combat with P-40, force landed Turbuiya, 70%' though some other pilots made probable and damage claims for Bf 109s that day.

Hopefully this is enough. I would say this is strong evidence that no less than three RAF squadrons (250, 450, 112) were heavily engaged in combat using Kityhawk III at this time. Plus there was at least one flying with 3 RAAF, and there were also some with 57 FG.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In that game Wespes had six or seven shots before reloading, no unlimited ammo, but the fact it was mobile meant in game rules it could provide defensive fire immediately for any directly adjacent unit. No need to uncork the gun, made it really nasty on the offensive where they could pile up against you and have immediate arty support. You'd better have air.

Panzer General game engine, same basic rules.

In "Combat Mission" neither Wespe nor any other AFV has unlimited ammunition, very much to the contrary. Ammunition is very finite and runs out quickly. Nor do they shoot instantaneously. If they are 'on the board' they are probably hiding very far from the front line. How fast guns respond to a call for artillery depends on several factors (rank of the spotter, target reference points, type of artillery) but usually takes at least a minute or two, sometimes as much as ten minutes.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Sure, glad to help. The 24 105mm guns

Ask for combat reports and receive the sales pitch for SP artillery, with pictures. With the evidence presented so far the invalid claim could be made the M7 Priest was not used at all. The claim was "significant difference", now "maybe a little more than 3%". One easy way they would make it to over 3% is the artillery of XIII corps was not used as much, making the units in X and XXX corps over represented in combat activity. There were probably more Bishops than Priests in the 8th Army but no reference so far says which units had them and when.

The things required to decide the effect are the actual combat records. 1st Armoured division had the 11th Royal Horse Artillery with its Priests under command, at the start of the battle the division had 4 artillery regiments, plus a fifth in Hammerforce but that was attached to 9th Australian division. Looking for a book that mentions the RHA unit leads to Alamein by C.E. Lucas Phillips, 11 RHA guns were in action the day after the offensive began, 24 October, while the infantry and armour commanders were arguing where the front line was, the artillery commander who offered to check things was told to stay out of it. The maps were interpreted as Kidney Ridge, it was Kidney Depression. "First successes" that day supporting the Australians, along with Shermans firing AP and HE, the artillery engaging enemy tanks over open sights, all the batteries of the regiment sustained anti tank gun hits on the priests. The 88mm guns were caught in a dilemma when an air strike occurred, raising the barrels to shoot at the aircraft gave their position away to the ground units. The description indicates the Shermans did not really need the useful local artillery support but the division had one regiment with Crusaders which clearly did. FOOs were being carried in the leading tanks. The German counter attack that afternoon "In the usual enemy manner, it was made at slow speed under cover of anti tank guns, in to which the enemy sought to entice our armour." On 27 October 11 RHA shell a British position called Snipe, which was out in front of the main line and in the path of Rommel's counter attacks. The post battle Committee of Investigation decided the unit in the Snipe position had destroyed a minimum of 31 tanks and 4 SPG, and knocked out at least another 15. 1st Armoured was pulled into reserve on 27 October, coming back into the line on 2 November as part of Operation Supercharge. 11th RHA was being used as part of the tank columns during the final attempts to break out. The unit shelled the bailed out crew of a mark III after the breakout, the shooting stopped when a tall and obviously important man started walking towards the British, General Ritter von Thoma. So the unit was in action for the first 4 to 5 days, in reserve for 5 days, then part of the final attacks. Yet without apparently knowing any of this the Priests were a "significant difference", now "maybe a little more than 3%". The unit was in combat for about half the total battle, the 25 pounder batteries of the infantry were there for the entire battle, along with various attached and corps artillery units. Please do not provide another opinion on Priest combat effectiveness without first adding factual material to their Alamein combat record.

Bobby Gibbes managed to obtain a Kittyhawk III for his use, the rest of the squadron stayed with mark I. Number 3 squadron records, what the RAAF calls History Sheets, like all RAAF squadron records, can be downloaded from the Australian Archives Web Site, but that was offline when I checked. The reality of air superiority, your older types can operate with acceptable losses, the detailed OOB presented shows an overall quality improvement but also the increase in numbers. Add the reality of the need of the need for reserves at the end of a long supply line and plenty of units were flying older types, like Kittyhawk I and even Tomahawk.

It was a timeline, summarized so it doesn't go into legalistic detail. The big reorganization seems to have taken place in mid 1942 during a series of meetings headed by Tedder. By this time he seems to have had enough allies and support to get what he wanted done.

Is this mid 1942 before or after Gazala? The theory and system developed in Britain was first used at Gazala via one of the new liaison units being in action, as noted it cut air support call times from 2 hours to 30 minutes. Reading the Australian, New Zealand and South African histories is useful as they are effectively divisional histories, the Australians report they received their new air support system on 8 July just after arriving at Alamein, showing wide spread adoption. The evidence from Gazala was the system worked. In addition with the Desert Air Force pushed back onto its supply bases plus new units arriving a reorganisation was worthwhile.

So to answer this specific question as to the timing of forward air controllers (or their equivalent, I have a feeling there may be a lawyerly 'gotcha' in some kind of distinction in the specific terminology here so I'll be very careful with my words). Under Tedder, the DAF was shifting toward a more coherent system of coordination between air and ground forces of the 8th Army. Tedder put Arthur Coningham in charge of this specific aspect. They first developed "Forward Air Support Links" (FASL) which was more for airborne spotter aircraft to direct intelligence to ground forces (sometimes called "tentacles"). Then came the "Air Support Control' (ASC) system "which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. This system included what was at the time called a "Mobile Fighter Controller" who was assigned to a vehicle traveling with the army columns. This was the beginning of what came to be called Cab Ranks.

There is no lawyer involved, it is simply that you keep announcing things that when checked do not properly pan out. The description you present is the same in outline to what I gave in message 25, tentacles, my explanation gave dates. Under Tedder is from mid 1941, so when did this move begin? Your description gives the credit to the Desert Commanders versus them adopting and building on something coming out of Britain. The thing to note about Cab Ranks is you require at least air superiority to do it, plenty of aircraft and low chance of your small, low, slow, loaded formation being bounced, the light aircraft came out as part of operation Torch.

Given the Wiki entry what happened to the trained Air Support unit that came out tentacles and all, from Britain and joined the army at Gazala, was it a complete waste of time? It contributed nothing at all?

As for the things like critical factors. Sunday Times Book of Alamein and the Desert War, in a quote the Australians would like, General Montgomery "But I must say this – we could not have won the battle in 12 days without the magnificent 9th Australian division." Len Deighton "The flimsy four gallon can had come close to losing the war for us. Auchinleck estimated that 30% of all petrol leaving base was lost due to punctures in them." The Priests "were very successful" during the African war and later.

No. You are wrong about the Mosquito

I presented the data, the Richard Davis raids spreadsheets coupled with the Bomber Command monthly summaries in AIR 14/931, with a check using the list in Sharpe and Bowyer. Once again you present an opinion.

My rather obvious point is that Hurricanes and Blenheims alone were not sufficient. It took the arrival better US fighters (Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks, especially once used with new fighter tactics) , Spitfires, and a bunch of mostly US strike aircraft (Boston, Maryland, Baltimore, B-25, B-17, and later B-24), plus some Beaufighters, to make the difference.

Out of curiousity what B-17 are you referring to the handful of 90 Squadron sorties, or the USAAF after Torch?

The trouble for me is the original claim of "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein"

It is widely known the Desert Air Force had other types in service in June 1942. So the interpretation is having Hurricanes in early July 1942 meant a lost battle. The Hurricanes were around for the both battles. Rommel had pushed so far so fast he had made it had for the Luftwaffe to mount sustained operations, far harder than the Desert Air Force, particularly for bombers. A significant factor seem to be most axis fighter sorties ran into allied aircraft, though how much of that is from reconstruction of events via combat reports is unclear.

The scale of effort the axis air forces could mount meant their impact was low, Andrew Arthy notes the fuel problem, both aviation and vehicle, the 4 July report of 22 serviceable Luftwaffe fighters. So the opinion is Hurricanes were so poor they could not operate with any success when there were maybe 14 allied fighter squadrons to 2 German, plus some Italian, on top of that 8th Army was so poor that the equivalent of 2 companies of tanks with similar weakened support in DAK were going to defeat the remnants of the army plus the fresh troops brought into the line. The comment on the on to Alexandria signal sent to Littorio, "To Alexandria 150 km, Littorio fuel – 20km" comes to mind. How did the Hurricane ever survive the Battle of Britain given it was outnumbered there?

Against the above Hooton in Eagle in Flame quotes Gundelach who references L'Aeronautica Italian nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale Volume 2 (Became Gundelach appendix 8), including convoy escort and cover, has the Luftwaffe in Africa flying 3,570 sorties in May 6,325 in June, 4,880 in July and 2,605 in August, monthly fuel requirements put at 1,400 tons. So there is a contradiction there.

90th Light war diary 1 July 1942 "Every twenty or 30 minutes 15, 18 and sometimes even 20 bombers, with adequate fighter protection, launch their attacks. Although their material achievements of these heavy and continuous bombing and low flying attacks are negligible, owing to the dispositions of the fighting and supply units, the morale effects on the troops is much more important." It goes on to note a wish for Luftwaffe fighters and how few appear. Trying to find histories of the July fighting where the axis air force was a persistent problem to the allied ground troops, there were certainly times it was. The New Zealand division notes at least one heavy attack, the Australian a day of dive bombing with little damage then on 18 July "In air support, artillery and also in infantry strength, Auchinleck had, over his enemy, a remarkable superiority." As far as I can tell Arthy is more correct that Hooton in terms of scale of effort.

von Mellenthin, in his book, notes on the morning of 4 July the position of Panzerarmee Africa was perilous.

The idea the Air Force was decisive at Second Alamein is incorrect, at best an unprovable opinion. Alamein was mostly an infantry artillery battle, tanks in support as per WWI, something the British usually had an edge in during the desert war. The Germans had decentralised their artillery to give rapid fire response but that meant no rapid heavy fire response, the British did both. The British also had lots more ammunition and probably spare guns.

One of the things you are missing is that the Axis supply lines were pushed to the breaking point in large part by the air power. They were losing 40% of their supplies going across the Med, and this only got worse, how much of that was to air power? We can dive into those numbers.

I posted the relevant supply tonnages including that many were to airpower, and losses, the ones you are now using, before you chose a surge month with low losses now the worst month for losses, it was 6.5% in July, 33% in August, 20% in September and 44% in October. July to October 1942, 24.8% of all cargo lost, or 88,156 tons. In November the losses were 25.9%, then they became worse percentage wise, 52.6% in December and 68.8% in January 1943, but only 13,468 tons were shipped in those two months.

Then they were losing another big chunk bringing supplies from ports to forward depots. Then more were being lost when those depots were hit.

Please post these losses since you must have them to make the claim, plus the supplies used by the supply system to move the supplies to where the supplies could be used in combat, at least 400 or so miles from Tobruk.

As it was, both battles of El Alamein were hardly cakewalks. They were in fact pretty close. I don't know how much of the Axis supplies were lost to bombing ships, bombing trucks, bombing supply depots, but it's a fair bet that in aggregate it was a good deal more than half. So that is a significant effect already.

Please provide the figures because all you are doing is piling opinions on top of each other and calling the pile fact. And what does pretty close mean when it comes to both battles?

Add to this that whereas in previous battles, the Germans had had a significant effect on Allied supplies and logistics,

When? Again please provide the figures. The histories I have make little mention of successful German interdiction and supply chain disruptions in North Africa. Dropping mines in the Suez Canal did disrupt things for a while

yes, they would have. Glad you seem to have grasped my actual point there.

My words were, but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated. Assuming you are not trying to be funny, note the word apparently in my reply, if you interpret that as agreement then you are very much mistaken.

With just Hurricanes, fighter losses to the Allies would have bee much more severe, fighter operations would have been much more limited. Strikes would have been constrained to much shorter range (no deep hits to enemy supply lines, or much fewer - you could still do some maritime attacks with Wellingtons) and losses to strike aircraft would be much higher. Just look at the losses to Blenheims in the earlier months of the Desert War.

Your method of declaring opinions as facts has limits. Is this day or night strikes, and since none of the allied bombers could survive unescorted, day raids tended to be within allied fighter range. You declare lots of axis supply losses in Africa to allied raids, then declare the raids could not have happened and all completely opinion piled on opinion. No mention of the lack of axis airpower to actually do the intercepts for example.

If mass artillery alone worked then WW1 would have been over a lot quicker.

Does this mean the barrages in WWII were similarly ineffective, and is that except for SP 105mm guns? Given how good you rated them above? It had to be airstrikes?

one of Tedders mid 1942 innovations which I have mentioned several times is the targeting of Axis airfields with air strikes especially by Baltimores and later B-25s and still later, B-24s. These were very effective, as you can see in the numbers in Shores, and there is no doubt that they destroyed more aircraft this way than in air combat, probably 3-5 times as many. I can cite some specific cases if needed.

It is not specific cases, Schweinfurt in 1943 is a specific case, it is the horrible day to day cumulative losses. Andrew Arthy notes the Luftwaffe across the Mediterranean losses to enemy action March to October 1942 was 345 aircraft, plus another 403 to accidents. Removing the 69 in March and April to arrive at mid 1942 leaves 276, so the Luftwaffe in 5 months lost between 46 and 69 aircraft to allied aircraft and AA fire and over 200 to bombing raids to achieve the 3 to 5 losses on the ground to those in the air. Or as these are combat unit losses were there lots of non combat unit Luftwaffe losses to bombing? Andrew's table of allied fighter losses to enemy fighters in North Africa May to October is 546, admittedly the Italians are involved but you have to reduce the Luftwaffe losses to just fighters and remove non North Africa losses but 69 to 545 is about 8 to 1. Which brings into question whether the Desert Air Force was fit for purpose.

August DAF 65 fighters lost to enemy fighters, 24 Luftwaffe combat unit losses to enemy action in the Mediterranean, September 95 to 37, October 43 to 33. Take away a sizeable slice of Luftwaffe losses to the bombing successes and to operations over Malta, which are reported to be 7.5% of sorties in October, while in North Africa JG27 reporting 15 pilots killed or failed to return in September.

I'm sure weather, length of supply lines, better air bases on the Allied side etc. all had an impact in the outcome. So did the Allies outnumbering the Axis. But as noted already, both of these were fairly close battles. The Desert Air Force is what tipped it over into an Allied victory.

Another opinion about being close battles, so Supercharge was the last roll of the dice at Second Alamein? Rommel and his under 30 operational Panzers was really close as of 3 July to shifting a dug in infantry division with more than divisional artillery in support? Or bypassing it with adequate supplies and force to press on? To run into fresh troops further back. Von Mellenthin, being a staff member at DAK HQ is completely mistaken on 4 July?

Minor points, 19 Flak division was Rommel's main AA firepower, 174 88mm guns, nearly two thirds were lost at Alamein. The air transport used Ju52 and gliders to Tobruk, but the European end at least partially shifted from Greece/Crete to Brindisi. While Sonderkommando Dora had gliders for transport within Africa in July 1942.

Any chance on commenting on the supply information and tank reliability?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Ask for combat reports and receive the sales pitch for SP artillery, with pictures. With the evidence presented so far the invalid claim could be made the M7 Priest was not used at all. The claim was "significant difference", now "maybe a little more than 3%". One easy way they would make it to over 3% is the artillery of XIII corps was not used as much, making the units in X and XXX corps over represented in combat activity. There were probably more Bishops than Priests in the 8th Army but no reference so far says which units had them and when.

Assuming we get that far, I will get into the hour by hour ground combat records for Second El Alamein.

I don't want to go there yet because there are still some very basic facts regarding the air power, organization and available weaponry which should have already been cleared up. Once they are, if they are, we can get into the ground combat and the day by day air combat losses. If we get into everything all at once, we end up with a confused mish mash and going round and round hitting at mostly random points, which is basically impossible to follow and can't ever be resolved with any clarity. For example most of the post I'm replying to here.

Bobby Gibbes managed to obtain a Kittyhawk III for his use, the rest of the squadron stayed with mark I. Number 3 squadron records, what the RAAF calls History Sheets, like all RAAF squadron records, can be downloaded from the Australian Archives Web Site, but that was offline when I checked.

I already posted, upthread, the precise dates when the unit of which Bobby Gibbes was commander, 3 RAAF, received it's P-40Fs, and this includes serial numbers of the aircraft. Go back and look, and then if you like check these serial numbers because there is an audit trail so to speak. After November 1942 3 RAAF was flying primarily Kittyhawk II / P-40F, which they continued to use into 1944.

The reality of air superiority, your older types can operate with acceptable losses, the detailed OOB presented shows an overall quality improvement but also the increase in numbers. Add the reality of the need of the need for reserves at the end of a long supply line and plenty of units were flying older types, like Kittyhawk I and even Tomahawk.

By early 1942 the Hurricane I and II, Tomahawk IIB and Kittyhawk I and Ia were taking unacceptable losses. They could not sustain them. The early months of 1942 were very bad for the British Air Forces.

New fighter tactics brought in during summer to fall 1942 helped, as did the increase in boost which especially made the older Kittyhawks more viable again. With tropical filters Hurricane IIs were barely managing 260 mph at Sea level and just 300 mph at altitude. Increasing the boost to +12 lb and then +16 lb (due to improved fuel?) got that up to 270-290 at sea level and 325 mph at 20'000 ft. Probably a bit less with bomb shackles etc. Kittyhawk I at original boost settings of 44" Hg were making peak 1150 hp for 330 -340 mph. And about 2,400 fpm climb rate. 'Tomahawk IIB was managing 340 mph with more like 3,000 fpm climb, but had somewhat inferior armament.

With the higher boost of 52"- 56" Hg Kittyhawk I was up to a max of 1470 HP at sea level (not counting overboosting, which was also done) with a corresponding increase in speed especially down low, which gave them a chance, though they were still at a disadvantage due to their effective altitude ceiling of about 12,000 ft.

Kittyhawk III made 1550 hp at WEP and could do 350-360 mph (and 320 mph at Sea Level) making it quite dangerous for Axis fighters to tangle with at lower altitudes, and Kittyhawk II could make 360-370 mph at 20,000 ft (or up to 374, depending on kit like bomb shackles. Spitfire Mk V with tropical gear was making 350-370 mph depending on kit (including external bullet proof windscreen etc.) and also had pretty good performance at 20,000 ft.

Bf 109F and early G were also somewhat hampered by Tropical gear, and there is a great deal of debate as to what their top speeds actually were, but probably something like 360-390 mph for Bf 109F and a bit better for the G-2. MC 202 was about 360-370 mph. Both could perform well at 20-25,000 feet.

This meant that only the Spitfire V and P-40F/L could really face the Bf 109F-4 and G-2, and MC 202 at near parity at altitude. If the Axis fighters came down low, using the newer tactics, with the increased boost Kittyhawk I could hold it's own as well, as could the Huricane II sometimes, but basically as a reaction. The Kittyhawks were better at escaping via dives. But neither of the older types usually initiated combat with Axis fighters.

Meanwhile in 1942 only the Kittyhawk could really provider longer (medium) range escort for daylight raids by bombers like the Baltimore and the B-25. This was obviously better with Kittyhawk II / P-40Fs. I believe the Allied bombers did also do night time raids but of course that means a diminution of accuracy and limited the type of targets they could hit somewhat.

There is no lawyer involved, it is simply that you keep announcing things that when checked do not properly pan out. The description you present is the same in outline to what I gave in message 25, tentacles, my explanation gave dates. Under Tedder is from mid 1941, so when did this move begin? Your description gives the credit to the Desert Commanders versus them adopting and building on something coming out of Britain. The thing to note about Cab Ranks is you require at least air superiority to do it, plenty of aircraft and low chance of your small, low, slow, loaded formation being bounced, the light aircraft came out as part of operation Torch.

The "Lawyer" aspect comes in when you pour through a post trying to find some detail to pounce on and then turning the whole discussion into a referendum on that. My point didn't hinge on Kittyhawk III in July.

They were spotting with Lysanders, (albeit haphazardly) as early as 1940. Later they were doing it with fighters and fighter-bombers.

To me it really doesn't matter who gets the credit for the fighter tactics and CAS / forward observer reforms. The point is, it was done. And it made a significant difference. Clearly they had better fighter tactics already deployed in England since 1940 which took an awful long time to filter down to North Africa. The Australians claim that they instigated some of the reforms such as fighter-bombers carrying bombs instead of escorting Blenheims at 95 mph) and also pushing the higher boost ratings, which they started using before it was officially sanctioned. Again, it doesn't matter that much to me (or to the outcome of the battle) who initiated the reforms, just that they happened.

Given the Wiki entry what happened to the trained Air Support unit that came out tentacles and all, from Britain and joined the army at Gazala, was it a complete waste of time? It contributed nothing at all?

My understanding is that the 'tentacle' system was more about spotting and relaying positions of enemy troops to ground forces. The forward observer system for calling in air strikes came later.

Out of curiousity what B-17 are you referring to the handful of 90 Squadron sorties, or the USAAF after Torch?

Mediterranean Air War, page 401-403, lists the following US and heavy and medium bomber types in Theater for Oct 27 1942 (so i.e. before Torch and during 2nd Al Alamein)

(under "Air HQ, Egypt"):

US 1st Bombardment Group (Provisional)
9th Sqn B-17E
Halverson Sqn B-24D

98th Bombardment Group B-24D (343, 344, 345 and 415 Sqns)
12th Bombardment Group B-25C (81st, 82nd 83rd, 434th Sqns) ((this unit is under "Air HQ, Western Desert")

UK 242 Wing Liberator (147 and 160 Sqns RAF)

So looks like 1 squadron of B-17 and 6 squadrons of B-24s, plus 4 squadrons of B-25s.

Also 3 squadrons of Baltimores (21 SAAF, 55 and 223 Sqn RAF), two of Bostons (12 and 24 SAAF)

The trouble for me is the original claim of "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein"

This seems to imply, incorrectly, that I was claiming that the problem was the very presence of Hurricanes and Blenheims. That would make no sense, and is what we call a "Straw Dog" mate. Easy to shoot down but it's not what the other person was actually arguing.

What I actually meant (again) is that these aircraft types alone were insufficient and could not have carried the day.

The scale of effort the axis air forces ... I

I'm sorry but you are all over the map again here and are making factual errors, I'll try to break it down point by point in a subsequent post.

The idea the Air Force was decisive at Second Alamein is incorrect, at best an unprovable opinion. Alamein was mostly an infantry artillery battle, tanks in support as per WWI, something the British usually had an edge in during the desert war. The Germans had decentralised their artillery to give rapid fire response but that meant no rapid heavy fire response, the British did both. The British also had lots more ammunition and probably spare guns.

I'm sure all that was true, but air power was decisive. To explore this we'll get into the details of both the air battle and the ground battle and where the two intersect. But it has to be done in a systematic way. First thing is we need to get the actual forces on each side correct as well as the losses.

I posted the relevant supply tonnages including that many were to airpower, and losses, the ones you are now using,

Allow me to explain this. Since you are challenging everything I post in this discussion, and sometimes pretending I said things I didn't, it is a convenient short cut to refer to your own numbers to make my point. 50% losses of supplies are due to interdiction across the Med, according to your own numbers. Some of this is due to submarines no doubt, but a lot is due to air interdiction. I have seen some numbers on tonnage sunk by various Allied air units (from Malta and North Africa like) and can compile these to help construct a baseline of how much of these losses were due to long range Allied air attacks. We can also look at how much damage the Axis was doing.

Please provide the figures because all you are doing is piling opinions on top of each other and calling the pile fact. And what does pretty close mean when it comes to both battles?

So here at least we have defined one of the points of contention clearly: Were the two battles of El Alamein close, or something of a foregone conclusion?

When? Again please provide the figures. The histories I have make little mention of successful German interdiction and supply chain disruptions in North Africa. Dropping mines in the Suez Canal did disrupt things for a while

Ok here is another point of contention: Did the Germans interdict Allied supply chains with any air strikes in North Africa? Do you mean for a specific time period?

My words were, but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated. Assuming you are not trying to be funny, note the word apparently in my reply, if you interpret that as agreement then you are very much mistaken.

No, I didn't interpret your comment as an agreement, I was appreciating the fact that you seem here to be disagreeing with what I actually said (Hurricanes and Blenheims wouldn't cut it), instead of seemingly arguing against something I didn't say (if you had Hurricanes and Blenheim's in the mix, you lose).

Once we define where our actual points of contention are, we can try to address them with data.

Your method of declaring opinions as facts has limits. Is this day or night strikes, and since none of the allied bombers could survive unescorted, day raids tended to be within allied fighter range. You declare lots of axis supply losses in Africa to allied raids, then declare the raids could not have happened and all completely opinion piled on opinion. No mention of the lack of axis airpower to actually do the intercepts for example.

I'm glad you made this point. One of my points is that Blenheims took unacceptable losses even with escorts. Escorts do not automatically mean that the bomber is safe. Bombers still get attacked in spite of the escorts. Baltimores and Bostons did a lot better, as did the B-25s. B-24s were a bit more of a mix.

Does this mean the barrages in WWII were similarly ineffective, and is that except for SP 105mm guns? Given how good you rated them above? It had to be airstrikes?

No that isn't what I was arguing. But I don't think artillery alone can do it (and I also say categorically that artillery alone didn't win the battle nor could it have without the air power).

It is not specific cases, Schweinfurt in 1943 is a specific case, it is the horrible day to day cumulative losses. Andrew Arthy notes the Luftwaffe across the Mediterranean losses to enemy action March to

No, you apparently misunderstood me again. What I meant by 'specific cases' is that I can provide examples of days, numerous days, in which Allied bombers damaged and destroyed large numbers of Axis aicraft at their airfields, which is one of the major points I was originally making.

October 1942 was 345 aircraft, plus another 403 to accidents. Removing the 69 in March and April to arrive at mid 1942 leaves 276, so the Luftwaffe in 5 months lost between 46 and 69 aircraft to allied

Your numbers are incorrect. I've already posted the actual Axis aircraft losses for Oct 1942. With due respect to Andrew Arthy, I think we have better sources available which can give us the actual losses on a day by day basis, including Allied but also German and the all too easily dismissed Italians. During October 1942, the Axis lost 81 aircraft (62 shot down and 19 crash landed), including 34 Bf 109 shot down and 7 Bf 109 crash landed. This is direct combat losses only and does not include other operational losses (which we can also get).

Any chance on commenting on the supply information and tank reliability?

You would have to clarify a bit what you are actually asking for here.

Am I correct in understanding that you are making the argument that the DAF was basically useless or irrelevant to the outcome of these two battles? Because I think that would be an outlier position.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Often in engagements in this region, multiple aircraft types are involved on both sides, so it can be quite tricky to tease out who did what.

On Dec 30 1942, there is a fairly rare case of just two types of fighters clashing - late model P-40s and Bf 109s.

There was one claim by a Kittyhawk III from 450 Sqn (for a damaged 109) early in the morning,
Then a 3 RAAF pilot in a Kittyhawk II claimed an HE 111 probable during an interception in a separate action. His gun-sight froze during the chase so he thought he didn't get it.
Then a flight of Kitty II and III from 260 Sqn caught some Bf 109Gs flying cover for Bf 109F Jabos that were strafing, and 260 RAF were above them. The claimed 6, Shores thinks they actually got 2.
Then that afternoon, seven Kittyhawk IIs from 3 RAAF were patrolling over Bir el Zidan when they were attacked from above by 15 x Bf 109s from II.JG77. The Aussies did well and made three claims by 3 RAAF plus a probable. It looks like they also got 2, for no losses.

At this time 260 Sqn had reverted to using some Kittyhawk III so they had both types in action on this day. 3 RAAF was using Kittyhawk IIa by this time (which I think means long-tailed P-40F).

Total claims were for nine Bf 109s destroyed, for no losses, plus the one He 111 damaged. Actual losses were 4 Bf 109s (3 x G-2 from JG 77 and 1 F-4 from SchG 2) plus the He 111.

One of the 260 Sqn pilots Lionel Sheppard (who claimed a Bf 109 that day while flying a Kittyhawk III) made the following statement:

"When I did top cover or fighter bomber sweep, I used a Warhawk, but when it was a strafe and dive bombing show, I took a Kittyhawk III. On a sweep the Warhawk gave me the advantage of height, but on the strait strafe and dive bombing at lower levels, I preferred the Mark III."

I think this engagement shows the potential of the new P-40 types, though outcomes were not always so great by any means (on 14 January for example Allies lost 12 x Kitythawk II and III whereas the Germans lost 5 x bf 109s and a Ju 87). The pilot's comment also illustrates what I was saying earlier about the different strengths of the two types.

 

[Shortround6]

The British also had lots more ammunition and probably spare guns.

It is hard to judge Artillery.
It was a big killer in both WW I and WW II but WW I it varied considerably depending on the year (actually the ammo) and the state of entrenchment. It was found out that bombardments that lasted for days didn't actually accomplish much much more than a bombardments that lasted for a few hours. Most artillery commanders of WW II knew this.

However this gets back to The Germans, Artillery and Stukas in Poland where the myth of air power started.
Osprey book (ducks for cover) By Steven Zaloga (peaks out) on Poland 1939.

A typical German infantry division had 68 tubes, A typical Polish division had 48 tubes.
However the German division used mostly 10.5 cm howitzers (2nd line divisions used 7.5 cm guns or mixed) German Division also the 15cm howitzers in the division.
Germans also had their little infantry guns.

Poles were using French 75s and rechambered Russian 02/26s. These were mostly old pole trail guns with limited range and traverse. Poles had a bunch of odds and sods for heavy guns but again, ex WW I left overs.

Germans could fire about twice the weight of shells per salvo.

German division had over 900 motor vehicles and over 500 motorcycles (only included so they aren't counted as cars/trucks)
Polish division had 76 motor vehicles. Both had 5-6,000 horses.

Getting to the end
A German division had 230 tons of artillery ammo as it's basic load. The Poles had nowhere near it. They couldn't carry it, they couldn't move it even it was dumped on a rail road siding.
The Germans could move supplies more easily (still hard) using division transport.
Germans were using radios and field phones, Poles were using Field phones only.

And with this disparity (won't even get onto the mis-match with automatic weapons) The Stuka gets the credit for the German success.

Not saying they didn't help but the Stuka and Stuka bombing strikes in news reels were a powerful propaganda tool in excess of the actual effect.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

And with this disparity (won't even get onto the mis-match with automatic weapons) The Stuka gets the credit for the German success.

Not saying they didn't help but the Stuka and Stuka bombing strikes in news reels were a powerful propaganda tool in excess of the actual effect.

This is really the heart of the debate right here. It's somewhat difficult to evaluate the efficacy of air strikes in the tactical role.

In spite of this being an aviation forum and y'all being aviation buffs, clearly there are many people here who think that aviation played relatively little role in ground warfare.

I disagree 100%. I believe the Stuka specifically was actually pivotal, crucial to the success in Poland and especially France. It wasn't 'just' or even 'mostly' propaganda, if anything I believe it is a bit understated.

We can dive into specific battles to look at that.

I think it was also very important in some early battles in North Africa.

It was obviously extremely lethal in some of the convoy fights, I don't think there is any debating that.

And I think Allied air strikes were quite important in subsequent battles.

There has been a kind of see-saw about the significance of air support on the tactical battlefield in WW2 and subsequent eras. Like artillery, a lot of bombs dropped didn't hit much of anything of any significance. And it's not necessarily going to be an equal effect in every battle or every contested region. Air support plays a different role in Central Italy than it does in North Africa.

And the issue of whether you are just 'moving mud' or actually taking out enemy units and affecting the outcome of the battle is very similar with both aircraft and artillery - it comes down largely to what you can spot or see. This in turn comes down a lot of the time to how effective are your spotters and your links between the spotters and your command and control, the people dropping the bombs or shooting the howitzers / mortars.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
The RAF/British Army Close Support organization was changing as experience was gained. CAS depends on the communication system and knowledge of where friendly and enemy troops are. Diagrams from Vic Flinthams 'Close Call' Volume I (first and last diagram) and AP 3235 'Air Support' (middle two) show this over a period of time:

From Middle East (Army & RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support, 30 September 1941.

Modifications dated 16 November 1941.

Mike

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Hi
The RAF/British Army Close Support organization was changing as experience was gained. CAS depends on the communication system and knowledge of where friendly and enemy troops are. Diagrams from Vic Flinthams 'Close Call' Volume I (first and last diagram) and AP 3235 'Air Support' (middle two) show this over a period of time:
View attachment 701789
View attachment 701791
From Middle East (Army & RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support, 30 September 1941.
View attachment 701792
Modifications dated 16 November 1941.
View attachment 701793
Mike

Great stuff, thanks for posting that

 

[Shortround6]

I believe the Stuka specifically was actually pivotal, crucial to the success in Poland and especially France. It wasn't 'just' or even 'mostly' propaganda, if anything I believe it is a bit understated.

The mismatch between the German artillery and the French artillery was almost as bad.
The French still about 4,000 of the old French 75s in service. Limited elevation/range, flat trajectory (can't reach behind hills/obstructions.) limited traverse. Many of them limited to horse traction. And crappy fire control.
German artillery officers must have been very angry men to see the Stuka boys get the credit.

It was obviously extremely lethal in some of the convoy fights, I don't think there is any debating that.

We are talking about Air power vs artillery.

Not seeing much artillery trying to shot convoys at sea.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The mismatch between the German artillery and the French artillery was almost as bad.
The French still about 4,000 of the old French 75s in service. Limited elevation/range, flat trajectory (can't reach behind hills/obstructions.) limited traverse. Many of them limited to horse traction. And crappy fire control.
German artillery officers must have been very angry men to see the Stuka boys get the credit.

Ok lets get into the weeds on a couple of battles in France and go from there.

We are talking about Air power vs artillery.

Not seeing much artillery trying to shot convoys at sea.

hahaha ok bruh, I didn't realize we were only debating artillery vs. air strikes now, but I can roll with that.

 

[Shortround6]

hahaha ok bruh, I didn't realize we were only debating artillery vs. air strikes now, but I can roll with that.

Don't bother.

looking for accounts to prove you point is bad methodology.

1. successful accounts will be written up.
2. Unsuccessful accounts will be buried if they exist.
3. Artillery successes won't be in the same books/accounts.
4. Unsuccessful artillery engagements may only be mentioned if some other arm (tanks or tactical air) that saved the day.

You may find a few of each but unless you know the rate of success (or failure) and WHY, trying to draw a conclusion is near impossible.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I don't see it as that futile. I think the key is to focus on the history of the battles, in as much detail as necessary, and just look at what seemed to happen. The analysis is not as important and we don't have to cherry pick, we can all look at the same sources.

 

[Shortround6]

OK, Hypothetical.

Army division shells enemy strong point for several hours. Uses up 50 tons of shells, 12 airplanes fly over drop 3 tons of bombs (500lbs each) defenders surrender.
The artillery bombardment or the aerial attack?

Or Army division shells enemy position for several hours, Infantry advances, enemy has retreated, Success!!!!
Come to find out the enemy unit on their flank bugged out an left their flank hanging in mid air. Unit departed to find more secure ground (or unit that won't leave them behind).
Bombardment had little to do with it except signal that an attack was coming.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

War is complex, sometimes you can't untangle all the factors, but it's not always impossible. We don't have to look for edge cases.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

War is complex, sometimes you can't untangle all the factors, but it's not always impossible. We don't have to look for edge cases.

If you can't untangle all the factors, how do you know what is an edge case and what is a definitive result?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

If you can't untangle all the factors, how do you know what is an edge case and what is a definitive result?

There are cases where it's not really that clear because losses were possibly attributable to a variety of causes so you can't untangle it, and cases where it's obvious what happened from the data, and you can. There are for example cases where attacks were stopped or defenses were overcome immediately after an air strike.

Sometimes it's not really that mysterious.

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
Ehler's book ('The Mediterranean Air War'), pages 236-241, has this reference the lead up to 2nd battle of El Alamein:

Mike