Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France
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parsifal
Colonel
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I have a few of points.
1. Army performance should be based on a critical analysis of battles, and identify why battles were lost, or not won easily, or what could be improved, with less emphasis on the drum beating, chest beating jingoism about how good the army allegedly is. Studying why battles were won simply confirms what we already know. This is a point brought out by both Zetterling and Col. Dupuy, and Id recommend them to you if you can get over this dispute. too often we study battles with the agenda of confirming our national superiority, and not from the point of view of learning from our mistakes.
2. You claim that the german infantry was the best in the world is not based on any serious analysis of outcomes and why those outcomes were achieved. At this stage its an unsupported hypothesis based on a non critical analysis. I end to agree, though, and in particular, in 1942, the US army stood little chance against the German army in France.
3. In both TOs, US seems to have needed local superiorities on the battlefield of around 8:1 in order to win them. that's not particularly bad, but it comes as a shock for many to know that. its not just a numbers comparison, but should also take into account all factors. to achieve such advantages at the decisive point the US needed front wide advantages of about 2.32:1 in the PTO, and around 3:1 in the ETO. By comparison, at the beginning of the war the british army against the germans needed an estimated front wide superiority of 4:1 and a local advantage at the point of decision of around 9 or 10:1. As the war progressed this requirement reduced gradually, down to about 2.6:1 (in the ETO) and local point of decision advantages of around 6:1.
looking at the issue in reverse, at the beginning of the war, the germans, versus the brits needed front wide advantages as low as 0.8:1 and breakthrough advantages of about 3:1 to achieve success, whilst by late 1944, it was about 4 or 5:1 overall and about 10:1 at the point of decision. Problems arise when generalising about the germans, however, because there is such a wide variation in quality in the heer. it was very patchy.
4. im not all that interested in best, worst, nationality or historical outcomes per se. We know the US and the allies won, but was that solely for reasons related to the quality of their army, or also because they outnumbered their opponents and held other advantages as well. this last point is important in the context of why we are doing this in first place. Naval gunfire support, for example, vital in a battle to get ashore, or against a fortified atoll, but not of any importance if you are slugging your way across the countryside 100 km from the shore. Airpower....a very useful force multiplier, so long as the weather allows it, and the terrain permits adequate visual targeting... artillery, the unsung hero of the battle because it was the number 1 firepower source, but not much use , if you cant keep up to its insatiable supply appetite. And so on. its important to know the capabilities of each element of your victory, even more important to know your weaknesses.
Some General observations
US army was strong in logistics, mobility and firepower, weak in tactics, and trained manpower. its infantry was not particularly good, but it compensated for that in other ways. Those "other ways" were generally not available to it in 1942. also in 1942, it was particularly weak in training and experience, and it took longer than you are admitting to acquire that experience. This was applicable in both TOs. As the war progressed, the US tended to rely on a few very experienced units, which it over-used and because of that narrow base of experience, this limited the extent to which it could engage. later, as the Japanese and German quality went into their own respective crises the Americans could risk a more general commitment of its army, though it always needed to be wary of casualties, because its training and replacement capacities were so limited. this observation is based mostly on the analyses by Shelby Stanton and others.
parsifal
Colonel
That's one of the things about random sampling. you try to be as random as possible. There would be some that say the results at guadacanal are atypical, but they still form part of the historical model on which to draw observations.
They still managed to flatten the opposition. Pz Lehr, down to about 3000 combat effectives by the time of the battle, effectively ceased to exist after the battle.
Gamers love St lo as a simulation though because as the US commander, you don't have to try too hard to do better than the historical example.
The Germans were so good because of a different philosophy, that is 'mission command', delegatng tactical authority down the line and everyone was trained to take over and command.
None of the British, Canadians (though they were better) or the US had it, or does today. It is an alien concept to our hierarchial culture. The closest (even equals, maybe even better then) were the Australians and New Zealanders in WW2, though specalist units (paras, etc) came close.
Martin Van Crevald did a book on this and and an analysis of US/British vs Germans shows German supoeriorty in the attack or defence, whether they had air support or usually none.
Monty was well aware of this and knew that it was impossible to change the British Army enough, quickly enough, so his tactical decisions were very much based around nullifyng those German advantages. The US took a different approach and went for attrition, throwing more and more men into battle..expensive as they found at places like Metz and Hurtogen Forest.
The US ETO logistics was a corrupt useless joke. Ike did not have control of it (and ddn't have the guts to make a scene abut it..ever the politician) and COMZ ran its own comfortable and enrichening war...stuff the soldiers at the front. And they were stuffed.
A US front line soldier basically fought until they were wounded or killed, there was no rest, no reserves to take over and let a regiment or division rest and regroup. They just fought until their couldn't any more. It was US industrial warfare, Taylorism ran rampart. While the backroom 'big' boys drank champagne.
Monty when he took over the US Northern forces at the Bulge, because Bradley screwed up so much even Ike gave him the flick, was horrfied that the US soldiers not gettng hot food, fighting in freezng temps...but the US higher command didn't care one little bit "more where they came from" was ther motto. So they just fed young badly trained inexperienced troops into the meat grinders over and over until they ran out, and then the institutionally racist US Army then had to turn to black troops (who did really well by the way).
US chauvinism meant they rejected the British spcialist tanks (mine clearing, flamethower petard, etc) and the 17 pounder equipped Sherman (firefly), the only tank in the west that could match a MK IV, V let alone a VI. But did Ike, Bradley or Patton care? Nope. they just sent in more..well until there were no more left to send in.
Marshall had decreed that the ETO 'glory' was going to the US Army, Ike agreed (politician), Bradley dithered and did waht Patton said and Patton screwed up by the numbers endlessly. The other US generals (sone like Collins really good, amongst the best of the best) got the short end...and usually wished that Monty was their boss.
parsifal
Colonel
Well, I wouldnt be quite that critical. What started this was the notion that with near 1:1 parity in numbers, in 1942, the US Army could handle the germans. I think universally that was rejected, but I tried to quantify that with some quantified analysis , which is not my work, but that of some highly respected soldiers and a very good author. Dupuy has written a book on combat performances and receiverd death threats for his trouble Im told.
Someone then asked me if similar comparisons had been done with the japanese, which i dont think have been done, but i was asked my opinion anyway. I gave it, not realizing what a sacred cow, with overtly racist overtones I might add, the idea of utter superiority the US ground forces have over the Japanese is retained in this place.
Between 1942 and 1944, the Americans learnt a lot, and the army fielded at Normandy and fought its way across France was a far cry from the rabble in US uniform in 1942 (there are similar parrallels for the US in the Pacific) . This applied to both TOs. There were still acute shortages of experience. NCOs and junior officers cant be built in a year, and that was the basic problem in the US Army. It showed in a number of ways, their inability to aggressively patrol, the need to retain units under command at a large scale, and the inability to delegate downward are examples. According to Stanton, a US author I might add, the US tried to compensate for that with massive firepower. That was a response that largely grew out of the French Army influences on the US Army, and their overweaning desire to assault stuff frontally. Stanton describes the advance across France as competent, but not brilliant, which i think is reasonable. They kept steady pressure up on the germans, and the germans made some whopper mistakes of their own, and not just because of hitler either. The supply issue Im not so sure of. Maybe you are right, but i always believed the supply shortages were because monty hogged the very limited supplies reaching the front, and the Germans did a massive job destroying the port facilities in France as they retreated .
Its frustrating that we cant discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various armies without getting into this pointless argument about how convincingly superior one side was and not be able to objectively break apart the strengths and weaknesses that each protagonist had and how those aspects of their military affected the progress and outcome of a given campaign. I realloy wish we could discuss this in a professional way, but people simply want to deal in absolutes all the time. We Australians are not immune from that. We had had some very costly lessons in WWI and were determined to avoid casualties wherever we could. Sounds good, but in reality it probably cost more lives than it saved . We were always the sucker cousin as well, whether the bigger cousin was British or American.....
Someone then asked me if similar comparisons had been done with the japanese, which i dont think have been done, but i was asked my opinion anyway. I gave it, not realizing what a sacred cow, with overtly racist overtones I might add, the idea of utter superiority the US ground forces have over the Japanese is retained in this place.
Between 1942 and 1944, the Americans learnt a lot, and the army fielded at Normandy and fought its way across France was a far cry from the rabble in US uniform in 1942 (there are similar parrallels for the US in the Pacific) . This applied to both TOs. There were still acute shortages of experience. NCOs and junior officers cant be built in a year, and that was the basic problem in the US Army. It showed in a number of ways, their inability to aggressively patrol, the need to retain units under command at a large scale, and the inability to delegate downward are examples. According to Stanton, a US author I might add, the US tried to compensate for that with massive firepower. That was a response that largely grew out of the French Army influences on the US Army, and their overweaning desire to assault stuff frontally. Stanton describes the advance across France as competent, but not brilliant, which i think is reasonable. They kept steady pressure up on the germans, and the germans made some whopper mistakes of their own, and not just because of hitler either. The supply issue Im not so sure of. Maybe you are right, but i always believed the supply shortages were because monty hogged the very limited supplies reaching the front, and the Germans did a massive job destroying the port facilities in France as they retreated .
Its frustrating that we cant discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the various armies without getting into this pointless argument about how convincingly superior one side was and not be able to objectively break apart the strengths and weaknesses that each protagonist had and how those aspects of their military affected the progress and outcome of a given campaign. I realloy wish we could discuss this in a professional way, but people simply want to deal in absolutes all the time. We Australians are not immune from that. We had had some very costly lessons in WWI and were determined to avoid casualties wherever we could. Sounds good, but in reality it probably cost more lives than it saved . We were always the sucker cousin as well, whether the bigger cousin was British or American.....
Ascent
Senior Airman
I have heard that one of the problems for the US army was the fact that the more educated and brighter recruits were grabbed by the specialist branches meaning that the basic infantryman, while not necassarily stupid, tended to be less educated and motivated.
Do you know if there is anything in this?
Do you know if there is anything in this?
I would imagine that would be the case in any military.
Robert Scales, whose views are usually diametrically opposed to mine has written an article whose title is self explanatory, "Drafted armies are self-killing machines." Whilst you might not agree absolutely his view deserves consideration, he is well qualified to have such a view.
On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. But this is America. When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman's office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."
These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
Cheers
Steve
On conscription or some kind of national service in the US he has written.
"National service sounds like a utopian concept for social leveling, and it might be if it were applied fairly. It might be applied fairly during peacetime. But this is America. When the bullets start to fly Mom and Dad from the middle and upper classes will find a nice internship for their child in a soup kitchen or a Congressman's office. But the less well connected will, as always, go to war poorly prepared, untrained and resentful."
These are not exactly my views but may have a bearing on reasons for the poor material the US Armies had to mold into infantry in WW2.
Cheers
Steve
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The US had very very few legal deferments from the draft. And where do you get this idea that the US had "poor material" to work with. The US success in this war of unprecedented mechanization was due to this "poor material" already having a lot of the skills necessary to jump into the specialist roles.
Methinks that is not just the case for USA. The better connected Moms and Dads strive to keep the offsprings from the pointed end in all feasible ways anywhere in the world.
parsifal
Colonel
With a few exceptions, the best soldiers at a national level has a direct correlation to the education levels that exist in their country of origin. There is still some debate as to why that is the case, but it just is. The one glaring exception to that was the Red Army where basically peasant levels of education produced some of the toughest soldiers in history. Thats a different discussion, but basically the russians solved their problem through specialization, a unit might have just one or two weapon types, and a soldier would be taught how to use that weapon and that was that.....
Im not referring to overall performance, just the enlisted ranks, the building blocks of the army. Officers and leadership are a different thing altogether. The US produced good soldiers at enlisted level I think because there was a good starting base of education in the wider community. It made "production" of the technical branches easier as well. Even the production of officers was easier with better education base. Personnel could learn their own jobs easier, and could gain appreciation of the way the system as a whole was meant to work.
What held the US army back were basically two things, small unit leadership and its underlying doctrine. Neither of these aspects of the army were easy to overcome, but the US Army did eventually make allowances. Neither do i subscribe to the theory that it was just about the numbers. They enjoyed a very comfortable numbers advantage (in equipment at least) but they needed to work out ways of applying that advantage.
Its small unit leadership was heavily constrained by the small size of the army at the beginning of the war. Ive read the army at the beginning of 1940 was 100000 men give or take,, with sizable chunks of the army on overseas deployments and the like where their ability to process and "produce" leaders was limited. A man digging a trench, or guarding a beach isnt learning or teaching anything. By the end of 1942, the army was around 2 or 3 million men. You cant have an expansion like that and expect your army to retain its proficiency levels. The Germans by comparison had 7 years of peace in which to develop their leadership skills, plus from the end of 1918 Von Seekct had made sure the heer was "leader heavy" so that when the expansion came, it could be done as smoothly as possible (just the same ther was a slight crisis for the the germans in 1941, and a massive one in 1944 as they lost, or were caught short of leaders by the unfolding events). You cant build leaders quickly under any circumstance, and this was never more true than for the US Army. Moreover, active engagement can actually decrease your experience levels, not enhance them. Your Corporals, Sgts and Lts suffer massively higher casualty rates (as a percentage of the total) than any other ranks.
The other constraint holding the US Army combat efficiency was its narrow doctrinal approaches to battle problems. Having emerged from WWI thoroughly influenced by the French model of using firepower over movement, they remained wedded to that very narrow and limited concept for a long time. Theres nothing wrong with firepower, it is one element of the battle problem, but it is only a half solution. Just as important is manouvre, and whilst the US generals did eventually come to use that concept (at the top of the pile in that category has to be Patton) for the army in general ity took a while. That was amply demonstrated in France 1944. Notwithstanding the spectacular breakout in July and the encirclement at Falaise (which put down to German incompetence more than Allied brilliance) , thereafter the US advances were broad front, conservative, unimaginative affairs in which the old maxim of firepower over was dominant again. The Americans would basically waddle up to a German delay point, blast the crap out of it, and then occupy that position, usually allowing the few German defenders plenty of time and opportunity to escape.
These problems were overcome and compensated for, but not as a whole in 1942. in the pacific the one unit that did well in the beginning were the marines, where the leaders were mostly or significantly prewar, and the fighting was positional, where US doctrinal strengths could be exploited to the maximum. Elsewhere, the US in 1942 fought with very mediocre performance. In the later campaigns they compensated for these persistent issues with numbers at the point of impact, coupled with massive supporting firepower. Where that firepower was not available, or less available, they struggled again.
Im not referring to overall performance, just the enlisted ranks, the building blocks of the army. Officers and leadership are a different thing altogether. The US produced good soldiers at enlisted level I think because there was a good starting base of education in the wider community. It made "production" of the technical branches easier as well. Even the production of officers was easier with better education base. Personnel could learn their own jobs easier, and could gain appreciation of the way the system as a whole was meant to work.
What held the US army back were basically two things, small unit leadership and its underlying doctrine. Neither of these aspects of the army were easy to overcome, but the US Army did eventually make allowances. Neither do i subscribe to the theory that it was just about the numbers. They enjoyed a very comfortable numbers advantage (in equipment at least) but they needed to work out ways of applying that advantage.
Its small unit leadership was heavily constrained by the small size of the army at the beginning of the war. Ive read the army at the beginning of 1940 was 100000 men give or take,, with sizable chunks of the army on overseas deployments and the like where their ability to process and "produce" leaders was limited. A man digging a trench, or guarding a beach isnt learning or teaching anything. By the end of 1942, the army was around 2 or 3 million men. You cant have an expansion like that and expect your army to retain its proficiency levels. The Germans by comparison had 7 years of peace in which to develop their leadership skills, plus from the end of 1918 Von Seekct had made sure the heer was "leader heavy" so that when the expansion came, it could be done as smoothly as possible (just the same ther was a slight crisis for the the germans in 1941, and a massive one in 1944 as they lost, or were caught short of leaders by the unfolding events). You cant build leaders quickly under any circumstance, and this was never more true than for the US Army. Moreover, active engagement can actually decrease your experience levels, not enhance them. Your Corporals, Sgts and Lts suffer massively higher casualty rates (as a percentage of the total) than any other ranks.
The other constraint holding the US Army combat efficiency was its narrow doctrinal approaches to battle problems. Having emerged from WWI thoroughly influenced by the French model of using firepower over movement, they remained wedded to that very narrow and limited concept for a long time. Theres nothing wrong with firepower, it is one element of the battle problem, but it is only a half solution. Just as important is manouvre, and whilst the US generals did eventually come to use that concept (at the top of the pile in that category has to be Patton) for the army in general ity took a while. That was amply demonstrated in France 1944. Notwithstanding the spectacular breakout in July and the encirclement at Falaise (which put down to German incompetence more than Allied brilliance) , thereafter the US advances were broad front, conservative, unimaginative affairs in which the old maxim of firepower over was dominant again. The Americans would basically waddle up to a German delay point, blast the crap out of it, and then occupy that position, usually allowing the few German defenders plenty of time and opportunity to escape.
These problems were overcome and compensated for, but not as a whole in 1942. in the pacific the one unit that did well in the beginning were the marines, where the leaders were mostly or significantly prewar, and the fighting was positional, where US doctrinal strengths could be exploited to the maximum. Elsewhere, the US in 1942 fought with very mediocre performance. In the later campaigns they compensated for these persistent issues with numbers at the point of impact, coupled with massive supporting firepower. Where that firepower was not available, or less available, they struggled again.
I was going through the USSBS for an unrelated reason when I found a table showing the total number of aircraft involved in the European war. A footnote explains that for the USAAF this includes 'total combat planes in European and Mediterranean theaters of Operation.' It does also include reconnaissance types as fighters.
June '43 2,273 bombers and 2,621 fighters for a total of 4,894 aircraft
June '44 6,384 bombers and 5,296 fighters for a total 0f 11,680 aircraft.
For the RAF, which was not building up in Europe, it was already there and had been for nearly four years by June 1943
June '43 5,994 bombers and 6,990 fighters for a total of 12,985 aircraft
June '44 5,574 bombers and 7,663 fighters for a total of 13,237 aircraft.
It took until June '44 until the USAAF had anything like comparable numbers of aircraft to the RAF.
Cheers
Steve
June '43 2,273 bombers and 2,621 fighters for a total of 4,894 aircraft
June '44 6,384 bombers and 5,296 fighters for a total 0f 11,680 aircraft.
For the RAF, which was not building up in Europe, it was already there and had been for nearly four years by June 1943
June '43 5,994 bombers and 6,990 fighters for a total of 12,985 aircraft
June '44 5,574 bombers and 7,663 fighters for a total of 13,237 aircraft.
It took until June '44 until the USAAF had anything like comparable numbers of aircraft to the RAF.
Cheers
Steve
Those numbers, particularly for 1943, would contain many obsolete aircraft. It is not a reflection of front line strength but a total number, by category, calculated as monthly averages. For example the RAF total would include every Spitfire I, II, Blenheim, Defiant and Hurricane still flying at the various training units, not exactly useful for an invasion of Europe.
A comparable number for the Luftwaffe would include every fighter, including those a flight schools and other types which might fall into the 'fighter' category. I wouldn't fancy flying an ex French Hawk against the invasion
Air superiority was secured and maintained in 1944 with about 13,000 fighters not the less than 10,000 of a year earlier. Notice that the RAF strength barely changes (increase of 673/<10% in the year) and yet it was not capable of dominating European air space until the arrival of significant numbers of US air forces in 1943/4. US fighter strength in Europe increased by 2,675, near enough doubling in the same period.
The type of aircraft is also important. Those American fighters, arriving in force, were P-51s.
Cheers
Steve
A comparable number for the Luftwaffe would include every fighter, including those a flight schools and other types which might fall into the 'fighter' category. I wouldn't fancy flying an ex French Hawk against the invasion
Air superiority was secured and maintained in 1944 with about 13,000 fighters not the less than 10,000 of a year earlier. Notice that the RAF strength barely changes (increase of 673/<10% in the year) and yet it was not capable of dominating European air space until the arrival of significant numbers of US air forces in 1943/4. US fighter strength in Europe increased by 2,675, near enough doubling in the same period.
The type of aircraft is also important. Those American fighters, arriving in force, were P-51s.
Cheers
Steve
soulezoo
Senior Airman
Without comment on the rest, the Stuarts were very competitive with the Shinotos and the Shinotos were vulnerable to the 37mm gun on the Stuart (as the Stuart was to the larger gun on the Shinoto). Much as we argue with regard to fighter aircraft, the differences came down to the user. The Grant tanks, ungainly as they were, were much superior in most respects to the Shinoto. The Shinoto Chi-Ha was indeed the best of Japanese tanks; however, that did not make it a very good tank. Although it was very competent for jungle warfare unopposed by other armor.
soulezoo
Senior Airman
The same folks arguing this will typically try to have it both ways:
In the first, you have the "we need to have a draft for fair social leveling" thought in which the rich and poor are equally drafted and in that the rich (who usually control governance) will be less likely to start a war. But in any case, the "rich" have to fight too.
Then the same will argue that a draft unfairly targets the poor as so many more of them are drafted than the rich. Forgetting that there are so many more poor to begin with.
That is how the US ended up with the volunteer services. Hard to discriminate when one volunteers. However, that is also argued against as when it is volunteer, the "rich" don't have to play at all.
All of this screams at me "Marxist class warfare".
I think you need to check who Scales is. Whatever I may think of him, a Marxist he is not. I doubt that the US would appoint a Marxist as commandant of the U.S. Army War College
Cheers
Steve
parsifal
Colonel
Steve, regarding your post 153....
Im curious as to readiness rates between June 1943 and June 1944. How many sorties per day was the air force of 1943 capable of, compared to the air force a year later. Im willing to wager it was lower per a/c at the earlier date.
Im curious as to readiness rates between June 1943 and June 1944. How many sorties per day was the air force of 1943 capable of, compared to the air force a year later. Im willing to wager it was lower per a/c at the earlier date.
from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a542518.pdf
vs Germany
June '43
on hand - 5928
sorties - 17352
sorties per a/c - 2.9
June'44
on hand - 15210
sorties - 130043
sorties per a/c- 8.5
vs Germany
June '43
on hand - 5928
sorties - 17352
sorties per a/c - 2.9
June'44
on hand - 15210
sorties - 130043
sorties per a/c- 8.5
