Casualities in unescorted US heavy bombers by German fighter type

[drgondog]

IMHO hits on viermot anywhere was a mission kill. From pilot accounts I read, attacked bombers SOP was to jettison bombs immidiately.

Tante Ju - dropping bomb load was discretionary when forced out of formation and some bombers thus affected actually returned with bomb loads because the bombadier and pilot were concerned about dropping them sight unseen on occupied country - not so much of a 'problem' over Germany.

 

[Jenisch]

Tante Ju - dropping bomb load was discretionary when forced out of formation and some bombers thus affected actually returned with bomb loads because the bombadier and pilot were concerned about dropping them sight unseen on occupied country - not so much of a 'problem' over Germany.

Some days ago I was thinking just of this. Even over Germany, imaginate you could kill inocent people that weren't in the cities and should not been killed makes you think. However, if I was a bomber caption over Germany and had to jettison the bomb load to not fall out of the formation by damage, I wouldn't think twice in do so.

 

[drgondog]

Having said That Janisch I know a lot of bomber pilots that reflected back on the loss of innocent life during their service and nobody I knew said "kill em all and let god sort it out!". I know my father strafed barges and trains and his combat film had several clips of train cars blowing up with passenger cars attached. While he assumed the passengers were German troops he just didn't KNOW that no civilians were killed.

 

[Jenisch]

Perhaps pilots had this feeling more in mind because their training. They were ordered for example, to never test their guns over urban areas. There was risk of the falling cartridges hit someone and cause serious enjury, not to mention the projectiles themselfs. In the congested skies of Europe in WWII, there was even risk of in the act of jettison your bombs, you hit someone with them (the best being an enemy).

 

[Erich]

discharging of weapons happened many times over sea as it was expected the LW fighters could come up in numbers 43-44 and engage even before making land en-masse, 44-45 it didn't matter any village below was going to be buffled by shell casings as well as ground based Flak debris

 

[stona]

There seems to be a supposition that a head on attack was a tactic universally adopted by the intercepting Luftwaffe fighters at some point in the war. That's news to me. It was adopted by some units but was desperately difficult to pull off. Most interceptions were of a more traditional type. Check pilot accounts and gun camera footage.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

Egon Mayer with JG 2 developed the S/E head on attack in 43 and all JG's used it till early 1944, T/E would attack from the tail or above and from the sides. with the advent of Fw 190A equipped Sturmstaffel 1 in late December 43/44 the tactic slowly changed till all JG's used from rear from June 44 till wars end with several small cahnges, instead of attacking in line abreast staffel it was by rote.

 

[drgondog]

Erich dead on with respect to LW adoption of effective attack strategy.. AFAIK it was only used against US heavy bombers in massed combat formation - and certainly the reason the B-17F was field modified to place more guns available to the bombadier and occasionally the navigator. When the YB-40 entered it was too slow on return trip but the chin turret became the standard for B-17G's and was somewhat more effective for company front head on attacks.

 

[Erich]

and then the opposite happened Bill in LW aerial tactics to counter the weakest point on the 4-engine heavy, attack the single position tail and then close in as close as possible and shoot out the inboard engines or both engines on one wing

 

[stona]

JG 2 developed the S/E head on attack in 43 and all JG's used it till early 1944,

It was used but I have never seen any evidence that it was the sole or even most common tactic.If there are any orders to that effect I'd love to see them. I'm working from my dodgy old memory as I'm away from home until next week! Pilot accounts and combat footage,including the educational reels, would indicate that other tactics were also used.
A head on interception is difficult to achieve and a head on attack is the most difficult to execute. The Jagdwaffe simply did not have pilots capable of carrying out this sort of interception and attack after the losses of early 1943.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Erich]

suggest you find the Dr. J. Prien individual histories they explain fair enough how the tactic was carried out with first person account true to say the closing rate was horrible and collision occurred. the head on ws the main tactic but the rear and side cannot be ruled out as if the Allied escorts were not about once the ehad on was done through the attack was remounted and re-used or attacks from all angles.

Much of the gun cam footage from S/E fighters is in fact T/E and also the dates-years are not correct. as I said earlier the T/E both Bf 110G-2 and Me 410 variants had loads of cannons of large caliber and it makes sense to sit back to the rear or left, right side and pop off rounds to see if they connect so the crew could close in if the chaos developed especially when the Br 21cm mortars were used in the dual underwing capacity.

 

[drgondog]

Steve - with all due respect, the 'dean' of head on attacks was Egon Mayer, the tactics were developed in ~ summer 1943 and Mayer was killed as JG2 Kommodore on March 2, 1944. Not sure what you had in mind referencing 'losses of early 1943'?

I suspect pilot training was an issue but the introduction of the 30mm cannon with its associated lob ballistics and devastating firepower made the mass attack more desirable simply because the pilots had to close to be effective and the head on attack was designed to a.) kill the cockpit, and b.) attack the weakest coverage at the highest closing rate to reduce LW casualties.

 

[Erich]

Priens volume 1 and 2 point this out dramatically. when viewing the 2nd volume that I./JG 11 was equipped with the Fw 190A-8/MK it was quite apparent that I. gruppe had a terrible time closing in head on to fire the outboard 3cm weapons; yes the 3cm had the devastating firepower but all the .50's pointing at you and of course you had to run the gauntlet of going through the box which took an eternity being fired at point blank range before you could ascend or descend out of harms way.

 

[Milosh]

What is a Fw190A-8/MK? Never seen that sub type before.

 

[Erich]

Milosh, Sturmstaffel 1 had a few on hand, I./JG 11 and portions of JG 1 also used them for several months, this is before the R2 designation was given to them and increase in body armor. Fw 190A-8 un-armored version but with outboard 2cm removed and replaced by 3cm MK 108's.

 

[Milosh]

So the MK designation denote the installation of the MK108. Learned something new.

 

[Erich]

YES confirmed !

 

[iron man]

Priens volume 1 and 2 point this out dramatically. when viewing the 2nd volume that I./JG 11 was equipped with the Fw 190A-8/MK it was quite apparent that I. gruppe had a terrible time closing in head on to fire the outboard 3cm weapons; yes the 3cm had the devastating firepower but all the .50's pointing at you and of course you had to run the gauntlet of going through the box which took an eternity being fired at point blank range before you could ascend or descend out of harms way.

On this topic, Dr. Prien's (etal) work stands head and shoulders above anything else published in the English language, IMO.

Time to pony up for a few books Stona/Steve.

Pick up Theo Boiten's volumes on the Nachtjager while you're at it. Money well spent for a "hardcore airhead"...

Agreed Erich...the ballistic properties and rate of fire (limitations) of the 3cm MK108 round were far from suitable for the closing speeds of frontal attacks; OTOH, the 151/20 was a whole different matter and it was used to devestating effect (from the front) during the period our OP indicated. One also has to bear in mind that the MK108 was rife with "problems" during it's early phase of operational trials (Especially as a Motorkannone in the 109G/U4; Autumn 1943>) and it took considerable effort to sort it all out. The U9/(later R3) mod to the 110G-2 went though similar "issues" with the Mk108 as well.

Also? I fully agree (on the "I saw it on a 'documentary'" aspect) when talking about some of the gun-camera footage that floats about in cyberspace.

 

[Siegfried]

and then the opposite happened Bill in LW aerial tactics to counter the weakest point on the 4-engine heavy, attack the single position tail and then close in as close as possible and shoot out the inboard engines or both engines on one wing

I'm not sure if it signals a change in tactics as much as introduction of extra tactics. Specially armoured Stormbok FW 190's conducted tail attacks, their armour allowed them to survive long enough to bring down the bomber and their fire power armour combo meant they had more destructive power against the bomber than the other way around.

More lightly armoured aircraft eg Me 109G or ordinary Fw 190A continued with the head on attack tactics.

 

[Erich]

actually with the SturmFsw attacks all Jg gruppen with 109G's were to provide high cover agaqsint the US escrts before assaulting the bombers, the heavy
Fw 190A-8's had priority thatg is just the way it was. JG 1 and JG 11 stayed with attacks from the rear as well. when JG 301 came on the scene renewed with new Fw 190A they had practised the tail attack tactic from All of September till their first mission of 21 November which was a total failure the LW craft leader took then in a round about way to attack from the front which all pilots disagreed upon even during the attack and paid for it as the head on attack was all new to the new recruits.

it was already proven clear through summer of 44 into the terrible fall of 44 that the underbellys even half armored on the heavy Fw 190A's could not withstand the .50 firepower at such a close range........ JG 3, 4 and 300's Fw 190 cadre history is an interesting one yet sadly with terrible casualties.