Why the heck did they design it that way?

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The undercarriage bit, especially, and on the Spitfire, especially. With that thin wing, you would have thought you'd want the fat wheel inboard, on the thickest part of the wing.

The problem is that placing an undercarriage further from the fuselage demands wing spars that are capable of withstanding all the forces and moments associated with the landing impact. That requires a heavier structure but that, surprise surprise, will further increase landing forces. Now, it's clearly not an endless spiral but Mitchell clearly thought it better to have the narrow track Spitfire undercarriage with its skinny tyres rather than a Hurricane-like inward-retracting design that would have required more airframe weight just to make it feasible.


Well, we know the Spitfire was designed as a point interceptor, a defensive fighter, so less range, less fuel, less weight, more speed, better rate of climb, etc.
And both were tactical, rather than Strategic weapons. The bomber would always get through (Sir Hugh Trenchard) so no need for escort fighters. Just need masses of short range fighters to shoot down as many bombers as possible of the enemies.
That conflict in thinking has always bothered me.
MY bombers will always get through, so I need no escorts, but I can build fighters so the enemy CAN'T get through with HIS bombers.
Germany too thought of their aircraft TACTICALLY, to safeguard short range medium bombers, with a forward placement of shorter ranged fighters.
I agree, a conundrum m.

Well...yes and no. Bear in mind that fighters were rather neglected between the wars in most air forces. For example, many USAAC officers who were advocates of "pursuit" aircraft felt that their careers were being hindered by the "bomber barons" who refused to invest in fighter development. This is precisely the reason cited for Chennault's resignation (and we know where that ended up).

From the RAF perspective, there were additional factors which might have pushed senior leaders further into what might be seen as a paradoxical position. For starters, RAF heavy bombers were increasingly armed with power turrets which were seen as more effective than other defensive weapon systems. Then there's the development of radar and an integrated air defence system throughout the 1930s which offered the possibility of more effective use of available fighters. We should not forget that the RAF still had a large number of biplane fighters in front-line service in September 1939 which just shows that the rapid rearmament with modern fighters, which only started with the order of the Hurricane in 1936, didn't come a moment too soon.
 
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Another good why the heck did they design it that way is the Boulton Paul Defiant with no forward facing armament at all. Not that the adition of such would have made it a great plane but maybe at least a ok one although I read they did ultimately find some use intercepting German bombers at night.
 
Another good why the heck did they design it that way is the Boulton Paul Defiant with no forward facing armament at all. Not that the adition of such would have made it a great plane but maybe at least a ok one although I read they did ultimately find some use intercepting German bombers at night.
The Defiant was developed per an RAF specification, F.9/35 which called out the turret armament. The manufacturer built what the customer requested.
 
Another good why the heck did they design it that way is the Boulton Paul Defiant with no forward facing armament at all. Not that the adition of such would have made it a great plane but maybe at least a ok one although I read they did ultimately find some use intercepting German bombers at night.
The turret could rotate and lock forward with the MGs depressed to a max of about 18 degrees elevation, with the pilot having fire control.

It was not designed as a fighter, it was purely a bomber interceptor with the idea of flying in groups to intercept bomber formations and exchanging fire like in the days of sail, where the ships exchanged broadsides.

Keep in mind that the U.S. Navy had similar aircraft in service, though not fighters, they still had turrets on a single-engine airframe.
 
The Defiant was developed per an RAF specification, F.9/35 which called out the turret armament. The manufacturer built what the customer requested.
Then I guess in all fairness the focus of my bewilderment should be whoever issued RAF specification F.9/35 and not the Boulton Paul Aircraft Company. Maybe it was one of those ideas that looked good on paper but in practice didn't fair so well.
 
The turret could rotate and lock forward with the MGs depressed to a max of about 18 degrees elevation, with the pilot having fire control.

It was not designed as a fighter, it was purely a bomber interceptor with the idea of flying in groups to intercept bomber formations and exchanging fire like in the days of sail, where the ships exchanged broadsides.

Keep in mind that the U.S. Navy had similar aircraft in service, though not fighters, they still had turrets on a single-engine airframe.
Now there's some new information. I'm sure i have read specifically that the Defiants could not be made to fire forward.
I'm sure your correct though. I'm learning alot of the things claimed in alot of books and websites can be a bit dodgy so to speak. Funny, all these years I've wondered about this obvious oversight and turns out it wasn't the case at all.
 
I gotta say, "the bomber will always get through" has to be one of the most misunderstood quotations.

The idea wasn't that bombers would always get through to their targets no matter what the enemy did to defend - it was that no matter how much effort you put into defense, your cities wouldn't escape being bombed.
 
Now there's some new information. I'm sure i have read specifically that the Defiants could not be made to fire forward.
I'm sure your correct though. I'm learning alot of the things claimed in a lot of books and websites can be a bit dodgy so to speak. Funny, all these years I've wondered about this obvious oversight and turns out it wasn't the case at all.

Don't we all know it - how many times a month does someone state that some (or all) Allison powered aircraft did not have superchargers. :oops:

The B-P Defiant's pilots notes are at Boulton-Paul Defiant Pilots Notes The diagram on page 18 has the pilots gun firing button on the control grip.
 
I don't think that 'the bomber will always get through' was particularly ridiculous until the advent of radar. Until then you had to have standing patrols and you couldn't vector fighters to the target until they were much too close.

Once radar and the control network come in all bets are off. Where forces went wrong is persisting with the belief after it was shown what radar could do for the defender.
 
I don't think that 'the bomber will always get through' was particularly ridiculous until the advent of radar. Until then you had to have standing patrols and you couldn't vector fighters to the target until they were much too close.

Once radar and the control network come in all bets are off. Where forces went wrong is persisting with the belief after it was shown what radar could do for the defender.
Good point.
 
MY bombers will always get through, so I need no escorts, but I can build fighters so the enemy CAN'T get through with HIS bombers.
Germany too thought of their aircraft TACTICALLY, to safeguard short range medium bombers, with a forward placement of shorter ranged fighters.
I agree, a conundrum m.
Without RADAR things would be radically different. The Chain Home system was about as primitive as it is possible to be and still work adequately. From initial work in 1935 on just seeing if it was possible the CH system (with Chain home low) was just being completed in 1940. Anyones opinion before 1935 or before 1940 who wasn't aware of RADAR was speaking from ignorance. Without RADAR fighters of WW2 would have to mount standing patrols, this is a huge effort with no guarantee of results.
 
And thanks for the heads up on the book. Looks good and like it might answer quite a few other questions I have about early war and pre war thinking. Several people here have given me some really goog book suggestions. Just got my first delivery of 3 of those yesterday as a matter of fact.

It's an interesting read but some of it's main points are outdated. Especially on tactics and armament. Particularly the section on armament, I hate to say it but the section about .50 heavy machine guns is absolute rubbish falling into the usual trap of using the performance of a late war Browning M2 and it's ammo when a 1939 M2 and it's ammo were a completely different beast.
 
I gotta say, "the bomber will always get through" has to be one of the most misunderstood quotations.

The idea wasn't that bombers would always get through to their targets no matter what the enemy did to defend - it was that no matter how much effort you put into defense, your cities wouldn't escape being bombed.

This is right.
Another thing the rapidly changing progress that was being made that had first one side and then the other appear dominate. Most Biplanes were limited by their engine power between 1 and 2 hours of endurance so standing patrols were difficult and wasteful. Few 1920s fighters or early 30s fighters even had radios so vectoring in planes under ground control wasn't going to work even using observers on the ground without radar.
With limited engine power adding a 3rd and 4th machine gun did impact performance significantly. The Bristol Bulldog for example first flew in 1927 and in it's later form only had 440hp, this was the version that made up over 1/2 of the British fighter defense in Jan 1935.
The later Hawker Fury had 640hp and while speed had increase to a peak of 223mph endurance had not changed much.

A lot of store was placed in the maneuverability of fighters which made air forces (and designers/manufacturers) reluctant to change to monoplanes. A biplane will be lighter for the same square footage of wing area than a monoplane due the brace effect of the two wings and the struts.
With less expectations of maneuverability it was easier for some countries (builders) to switch to monoplane bombers in a quest for higher speed to avoid interception (and get longer range).
In Spain even relatively crude monoplanes with retractable landing gear flew fast enough to make interception difficult for the mostly biplane intercepters in the beginning.
With defensive guns on bombers limited to 1 or 2 hand aimed rcmgs per mount they bombers had little advantage in defensive armament if any over the twin guns that were almost standard on fighters.
With the coming of powered gun mounts and much improved ability to aim (sometimes figured at around 3 times more effective than hand aimed) and long belt feeds vs 75-100 round magazines (and faster firing guns) the defensive ability of some bombers took a big leap, unfortunately at the same time the fighters went from bipanes to monoplanes and went to at least 4 machine guns or a cannon/machine gun combination.

Since not all countries made these changes at the same time it took quite a while for changes in tactics or equipment to really show their effects.
 
It's an interesting read but some of it's main points are outdated. Especially on tactics and armament. Particularly the section on armament, I hate to say it but the section about .50 heavy machine guns is absolute rubbish falling into the usual trap of using the performance of a late war Browning M2 and it's ammo when a 1939 M2 and it's ammo were a completely different beast.
10-4. Sounds like like it might be useful for understanding the mindset at the time though especially as it relates to some design and tactical decisions that might seem questionable now.
 
Also, we look at things with hindsight, if Leigh Mallory was in charge during the BoB and someone like Park in charge of the LW the bomber would probably have got through and the USAAF not given the chance in Europe.
 
10-4. Sounds like like it might be useful for understanding the mindset at the time though especially as it relates to some design and tactical decisions that might seem questionable now.

Like all history books you need to read it and balance its conclusions with the knowledge that we have more facts to hand than the author because of things like the internet and the release of documents under the 30 years rule. Unfortunately a lot of Air Ministry paperwork was destroyed when the Air Ministry was merged into the Ministry of Defence in 1964.

Some years ago I tried to research the history of a relative who served as a pilot in the RAF 1940 to 1943 I discovered where he is buried and that he had been awarded the Air Force Cross but the reasons for his death and why he was awarded the AFC were not available, I was told that in 1964 lorry loads of records were sent out to be buried under an extension to the north London Circular road.

Fying Officer Wilfred Seaman AFC
 

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