Custer and the Little Big Horn (1 Viewer)

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Custer's fault - shouldn't split your army before a numerically superior enemy. Only Lee could do that. Custer was arrogant.
 
After reading all the posts, my opinion is that it was Custer's fault for losing that battle, also the Indians were better armed ( with bolt action rifles ), while the US troops were armed with old, one bullet Springfield rifles.

I don't think that the sabres would have done any good. Also, it was Custer's arrogance and ambition that got better of him and, unfortunately, of his soldiers.

Heard about this on History Viasat once, and they said exactly the same thing.

Cheers
 
Horse of Captain Myles Walter Keogh named Comanche was the only survivor of the Custer's fight for the U.S. Army. Near death with arrow and bullet wounds, the horse was found on the battlefield on June 27. The animal was nursed back to health and proclaimed by special orders of the Seventh Cavalry as the very embodiment "Of the desperate struggle against overwhelming odds, of the hopeless conflict, and heroic manner in which all went down that day."

Comanche's remains are now enshrined at the University of Kansas.
 

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Custer was a great cavalry officer. That is forgotten alot these days. He was chosen to lead the 7th because he would pursue the indians and fight. This was needed on the great plains because the indians moved fast and it could take weeks to pursue them and start a fight.

I don't think anyone was expecting the Lakota and Cheyenne camp to be so big and the Indians so numerous. Custers command also had the worst terrain in the area to fight; rolling terrain covered with gullies. The Indians were down on the river plain allowing them to mass their forces quickly while Custer's men and horses were tiring out crossing the gullies.
 
Doesn't Custers decision to fight in such circumstances betray poor leadership and competence? To give battle to the enemy on terrain that gives him the advantage is one of the most basic no-no's in military theory. Surely Custer should have used his speed and mobility to engage the enemy on better ground, or to draw the enemy away from his camp and divide his force into elements which could be defeated in detail?
 
I have watched documentary on Little Big Horn recently, and they mentioned interesting theory that Custer was actually on the verge of victory at the Little Big Horn. Theory goes that his goal was to lure Indian warriors out of the village with Reno's attack and then attack village from the other end and capture Indian women and children. By taking noncombatants hostage Custer would force warriors to accept his terms and return to the reservations. It was tactics used succesfully by Custer before, most notably at the Washita and that's also the reason for sending Benteen to scout southern ridges and prevent escape of noncombatants in that direction. However, when he reached the river and realised true size of the village Custer send orders to Benteen to join him becouse he needed more troops to execute his plan. While waiting for Benteen arrival, Custer attemped to find suitable crossing point over the river, deploying skirmish line on the bluffs above to protect the crossing. He encountered resistance but was still in offensive mode. But after Reno's unexpected and premature withdrawall across the river, all Indian warriors were now free to engage Custer's force... and we all know what hapened next.

Interesting theory, isn't it?
 
Custer was a great cavalry officer. That is forgotten alot these days. He was chosen to lead the 7th because he would pursue the indians and fight. This was needed on the great plains because the indians moved fast and it could take weeks to pursue them and start a fight.

I don't think anyone was expecting the Lakota and Cheyenne camp to be so big and the Indians so numerous. Custers command also had the worst terrain in the area to fight; rolling terrain covered with gullies. The Indians were down on the river plain allowing them to mass their forces quickly while Custer's men and horses were tiring out crossing the gullies.

Of course it's a lot easier to armchair this scenario over a hundred years later...

But a commander should only commit his forces if he can bring about decisive action. He sure had aggressiveness, but he did not shape the battle to his advantage, and seemingly attacked into the enemy strengths with a badly outmatched force. Custer didn't assess the enemy situation properly. However, I'm sure he didn't know what he was about to get into, which is always the problem. That doesn't seem to be actions of a great officer.

If I got all my Marines killed by engaging in an action quite similar...
 
Milos, the Indians did not have bolt action rifles. In fact the bolt action rifle was generally not in service anywhere in the world at that time. Some did have lever action repeating rifles. The Trapdoor Springfield did fire a heavy bullet with a lot of knockdown power, but the action had to be opened after every shot, the case extracted(and many were stuck) a new round chambered, the action closed and the hammer cocked before a new round could be fired. Custer was an arrogant officer and let his alligator mouth overload his aspirin ass.
 
mk, it is of course easy to armchair the scenario, but what I have read here so far suggests that Custer got himself into something he shouldn't have and didn't have to. I would have to say his course of action shows a mismatch between his abilities and his perception of his abilities. Like you say, it certainly wasn't the work of a great officer...
 
mk, it is of course easy to armchair the scenario, but what I have read here so far suggests that Custer got himself into something he shouldn't have and didn't have to. I would have to say his course of action shows a mismatch between his abilities and his perception of his abilities. Like you say, it certainly wasn't the work of a great officer...

I would tend to agree with that. He had mobility to avoid an engagement on unfriendly terms...
 
Everybody points out Custer's arrogance... but that is not necessary a bad characteristic. He was a succesfull commander in Civil war and a brave one too. Not that I want to argue about this. Of course, he was comanding officer at the Horn and made wrong decisions on false presumptions and with disasterous consequences.

But what about conduct of other senior officers involved, most notably Reno and Benteen. Of course it's easier from historical distance to judge their behavior and say: Yes, Benteen was a smart one and wisely avoided annihilation of his command and saved Reno at the same time. But he didn't had our perspective on the battle. Fact is that Benteen disobeyed direct and written order of his commanding officer to "Come on.." and to "Be quick..." He even disregarded well known military axiom to always march to the sound of the guns. Failure of marschal Grouchy to do the same at Waterloo greatly contributed to Napoleon's defeat.
 
He was a successful commander in Civil war and a brave one too...

...Of course, he was Commanding Officer at the Horn and made wrong decisions on false presumptions and with disastrous consequences
If you're not ready for the position
that's the difference between following orders and giving them...

difficult to know what was going through Benteen's head, maybe he was just more shrewd and tactically savvy than Custer and didn't want to lead his own men to certain death but you can't ignore the fact that Custer turned down an extra battalion and a battery of Gatling guns - with the obvious benefit of hindsight, madness.
 
you can't ignore the fact that Custer turned down an extra battalion and a battery of Gatling guns...

I'm not ignoring that at all. As I wrote in one of my previous posts, decision not to take Gattlings was correct in light of Custer's intentions, terrain difficulties and high mobility required, but completely wrong in light of actuall events. Decision not to accept additional troops from 2nd Cavalry I can not understand and even less explain. More so becouse Custer expected to be outnumbered, although to the lesser extent. Reportedly he said to his officers during officer's call day before the battle that they may expect to face over 1000 warriors. Some historians today estimate number of Indian warriors around 1500 (noncombatants are not included in this number). The 7th numbered 647 soldiers in total.
 
He also ignored repeated warnings from his Crow scouts telling him that they have never seen a remuda of horses that large ever. The Lakota/Cheyenne encampents' herd was massive.
 
Doesn't Custers decision to fight in such circumstances betray poor leadership and competence? To give battle to the enemy on terrain that gives him the advantage is one of the most basic no-no's in military theory. Surely Custer should have used his speed and mobility to engage the enemy on better ground, or to draw the enemy away from his camp and divide his force into elements which could be defeated in detail?
You won't be able to get me to say that Custers performance at the Little Bighorn was satisfactory. I was merely pointing out why he had a job to begin with. Besides the cavalry can't come to rescue in every instance in real life.
 
I completely agree Amsel. I feel that Custer's decisions on that fateful day were rash and arrogant, and not at all in keeping with the usually irreproachable professional standards of the US armed forces. It is a tragedy that men always have to pay the price of such poor decisions - although Custer also paid his due that day, of course.
 
PART 1

After fallowing with attention the course of this thread about Custer and Little Big Horn, I would like to write some of my views on the battle, although this will probably spark another debate on the issue...

First I think we had all agreed about Custer's reffusal of Gattling Guns and aditional troops. Decision not to take Gattlings can be judged both as wrong or as a correct one (it depends on arguments you take in consideration), but refusal of aditional troops was surelly wrong. Period!

Now, let us see what could have been done with assets at Custer's disposall on 25th of June 1876 at the Little Bighorn - and that were 647 soldiers of 7th U.S. Cavalry, armed with Springfield carabines and pistols.

Custer's plan

Custer was arrogant... this had been written many times in previous posts. Yes, he was. And his agresive style of warfare, will to take risks and his personal bravery served him well in his career, both in Civil war and in fighting Indians up to that point.
Custer's decision to attack hostile village from three directions wasn't rash, it was straight from the book. In fact it was common Cavalry tactics during Indian wars to flank the enemy when ever possible and prevent them to scatter. Custer had limited knowlege of terrain ahead of him but he didn't greatly underestimated number of hostile Indians. He told his officers that they will probably face over 1000 warriors and actual number of wariors is now estimated to be around 1500. In fact Custer's plan of attack at Little Bighorn (Custer's plan was this: Reno in the front of the village, Benteen in the center and Custer in the extreme opposite) has been supported by such figures as US general in chief Nelson Appelton Miles, the most successful Indian fighter in US history, in his writings.

The true size of the Indian village

The village of Little Bighorn was never "five miles" long as the myth says... Lieutenant Oscar Long's early map from 1878 showed that the village was 1.32 miles long, not extending past Medicine Tail Coulee ford, which pretty much matches Grinnell's (based on Soldier Wolf's testimony) Ricker's (based on Respects Nothing's account) maps. The Indians moved north after the first day of fighting, giving the post-battle observers (General Terry's men) the impression of one continuous larger camp.
There were 1500 warriors and unknown number noncombatants in the village. We can speculate if Custer's plan was actually to take noncombatants hostage or not... maybe it was maybe it wasn't. Fact is that Indian village was not as large as sometimes claimed but still large enough for Custer to realise that he will need more troops and additional ammunition. This is the point when he sent orders to Benteen to join him and bring ammunition packs.

Reno's fight

Reno's attack opened the battle. After charging across the valey into the striking distance of the hostile village, Reno ordered a halt and deployed a skirmish line across portion of the valey. After warriors started to appear in growing numbers (note that this still wasn't the entire Indian force that Custer will later face), soldiers took better position in the timber by the river. Lieutenant Hare, of Reno's batalion, later said that holding the timber was evidently made to support Custer's flank attack against the village. But Reno left the timber (which was highly defendable position) after only 30 minutes of light fighting.

Here is description of this event by one of the participants:

"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; that he could and should have held that position... Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command. The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "

Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn (letter to Agent Asbury in 1929)​

The witnesses make clear that after reaching Reno Hill, Major Reno wasn't under fire anymore. The warriors left him almost immediately, because they were watching the arrival of Captain Benteen and, close to him, the pack train.
 
PART 2

Benteen's behavior


Benteen was approximately at the 3 mile distance from Custer when he received written order to join him.
Even when message suggested utmost urgency he apparently took his time to execute it. He proceeded slowly and even watered his horses along the way. He reached Reno's position one hour later when most Indian warriors were allready gone to fight Custer. So at that point Reno's battalion was not in any danger. Joined Reno-Benteen commands, together with the pack train (which was escorted by one reinforced company and arrived soon after Benteen), now numbered 7 companies - 380 men - and had at their disposal 24000 rounds of ammunition. They consolidated in strenght and what is more important at that moment were unoposed by any number of Indians. Some junior officers suggested to continue advance towards sound of the guns but Benteen refused. Captain Weir disobeyed this order and march out with his company anyway. He haven't reached Custer however but observed last moments of Last Stand from what is now known as Weir Point. Benteen eventually followed Weir 30 minutes after his departure. Arriving on a hill named Weir Point, Benteen took a look on Custer's position, then ordered (according to Private George Glenn) to fall back. Contrary to the myth, the only Indian force Benteen was facing at that point was Low Dog's small band of warriors. As Lieutenant Edgerly stated : "The Indians didn't repulse us. The order was to fall back and we fell back."

I think that Benteen's personal hatred towards Custer is overlooked as significant factor in previous posts in this thread, but it could explain much of his behaviour, which was highly questionable to say the least. After all, these are Benteen's own words:

"What a big winner the U.S. government would have been if only Custer and his gang could have been taken. The Lord, in his own good time, had at last rounded the scoundrels up, taking, however, many good and innocent men with them!"
Letter by Captain Benteen to Lieutenant Maguire​
How the Last Stand looked like

One of probably most accurate portrayals of the Last Stand (see the picture in attachment taken from "The Custer Album") shows 42 men behind 39 dead horses, in a 30-feet circle. This is also the place where most of 200 Indian casualties fell. At this point when organized resistance of Custer's battalion was at an end and when most of the command had already been whiped out, Benteens arrival probably wouldn't change much, but would only added more casualties. Or would it? Who knows, maybe Indians, supprised by the attack from behind, would have retreated. One could only speculate, but General Miles believed that this is exactly what would happen.

One thing is certain, as Sioux chief Sitting Bull stated : "The soldiers were looking on the hills in the East, and in every direction. They were looking for the other soldiers on the hills, hoping that these soldiers would come and help them."

They were hoping in vain.... Reno and Benteen remained on Reno hill unopposed (at that moment), while Custer took his Last Stand.

But what if Benteen had executed his orders with urgency which was expected of him by his comanding officer? Entire battle lasted for two and a half hours. Had Benteen arrived on the scene at the point when Custer's forces were still deployed in skirmish lines above the river and when all-out Indian attack still haven't began, I think it would made a difference. Not that it would resulted in victory but it would probably saved Custer's command from destruction.

It has been suggested that Indians were armed with repeating rifles and thus gained advantage over US troopers armed with Sprigfield carabines. But Springfield had one significant advantage - greater range. Concetrated volley fire by the troopers, which would be possible if Benteen reinforced Custer as ordered, would keep any number of Indians at the distance and prevent them to use the advantage of repeating rifles. In that case, joined Custer-Benteen batalions could have executed fighting retreat in good order to more defendable position, posibly even to Reno's hill. Sure Indians would have probably scatered and escaped after that, but at least lives of meany US troopers would be saved. And who knows, if Custers plan was really to take hostage Indian noncompatants while warriors were engaging Reno, battle could have even ended with his victory.

Conclusion

Custer took his most trusted officers with him - his brother Captain T.W.Custer (recepient of two Medals of Honnor), Keogh, Calhoun, Yates... Had any one of them been in Benteen's place, he would have fallowed his orders and joined Custer without delay. And I believe this would made a difference in the fight. Custer made several mistakes at the Little Bighorn and putting Benteen in charge of one of three batalions was one of the greatest.

For officers oppinion on Custer's plan at the Little Bighorn see the fallowing link: custerwest
 

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I think that splitting his force was his downfall and ultimately led to his death. I say this because of knowledge of other tough fights against superior Indian forces on the plains. Even without extra troopers or Gatling guns I think his unit in full strength would have repelled numerous attacks. As with any look at history I cannot be 100% sure.
Indians were not proffessional soldiers but guerrilla fighters who chose hit and run tactics most of the time. They would generally not stick around and take too many casualties. Once the Indians began taking casualties they usually scattered at high speed. This was the norm on the plains and southwest deserts. Another good example of this is the Adobe Walls fight in Texas. Some buffaloe skinners held out with their Sharps rifles against an overwhelming force, using long range shooting and even killing old Roman Nose.
 

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