Thanks for the very informative replies.
BarnOWL: I never said 8th AF leadership dominated by bomber guys. I said USAAC/AAF leadership dominated by bomber guys, and I think that was key to Greg's original contention. Its an interesting topic, the leadership mix. For example, in the USN you have basically 3 branches: Aviation, Surface Warfare, and Submarine. Yes there are other parts of the makeup, but generally those are the 3. They try to equally distribute the flag positions to those 3 branches, and even then some outstanding officers like Edward L. Beach, jr. do not make flag rank. I think the basic assertion is that the bomber mafia dominated the USAAF, and that their biases affected force structures, and thus outcomes. Thanks also for the reference to the book, which I keep seeing mentioned but had not yet seen the actual title.
When I pressed Greg to be specific regarding names in the Bomber Mafia he was somewhat evasive and then named Arnold. Who are your nominees?
The Vision for an independent Service Arm, co-equal to Army and Navy was to build a Strategic Air Combat arm capable of destroying enemy Industrial capacity, while sill serving the needs of the Army with respect to Pursuit, Attack, Transport and Observation.
Ponder a 1939 Budget pre-Poland Invasion in which the Armed Services were extremely small and the budget by reuirement was very low. Then, in your mind's eye envision the leadership structure trying to control explosive growth in anticipation of engaging a war for which we (US) were woefully unprepared for.
Place yourslf as the critic, given full hindsight of the outcomes, of War Planners trying to plan and allocate priorities of a nation that 'can do anything- but not everything'. Your country is isolated frm Europe and Asia by watery logistical nigtmares for a foe to solve - if contemplating war with US. What priority for range for Pursuit do you see as desirable, recognizing that fuel fractions are the bane of performance attainment. I suspet command and control of the airspace over CONUS and a band offshore might even be your huckleberry.
Forget for the moment the fierce battles for favor by the Navy and Army for the President's ear and approval. What are your priorities for the AAC/AAF in November 1941? Remember that the 1939 priorities are being executed and the 1940 priorites are really just getting started.
Tell us what your agenda is (in Fy 40/41 for US Strategic Air Force (fledgling) for 1943?
Mr. Sinclair: Thanks for your long and informational reply. It appears that you have shown that I over-stated the bomber crew casualties caused by lack of fighter escort in the early part of the war. Having said that, those casualties were still very significant, far more than were anticipated. Whenever I listen to videos or read narratives from USAAF veterans, I always ask myself WHEN they were in combat. There aren't very many from 1942/43, a staggering number were killed. It would appear that the life expectancy of a bomber crewman arriving in the theatre in June/July/Aug/Sept of 1943 was very short indeed. Your question about the number of senior leaders coming from the bomber pipeline hits to the core of the claimed issue. I confess I don't know the percentages, but it APPEARS that the bomber mafia had undue influence over decision making, even if the %'s of general officers don't show that. Thanks also for the Eaker quote that 2/3 of the casualties on the Munster raid in Oct 43 could have been avoided with fighter escort. If I was FDR or Marshall, and Eaker said that to me, I would have unloaded on him, "So why weren't they provided? Don't you or the other USAAF leadership know what you are doing? You told me that this force could do this job, and now these boys are being hacked to pieces and we don't have the tools to protect them!"
Asst Secy War Lovett HAD the ear of Stimson AND the President AND General's Marshall and Arnold - and reported his findings during his tour of ETO/England in Spring of 1943. General Deloss Emmons, former equal (and well respected) of Arnold was quite clear that escort fighters all the way to the targets were essential for success of POINTBLANK. Bot recommended dispatching P38s and P-51s ASAP. Eaker pleaded with Arnold for Mustangs and Lightnings in June, 1943 - and Arnold responded by re-routing 20th and 55th FG to ETO and directing the soon to be equipped tactical FG's (P-51B) to 9th AF.
You are blaming Eaker (and by proxy rnold) for the unexpected resistance of the LW and the 'massive transfer' of experienced LW units from OST and SUD fronts to the Defense of the Reich beginning summer 1943. That is an intelligence failure coupled with over optimistic claims by 8h AF gunners which led Eaker to believe 8th AF could win a bloody war of attrition.
My guess is that those leaders never heard those words from the horse's mouth, since you say that they were in a letter to another person.
Mr Gunn: Thanks for your comments Oblique references such as the one to the Colonel are frustrating to newbies like me. Which Colonel, and when? There are a lot of those kinds of "toss off" remarks made in this forum that require hours of reading of old threads to figure out. There was a Colonel that was holding up the Merlin Mustang? I guess I need to read the book.
No need, Col (1940), B.Gen (1941), MGen (1942) Oliver Echols CO Materiel Command including Wright Field Development Ceter as well as AirService Command. He was stonewalled by Kindelberger when requesting NAA build P-40s for the Brits. There is ample evidence that he held a grudge to the extent that he fought Operational Requirements specific order to buy the A-36, was treated 'roughly', tried aain to kill Mustang production but was over-run with exedited priority for Merlin Powered Mustang prototype and once again, for continuation of Mustang with P-51A orders.
Echols also bought into the worst turkey ever ordered by Mat.Command - namely the XP-75 - to meet Arnold's demand for a Fighter with 1500 mi range and peformance equal to best in world (Dec 1940).
Flight Testing for Operational Suitabiity was peeled away from his hands and dispatched to Orlando and Eglin Fields - primarily because of the god awful issues incountered with P-47 and P-38 early in combat operations
The bottom line to me is that the USAAF was poorly equipped and trained to carry out the planned operations, not unlike other services such as the submarine service I have mentioned several times. (How someone didn't end up in the stockade over the torpedo problems alone is beyond me but I digress.) I still see Greg's central argument as valid: the lack of drop tanks was scandalous and unforgiveable. (By "lack of drop tanks" I mean the whole program for tactical use: engineering, design, testing, implementation, production, training, etc.) I haven't seen anyone really refute that, and will look forward to the "debate" if and when it happens.
To the above, think about a nation growing from 320,000 active duty military peronnel in 1938 to 13 million in 1944 and an unlimited budget with few adult supervisors to anticipate the battle requirements to win.