WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?

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Axis Order of Battle for Operation Barbarossa
65 x Do-17Z. KG2
36 x Do-17Z. KG3
24 x He-111H. KG4
86 x He-111H. KG53
87 x He-111H. KG27
84 x He-111H. KG55
31 x He-111H. KG26
…………………………..
413 total German level bombers supporting Operation Barbarossa.

So...
In this scenerio I assume 413 German medium level bombers would be replaced by at least 600 heavy level bombers. A nice strength increase.
 
A force of 600 4-engined bombers would've required 2400 engines, compared with 826 used by historical bomber force. Meaning almost 1600 more engines built, say, in six months prior Barbarossa? We can compare that with ~750 single-engined Bf-109 taking part in the operation. A major mobilisation of German industry would've been required to produce such bomber force, at least to say.
 
Axis Order of Battle for Operation Barbarossa
65 x Do-17Z. KG2
36 x Do-17Z. KG3
24 x He-111H. KG4
86 x He-111H. KG53
87 x He-111H. KG27
84 x He-111H. KG55
31 x He-111H. KG26
…………………………..
413 total German level bombers supporting Operation Barbarossa.

So...
In this scenerio I assume 413 German medium level bombers would be replaced by at least 600 heavy level bombers. A nice strength increase.

Are you sure about those stats? I get 829 2-engine bombers in 24 June'41 .Source: Luftwaffe Data Book.
 
The key point is that Britain poured huge sums of money into building replacement aircraft and aircrew. Consequently RAF Bomber Command flew over 17,000 sorties at night during May to December 1940 while losing about 340 aircraft. The RAF
shrugged off the losses and just kept on bombing week after week. Give the Luftwaffe bomber force a similiar budget and they will keep on bombing week after week also.

The Luftwaffe bomber force was larger and flew a lot more sorties than that. About 15,500 night sorties in October, November and December 1940 alone. In total about 33,000 night bomber sorties during the 8 month Blitz.

Are you sure about those stats? I get 829 2-engine bombers in 24 June'41 .Source: Luftwaffe Data Book.

The Ju88 is missing from the figures. Whilst you can argue it was a dive bomber, I believe it was mostly used as a level bomber.
 
control of the sea didnt help britian with norway. the blockade didnt fair too well against the bombers. the US had a pretty decent fleet in the pacific and less than 200 aircraft negated them. owning the sea does you no good if you dont own the skies overhead and if your adversary can do that you are in a world of hurt.
 
Japan needed entrenched and defensible bases in Mexico or west coast to threaten US industrial strength in NE with B-29s, much less so with B-24s.. of course reducing west coast takes out much US fighter and bomber production by and of itself.
 
the US had a pretty decent fleet in the pacific and less than 200 aircraft negated them. owning the sea does you no good if you dont own the skies overhead and if your adversary can do that you are in a world of hurt.

True on December 7, 1941 - never true after that - simply because the Japanese quickly lost control of the skies from mid 1942 onward.
 
control of the sea didnt help britian with norway. the blockade didnt fair too well against the bombers. the US had a pretty decent fleet in the pacific and less than 200 aircraft negated them. owning the sea does you no good if you dont own the skies overhead and if your adversary can do that you are in a world of hurt.

What about the Battle of the Atlantic?
Fighting the U boat menace in the mid Atlantic winter storms was a challenge for the Royal Navy aided with a few CAM's to deal with the FW Condors but, the real fighting was on and under the ocean.

By the end of the war, German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic had sent over 2,900 ships and 14 million tons of Allied shipping to the bottom of the sea. In exchange, the Allies sank almost 800 U-Boats and over 30,000 of the 39,000 German sailors who put to sea, never returned – the highest casualty rate of any armed service in the history of modern war.

During the early war, German U-Boat successes against British and American shipping were so remarkable, that on January 1943, the Allies issued a decree in Casablanca which made the defeat of German U-Boats a number one priority. Winston Churchill, the then Prime Minister of Britain was most noted in his speech summarizing the German U-boats and the Battle of the Atlantic as "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril".

Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, commander of the German U-Boat force understood the potential of the submarine's unconventional ability, and believed Germany could fight a naval power like Great Britain, and win. He was the only officer in the German High Command who viewed that victory in the Battle of the Atlantic could only be achieved by German U-Boats, and such a victory would lead to an early conclusion of the Second World War. Others did not share his view and held the notion that big guns and the unsinkable battleship was key for control of the high seas.

In fighting for supremacy in the Battle of the Atlantic, the Admiral was proven right, as the super battleships of Germany such as the Bismarck and Graf Spee had only made headlines as being hunted down and sunk by the Royal Navy, while the German U-boats continued to inflict heavy losses on Allied shipping. The most famous element of the Battle of the Atlantic was the "Wolf Pack", or Rudeltaktik as the Germans called it. It had brought such devastation on the high seas and was based mainly upon the works of the Admiral.


Cheers
John
 
The thing is though is that Germany wouldn't have been able to achieve the same amount of air power that the Americans and the British (with American help) had. Germany lacked the resources to construct these very large four-engine bombers which is why they focused on the procduction of twin engine bombers; 1 four-engine bomber equals 2 twin-engine bombers. When talking about the BoB, the Luftwaffe was actually very close to winning the Battle; switching from military to civilian targets would be the main cause for losing the battle.

It was possible for the Germans to create a long-range fighter but the problem was that not a lot of focus was put into fighters in the early stages of the war. The Bf 110 was quickly created without any true planning and throughout the rest of the war, German fighter pilots would almost always be outnumbered. It was only until 1943-44 that fighter production was dramatically increased. But by then, the Luftwaffe lacked a sufficient amount of fuel and experienced fighter pilots.

To be honest I think that, other than an insufficient fighter force, the Luftwaffe was an effective fighter force. Sure the blitzkrieg had many problems, but for the most part it proved to be very effective. Plus it made it much easier for the Luftwaffe to impact the war. The Ju 88 was a fantastic aircraft; simple and versatile. The Ju 87 was devastating in the ground attack and tank-busting role (and could have been even more if it had more fighter protection). And the Fw 190, which gave itself a reputation of a tough, mean fighter with great multi-functionality.

The main places I would say that the Luftwaffe needed some serious work on was to have the majority of the Luftwaffe combrised of mostly fighters (the Germans frequently used heavy fighters like the Bf 110, Me 410, and particularly Ju 88C all of which proved to be effective in the fighter-bombesr, train-busters, and to a certain extent ground attack aircraft). Increase the production of the Do 217 which although was a pain, was the closest thing that the Luftwaffe had to a heavy bomber; one that carried a very good defensive armament. And not postpone or slow down the Me 262 project; if everything had gone smoothly, the Me 262 could have entered service as early as 1943.
 
We have discussed the pros and cons of the allied bombers (and agreed to differ :lol:) Lets look at the situation should the Luftwaffe have had the allied heavy bombers, escort fighters etc and 'we' had the German aircraft.
Given the resources of the Americans and ingenuity of the British would we have still won the war?

Starting with the Blitz....I'm not necessarily convinced that we would have won the BoB as the factories and airfields could have been totally destroyed.

What do you all think?
Cheers
John

No, it wouldn't have had much effect, other than a drain on German resources.

You don't need an escort fighter when bombing at night. Which is how the Luftwaffe attacked the Port of London during the fall of 1940 and the Port of Liverpool during May 1941.

Indeed, but night bombing produced very poor results vs losses in 1940 - 1941.
A British report (Butt Report) in the summer of 1941 found that only 10% of the bombers which reported attacking the Ruhr bombed within 5 miles of the target.
On the whole, the British night bombing from June 1940 - June 1942 was very costly for poor results.

While it was easier to attack ports, the Germans would still need to fly many hundred miles over Britain (to Liverpool, Glasgow, Bristol, Belfast etc) while dealing with British radar equipped defences.

I think the outcome in Russia might have been a bit different if the LW could hit the factories in the Urals.

It's unlikely in the extreme that they could ever find the blacked-out factories in the middle of a Siberian (or Ural) forest, after flying 1,000+ miles with no geographical markers.

How many aircraft did RAF Bomber Command have as of June 1941?

About 500 - 600 or so. They had just over 1,000 for Operation Milennium (Cologne) on 30/31 May 1942, but only by using some Training Command aircraft.



In the final analysis, would it make much difference? No

If Germany produced similar heavy bombers that the British did, it would be swapping Ju88's (4 crew, 7 - 8,000lb bombs, 1,400 mile range) for something similar to Short Stirlings (7 crew, 14,000 lb bombs, 2,300 mile range)
This is likely what the He177B would have been, had it not had design engine problems, and not been intended as a dive bomber.

Not really much savings in crew or fuel. The greater ranges of the British "heavies" was useful to the British to bomb Germany from the UK, but not as important for Germany. (with nearer French bases)

The big downside is that the German mediums were much more useful in ground attack army support missions, compared to the British bombers. This was vital to the LW, as it was able to switch it's bombers to the Eastern front.
 
IMO swapping Ju-88A dive bombers for Short Sterling level bombers would just make things worse for Germany. The Luftwaffe would lose most of their precision bombing capability.

Swapping He-111 level bombers for Short Stirling level bombers makes more sense. Bombing accuracy is similiar but the Stirling has twice as much payload.

Short Stirling I
Short Stirling - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
11,800kg payload (Max take off weight minus empty weight).

He-111 H6
Heinkel He 111 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
5,320kg payload.
 
Germans might have loved to have just He 111H-6 for the Battle of Britain instead of the H-1 through H-4 they actually used. The difference being the H-6 used Jumo 211F engines which were only introduced on the last of the H-4s. The majority of the He 111s used in the summer of 1940 used Jumo 211D engines (some planes might still have had Jumo 211A's) with 240-300hp less for take-off depending on who you believe, with proportionately less power at at altitude. take-off rpm was 200rpm lower than the later "F" engine and they used a different supercharger. One source (war time) gives a maximum HP of 975hp at 2300rpm at 4,500meters for a "B" series engine which wasn't much different than a "D" and still in use in the summer of 1940. I would imagine that operating planes with 15-20% less take off power than the H-6 would impact their operational capabilities.
 
You take no account of the psychological effects of bombing.
The Zeppelin raids in WW1 caused pandemonium and the Blitz caused damage but, also enraged the general public.
My contention is that the level of infrastructural damage and psychological terror is exponential to the tonnage of bombs delivered.
Cheers
John
 
19 million tons of food was imported vie the Port of Liverpool. Keep the port closed and Britain will have something more important to worry about then "psychological terror".
 
You take no account of the psychological effects of bombing.
The Zeppelin raids in WW1 caused pandemonium and the Blitz caused damage but, also enraged the general public.
My contention is that the level of infrastructural damage and psychological terror is exponential to the tonnage of bombs delivered.
Cheers
John

Actually the level of terror decreases over time, as the shock value wears off.

19 million tons of food was imported vie the Port of Liverpool. Keep the port closed and Britain will have something more important to worry about then "psychological terror".

Not unless they could close all the other ports as well.
British imports fell from 50 - 60 million tons pre-war to about 28 million tons in 1942, so there was more port capacity than ships available.

What makes you think that swapping He111's for Stirlings would be any more effective?
It's about 250 - 300 miles to Liverpool, well within reach of all German bombers.
The Stirling has twice as many engines, 7 crew vs 4, probably uses twice as much (or more) fuel resources to put in the air, for twice as much bomb tonnage.

The Germans could still only deliver the same tonnage of bombs over the UK, so no real difference, unless they wanted to divert production manpower from other areas, such as fighters, U-boats or Panzers. (bad idea)
 
U boats very nearly won the Atlantic battle. That was the only WW2 concern that Churchill had lose the Atlantic conveys and Britain was in as spot of bother.

With respect, I disagree about the shock wearing off over time. Consider that no country can be be bombed all over all the time and 'who's next' when you all know what's coming with firestorm's etc is hardly conducive to good public morale.
The harder the hit, ie the bigger the bomber payload, the more fear is generated.
Dresden was carefully selected for an incendiary attack , the Dam Busters was planned for maximum effect and so were the mass RAF USAAF raids on Hamburg and were all a success.

Now, back to original point, if the Luftwaffe had been able to deliver these blows with heavy bombers or more medium bombers would Britain have been able to take the punishment?

Or, if Japan had been able to deliver these blows to you Americans how would that have been received?

Cheers
John
 
The Germans would have needed to deliver a lot more than they did. An awful lot more.

I don't want to get into a debate about national courage or fortitude but the German civilians certainly stood up to much worse than the British received as a whole as did the Japanese. A few large Russian cities stood up long sieges/bombardments lasting over months. Individual blocks or city sections may have been equally hard it all those countries but Germany and japan had more sq mileage and more civilians killed by far.
The pre-war theories of mass panic in the streets caused by a few hundred bombers were shown to be bunk. People lost homes, businesses, family members and even their own lives, civilians in many nations paid a terrible price due to bombing raids but only in Japan did bombing alone (or nearly alone)bring a nation to surrender. and that took hundreds of bombers of double the capacity of the bombers used in Europe against a defense of less effectiveness than used in Europe plus the submarine campaign plus atomic bombs.

In addition to fear there was a lot of revenge being motivated. People stood up to bombing better if they thought the bombers were being hurt. Shot down by AA fire or interceptors. Or that the bombers bases and homeland were being bombed, or at least could be bombed in the not too distant future.

while individuals may have broken (and everyone has a different breaking point) the populations as a whole did not break. At least not until the infrastructure was such a wreck that it didn't matter. If the morale doesn't really crack until the power to the run the factories is no longer there and the road/rail transportation system no longer can get raw materials to the factory or finished goods away from the factory does it really matter if the morale cracked or not?

The Japanese had exactly ZERO chance of mounting a bomber campaign against the United States that would accomplish anything.

Unless they could base out of Mexico or Canada. Give them 1000 B-29s and Hawaii and all they could do would be to tick off the west coast.
 

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