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In the build up to D Day there was also a requirement to bomb targets away from Normandy more than Normandy itself which means targets were bombed for psychological not military reasons. It is very difficult to destroy a refinery, you can damage it and it can be repaired. It should not be forgotten how much the Russian advance removed oil capacity from the Nazis or how much it concentrated the remaining targets to be hit.The Oil Plan officially started after the invasion.
The Transport Plan was in place in the lead up to the invasion.
The two plans were put forward by the British and the 8th AF. The British (Portal?) pushed the Transport Plan and the the 8th AF the Oil Plan (Spaatz). The Transport Plan was chosen, but Spaatz was given permission to bomb oil facilities when the transport targets could not due to weather.
The Transport Plan was aimed at restricting movement of men and materials in occupied Europe, particularly in and around the invasion area. There may have been some effect on oil production because transport of coal to the synthetic oil plants was restricted.
I spent 3 great months in Mexico working on the UNDERGROUND piping for the Aramco Berri project in Saudi Arabia. Most of it was the water supply pipe work but there is no reason at all why most of a refinery cant be built below ground level, we have been building railways underground for over 150 years.They though they had underground refineries?
No one seemed to bomb the oil facilities early on. At Taranto and Pearl Harbour, the fuel farms left essentially untouched. Sumatran oil fields, left intact for the coming Japanese.Why didn't they target oil more extensively earlier?
Very few oil production and transfer facilities were left intact for the Japanese as the Dutch, British and Australians withdrew from the East Indies.Sumatran oil fields, left intact for the coming Japanese.
I spent 3 great months in Mexico working on the UNDERGROUND piping for the Aramco Berri project in Saudi Arabia. Most of it was the water supply pipe work but there is no reason at all why most of a refinery cant be built below ground level, we have been building railways underground for over 150 years.
Why was that?No one seemed to bomb the oil facilities early on. At Taranto and Pearl Harbour, the fuel farms left essentially untouched. Sumatran oil fields, left intact for the coming Japanese.
I spent 3 great months in Mexico working on the UNDERGROUND piping for the Aramco Berri project in Saudi Arabia. Most of it was the water supply pipe work but there is no reason at all why most of a refinery cant be built below ground level, we have been building railways underground for over 150 years.
How hard would it be to take out underground oil-refineries and oil-stocks with bombs and technology used in WWII?The ventilation, explosion and evacuation issues would be considerable and challenging. The plan to move some oil production plant underground was called the "Geilenberg Plan"
While I remember reading that Germany was using the Fischer Troppsch process as early as 1936. When did the Bergius high-pressure catalyzation process come online?The Germans used two major processes:
1 Bergius high pressure hydrogenation.
2 Fischer-Tropsch catalysis.
Tallboys and Grand slam stood a decent chance depending on the depth of the plantsHow hard would it be to take out underground oil-refineries and oil-stocks with bombs and technology used in WWII?
While I remember reading that Germany was using the Fischer Troppsch process as early as 1936. When did the Bergius high-pressure catalyzation process come online?
This I admit is partly a guess but synthetic oil d
Tallboys and Grand slam stood a decent chance depending on the depth of the plants
Sumatra is covered by others above, but Taranto was a night attack and the Brits were short of carriers and aircraft, with CAGs optimized for torpedo strike. Had Cunningham had more than just HMS Illustrious and sufficient fighters to allow a daylight raid with Skuas armed with incendiary bombs, or if still at night, pathfinder flare drops, then hitting the bunker farms would have been possible.Why was that?
Just curious how much of the six months that would have bought. How much of a reduction in the ability of the Navy and aaf to mount air operations would have resulted? Presumably aviation fuel could have been tankered to Hawaii. Logistics would be a major problem but the fuel and the tankers did exist no?Sumatra is covered by others above, but Taranto was a night attack and the Brits were short of carriers and aircraft, with CAGs optimized for torpedo strike. Had Cunningham had more than just HMS Illustrious and sufficient fighters to allow a daylight raid with Skuas armed with incendiary bombs, or if still at night, pathfinder flare drops, then hitting the bunker farms would have been possible.
As for Pearl Harbour, the IJN strategy was about gaining a six month window, so hitting the ships, not the fuel they use was the priority. But this was poor planning and understanding of logistics, they should have destroyed the bunker farms, thus reducing the USN's ability to operate far from the US west coast. In what they already knew was a campaign of naval aviation, sinking old battleships did almost nothing to help the IJN's cause.
Oil refineries, like a lot of industrial targets are actually pretty hard targets.
No, but it made Japanese admirals happy.In what they already knew was a campaign of naval aviation, sinking old battleships did almost nothing to help the IJN's cause.
Please remind (who?) that when a weather event hits the US SE, refineries shutdown or are claimed to receive damage and fuel prices spike.
That is an excellent read, thanks for posting the link it's much appreciatedOne is that they're beings shut down to protect the workers who would be in less than robust office buildings and workshops. The US Strategic Bombing Survey has some information about this: it took a year, over 6,000 sorties, and over 18,000 tons of bombs to put one refinery out of operation. See pp 22-23 of https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a421958.pdf.
The Tirpitz was a far easier target to destroy.
Bergius was greatly favored over Fischer-TropschThe ventilation, explosion and evacuation issues would be considerable and challenging. The plan to move some oil production plant underground was called the "Geilenberg Plan"
From Wikipedia:
Edmund Geilenberg (born 13 January 1906, Witten-Buchholz-Kaempen – died 19 October 1964, Bassum[1]) was a German official of World War II who headed an emergency 1944 decentralization program, the Geilenbergstab or Geilenbergprogramm (Geilenberg Special Staff), to disperse Nazi Germany oil production.[citation needed] The program included the Cuckoo project[citation needed] for an underground oil plant to be "carved out of the Himmelsburg" North of the Mittelwerk,[2] as well as plans for an oil facility at Ebensee.[3] "Geilenberg used as many as 350,000 men for the repair, rebuilding, and dispersal of the bombed plants and for new underground construction [which] were incomplete when the war ended".[4]
Defenses included a 21 June 1944, order for a minimum number of flak guns to be placed at Pölitz (200), Auschwitz (200), Hamburg (200), Brüx (170, Gelsenkirchen (140), Scholven (140), Wesseling (150), Heydebreck (130), Leuna (120), Blechhammer (100), Moosbierbaum (100), and Böhlen (70);[1] and the Ruhland Fischer-Tropsch plant and other synthetic oil plants were upgraded to be "hydrogenation fortresses" (e.g., the plants in the Leipzig area were protected by over 1,000 guns). In addition to increased active defenses, the facilities (German: Hydrierfestungen) incorporated blast walls and concrete "dog houses" around vital machinery. Similar to the technical experts transferred for the V-2 rocket program, 7,000 engineers were released from the German Army to provide technical support for oil facilities.
As you can see a lot of resources were tied up.
The plan was to decentralise and disperse most of the plants but only 1 may 2 Bergius plants would go underground . The Germans used two major processes:
1 Bergius high pressure hydrogenation.
2 Fischer-Tropsch catalysis.
Bergius hydrogenation involved pressurising an oil coal slurry at up to 700 atmospheres. (10,000psi). The special alloy developed to this was called bondur and resistant corrosion and embrittlement. (Useful for the order for 300 Uranium Centrifuges order pace an the Bamag firm at the end of the war)
The issue was that you need a Lurgi coal gasifier to make syngas which is then converted to hydrogen by pressure swing absorption. The Gasifier needs a liquid oxygen plant. The production of oxygen is associated with the production of nitrogen which can be used to make ammonia (using some of the hydrogen). The ammonia helps desulpherise the coal but is also an important co product in itself for explosives and fertiliser etc. The reactors and piping were so strong they were unaffected by direct bomb hits. However the hydrogen plant was very vulnerable. The plants continued to operate during allied bomb raids with the operators being given special pill boxes. When the plants were shutdown it was on the side that produced syngas. These plants produced 74 RON fuel out of the hydrogenation that could be upgraded with TEL to make 87 octane.
he Fischer Tropsch plants also needed gasifiers, syngas but it didn't need to be conditioned to hydrogen and after desulphurisation was reavted over catalysts to produce diesel or lubricants, the gasoline tended to be low grade, about 46 RON but I think with addition of TEL, some 30% methanol and a little upblending.
These fischer tropsch plants could be only 1/5th the size and dispersal could work with them.
There was a process that looked like fischer-tropsch but produced butanol which could be converted to butylene which could make both synthetic rubber and pure iso-octane. About 22% iso-otane was added to 87 octane fuel to make 97/130 fuel.
Improvements in gasifier and fischer tropsch such as fluidised bed reactors and new catalysts looked like increasing output and making higher octane fuel would have greatly improved the productivity of the system and reduced its costs. If the Germans had the technology they had in 1943 in 1937 their production would be higher due to improved efficiency.