That was a different thing, my quess is that Balljoint means Y-Service, LW used the same system later on, simply noticing that many aircrews checked their radios indicated that a raid was soon coming.
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...So it seems it wasn't for every raid only some of them.
You are still fighting the historical scenario,not the campaign that I would wage with the benefit of hindsight.
The Battle of Britain was winnable by the Luftwaffe with some major tweaks to their strategy and some minor ones to their equipment.
Britain's problem was pilots not aeroplanes. It's much easier to keep a man down than to get him down and any sign of the green shoots of recovery from the RAF would be dealt with.
Whether Britain could be forced to terms is an entirely different question. I think that she could have been in certain circumstances. An offer whereby she conceded Europe but held on to her maritime Empire would have been appealing to many in the British elite. It's not ideal but after the series of defeats she has now,in my scenario,suffered at the hands of Germany and with her cities defenceless from aerial attack (how many Luftwaffe bombers did British AAA shoot down in 1940?) it might be seen as the lesser evil.
Cheers
Steve
Even if you win a battle of britain, where do you go from there? Hoping they will come to terms wehn you can put no real pressure on them (i.e. boots on the ground) is a risky endeavour considering the loss in equipment and pilots you are willing to take.
The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.
a suggestion out of the realm of the subject in hand I'm afraid.
If you can't secure air supremacy over the RAF, where are you?
After 14 pages of discussion, it still comes down to the basics, (with the benifit of hindsight,) eliminate the radar, don't get sidelined on retallitory strikes on London, and keep up the pressure on the R.A.F. Done deal.
I know - I'm very simplistic.
no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.
It wasn't necessary, as the Blitz showed; British industry was bombed at night with accuracy early on thanks to the guidance beams. They of course degraded, but area attacks did affect British industry, as it did when the RAF bombed the Ruhr in 1943. Not engaging in the Battle of Britain would preserve bomber strength for a sustained bomber campaign against British industry at night. Whether or not people accept that bombing the big ports would matter, the technology and skills existed for the Germans to hit targets at night. Part of the problem with targeting specific industries though is really poor intelligence on where factories were and what they produced. Shadow factories were not even known to the Germans, so they couldn't be targeted. So frankly I think this too is a non-starter.No one has stated that that alone would do so either. The key is a sustained bombing campaign against British industry. In order to do this without hindrance, Fighter Command has to be eliminated as first priority. This is how the LW intended on waging the war against Britain.
Not really; no one has demonstrated that defeating Fighter Command would force Britain from the war.
The case is far from proven that FC was likely to be defeated.
Exactly.The only answer is subjugation through invasion. If the pressure of the attacks discussed abated, Britain would soon rebuild, not to mention enlist assistance from its Commonwealth. Essentially, any such attack without invasion would be ultimately fruitless and regardless of which course was taken, what would evolve is a war of attrition; who can maintain the hard losses the longest.
Yes, and seeing how long it took two giant bomber forces better equipped for strategic warfare to have any meaningful impact on the German war industry, we are now talking about years of attacks, development of new equipment and strategies and so forth. I don't see that happening without essentially abandoning any expansion plans to the east for years to come. So you either change your whole Weltanschauung and declare the Soviets not so evil after all or you risk Stalin and his quickly expanding red army pulling their own Barbarossa on you, while you are occupied with an exhaustive strategic air war. Option 1 is not a bad idea, but not likely to happen with the Nazis in charge.The only way that such a campaign would succeed is if all resources were poured into achieving the objective, which is the destruction of the RAF and Britain's war making industries (including ports, factories etc). The Luftwaffe would need a constant supply of bombers, fighters, recon aircraft, ammunition, pilots, support crews etc, otherwise, as you say, where do we go from here? This would obviously clash with resources required for the sustaining of an invasion, but if the objective is to be achieved, then this is necessary.
"Kampf gegen England, meine Herren..."
My premise for the defeat of Fighter Command,which I have repeated several times,is based on the destruction of the RAF's command and control system. This is now a pre-requisite of any modern aerial campaign.
It is essential to destroy the Chain Home sites and the Luftwaffe demonstrated historically that this was possible. It wasn't done because the Luftwaffe didn't understand and under estimated their importance to Britain's air defence system and never made a coordinated effort to disable them
The anti radar attack of 12th August which tore a 100 mile wide gap in British radar coverage was never repeated.
Goering:
"It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action."
Infact he was wrong,some had been put out of action (Rye,Pevensey,Dover for a short period,Ventnor for three days) and wrong again,he should have continued with the attacks.
On 7th August a Luftwaffe intelligence report had already demostrated that they just didn't get it.
"As the British fighters are controlled from the ground by radio-telephone, their forces are tied to their respective ground stations and are thereby restricted in mobility, even taking into consideration the probability that the ground stations are partly mobile. Consequently the assembly of strong fighter forces at determined points and at short notice is not to be expected."
Of course that is exactly what Chain Home did enable the RAF to do.
Without this system the familiar voice of sector controllers immortalised in various movies....."Blue leader I have some trade for you,60+ bandits,Angels one five,vector one six zero" ....becomes the self same controller picking up another telephone to be told...."Sir we have reports that they are bombing Hawkinge".
Fighter Command wouldn't know where the Luftwaffe attacks were heading or even the strength of the attacks until it was too late to intercept them with fighters already at altitude and in approximately the correct position.
People are quoting the historical Luftwaffe losses as evidence of its diminishing strength,which is historically correct,but in my scenario the RAF are not making the interceptions and my Luftwaffe losses are much reduced.
That is how Fighter Command could have been defeated. I am not repeating the historical campaign and it doesn't really matter whether we agree or disagree on just how close run that was. I won't be making the same mistakes.
Cheers
Steve