Wow, Parsifal, that is great. Simply saying my comments lack any veracity because I didnt provide sources.
Anyway, hstart with this
Axis History Forum • View topic - Soviet Far East
(I just hope you won't dismiss it as just an internet source)
And your ratio comments are completely misplaced. You are confused about the meaning of the 3:1 superiority. You give examples of how locally a superiority has to be formed to break through the enemy lines, Schwerpunkt as the Germans called it. That is the correct way. But then you want to apply it to overall forces in an offensive. That just doesn't make sense: just look at overall forces in all major battles in WW2. Hardly ever such superiority. 70k vs 40k is actually quite high.
I often read about this misuse of the 3:1 ratio in American (and British?) opinions/posts.
And about neutral shipping, you are also not thinking it through, sorry for saying. The Japanese were not at war with the Russians and had no cause to attack neutral ships supplying the Russians. In fact, there was little neutral ships to destroy in Japanese controlled territory: what would those ships supply as the entire area was occupied by the Japanese. The German situation is completely different: neutral ships were supplying Britain who the Germans were at war with.
Kris
Hi Kris
Wow Kris!!! You do understand the need to prove your statements dont you. I dont mean to lecture you, but this is basic debating criteria, my friend.....your comments do lack veracity when you make claims and dont back them up. If you dont back up your statements, you can say anything, but dont expect me to accept them.....
Please correct me if Im wrong, but your position appears to be based on the posting by a particular individual of that forum. If not, please cut and paste the relevant excerpts, with acknowledgment of who said it so we can look a little closer. For the moment, because you omitted (or just decided not ) to do this, you are going to have to put up with my own inadequate analysis
Well its a start, and no Im not going to dismiss it just because its an Internet source. But lets be clear about this, this is an extract from a forum site, not properly referenced, nor have you undertaken any indepth analysis of your source. Not a good start, or indicatigve of a a thorough investigation....
The guy you are appearing to rely on as your main source is not "official source" is it, nor is he even quoting official sources, is he......
Further, this guy repeatedly states in his post that it is exceptionally difficult to pin down numbers. But what really makes me smell a rat , and a dead one at that, is that he is not even quoting manpower figures for the Far Eastern Fronts at al, and when he does quote figures, he appears to be looking at front line strengths only. You do realize that dont you????
The Zabaikalsky Military District was the area east of Baikal, basically to the northwest of manchuria, and on the far side of the Black Mountains. It was not part of the Far Eastern Military District. The poster fails to answer these questions in anything like a competent way IMO.
Here is a link to a site which I think approaches a level of competency. It provides some details of troop strengths and gives a lot of detail on the military fortifications. Just glancing at the extent of fortification, one is drawn to the inescapeable conclusion that your guy is blowing it out certain parts of his anatomy, to be brutal about it. Look at the Link, determine the extent of the frontage, and then count the number of gun emplacements strongpoints....the Russians called these agglomerations "fortified regions" or "fortified zones". The numbers of troops needed to man a region or a zone might vary from 10000 to about 30000 men typically. Judging by the sheer scale of the works put into place, i would wager that many of these regions manned at least 30000 men. This was a scale of fortification that rivalled the maginot line, except that whereas the French Fortifications were about 140 km, this line was 1400 km. The French needed a minimum of 200000 men to man their dfences....how many more do you think they needed to man their Siberian defences?
Fort 35 - USSR Far East fortification
Relevantly this site I have provided you says this about manning levels.
"
It is well known that the German aggression that commenced on 22 June 1941 led the Soviet Union to the edge of catastrophe. The troops of the Western Special and later the Kievsky Special Military Districts were nearly broken and the situation with the troops of the former Odessky, Baltic and Leningradsky Military Districts were not significantly better. The most economically developed territories in the European part of the country were lost. The sources from which the Soviet Union might quickly replace the losses of troops and arms were the Far Eastern and Zabaikalsky Fronts. However, the threat of Japanese aggression forced the USSR to keep these troops in place. Only in the Autumn of 1941 when the Germans nearly took Moscow were five rifle and two tank divisions transferred from the Far Eastern Front to the combat theatre (one additional tank division was delivered in July). These well-trained troops played a very important role in the defeat of the German troops on the approaches to Moscow. To replace the troops transferred to the combat theatre, the Commander of the Far Eastern Front General of Army I P Apanasenko formed new units based on the very limited local manpower resources. A significant source of these recruits were prisoners of the Gulag, while by Apanasenko's orders they were taken even from Kolyma despite the protests of the local NKVD leaders.122 In this way the troop strength in the Far East was maintained. The second crisis on the Soviet-German front, namely the battle of Stalingrad in July 1942 again required the rapid transfer of eight rifle divisions and three rifle brigades to the European part of the country. These troops played an important role during the fight for Stalingrad and on other parts of the front. Despite the fact that the transfer of these troops also was compensated for by the formation of new units, the overall troop strength decreased slightly. Nevertheless, during entire period of the war the strength of the Soviet troops in the Far East was close to that of the Japanese forces and was even slightly larger 123.. After the defeat of the German forces near Stalingrad, the threat of Japanese aggression significantly decreased in 1943 and General of Army I R Apanasenko was transferred to the Active Army in the position of Deputy Commander of the Voronezhsky Front and was soon killed during the Kharkov-Belgorod Operation. His place was taken by the former commander of the Kalininsky Front, General M A Purkaev."
Frankly, I would prefer this source over the claims made by your friend. The simple visual material suggest strongly higher manning levels than he is prepared to admit. He makes factual errors about basic facts like military districts that demonstrate to me he does not know what he is talking about, despite saying he is russian (I even question that given the language and tone of this posts. I suspect he might be latvian or estonian, or similar to be honest)
With regard to this 3:1 superiority issue, no i am not misusing it. The key to understanding this is mobility. The Germans actually attacked the Russian with an inferior number of troops, but because of their superior mobility were able to concentrate where needed. Same situation applies to the Allies. For the relatively static armies of the Russians and the Japanese, this was not possible, or at least, not as possible.
Why is the 3:1 ratio relevant? Because in theory it allows a 1:1 ratio in the assault forces, enough men to maintain an artillery/suppressive fire advantage, plus enough men to expoit a breakthrough and pursue the defeated enemy. Its not a misuse of the theory. Again, I suggest you read its author, Von Clausewits, before dismissing it as bunkum, or trying to come up with some new formula that is all your own....
The reason the neutral shipping issue was raised, was because of your assertion the port or the region would be isolated if the rail line was cut. I firstly question that the line could be cut, but in the second instance, even if it was, the far east would receive oodles of supply from the neutral allied shipping. I dont think the Japanse would attack neutral allied shipping. I understqand what your saying about the destination being to a combatant (in this case the Russians), but during the war, the Japanese would not even attack Nowegian or Greek flagged shipping for the allies (source:
The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII, Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books 2002)