The crews of IV./JG 27 participated in two very successful operations on 15.11.43 when they shot down 14 Lightnings and one Mitchell bomber with no losses of their own aircraft. Hptm.Kirschner and Fw.Bartels both returned with four kill.
On 17.11.43 the German fighters flew in defence of Kalamaki airfield under attack by a large formation of Mitchells and their P-38 escort. The Luftwaffe pilots brought down four B-25s and four P-38s. Most of the kills again went to the 'killer duo': Hptm.Kirschner shot down two enemy aircraft and Fw.Bartels three.
A little background on confirmation of Luftwaffe claims:
The major difference between the German and Western Allies' method of scoring victories was that the Germans were not allowed to share a victory. Their cardinal rule was: "One pilot-one kill." In contrast Allied pilots were allowed to share victories. If two pilots fired at an enemy and it went down, each Allied pilot received one-half of the kill. Carried to absurdity, it is conceivable that an Allied pilot could become an ace with ten or more half-victories, never scoring any victories of his own! The Luftwaffe system of awarding victories was impartial, inflexible, and far less prone to error than the American or British method. That is not to say that errors were not made, history shows that both sides during the "Battle of Britain" tended to overclaim victories on a scale of 2:1.
The German's recorded victories in one of three categories: Abschuss (Destroyed), Herausschuss (Seperation), and endgueltige Vernichtung (Final Destruction.) These three categories were used for assessing "points" towards awards. Only an enemy aircraft in an Abschuss was counted towards the pilot's overall victory tally. A pilot that brought down and enemy plane with a Endgueltige Vernichtung or Final Destruction of a damaged aircraft was not awarded credit for the "kill", however he did earn "points" for the aircraft's destruction.
Following the policy of "one pilot-one kill", the investigating authorities would determine if the claiming pilot was solely responsible for the destruction of the enemy plane. Every Abschuss had to be observed by a witness: either a ground observer or the encounter, the pilot's wingman, or a Staffelmate. Witnesses were necessary unless the victor's aircraft had been fitted with a gun-camera and the destruction of the plane or the vanquished pilot's bailout had been recorded on film, if the wreckage of the downed pilot or other crew crew member had been captured by German forces. In effect: No witness or tangible evidence - no victory.
Every Abschuss had to be confirmed by the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe or Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Jagdwaffe pilots were at all times required to note their geographical position as well as the type and number of the aircraft in enemy formations engaged. Naturally, the victor was required to log the exact time of a kill, while he maneuvered for a tactical advantage over the remaining enemy aircraft! In addition, he had to observe other actions in the air in order to be able to witness victories by his Staffelmates. Upon landing, the claimant prepared his Abschuss report for review by the immediate supervisory officer, who either endorsed or rejected the claim. If endorsed, the pilot's report to the Geschwaderstab, or Wing Staff, which, in turn, filed its report and sent both to the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), or Air Ministry. After checking all the papers that were submitted, the official confirmation was prepared and sent to the unit. This very long bureaucratic proceedure sometimes took as long as a year! During 1944, another authority was created: the Abschusskommission, which received all reports on crashed aircraft remains found by search units. This commission checked conflicting claims between antiaircraft batteries and fighter pilots, and awarded credit for the victory to one claimant or the other. This system ensured that no more credits would be awarded than wrecks found.
The German system of confirming aerial victories was very effective in keeping human errors and weknesses within limits. Despite this, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, or Luftwaffe High Command, considered the large victory totals during the early days of the Russian campaign as incredulous. On many occasions, they accused the Jagdgeschwader Kommodores of exaggerating the victory scores. In effect Goering was calling the frontline pilots liars. This was one of the grievances that brought about the Mutiny of the Fighters, or the Kommodores' Revolt Conference, in Berlin during January, 1945.
When a German fighter pilot scored a victory, he would call "Horrido" on the radio. This distinctive announcement of victory alerted his fellow pilots to watch for a crash or a flamer, as well as notify ground stations, which helped to confirm many victories.
So, in my opinion on 15.1143 17.11.43, there were serious errors in Allied reports of damaged/destroyed aircraft. How to prove those errors 65 years later is another matter all together.
On 17.11.43 the German fighters flew in defence of Kalamaki airfield under attack by a large formation of Mitchells and their P-38 escort. The Luftwaffe pilots brought down four B-25s and four P-38s. Most of the kills again went to the 'killer duo': Hptm.Kirschner shot down two enemy aircraft and Fw.Bartels three.
A little background on confirmation of Luftwaffe claims:
The major difference between the German and Western Allies' method of scoring victories was that the Germans were not allowed to share a victory. Their cardinal rule was: "One pilot-one kill." In contrast Allied pilots were allowed to share victories. If two pilots fired at an enemy and it went down, each Allied pilot received one-half of the kill. Carried to absurdity, it is conceivable that an Allied pilot could become an ace with ten or more half-victories, never scoring any victories of his own! The Luftwaffe system of awarding victories was impartial, inflexible, and far less prone to error than the American or British method. That is not to say that errors were not made, history shows that both sides during the "Battle of Britain" tended to overclaim victories on a scale of 2:1.
The German's recorded victories in one of three categories: Abschuss (Destroyed), Herausschuss (Seperation), and endgueltige Vernichtung (Final Destruction.) These three categories were used for assessing "points" towards awards. Only an enemy aircraft in an Abschuss was counted towards the pilot's overall victory tally. A pilot that brought down and enemy plane with a Endgueltige Vernichtung or Final Destruction of a damaged aircraft was not awarded credit for the "kill", however he did earn "points" for the aircraft's destruction.
Following the policy of "one pilot-one kill", the investigating authorities would determine if the claiming pilot was solely responsible for the destruction of the enemy plane. Every Abschuss had to be observed by a witness: either a ground observer or the encounter, the pilot's wingman, or a Staffelmate. Witnesses were necessary unless the victor's aircraft had been fitted with a gun-camera and the destruction of the plane or the vanquished pilot's bailout had been recorded on film, if the wreckage of the downed pilot or other crew crew member had been captured by German forces. In effect: No witness or tangible evidence - no victory.
Every Abschuss had to be confirmed by the Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe or Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Jagdwaffe pilots were at all times required to note their geographical position as well as the type and number of the aircraft in enemy formations engaged. Naturally, the victor was required to log the exact time of a kill, while he maneuvered for a tactical advantage over the remaining enemy aircraft! In addition, he had to observe other actions in the air in order to be able to witness victories by his Staffelmates. Upon landing, the claimant prepared his Abschuss report for review by the immediate supervisory officer, who either endorsed or rejected the claim. If endorsed, the pilot's report to the Geschwaderstab, or Wing Staff, which, in turn, filed its report and sent both to the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), or Air Ministry. After checking all the papers that were submitted, the official confirmation was prepared and sent to the unit. This very long bureaucratic proceedure sometimes took as long as a year! During 1944, another authority was created: the Abschusskommission, which received all reports on crashed aircraft remains found by search units. This commission checked conflicting claims between antiaircraft batteries and fighter pilots, and awarded credit for the victory to one claimant or the other. This system ensured that no more credits would be awarded than wrecks found.
The German system of confirming aerial victories was very effective in keeping human errors and weknesses within limits. Despite this, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, or Luftwaffe High Command, considered the large victory totals during the early days of the Russian campaign as incredulous. On many occasions, they accused the Jagdgeschwader Kommodores of exaggerating the victory scores. In effect Goering was calling the frontline pilots liars. This was one of the grievances that brought about the Mutiny of the Fighters, or the Kommodores' Revolt Conference, in Berlin during January, 1945.
When a German fighter pilot scored a victory, he would call "Horrido" on the radio. This distinctive announcement of victory alerted his fellow pilots to watch for a crash or a flamer, as well as notify ground stations, which helped to confirm many victories.
So, in my opinion on 15.1143 17.11.43, there were serious errors in Allied reports of damaged/destroyed aircraft. How to prove those errors 65 years later is another matter all together.
