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I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.
Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.
In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.
Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.
In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.
I'll leave it at that, and Joe can expand on it if he likes, but you get the picture.
I'm mostly just interested in the historical facts...I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
That's weird, but interestingThe U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure.
WowIt was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.
Didn't he come to the US at some point?Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.
Basically we were drawn in over alliances to other nations.In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.
How was it unfair and how was it unconventional?Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.
Some people subscribe to the attitude that right lies in force...In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.
I would assume one or two hits from any of those would be fatal?While Japanese AA was not as concerted as German AA, it was still very capable.
They had several layout patterns for their installations and these would include a blend of types: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm and 155mm.
I didn't know thatThat were able to easily reach altitudes of 26 to 30,000 feet and there were many reports from B-17 and B-29 crews that verified that Japanese AA was reaching their altitudes of 32,000 feet and even witnessed bursts as high as 36,000 feet.
So basically light stuff on the outside to the big stuff in the middle?I should add that the AA batteries were also protected by a perimeter of 7mm and 13mm MGs as well as 20mm and 25mm pom-pom to protect the batteries from low altitude attack.
I didn't know we had multiple planes for atomic missions: I did know we had the bomber and a plane in trail and offset to the side...Shinpachi gave the account and it's been a long time since the discussion, but in summary, there was a lone patrol on the morning of the Nagasaki mission. The pilot (Shinpachi has his name and Sentai info) spotted the B-29 and thought it to be an American recon mission (there was actually several B-29s per Atomic mission) and disregarded it. However, he was at altitude and in a position where he could have intercepted the unescorted B-29s as they turned towards Nagasaki.
But as luck would have it...
I always thought scouting was predominantly artillery direction...Any USN aircraft that had the prefix "S" was intended for Scouting duties as one of their primary missions.
I never understood the SO designation as they were overlapping, but if scouting is non-photographic reconnaissance, and O was artillery direction it makes perfect sense.Curtiss SOC-3 for example, shows it's primary mission is Scouting.
It was designed as a dive-bomber first (Northrop's BT, which was then modified into the BT-2, then the SBD)The Douglas SBD was a Scouting Bomber and while it was designed as a Dive-Bomber, it's designed purpose was an armed Scout.
Did the Japanese have scouts of this sort?In those, the scouts were the eyes of the fleet, no matter who had radar and who did not.
So you have a sort of Venn diagram where the PRC and USSR cris-crossed each other?Dave - French and British can be accused of this or that, but Korea was not within either countrie's sphere of influence, let alone a former colony of those countries. Korea was a place where Russian/Soviet, Chinese and Japanese influences over-lapped, many times the Koreans drawing a short straw in the process.
As they were both communist powers.The big worry in Korea, especially after the Chinese jumped in, was that the Soviet Union would get directly involved and escalate a regional conflict into World War lll.
What was the motivation for the demobilization? I'm pretty sure I know the answer (so draftees can go home to their families, and we could throttle down military costs)We had abruptly demobilized after War ll, and had neither the preparation nor the stomach for another big one.
Why did they not comprehend?In Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson, and especially McNamara started out helping a (not very worthy) ally stem what they thought was a minor insurgency, and just couldn't comprehend the facts on the ground and the level of commitment of the Vietnamese people to unification.
Why?They clung to the illusion that by manipulating military actions and diplomatic initiatives they could discourage the North from their unification campaign.
Okay, I get it now...The Dauntless was spec-ed and designed at a time when there weren't a lot of long range patrol options available to the fleet. PBY-class aircraft were just coming into being, and battleships and cruisers each had a couple of seaplanes, but a carrier's flock of scout bombers were the backbone of the fleet's search capabilities.
There's logic to thatI think the USN had always thought of its aircraft as multi-mission platforms
I think it was just in different wayspossibly more so than the USAAC
Did they require two man crews?The USN did have a shot at scout-fighters, in the Grumman SF, and one wonders how that would have played out had the navy continued that into the monoplane world.
I did not know that, but that does make sense (in this author's opinion, it seems preferable to avoid sticking one's nose where it doesn't belong unless absolutely necessary because of the cost in human life, and generates enmity that all too often results in blow-back) to change the regime into something the public would accept rather than the ham-handed job we did.The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of 'first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support'.
Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...Regime change was a traditional British strategy as a cheaper way to achieve goals and with less casualties.
TrueThen harry and isolate the Vietcong on the ground so that they have to concentrate upon survival not attack. Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.
The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist.Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...
True
What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist.
What do you mean not PC?It was easier in Malaya when his support was principally from only one of the four principal ethnic groups and principally from the urban members at that. Easily isolated and penetrated by Intelligence, forced to withdraw into the jungle and chased around by specialist troops. To be fair taking communist heads by Iban trackers was a bit non PC.
What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?
What do you mean not PC?
What's OBE (I've seen it a lot)
That was often the problem with independent air-forces... their operations were based often around the idea of total war.Also, not every military action is a total war against an existential threat.
Correct -- there are certain wars which we can choose to engage in or not engage in.Not intervening in Korea would have been embarrassing, and possibly cause the US be seen as abandoning the world,as it did post-WWI, but there wouldn't have been stalinists taking over Alabama or California, nor would Red Chinese troops be coming ashore in Washington.
The term came from an inability to describe the type of warfare waged in WWI by Zeppelins and then bombers against cities.I'm not quite sure where to put the dividing line between tactical and strategic bombing
Fascinating.Definitions of strategy and tactics (and grand tactics) have changed out of necessity over the years.
For example
"To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, 1838.
and "...there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy."
That's a good one!"Order of the British Empire" - hence the irony!
Usually taken to be "Other Buggers Efforts"
UnderstoodAFAIK Swampyankee is right that the US dragged the UN into the Korean war. But, it was a question of grasping an opportunity. The Russians had walked out of the security council and their veto power was not invoked at the critical vote.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 - Wikipedia
Also, on Malaya, we just wanted to hand the country back to the majority population with minimal bloodshed after the debacle with the partitioning of India and Pakistan. OK, special circumstances, but we did win a jungle guerrilla war!
McNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted. He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.Why did they not comprehend?
How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too. Thus if you could make the cost of invasion too high, you could deter aggression. And with all our high-tech weaponry, that should be no problem, right? The willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.Zipper 730 said:Why?
Not to kick a dead horse, but somewhere back early in this long topic someone said a B-29 was hauling a very light bomb load. Something on the order of 6,000 pounds or so. It would take an hour to find it. Not saying anything except the B-29 could haul a LOT of bombs if the situation required it to do so.
Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds. This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-assMcNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted.
I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.
Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too.
They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousandsThe willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.
I know the Silverplate was modified with only one bomb-bay in lieu of two. Did the B-50's have such an arrangement?I'm with you Greg. Fat Man was only a 10,000 pounder, but they did try out two Grand Slams!
How do you quantify "hearts and minds"?? As far as Johnson and McNamara were concerned, if you couldn't put a number on it, it didn't exist. McNamara was a whiz-kid from Detroit who made his chops saving a car company from bankruptcy and leading it to market dominance through the power of statistical analysis.Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds.
Counter-insurgency? Uncle Sam's Misguided Children?? Don't make me laugh, it hurts too much!! "NVA's are in that treeline, top of the hill. Frontal assault, CHARGE!"Zipper 730 said:This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-ass.
The Chinese in Korea fit K, J, and M's image of a nation-state committing conventional military aggression against a neighbor. The situation in Vietnam of an insurgency of the people, aided and supplied by the "other half" of the people north of the DMZ just didn't fit into their world-view. They never realized how little support the rank and file citizenry had for our "friends" in the RVN government.Zipper 730 said:I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.
Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.
They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousands