Which aircraft would you cancel?

[fastmongrel]

Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940.

" From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.

The problem with the Anson it was a staple aircraft of Coastal Command not a particulary effective anti sub aircraft but it was pretty much all that was available in 1940 for inshore Scarecrow work keeping the U boats submerged. It was in short supply how many of those extra Ansons end up in CC squadrons. The problem with the Oxford is timing it only really got into large scale production just before the war how fast can its production be ramped up to replace all the Battles.

 

[Shortround6]

Just ran across this for US aircraft costs.

Warbirds and Airshows- WWII US Aircraft Costs

Prices obviously vary a lot from year to year and there is no direct equivalent to the Battle or the Anson.

But a Beech 18 (C-45 or AT7/11) cost a lot more than a P-40 and about the same as a P-39.

The Beech 18 was a bit larger and more complicated plane than the Anson.

The AT-9 and AT-10 were a bit smaller and used Lycoming 295hp engines and the Cessna Bobcat, while a bit bigger than those two used 245HP Jacobs engines.

Anson I s used 350hp Cheetahs, Anson IIs built in Canada used 330hp Jacobs, Anson IIs used 330hp Jacobs, Anson IVs used Wright Whilewinds and " 1,069 Mk Vs were built in Canada for navigator training; powered by two 450 hp (340 kW) Pratt Whitney Wasp Junior R-985 engines and given a new locally developed wood monocoque fuselage." but that is more than a bit late.

An Anson weighed Loaded about 80% of what a Battle did without bombs. Granted its tube and fabric construction was a bit cheaper but you had the two small engine and two props (which changed over time from fixed pitch to adjustable).

Part of the problem goes back to timing, The Oxford didn't fly until the Battle was going into service and had factories tooled up for it. Anson flew much earlier than the Oxford but despite beingmade in large numbers for a pre-war aircraft, there weren't enough of them in 1939-40.
from Wiki "At the start of the Second World War, the RAF had received 824 Ansons and there were 26 RAF squadrons operating the Anson I: 10 with Coastal Command and 16 with Bomber Command.[2] All of the squadrons in Bomber Command in 1939 with Anson Is were operational training squadrons that prepared crews for frontline service. 12 of the squadrons were in No. 6 (Operational Training) Group."
Once again Bomber Command, while not having what they wanted, did have at least a fair share of the resources.
Trying to add dozens of squadrons per year let alone replacement crews for existing squadrons called for an awful lot of trainers. The Battles may not have been Ideal, but they were there at a time when they were needed.

 

[pbehn]

It was not a by-product at all. The intention was to expand Fighter Command and the entire UK defence system (including civil defence) The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless in the role intended for them.

Expansion of the heavy bomber force was so slow that in June 1942 Harris complained to Churchill in a letter in which he sought to show that Bomber Command might still be a war winning instrument, that his command comprised just 36 squadrons with 548 aircraft of all types amounting to just 11% of the strength of the RAF and Fleet Air Arm combined. He also said that half his strength was being used in support of the Royal Navy. In August 1942 he complained to Portal that he had only 22 effective squadrons for bombing Germany. Harris was making excuses. He reckoned that 6 squadrons were 'on loan', 6 were re-equipping or forming, 5 were 'unavailable' (he doesn't specify why) and the 4 Polish squadrons were operationally limited, 'almost useless' are his words.
Bomber Command had been so ineffective in the preceding three years of war that it was probably saved not by Harris, Portal and some others' forthright and sometimes disingenuous support but more by Churchill's promises to Stalin of a bombing campaign in support of the Soviet Union, particularly as he had just had to explain to Stalin that there would be no new front opened anywhere, let alone Europe, in 1942.

There is a tendency to telescope history with hindsight. The huge and costly strategic offensives carried out by the Anglo-American bombing forces were very much a late war phenomenon, concentrated largely in the last 18 months of the war, not in 1939-43.
From 1937/8 through 1941 the emphasis and expenditure was very much defensive and from this it was Fighter Command that benefited, at the cost of other commands.

The argument that the Battle made a useful trainer must be flawed by the expense. I don't have figures to hand, but find it difficult to imagine that a supposedly front line bombing aircraft would cost less than a purpose built trainer. With hindsight the Battle (and Defiant) should both have been axed, but the decision makers at the time did not have hindsight.

Cheers

Steve

The defiant was never deployed in its intended role of attacking unescorted bombers.
Bomber command did have some successes against Hitlers build up of barges and various other naval/port targets.
From 1940 to 1941 the UK was under attack. 1937 to 1939 the war hadnt started so everything was theory much of which was borrocks. From 1940 to 43 there was a conflict in North Africa which while not what Stalin wanted was the best the UK and its allies could do at the time. If the Uk and its allies had not contested North Africa Greece Crete and given Germany a completely free hand then maybe Adolf would have had enough to encircle Moscow in Barbarossa.

The Battle maybe did serve as a useful trainer for pilots and ground crew.......if that is the case it just shows what a waste it was.

 

[Shortround6]

The Battle maybe did serve as a useful trainer for pilots and ground crew.......if that is the case it just shows what a waste it was.

Not quite, it also trained radio operators/rear gunners and it trained navigator/bomb-aimers. What is a bit more important is that it trained them to operate as a team. Most of the RAFs bombers in 1939-41 only had 3-5 man crews, there were darn few planes with 6-8 men flying combat at that time. a crew could start in a Battle and after a given number of hours or exercises move over to the Blenheims, Hampdens, Bostons, Marylanders they would be flying in combat. If you have a 3 man core it is not hard to add a 4th man like an extra gunner.
This is not to say that the Battle was an ideal trainer. It may have been on the expensive side but please compare it to twins with 350-450hp engines and not to Tiger Moths. It was fairly sturdy and forgiving of handling mistakes both on landing and in the air, being strong enough to at least simulate dive bombing attacks. The semi-retracting landing gear.

Also meant that should the low time pilots fail to extend it for landing the plane, coupled with it's low landing speed, might not only save the crew but might be repairable itself.

How good the Battle was (or wasn't) as a trainer is something of a side issue, many of the adherents to the "scrap the Battle" school want an equal number of Hurricanes or Spitfires or Henleys (?) in place of however many Battles they propose don't get built. They need to take into account that Battles started going to the Training schools a few days to a few weeks before Poland was invaded and if you don't have the Battles you need something else which is going to cut into the allocations of first line aircraft somehow. Now maybe you could not build 1000 Battles and get 500 Hurricanes and 500 Anson instead But if you build only 1000 Huricanes Bomber Command is going to be that much further behind come 1941-42 for trained crews.

 

[stona]

Bomber command did have some successes against Hitlers build up of barges and various other naval/port targets.

It rather depends how you quantify successes. Bombardment by the RN did at least as much damage to concentrations of the so called invasion fleet as all the bombing by the RAF.

Stalin wanted a second front in Europe and this is what he was told in 1942 would not happen. This would have forced the Germans into a huge commitment on a western or south western front, taking the pressure of the Soviet fronts. Instead he got bombing meaning that Bomber Command was reprieved for largely political rather than military reasons.

Cheers

Steve

 

[parsifal]

The reasons holding back the German efforts at the cross channel invasion are mostly known, and cannot be attributed to just one element. One reason for the failures were the extensive demolitions, placement of blockships, mining barrages in the channel, and the like that had occurred during the French campaign. The ports at Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Zeebrugge, the entrances to the Scheldt and Rotterdam all were significantly downgraded by allied demolitions at the time of their capture. Because of that, the invasion fleet had to come from many ports from very far away from the the points of assault. moreover, the germans realised it would take days just to get the assault waves out of the ports and organised into some sort of of organization afloat. It would take days to achieve this, and then on average about 3 days to make the actual cross channel passage. The German merchant marine had taken massive losses during the Norwegian campaign....roughly 350000 tons was lost during and in the lead up to the campaign, which in part,, explains the over -reliance on unsuitable river barges. There were virtually no barges (or Schuits) left in Holland, these having made good their escape in May to England, and similar stories applied to the other nations of western Europe. The Rhine Barges simply were never going to work in the open waters of the channel, and with 5 days of advance warning before an actual landing, the 94 available Destroyers (give or take a few) and roughly 100 coastal force vessels (MTBs and MGBs) available to the RN, along with extemporised craft like Armed trawlers and the like, would have made an absolute mess of any invasion fleet.

None of this was a given in 1939, but by 1940, after the choices the germans had made with respect to their conduct of their campaigns, which gave scant regard to naval issues, they had built for themselves problems of insurmountable proportions. Activities of the RAF over these invasion fleets and ports of embarkation may have had some effect, but was of secondary importance in reality.

 

[merlin]

In 1936 the spec for bombers that would form the four-engine bomber force would made, selections made in early '37. But then look at the make up planned of the RAF - from the Right of the Line p.51/52 " .. in Swinton's words "what as a General Staff you consider is militarily the proper insurance for safety, leaving it to the Cabinet to decide to which the programme should be carried out".
Scheme 'J' (October 1937) proposed a bomber force of 90 squadrons (as compared with 70 in scheme 'F') of which 64 would be heavy and 26 medium. It had, however two snags; first, it involved the mobilization of industry, and even with the lowering stormclouds of 1937 neither the Government nor the nation was yet ready to go that far. Secondly, the Minister for Coordination of Defence recoiled from the cost - and in doing so he used the argument of the knock-out blow to challenge the Air Staff's view of strategy.
The RAF's role argued Inskip, "is not an early knock-out blow ... but to prevent the Germans from knocking us out". He was not, he insisted, arguing for nothing but fighters:
'That would be an absurdity,. My idea is rather that in order to meet our real requirements we need not possess anything like the same number of long-range bombers as the Germans .... the number of heavy bombers should be reduced'.
... he suggested substituting "a larger proportion of light and medium bombers for our very expensive heavy bombers".
... the outbreak of war found the RAF with too many light bombers of practically no value, Inskip's suggestion would have compounded that disastrous condition. But Inskip was not thinking about tactics and strategy, like too many of his Government colleagues, he was thinking above all - on expense - and in this he received strong support from the Prime Minister, who stressed the need for economic stability once again. So Scheme 'J' was referred back for cuts to make it cheaper"
The next one was 'L' April 1938, it was not until Scheme 'M' (November '38) that a 85 squadron heavy bomber component with 50 Fighter squadrons (after 38 in 'L') - that the heavy bomber programme could really get going - and the programme had a 1942 completion date.

So on the one hand advances in Radar made defence possible, it was cheaper to have more small planes than big expensive ones - because that's what the politicians thought.

 

[stona]

I don't disagree with any of that. I would add that it wasn't just the advances in 'radar' but also advances in fighter technology that made a viable defence possible. Monoplane fighters armed with eight machine guns (in the case of the RAF) which had operational speeds significantly higher than the bombers they were to intercept only became available in the mid 1930s. They were certainly a cheaper option and intrinsically attractive to the politicians of the day.

As for the build up of heavy bombers, Harris admitted in a speech to an army audience (21st Army Group HQ on 14th May 1945) that the RAF's bomber offensive only started seriously in March 1943, and even here he was pushing the date back a little.
By the end of 1943 Bomber Command fielded 36 heavy bomber squadrons (45,330 air crew and 127,914 ground staff over 60 airfields) compared with 60 heavy bomber squadrons (52,476 aircrew and 134,834 ground staff over 81 airfields at the end of 1944.
At the end of 1941 it had 3 heavy bomber units, at the end of 1942 just 15.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

At the end of 1941 it had 3 heavy bomber units, at the end of 1942 just 15.

Cheers

Steve

Depends on the definition of Heavy bomber. On Jan 1st 1940 10 squadrons with Wellington MK Is and IAs were 'called' Heavy bomber squadrons as were 8 squadrons of Whitleys. Granted not all were operational (or shouldn't have been, Whitleys flying with Tiger engines shouldn't have been allowed to leave English soil). Obviously these old twins were no match for the later 4 engine bombers in capability but reclassifying bombers and squadrons at the stroke of a pen and then claiming lack of "heavy" bombers seems a bit much.

 

[stona]

The figures for heavy bombers are from the 'War room Manual of Bomber Command Operations 1939-1945' (AIR 22/03 at TNA). I can only go with the Command's own classification. In 1940 and 1941 the list contains no units as operating heavy bombers.
I've no idea when a 're-classification' was made, if that was indeed the case. It's probably to do with the number of engines.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

It may not be "official" but I am using the lists in "The British Bomber since 1914" by Mason. There is always a bit of debate about the Wellington but the Whitley was almost always referred to as a heavy bomber or night bomber in the articles of the time (1940 or before) .

I would note that the Post war History of Bomber Command (written post war I mean) BY Bomber Command may not be the most unbiased source. Just like any History of the US bombing effort in WW II written right after the war BY the US Air Force might not be the most unbiased source either. Both Air Forces fighting for funding in the post war economic climate.

 

[stona]

The problem is that those figures also match other war time sources, like for example the numbers of heavy bombers within the command reported by Portal to Churchill in late 1942 at a time when he was proposing that by June 1943 the RAF should have 60 heavy bomber squadrons out of a total establishment of 431 squadrons of all types worldwide.
From some time in 1942, possibly late 1941, generally only four engine types were classified as heavies. This was certainly the case by mid 1942 as evidenced in various documents either specifying RAF strength or proposing future strength. These are not unique to Bomber Command but to the RAF, Air Ministry and the political establishment at large. I don't know whether this was an intentional and sudden change (by a stroke of someone's pen) or just a creep in terminology. I could probably find out but frankly lack the time or inclination to do so Also I am in Norway and most of my references and sources are in the UK
What might have been considered a heavy bomber in 1940 was not in 1942.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shortround6]

The last is almost certainly true. I am not saying that the Bomber Command out right lied but may have been using the retrospectroscope a wee bit themselves. Applying later definitions to earlier times perhaps? In any case futzing about with programs in 1943/43 is almost too late to do anything. Changing programs or priorities had to be done in 1938-40 to change things significantly in in 1940-42. It taking around two years from even a flight of a Prototype aircraft to service squadron use and often longer.

Enjoy your time in Norway, I am jealous.

 

[Glider]

Fine choice, now build 700-800 more Ansons or Oxfords to act as crew trainers to replace the Battles you aren't going to make. While both of those planes were built by thousands you need the extra 700-800 by the fall of 1940.

" From August 1939, 739 Battles were stationed in Canada as trainers in the Commonwealth Air Training Plan" and around 300 went to Australia. The 700-800 Ansons/Oxfords may be conservative.

I don't pretend to know what aircraft were based where and when but I seriously doubt that 739 battles were based in Canada in August 1939 for the BCATP as it wasn't signed until December 1939.

Oxfords were normally used for twin engine training so production would not be changed by the withdrawal of Battles. Battles were normally only used for gunnery and bombing training duties shared with a variety of types including the Lysander. So in theory Lysanders could take the place of the Battle in Canada as there were plenty around and the RAF were looking for things for them to be used for.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't pretend to know what aircraft were based where and when but I seriously doubt that 739 battles were based in Canada in August 1939 for the BCATP as it wasn't signed until December 1939.

Oxfords were normally used for twin engine training so production would not be changed by the withdrawal of Battles. Battles were normally only used for gunnery and bombing training duties shared with a variety of types including the Lysander. So in theory Lysanders could take the place of the Battle in Canada as there were plenty around and the RAF were looking for things for them to be used for.

I doubt all 739 showed up in August of 1939 either. But show up they did in the months that followed. And while over 8000 Oxfords were built it took until July of 1945 to do it. Only about 400 had been delivered by Sept 1939.

You want a plane to cancel? The Lysander was a prime candidate. Pretty much a failure in all it's "normal" roles it's reputation depends on the 101 agents transported to and recovered 128 agents from Nazi-occupied Europe by No 138 and 161 Squadrons. For 1786 planes built, almost 82% as many as Battles, that seems a rather small return. There were plenty around because after France the RAF couldn't figure out what to do with them either. The Squadrons using them in France suffered about the same casualty rate as the Battles for about the same result. They just didn't attack any high profile targets to get the notoriety in the Press. There crews were just as gallant and just as brave and thrown away just as much using the wrong airplane for jobs given to them.
ANd it makes a lousy substitute for the Battle as a crew trainer in that it normally held only two men, not three. and the Battle had a bomb aimers station. The bomb aimer laid prone in the belly of the plane under the pilot and used a normal RAF bombsight through a panel in the bottom of the plane.

The Battle wasn't an ideal training plane but it was available, it was better than some of the alternatives, and it did good service until more specialized trainers could be built in numbers to replace it.

 

[merlin]

I don't have any idea who well Henley could have been adapted for carrier use, so no comment on that but yes, Roc, Albemarle and Botha were waste of meager resources. On Blenheim, the RAF thought that they needed a day light bomber and because the Bristol sleeve-valve radials were running late and had reliability problems Britsh could not developed anything like Boston or even like Baltimore, so there was nothing to replace Blenheim before they got enough Mossies and Bostons. But Blenheim V was a awful mistake.

A link/website which may be of interest about the Henley:

Hawker Henley Light Bomber / Target Tug

Blenheim replacement: the Beaumont nearly happened, but the Air Ministry kept changing their mind what they wanted, and when the Buckingham came along it was too late - its role was already taken up by the Mosquito.
On the other hand - the 'Havoc' idea doesn't happen = the RAF has about 280 Boston Mk Is available which gives at least 12 squadrons with reserves.

 

[buffnut453]

The by-product was the production of aircraft like the Defiant, which bolstered Fighter Command's numbers whilst eventually proving operationally useless in the role intended for them.

Sorry Steve but I have to disagree with this statement. The role intended for the Defiant was as a bomber destroyer. It was never intended to go toe-to-toe with single-engine fighters. In many respects, the Defiant concept (flying along the length of a bomber and raking it with fire) was not dissimilar to the Luftwaffe's Schrage Musik. The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.

 

[yulzari]

The Air Ministry never envisaged enemy (in this context Luftwaffe) single-engined fighters having the legs to reach the UK because nobody could imagine France falling (a not unreasonable assumption to make). As a bomber destroyer, the Defiant was a reasonable design, particularly against the lightly-armoured Luftwaffe bombers of 1940. Unfortunately, the poor Defiant crews were thrown into a fight for which their aircraft was not designed - aerial combat with single-engined fighters.

Quite so, although I never understood why it was not first deployed in the NW where it could match the unescorted bombers in its intended role. Once fitted with radar it did a fairly solid job as a night fighter with the turret raking fire compensating for the 4x.303 armament.

 

[kool kitty89]

But the fact is that Barracuda development ran into problems, skipping over Albacore would have release at least some resource to solve those problems but that would be a risk because while not a great plane Albacore had clearly longer legged than Swordfish and also somewhat faster. Swordfish was hopelessly too shortlegged for FE if something would have boiled over there before Barra was ready and in sqn service with reasonable numbers.
Agree that Battle was produced too long. And lerwick was a failure.

Would the Battle be at all a missed opportunity to potentially adapt to the torpedo bomber role? Or at least a related airframe following some of the same progression of the Fulmar (particularly the folding wings).

You want a plane to cancel? The Lysander was a prime candidate. Pretty much a failure in all it's "normal" roles it's reputation depends on the 101 agents transported to and recovered 128 agents from Nazi-occupied Europe by No 138 and 161 Squadrons. For 1786 planes built, almost 82% as many as Battles, that seems a rather small return. There were plenty around because after France the RAF couldn't figure out what to do with them either.

What would those same resources go to instead ... assuming Bristol didn't just build fewer Mercury and Perseus engines and Westland reduced overall production capacity. More emphasis on Whirlwind development might not have been all that practical with airframe teething troubles and engine teething and availability issues both being problematic.

And of the existing aircraft using similar engines, you've got Blenheim, Gladiator, and possibly F.5/34 production. Otherwise it's down to odd stuff like mercury/perseus powered Whirlwind derivatives (if they even fit without major mounting, prop diameter, and CoG issues, there's obviously much added drag ... though still might avoid some of the teething issues of the peregrine powered variant). But then both the Whirlwind and Gloster's own twin prototype came much later than the Lysander, so that really goes back to the previous 3 aircraft and perhaps gearing up Westland to start spitfire production much sooner. (doesn't account for those engines, but at least Westland's production capacity)

Honestly, the F.5/34 seems like the best option, especially compared to Gloster production going to Gladiators or Hurricanes. (plus those radial engined fighters wouldn't be competing with the potentially increased spitfire production capacity if Westland got on that sooner)


And one other thing I forgot to argue for the Navalized Defiant: couldn't a pair of underwing 20 mm cannon pods (and possibly synchronized .303 guns in the nose/fuselage) avoid re-arranging the fuel tanks while allowing the 2-seat arrangement to be retained? Given the sheer performance gap between the Defiant and Fulmar, there seems room for a number of compromises.

 

[parsifal]

This has been debated before so apologies to those who remember but I would replace the battle with the Skua. It was quite a decent dive bomber and better able to take care of itself in the air.

The skua was a better a/c than the Battle, but Battle losses in those first weeks of May 1940 were heavily affected by the way they were initially used. 103 sqn of the AASF provides a really good insight as to why those initial attacks were so massacred. The RAF flew strikes in , not as individual a/c like the Ju87s, and not leaving the remainder at altitude outside of harms way with adequate fighter escort to keep the 109s off their back. oh no. They were trained to fly in at zero height....hedge hopping, flying in groups of 3 or 6 with no evasive action. The results are predictable and well known. Without adequate escort, and flying in such a predictably vulnerable way, their losses were terrible. If Skuas were ordered to fly that way (or indeed any a/c) they were bound to be shot out of the sky by either the fighters or the flak, which is exactly what happened.

103 sqn and some other units changed tactics at sqn level from around the 16 May, and the results were immediate, and dramatic. They started to level bomb at altitude, or attack at night, the latter being preferred. Gradually they also realised that if they had altitude they could use speed to help evade enemy fighters a bit, and reduce time in the kill zones of the enemy flak. Losses immediately dropped to levels being suffered by other types used in similar roles.

The trick to getting more out of the Battle wasn't abandoning its production. In 1939-40 it was absolutely essential that it remain in production actually. The trick was to find a way to use it better. It seems blindingly obvious now, but they needed to use height, dispersal, better fighter protection about a rendezvous point, go in singly and get the hell out of Dodge once the bombs were dropped

The battle was never a type I would like to write home to Grandma about, but it was the way it was used that was more the problem over the actual characteristics of the a/c.