GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
That's odd, because an enemy plane is an enemy plane, whether it was a trainer or a bomber.
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That's odd, because an enemy plane is an enemy plane, whether it was a trainer or a bomber.A US Navy F6F pilot said that on one of their missions near Japan that they encountered a large number of Japanese trainer aircraft and blew a great many of them away, only to be told that they would not count as victories because they were only trainers. I have never heard of that kind of restriction before and I doubt that other countries used that approach for scoring kills.
Even the Navy wouldn't have a policy that stupid.A US Navy F6F pilot said that on one of their missions near Japan that they encountered a large number of Japanese trainer aircraft and blew a great many of them away, only to be told that they would not count as victories because they were only trainers. I have never heard of that kind of restriction before and I doubt that other countries used that approach for scoring kills.
Well, he wrote it in book, or else an author who interviewed him did. I am not in a position to say he was wrong.Surely you didn't believe him ?
An enemy plane with a trainee pilot and instructor should count as two.That's odd, because an enemy plane is an enemy plane, whether it was a trainer or a bomber.
There used to be an expert here who staked his reputation to his insightful reading of a manual, so, yeah.Well, he wrote it in book, or else an author who interviewed him did. I am not in a position to say he was wrong.
I recall another book written by a highly experienced USN fighter pilot who said that that used F2A's in training and that the landing gear was a pain to operate. Someone replied that he had read he F2A manual and it was easy to operate. So I should believe someone who merely read the manual rather than actually flown the airplane? Same difference.
Isn't this all a bit tasteless and disrespectful? What may have started as a valid query seems to have descended into a pissing contest on how loss of lives should be painted on the side of a bloody aircraft.
During WWII, U.S. submarines kept a tally on their sails of Axis shipping victories.Isn't this all a bit tasteless and disrespectful? What may have started as a valid query seems to have descended into a pissing contest on how loss of lives should be painted on the side of a bloody aircraft.
....and bombers kept tally of missions flown. Which really amounts to the number of times they got to drop tons of explosives on cities (I know, there's a LOT more to it, but the concept applies....)During WWII, U.S. submarines kept a tally on their sails of Axis shipping victories.
Pretty sure that each tally included scores (if not hundreds) of dead, whereas an aircraft victory over an enemy may have seen the airman parachute to safety.
WWII German armor and artillery units had the tradition of painting a "kill" ring on the barrel and each of those victories most likely saw their target's crew killed.
....and bombers kept tally of missions flown. Which really amounts to the number of times they got to drop tons of explosives on cities (I know, there's a LOT more to it, but the concept applies....)
Oh I agree .... I was trying to point out that we can't retro-actively apply our contemporary 'lens' to many actions in WW2. Tallies were a way to show contribution to the cause, to help morale, build cohesion, etc. As such, they were an important toolIt's macabre and yes, distasteful, but assigning that to a forum readership when the warriors themselves dressed their planes up while we try to understand that seems a bit hand-wringing to me.
Oh I agree .... I was trying to point out that we can't retro-actively apply our contemporary 'lens' to many actions in WW2. Tallies were a way to show contribution to the cause, to help morale, build cohesion, etc. As such, they were an important tool
Agreed, to a point. The emphasis was the destruction of the LW to prepare for Overlord. 9th AF FC subordinated to USSAFE until end of May as escort augmentation. The 354th dominated the contribution.Arnold's speeding up of the latest US fighters to Europe in numbers was necessary for Overlord as well as bombing Germany, the US bomb force was being limited by the number of available fighters as well as their range.
The mission of 8th AF was diluted by the Transportation Plan and several missions attacking French airfields. V-1 sites and marshaling yards but the core mission every month was strategic. 2TAC/9th AF focused on the France/Netherlands infrastructure.At the Marshall, King and higher levels by end 1943 the near absolute priority in 1944 was Overlord. For the air forces that meant bombing targets in France ahead of ones in Germany. The question of what targets with what with how many bombs was the subject of long debates in the first half of 1944, complicated by the growing need for strikes on V-1 targets, which were worked into the deception plan, remembering the worry was V-1 could seriously interdict the invasion ports, but the attacks were a drain on other invasion support duties. Everyone had their ideas, the transport plan took a while to be adopted with plenty of reservations.
JG2 and JG26 were the core of LF3 interceptor force and largely deployed vs 8th AF. The reinforcement of NJG units in France in late 1943 was as you say largely RAF BC focused, but NJG units also deployed against 8th AF in west Germany until losses became prohibitive.The Germans moved part of the night fighter force to France in response to the shift in Bomber Command targets, which in turn makes it probable the same would happen to some of the day fighter force. The Germans switching to conservation of force did not happen over Germany until losses had seriously damaged the fighter force, with minimal bombing of Germany there would have been a stronger defence of France, probably until losses became too high, remembering until 1944 attacking bomber forces had lost the campaign so a Luftwaffe victory was surely possible. Invasion defence also required a bomber force, that was mostly consumed in the Baby Blitz.
Agreed to a point. Spaatz was focused on LW, POL and critical industrial choke points (A/C engines, airframe rebuild, ball bearings), prioritizing diminishing LW ability to effectively oppose Allied forces during Overlord. His perspective was that while Allies sure to have overwhelming numerical superiority over the battlefield, ignoring LW strength build up was a dumb idea. It would not take a large % of an attacking force to wreak havoc on transport during the opening critical days of the invasion.Spaatz was offering to solve the US air force problem then solve the army one, write down the German day fighter force and try for its fuel supply. Leigh-Mallory was army first, definitely trying to provoke a fight over France but was not as worried if that did not happen, as it meant the Germans would have heavily bombed airbases and transport links to supply them and the army. Equals an inability to interfere with allied operations. Air forces are supply intensive. Based on the first 4 months of combat SHAEF calculates the daily supply requirements as 541 tons per divisional slice in normal combat, 426 tons if regrouping or negotiating natural obstacles and 462 tons in a rapid advance. Of the 541 tons the division itself consumed 223 tons and the rest by corps and army overheads. A B-17 load is around 15 tons, put up a bomb group of 40 and probably use over 400 tons of supplies, plus all the additional supplies of spare parts, food etc.
Agreed to a point - dropping bombs on Germany was the critical factor drawing LW day fighters into an attrition war, which they could not win. Units like JG 300/301 constituted as s/e night fighter units were re-deployed in defense of the Reich as well as several NJG units in east and south Germany performing double duty until losses to 8th/15th AF made them stop in order to conserve crews vs RAF.The Luftwaffe fighters lost defending Germany were a major win for the allies and important for Overlord, the bombs dropped on Germany in the run up to D-Day had almost no impact on the effectiveness of the German defence in France, that required bombs on France.
9th FC VC were all in support of 8th AF operations and under control of 8th AF during the period Dec 1943 through May 19449th Air Force bomber operations total dropped/on V-1 tons
Jan-44 1,546/1,497
Feb 44 3,368.0/1,822.8
Mar-44 5.116.33/1,229.4
Apr-44 9,161.325/2,576.437
May-44 14,664.45/1,116.108
January to May 1944 the 9th AF P-51 units claimed 307 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air.
Yes, and no. Erkner and other industrial targets were key to the war fighting capability of not only LW but also for all mechanized capabilities of Wehrmacht.As experience was gained it was understood things like fighter bombers could destroy bridges, Bomber Command was generally more accurate and having heavier effects than the 8th Air Force on targets in France while the Luftwaffe remained very willing to contest German airspace despite the casualties. Target assignments were duly altered. Day raids on Berlin were clearly designed to provoke a response.
In all the above examples, a vastly inferior (numerically) LW was able to badly harass harbor logistics. Not so, Normandy. Despite the airpower dominance, however, there were no 'break-outs' at Normandy until Patton was allowed to participate once again.So far landings on mainland Europe, Salerno and Anzio, had been rapidly fenced off, unable to take enough ground to deploy the forces to create a break out, Salerno relieved by the unopposed landing in southern Italy, Anzio left more as a drain on allied resources.
Agreed again. I might point out that nearly every German land force was significantly dependent on horse drawn logistics - which points to industrial chokepoints of ball bearings, POL due to the strategic efforts of RAF, 8th and 15th AF. Also, 8th AF largely re-pointed to France from June 1 through June 19 and once again in August to support near MLR tactical requirements.When it comes to transport links and mobility, what price lower delays in German movements and assembly, Second SS, like all the reinforcements did not arrive in one piece, so it depends on what date you wish to use. Tanks prefer to go by rail. Yes, fighter bombers played a big part in slowing the German army down.
Agreed, but as pointed out above, 2TAC was also augmented by 8th AF during that period. Looking over my father's logbook, all missions were tactical June 6 through June 19th. Either devoted to fighter bomber missions with bombs against bridges and marshaling yards, escort/patrol for VIII BC over French targets then strafing targets of opportunity on the way home.2nd Panzer departed the 8th, first elements on the 13th, first armour on the 18th of June
17th SS in numbers by 12th June.
2nd SS activated 8 June first arrivals 15 June, last arrival 30 June, used as fire brigade, not assembled as division until 10 July.
1st SS activated 15 June, 25 June first arrivals, 30 June still waiting on last tanks.
9th, 10th SS in Lorraine by 16 June began arriving 25 June.
3rd Parachute, 77th and 275th infantry needed 5 to 6 days to march the around 150 miles to the front.
The more German troops arriving earlier the greater the chance the beachhead ends up too small to allow the landings to advance, even if the Germans are in turn unable to eliminate it.
Galland states 500 per month in Defense of the Reich against 8th and 15th AF. I would assume that some of those would include RAF VCs on Kanalfront. I suppose WIA were included but not certain of the context.Eisenhower correctly rejected the oil idea as taking too long to have an effect on Overlord, in May 1944 the 8th only bombed synthetic oil plants, while the 15th, now that it was officially allowed to bomb refineries versus missing the marshalling yards in the middle of the Ploesti ones, started reporting the attacks as such. Hydrogenation supplied effectively all German aviation fuel, over a third of motor fuel and a half of diesel fuel in the first quarter of 1944, all up 47% of fuel, lubricants and liquid gasses, then came fuel direct from Ploesti plus crude oil. All up Germany is estimated to have imported or produced some 11,300,000 tonnes of oil products in 1943, the USSBS puts production as 7,508,000 tonnes. The Red Army's 1944 advance eliminated Poland and Romania which were 67.6% of 1943 total crude oil supplies and 56.8% of crude oil available to the non Romanian axis powers in Europe. That made a big difference to German army fuel supplies.
Reading from a graph German production fell maybe 320,000 tonnes April to June, 260,000 tons of which from mostly the Hydrogenation plants, of which 125,000 tons was aviation fuel. German crude oil refineries had excess capacity and supplied about a quarter of Q1/1944 fuels, crude oil refinery runs in Germany were down to two thirds April 1944 figures by December.
I think the Luftwaffe was sustaining close to 500 day fighter pilot casualties, not killed, a month to all causes from all fronts, the clear majority defending Germany.
I don't know for sure but there were several t/e day fighter units such as ZG 26 and ZG 76 that took heavy casualties. The Me 110, 210 and 410s were hit so hard that they converted to FW 190A-8s in August.Williamson Murry reports 2,262 German day fighter pilot casualties January to May 1944, all causes all fronts as far as I can tell, his fighter losses for January to June 1944 are 2,855 combat, 1,345 non combat. It indicates well over half of losses resulted in a pilot casualty, assuming twin engine fighter crews are not counted.
Separating LF3 from Defense of Reich casualties does not move them to a separate category. Caldwell did a pretty good job of research in both his JG 26 and Defense of the Reich efforts with a rich detail on specific losses. JG 26 for example was almost totally deployed against daylight heavy bomber strikes from mid 1943 through D-Day.According to the Luftwaffe quartermaster January to May 1944 Luftflotte Reich lost, all causes, 2,217 single and twin engine day fighters, Luftflotte 3 lost 727. By cause that becomes Reich: 173 MIA, 1,381 in air combat, 597 not due to enemy action, Luftflotte 3: 51 MIA, 295 in air combat, 266 not due to enemy action, between the two of them MIA + air combat = 64.5% of total losses.
My comments above for JG26 also apply to JG2 - May/June 1943 began a steady growth period of % combat ops vs 8th AF vs RAF.The lack of pilot training was showing up in the non combat loss figures, while Reich lost a further 57 and Luftflotte 3 had 107 destroyed on the ground.
June 1944 adds another all causes 278 Reich plus 599 LF3 losses, all up 3,821 losses for the 6 months, Murray reports 4,200 losses, on the chance Murray is only reporting single engine fighters, Reich+LF3 = 3,376 single engine total losses.
I would read it as the Luftwaffe was taking unsustainable pilot casualties, mostly over the Reich but 18.2% of MIA + air combat losses in the west were from Luftflotte 3, from a mixture of operations against the various allied air forces and some losses were occurring in other theatres.
Totally agreed. I would re-shape your observations slightly to say that the key objective were a.) destroy LW threat to Overlord, b.) Attrit Germany industry to point of collapse in the long term - which were the objectives in AWPD-2.To reiterate Spaatz was taking the longer way home when it comes to Overlord and as much as it all worked it increased the risks involved, while finally hitting a target effectively that reduced German combat power in the medium to long term, fuel, German operations in mid 1944 were much more hampered by tactical supplies of fuel, not strategic, that is the links to the depots, not the production in Germany. It is also clear the allied bombing of oil targets was influenced by the ability to read Luftwaffe signals about the fuel situation, most other target classes had to rely on photographic assessment as economic intelligence was a weak point.
We can disagree regarding 'fair vs unfair' as a matter of perspective. That said, Davis did an excellent job of research for his Spaatz book (IMO) and I tend to share his viewpoints as communicated.The Davis comment is unfair. It is interesting Harris usually flew to the relevant 1944/45 SHAEF meetings while Spaatz tended to send a representative, Eisenhower decided he preferred Harris to Spaatz.
That reminds me of Shakespeare who had a way with words.I look at the kill markings, bomb markings, tank silhouettes as everything from the "I survived these things", to "You want to live then follow me". The guy who survived has every right to wear / paint / be proud of them as there is no struggle like the one for life or death. The guy with the kill markings has shown he is a hunter, and successful. If you not only want to survive, but thrive then he's the guy to fly with. He has a ton of good knowledge/ skill to share.
My dos centavos.
Cheers,
Biff