Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

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And you my friend are knowledgeable man but not a historian.

Some of the Japanese of that generation were like that. The ones trying to get the country ready for the 20th Century. But they were not alone.

Ever heard of the Satsuma rebellion? That was the last gasp of the medieval type Samurai, in 1877.

Satsuma Rebellion - Wikipedia



These guys were from the Boshun War, about 10 years earlier (1868-69), another Samurai rebellion.

Boshin War - Wikipedia

 
The more I've thought about it and looked at the outcomes the whole perimeter defence plan of Japans Navy in WW2 was flawed, they were establishing outposts too far from their logistic and force capabilities.

Guadalcanal and Midway were the great loss battles of IJN and they were both at their extreme reach, and offered no material or produce reward.
 
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Hi guys,

There are a lot of interesting ideas posted in this thread (and no that is not my way of saying some or all of you are all nuts or anything like that).

I would again like to suggest that anyone interested in the war in the PTO read the following book:

"War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by Edward S. Miller, published by the United States Naval Institute, and by Shinchosa Ltd. in Japanese

Although it is primarily concerned with the US perspective, it also necessarily includes some of the aspects of Japanese thinking on the subject of taking control of various areas in the PTO.

One aspect closely relating to this thread's subject is that the Japanese high command never considered it feasible to invade Hawaii in any early operation, and impractical at a later date unless they could defeat the USN in a decisive final manner, in which case there would have been no need to invade.

Another aspect is that the US also considered it impractical to invade a similar Japanese target at a similar distance in any early operation. At the beginning of the war in the PTO , the US planners knew the US did not have enough force projection ability to have a reasonable chance of holding distant areas already under US control (such as the Philippines) let alone invade and hold other objectives at similar distance.

Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchukuo, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union.

I have met a fair amount of resistance to this idea, all I can say is that if tomorrow the US (or any other modern high standard of living industrial nation) was suddenly cut off from oil: what would they do? I think that it is safe to say that the US and various European nations would go to war to regain access to oil.
 
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From what I've read anyway I agree but isn't the next layer to this that the reason that the western nations cut off the oil is the invasion of China and the abuses there.
 
So if there was no embargo then Japan wouldn't be forced to go to war with the western powers.

So no embargo no Pearl Harbour.
 

Just to be clear, all of the Atolls and islands that I mentioned my theoretical Japanese war-plan already had (American made) airfields in 1942.
 
But without the embargo, Japan would have far greater freedom to operate in China, which would make any nation supplying oil to Japan complicit in the atrocities committed.


It's quite complex - I highly recommend Dan Carlin's "Supernova in the East" series as a great introduction to the nuances of the situation. Japan had originally been opportunistic in China but over time they had kind of gotten stuck there with no easy way out. The US and others saw themselves as in the right to conduct the embargo but also didn't consider the Japanese as "one of them". The embargo was taking place in the absence of any kind of realistic diplomacy on either side that could have really de-escalated the situation.

It's kind of reminiscent of some of the same kind of things the US is doing today...
 

According to Lundstrom's First Team and Shattered Sword IJN losses to fighters against Midway were minimal, (~4 aircraft) with the majority of losses being from Midway AA:


 
An interesting twist is that the USN, in 1942, was periodically appealing for RN carrier support. However, the Allies big fear would be another IJN foray into the Indian Ocean.
 
By a long-ago rough count, more than 90% of WW II phib ops succeeded.
But
they were largely allied.
IMO a Midway loss would ensure that Hawaii was untouchable. The global strategy game might have been affected (Torch leaps to mind) but as noted here, Japan did not have the sealift or the offensive capability to mount a corps-sized operation on Oahu. The empire was already spread thin on the Asian mainland and in the W Pacific.
And THAT is worth just what you paid for it!

Sidebar: there's been recent discussion about Germany seizing Britain, with next year's 80th anniversary of the BoB. Was extremely unlikely. Apart from "D-Day in reverse," the Wehrmacht had no bow-ramp landing craft, a puny navy within a day's sail of the RN (KM capital ships were delegated to diversions, I believe), and the need to seize some channel ports intact. That was, IMO, never gonna happen.
 
I read this scenario somewhere. I think it was " If Mahan Ran the Great War". Oahu is too well defended to be captured easily. Instead of sending their troops to SE Asia/Phillipines, have the transports a safe safe distance behind the Pearl Harbor strike force. If the Pearl Harbor attack is not a success, the transports can withdraw with no losses.

If the attack is a success, invade one of the other islands (I believe Maui had a small airfield). Land a portion of the planes from the carrier strike force and keep Peal Harbor under attackI think that scenario could have worked if the Japanese had been bold enough.
 
Japan. We want to invade other countries.

Britain. Wanna buy Battleships?

Japan. Sweet.
Made sense at the time. Britain needed to recall its fleet to counter the Germans in Europe and was worried about growing Russian naval power in the Pacific. And of course Britain's shipbuilders were private companies seeking export business and foreign currency.

Had Britain refused to sell Japan battleships they would have bought them from the Germans, thus strengthening Germany's shipbuilding capability.

Back to aircraft, Britain is also responsible for the IJN air arm. William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill - Wikipedia and Mitsubishi 1MF - Wikipedia. Had Britain refused that assistance there was no one else to help them.
 

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