Custer and the Little Big Horn

[imalko]

I think that splitting his force was his downfall and ultimately led to his death. I say this because of knowledge of other tough fights against superior Indian forces on the plains. Even without extra troopers or Gatling guns I think his unit in full strength would have repelled numerous attacks. As with any look at history I cannot be 100% sure.
Indians were not proffessional soldiers but guerrilla fighters who chose hit and run tactics most of the time. They would generally not stick around and take too many casualties. Once the Indians began taking casualties they usually scattered at high speed. This was the norm on the plains and southwest deserts. Another good example of this is the Adobe Walls fight in Texas. Some buffalo skinners held out with their Sharps rifles against an overwhelming force, using long range shooting and even killing old Roman Nose.

I agree on your opinion Amsel but I believe that Custer realized and tried to rectify his mistake when he ordered Benteen to join him and to be quick about it. This never happened due to the questionable behavior of his senior subordinates. Even late arrival of joined Reno-Benteen commands to the Custer's battlefield could have possibly change the final outcome as General Miles suggested. More so, becouse at that time entire Indian force was fighting Custer and wasn't expecting attack to the rear, thus Reno-Benteen's advance would be virtually unopposed.

Splitting forces and poor choice of battalion commanders were two mistakes that cost Custer the battle and led to his death and death of 210 troopers who were with him.

 

[imalko]

So my final conclusion is as fallows:

Was a decision to split forces a mistake? Yes, it was, but not irreversable and not a fatal mistake at that point. In my oppinion Custer realized his mistake and tried to rectify it, but both Reno and Benteen (for whatever reasons they had) ignored direct orders and failed to do their duty. They had an obligation and opportunity to support Custer but they didn't. This contributed to chain of events which ended with massacre of 210 men of the 7th Cavalry. Custer is not the only one to be blamed here. Actions or rather inactions of two senior subordinate officers ensured the disastrous outcome of the battle.

 

[Milos Sijacki]

Milos, the Indians did not have bolt action rifles. In fact the bolt action rifle was generally not in service anywhere in the world at that time. Some did have lever action repeating rifles. The Trapdoor Springfield did fire a heavy bullet with a lot of knockdown power, but the action had to be opened after every shot, the case extracted(and many were stuck) a new round chambered, the action closed and the hammer cocked before a new round could be fired. Custer was an arrogant officer and let his alligator mouth overload his aspirin ass.

I know, stupid of me to use the term BOLT ACTION rifles. Thanks for the correction.

 

[imalko]

From Kansas Collection Books here is a link to the book "My Life on the Plains" written by General G.A. Custer

My Life on the Plains, by Gen. G. A. Custer

 

[Soundbreaker Welch?]

Failure of marschal Grouchy to do the same at Waterloo greatly contributed to Napoleon's defeat.

I like that, it reminded me of it too.

 

[renrich]

Just finished reading a book picked up specifically to refresh my memory about the Custer fight so as to make more comments on this thread. The book is "Custer's Last Campaign," by John S Gray. Published in 1991 and the interesting thing about the book is that many modern history books seem to have the mission to prove a certain viewpoint and often can be characterised as "revisionist." This book does not try to assess performance, except secondarily, and makes use of all the eyewitness testimony in conjunction with time and motion studies and with recent forensic evidence to determine who was where when and possibly why during the battle. It seemed that none of the major commanders involved, Terry, Crook or Gibbon distinguished themselves during the campaign which may explain partly why Custer did so poorly. None of them seemed to be well versed on Indian fighting. However, it seems clear that Custer violated every rule in the book which resulted in his debacle. Firstly, he badly misjudged the character, will, capabilities and intentions of his enemy. He had capable scouts to recon the enemy and the terrain but ignored much of their advice and devised a battle plan without knowing the location and strength of his opponent and was absolutely ignorant of the ground the action was to take place on. It seemed that his biggest concern was keeping any of the Indians from getting away and when told numerous times by his scouts that he was going to have more Indians in his lap than he could handle, he scoffed at them. His best scout, Mitch Boyer, knew they were getting in over their head and were doomed to the extent that he told a 17 year old friend, a scout also, to clear out before it was too late. The 17 year old did so and got away. Custer split his command without knowing exactly where the enemy was and in what strength( although if he had listened to the scouts he might have been more cautious.) He sent Reno and his battalion ahead in to attack the south end of the village and told Reno that he, Custer, would support him if need be. Meanwhile Custer had no idea if the terrain would allow him to make a flank attack on Reno's Indians. As it turned out, it would not and Reno had to make a fighting withdrawal. Furthernore, Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river as they began their withdrawal so Custer must have seen they were in trouble but Custer continued down river, abandoning Reno and his men. Recent evidence indicates that Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place. Prudence would suggest that, at that point, Custer should have executed a retrograde movement back to where Reno was fighting and perhaps most of his command could have been saved. From my point of view, it is too bad that some Johnny Reb did not take Custer down during the States War. It would have saved a lot of heartache later.

 

[imalko]

Hello Renrich,
First let me say that this book you mentioned seem to me like interesting read. However I can't agree with some of your conclusions. I won't repeat my agruments since I have extensively wrote about them several post before, when I gave my view of the battle. I would just like to make few comments.

It seemed that none of the major commanders involved, Terry, Crook or Gibbon distinguished themselves during the campaign which may explain partly why Custer did so poorly. None of them seemed to be well versed on Indian fighting.

Terry and Gibbon were quite inexperienced, while Crook seen his share of Indian fighting. However, I would say that Custer was most experienced of this four commanders mentioned. He spent 10 years on the plains fighting Indians...

However, it seems clear that Custer violated every rule in the book which resulted in his debacle..... It seemed that his biggest concern was keeping any of the Indians from getting away....

Custer actually did everything by the book... Flanking the enemy was then common Cavalry tactic as stated in US Cavalry regulations of the period.
Custer's biggest concern was keeping Indians from getting away becouse this is what they usually did when faced by Cavalry. Custer was just acting on his previous experiences in Indian fighting.

...he badly misjudged the character, will, capabilities and intentions of his enemy.

True, but again he was acting on his previous experiences in Indian fighting.

Custer split his command without knowing exactly where the enemy was and in what strength( although if he had listened to the scouts he might have been more cautious.) He sent Reno and his battalion ahead in to attack the south end of the village and told Reno that he, Custer, would support him if need be. Meanwhile Custer had no idea if the terrain would allow him to make a flank attack on Reno's Indians.

Only partially true...Custer did have limited knowledge of the terrain he would have to face, but didn't greatly underestimated number of warriors. He was expecting to face over 1000 warriors, and the actual number of Indian warriors was around 1500.
Custer did made flank attack on the Indians. He deployed skirmish lines on the bluffs above the river further downstream, while trying to find crossing point and while waiting for Benteen's arrival. This is one of the reasons as why Indians disengaged Reno in the first place.

...Reno had to make a fighting withdrawal. Furthernore, Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river as they began their withdrawal so Custer must have seen they were in trouble but Custer continued down river, abandoning Reno and his men.

Reno haven't made a fighting withdrawal - it was a rout, a panic and disorganized retreat. Only repositioning of his forces to the more defendable position in the timber by the river early in the fight can be judged as fighting withdrawal or, rather, redeploying of forces. But after 30 minutes of fighting in timber Reno led panic retreat back across river to so called 'Reno hill'. Just read in one of my earlier post how Lt.Edward Godfrey, Little Big Horn veteran, described this event. It appears that Reno lost his nerve becouse one of the scouts Bloody Knife was killed while standing next to him, with parts of scouts brain splashing into Reno's face.

When Reno's men spotted Custer on the opposite side of the river, they were still deployed in skirmish line in the valley, fighting Indians. At that time they weren't in trouble, and only thing Custer could see was that Reno began the fight and managed to lure warriors out from the village, so now was the time for his (Custer's) flanking attack. Reno's men couldn't see Custer during their retreat across the river and for sure not while they were still fighting in timber.

Recent evidence indicates that Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place. Prudence would suggest that, at that point, Custer should have executed a retrograde movement back to where Reno was fighting and perhaps most of his command could have been saved.

Yes, Custer was in heavy fighting before he got into the area where the last stand took place, but at first Custer's force managed fight of Indians for a time. However, the "Last Stand Hill" wasn't located further downstream but in opposite direction. Only when his lines collapsed and Calhoun's position was overrun, Custer actually retreated towards the "Last Stand Hill". But one thing we must keep in mind when talking about Custer's actions - he didn't knew what happened to Reno's command, but for all this time, from beginning to the end of Custer's fight, he was expecting Benteen's arrival. I think this can explain as why Custer didn't retreated towards Reno's position as you suggest.

From my point of view, it is too bad that some Johnny Reb did not take Custer down during the States War. It would have saved a lot of heartache later.

I disagree. Custer was successfull and capable cavalry commander during Civil war and indeed in Indian wars up to the Little Big Horn campaign. Yes, he had his ups and downs, but as Adler stated in one other thread, you can not judge a commander only by one engagement.

I don't consider myself a "Custer appologist". I only think that he was better then people give him credit for. It is too easy a way out just to blame Custer for everything that went wrong during this battle. The battle itself was not a simple affair and conduct of other senior officers involved was highly questionable. Yes, Custer made some mistakes, but as I wrote before Reno's and Benteen's actions ensured the disastrous final outcome.

 

[Colin1]

It is too easy a way out just to blame Custer for everything that went wrong during this battle. The battle itself was not a simple affair and conduct of other senior officers involved was highly questionable. Yes, Custer made some mistakes, but as I wrote before Reno's and Benteen's actions ensured the disastrous final outcome.

...but didn't greatly underestimated number of warriors. He was expecting to face over 1000 warriors, and the actual number of Indian warriors was around 1500...

Custer was blue forces (pun intended) battlefield commander, why shouldn't he be blamed for what happened, he

i. routinely dismissed his scouting reports regarding enemy strength
ii. was not fully intimate with the topology of the battlefield
iii. rejected decisive assets as unnecessary
iv. based on the above, split his forces (as it turned out) disastrously

if you're on Last Stand Hill with what's left of your command and 1500 choctaws are engaging you instead of the expected 1000, I'd call that a major underestimation (66%) of your enemy's field-able strength

Custer sounded like a vainglorious hot-head, he wasn't ready for the big chair

 

[imalko]

i. routinely dismissed his scouting reports regarding enemy strength

Not true, how else could he know that he is about to face over 1000 warriors.

ii. was not fully intimate with the topology of the battlefield

True, but not a decisive factor.

iii. rejected decisive assets as unnecessary

True, when additional troops are concerned, arguable regarding the Gattling guns(read previous posts).

iv. based on the above, split his forces (as it turned out) disastrously

if you're on Last Stand Hill with what's left of your command and 1500 choctaws are engaging you instead of the expected 1000, I'd call that a major underestimation (66%) of your enemy's field-able strength

Spliting forces was not by itself disastrous (anyway the decision was made on previous Custer's experiences in Indian fighting). What made it disastrous was disobedience of orders by two senior subordinate officers. That is why Custer is not the only one to be blamed here.

Custer couldn't won when two thirds of his total force was out of the battle after 30 minutes of fighting and contrary to his orders. I'm talking about battle on 25th June of course and not the "siege" that joint Reno-Benteen's commands endured in two fallowing days.

Custer sounded like a vainglorious hot-head, he wasn't ready for the big chair

Partly true, and that is why he wasn't a General after 1865 but only a Lt.Col.
Maybe he "wasn't ready for for the big chair" maybe he was, but he for sure wasn't totally incompetent as sometimes portrayed.

 

[renrich]

I think you mischaracterise Reno's fight. He dismounted his troops and put them into a line of skirmishers and advanced on the village. When the Indians outflanked him on the left, he withdrew into the woods along the river and when it began to be obvious he was going to be overrun he forded the river and staged a fighting withdrawal to the hill. His command was probably saved at that time by many of the Indians leaving to go get Custer. It seems sure that Custer had knowledge of the Rosebud Fight on June 17 where Terry with more than a thousand men was barely able to hold off the Indians. One would think that Custer would allow that knowledge to guide his actions. My thinking is that both Reno and Benteen knew that Custer was going to get them in over their head and they showed more common sense than he did. The facts are not arguable. Custer split his forces without knowing the strength of the enemy or how they were disposed or what the terrain was like where he would fight. Every decision he made showed how arrogant and wrongheaded he was. It is probably fortunate that Reno and Benteen were more levelheaded than Custer. He got away with a lot of his harebrained activities during the States War because the Union Army was usually better armed and mounted and outnumbered his enemy and the terrain over which they fought was well known. It is a shame that Stuart was killed and Custer was not. Stuart would have done much better at the Little Bighorn.

 

[BombTaxi]

On that note (although slightly OT), would Stuart have been allowed to hold high rank a decade after the Civil War? I just wonder - I have no idea myself how long it took to re-integrate ex-rebels into the forces (or government, for that matter).

 

[renrich]

Joe Wheeler, a Confederate General held that same rank in the US Army postwar. Stuart's first post after graduation from West Point was at Fort Davis in Texas fighting Indians, I think in 1854-55.

 

[BombTaxi]

Thanks ren, something else learned today! 8)

 

[imalko]

Regarding the Reno's "fighting withdrawal to the hill", here is once more a description of this event by one of the Little Big Horn veterans:

"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; that he could and should have held that position... Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command. The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "

Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry​

​

Regarding the Rosebud Fight on June 17 - commanding officer there was Crook and not Terry. It could be said that with more than a thousand men Crook was barely able to hold off the Indians. And Crook's casualties in this fight were 10 soldiers killed and 21 wounded. Indian casualties are estimated at less the 100. However, Crook was surprised by Indian's aggressiveness so on 18th June his entire column returned to the Goose Creek Camp to await reinforcements.

Custer and his 7th Cavalry separated from General Terry and Montana Column at noon on 22 June. Since Crook had send no words to Terry's Montana column about his withdrawal, I fail to see as how "it seems sure" that Custer had any knowledge of these events.

Custer split his forces knowing approximately the strength of the enemy...

I don't feel at all that "Reno and Benteen... showed more common sense than Custer." In fact Reno completely lost his nerve and his conduct of retreat across the river is proof of that. Further more this was his first campaign against Indians, so he was also completely inexperienced. On the other hand, Benteen was known to openly defying Custer in the past and deliberately disobeyed his orders at Little Big Horn. General Nelson Miles openly critisized both Reno and Benteen in his writings for their behaviour.

As for J.E.B. Stuart, my knowledge about him is limited. I know he was celebrated commander of Confederate Cavalry and that he was killed at Yellow Tavern. If he had lived I don't believe he could hold any rank in postwar Federal cavalry. Is there any example on Confederate officer who continued service in postwar Union army with retaining his rank?

 

[imalko]

I see my question about Confederate officers already has been answered... 8)

 

[renrich]

Anecdotal testimony by one man doesn't prove much. I suspect that the testimony at the Reno Inquiry was basically an expose of different peoples opinions of different officers. Custer was popular with some elements in the army. Before Custer's battalion got to the Last Stand area, many of his troopers had to be restrained from charging forward in front of the bulk of the battalion, they were so eager to get at the Indians. I am sure they felt differently later. As I said, this book by Gray does not attempt to place blame anywhere but is just a chronicle of what happened. Reno's actions seem to have been correct under the circumstances. Many of his men survived, even though Custer never supported him as he had promised to do. There is this quote from the book however, "Reno's abrupt halt short of the village was clearly well advised. At that moment he had no support at all and there was no way his 140 soldiers could expect to survive a charge through a village of 1000 lodges and 2000 fighting men. Even the minority of warriors who poured out to attack him made bad enough odds. The Indians soon began to turn the left flank of the open skirmish line, forcing it to take a better defensive position just within the timber. The men were safe there for a time, but the perimeter of the timber was so long as to spread them quite thinly. Worse yet the ammunition the troopers carried on their persons and saddlebags was fast diminishing, spelling imminent disaster. Reno's officers and men fully accepted the necessity of the retreat but much criticism was leveled at it's management. All the men were not formed before it began, nothing was done to cover the running retreat, the jammed up river crossing, or the exposed climb up the bluff. The casualties were indeed heavy and missing men many. The only thing that saved them was the failure of the Indians immediately to pursue the disorganized men across the river." Sounds like at the last it was a bug out. Having seen the number of enemy they were facing, it is no wonder they were disorganized. Having said this, the performance of Reno and Benteen, adequate or not, would seem to make little difference to the outcome. The bottom line is that some of Reno's men and Benteen's men survived. None of Custer's did!

 

[renrich]

I misspoke when I said that Joe Shelby served as a Confederate general and US Army general. It was Joe Wheeler. He was a cavalry general during the States War in the Army of Tennessee and served as a general in the US Army in the Spanish American War. I don't know how many other Confederate officers served later in the US Army but suspect it would have been unlikely but possible, if Stuart had lived, that he would have served in the US Army after the war.

 

[imalko]

Well Renrich, it appears that you and I agree that facts and sequence of events at Little Big Horn are undeniable, but somehow always manage to make slightly different conclusions. This is probably becouse we have different starting premises on the matter. You dismiss Custer as terrible commander from the outset while I do not. He was by no means outstanding and his promotion to General during the Civil war was result of circumstances and luck as much as his own ability. But, in my opinion, he was brave, aggressive and capable enough to be successful commander more or less throughout his career.

His decisions at the Little Big Horn were based on usual tactics used by the US Cavalry of the period, informations he received from his scouts and before everything else on his previous experiences in fighting Indians. And decision to split forces, clearly a mistake as it was, would not be fatal if Benteen obeyed his orders and joined Custer with urgency that was expected of him. (Why I think so, I have explained in detail in posts #38 and #39 on page 3 of this thread).

Also you keep repeating that Custer never supported Reno as he promised. But the fact is that he did. How else would you call Custer's flanking attack on Indian village from the East, which saved Reno's command from destruction after their panic retreat across the river. In light of your last post where you quoted a paragraph from your book, I hope we can now agree that this was indeed a disorganized retreat and not "fighting withdrawal" as you previously called it. And why it was so disorganized - becouse the number of enemy they were facing or becouse of Reno's incompetence or probably both - we can debate on it, but I must point out that Reno's was not facing at any moment during that fight the entire Indian force of 1500 warriors. I don't know exact figure but I suspect that Reno faced up to several hundred warriors. So, in my opinion number of warriors which Reno faced was not decisive factor, but rather his own inexperience and incompetence (and this is not "anecdotal" opinion of only one man I quoted but many other Little Big Horn veterans, same as general Miles).

Custer's flank attack forced Indians to disengage Reno and this is also exactly what would happen if Reno had hold his position in the timber. Indians would be forced to ease pressure on Reno's command but not to disengage him completely as in that case they would left southern edge of the village unprotected. On other side, Custer with Benteen joining him, would have to deal with a lot less warriors with a larger force at his hand and would held tactical initiative on the battlefield. Even in case of failed attack on the flank of the village he would still be able to stage fighting withdrawal in good order...

So, in conclusion...

...the performance of Reno and Benteen, adequate or not, would seem to make little difference to the outcome.The bottom line is that some of Reno's men and Benteen's men survived. None of Custer's did!

For the record, I believe that performance of Reno and Benteen were inadequate and that this made the difference to the outcome...

Some Reno's men survived despite his poor conduct of retreat across the river due to Custer's support which he provided by attacking hostile village from the flank... All Benteen's men survived becouse they virtually haven't been involved in any fighting on 25th June in the first place... All Custer's men died, becouse they faced entire Indian force (thanks to Reno's retreat) and were left unsupported by Benteen, which was clear defiance of Custer's orders...

However, disastrous outcome of this battle is rather the result of combination of factors: aggresivness, number and untipical behavior of Indians; some wrong Custer's decisions (including splitting of forces) made on his previous experiences on the plains and informations available to him; Reno's incompetence and unexpected retreat (which was arguably justified or not); Benteen's indifference and disobedience of orders, etc. All this factors combined paved "a road to disaster".

As a side note, I don't know who was better commander - Stuart or Custer - and frankly I don't care since this is not the issue here. However, you must admit that they both were killed in battle, so they were equal at least in that sense.

And in the end, I bring to your attention this interesting link, which you might have overlooked in one of my previous posts. It contains opinions on the battle of Little Big Horn of some officers including Gen. Nelson Miles, (most succesfull Indian fighter who studied the Battle during 22 years, interviewing witnesses, exploring the field), Confederate Major General Thomas Rosser, (a favorite of J.E.B. Stuart) and some others.

custerwest

 

[Amsel]

It is interesting to see what "Bearcoat" Miles said on the issue. It makes alot of sense and casts Reno and Benteen in the proper light deserved I believe. Ignoring lawful orders may have contributed as much to the decisive loss and massacre as Custers bold behavior.

 

[renrich]

Custer has been described as an experienced Indian fighter on this thread on a number of occasions. To my knowledge, he commanded in only one major Indian fight prior to the LBH, the Washita Battle. Beyond that he was mainly invoved in skirmishes, mostly bloodless. If one studies the Washita, one is struck by the similarities to LBH, except that Custer got away with his poor generalship at Washita by attacking a peaceful village. He attacked the peaceful village and prevailed because he did not bother to do thorough scouting and did not know that the hostile and much larger village was downstream. Is there a pattern here? Apparently he learned nothing from his experience at Washita for it seems he repeated the same mistake at the LBH. There seems to be no doubt that Custer did not command the respect of some of the officers in his regiment and some may have been incompetent. One would think that he would have gotten rid of the disloyal and incompetent ones. I still have a hard time with Reno being criticised for his actions. I live only a long day's drive from the LBH and have spent much time riding and hunting on horseback in the western part of the US, and served in the US Army. Trying to visualise what Reno faced, proceeding down an unfordable(except in a few places) river in June(when we usually have high water) with 140 troopers to attack an Indian village of unknown size(although scouts have insisted there were many, many Indians.) Having the main command on the other side of the river. Being cautious and correctly forming a dismounted line of skirmishers, where every fourth man is a horseholder. Finding out that many hundreds of braves are swarming out of the village with your right flank anchored in the trees along the river but your left flank is hanging in the air and about to be outflanked and you have a little over 100 rifles in your line. Swinging your command back into the trees where they have cover. No help in sight and your line is too thin to hold and the bluffs on the opposite side of the river are steep. You find a retreat ford barely negotiable. How do you communicate to all the men scattered in the trees and organize a rear guard and have an orderly retreat? No radios. Your men are scattered and some of the officers and NCOs are down. You are in danger of being overrun and there is only this one spot to ford the river which means that a lot of the troops are far from the ford. Sounds very difficult to me!