Custer and the Little Big Horn (1 Viewer)

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I really hate to critisize Reno and even more Benteen. But I take alot of stock into what Miles stated. He was the premier Indian fighter and was highly respected by both sides in the "Plains Wars" as well as the "Apache War". I probably need to look into what Bearcoat Miles said a little more. I have also spent alot of time in Montana and worked in Crow Agency for a bit. Beautiful country, but rough. With the mud, creeks , and ravines it is still tough country today. Big ol' muleys everywhere though. "Gods country".
 
I wrote about Custer as an experienced Indian fighter in my posts becouse he spent 10 years on the plains fighting Indians. To my knowledge he participated in general Hancock's campaign of 1967, the Winter Campaign of 1868 (including Battle of the Washita), he also led an expedition to the Black Hills in 1874 and there were numerous skirmishes in between, but how bloody or bloodless these were I really don't know.

Let me say gentlemen that I consider a privilege to discuss this topic with you. I have started this thread with my opinion on this matter already formed since this I my second most favorite subject after the aviation of course... And I haven't changed my mind yet. 8)

But I find it fascinating to hear other people opinions... We may disagree but we present our views, thoughts and less known informations on the subject, which is great.

If I ever travel to your part of the world I would very much like to visit the site of the Battle of the Little Big Horn and see this beautiful and rough country myself. However, since I had never rode a horse in my life I might need some lessons first. :D
 
Agree with you about this country, Amsel. Reason I live here instead of my beloved Texas. Matter of fact, where I live is about 100 yards from the Animas river. Was walking along it this afternoon and looking at the river and the steep banks and the steep ridge on the other side. No way I would try to take a horse across it and I could never wade it right now. I would wind up in New Mexico, drowned. Direct quote from Phil Sheridan in 1864 on Reno, " one of the most promising young cavalry officer's of this army." "the cavalry service has no better officer than Capt. Reno." Did he change that much since 1864? It seems his scout to the Rosebud before the LBH was well done and showed a lot of initiative, but also prudence and good judgment. imalco, The privilege is mine. A lovely discussion.
 
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Last Stand Hill on the Custer Battlefied, four of the 7th Cavaly's
Crow scouts pay tribute to those who fell with Custer. L-R: White-Man-Runs-Him,
Hairy Moccasin, Curly and Goes Ahead. (photograph by Rodman Wanamaker, 1913.)

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A Native American point of view, written by Mitakuye Oyasin
Of all the Indians present at the Little Big Horn (and estimates run as high as 10,000), only the Cheyenne had had any significant dealings with Custer. About eight years before, Custer had made his reputation as an Indian fighter by attacking a peaceful Cheyenne encampment on the Washita River. They were so peaceful that their chief even flew an American flag outside his tepee. Some warriors and others escaped, but Custer, after killing their herd of horses, dragged the remaining prisoners back to his fort. There is some evidence that he developed a conjugal relationship with one of his prisoners and that she mothered a blond-haired boy. While he was married, he was still considered a relative of sorts by the Cheyenne women who knew of his relationship with one of their own.

Custer never really had any other big ''victories'' over any other tribes, mostly because he could never catch them. They would hit, run and scatter, and he would be left with men ready to desert. Finally, he bravely set a meeting with some Cheyenne chiefs and went to their tepee by himself. In that encounter, they smoked the pipe together and he vowed never again to attack the Cheyenne. One of the chiefs emptied the pipe on Custer's boot and left no doubt that Custer would be like those ashes if he ever broke his promise.

These were some of the people gathered in celebration at the Little Big Horn. Picture, if you will, an encampment of tepees, each circled in its tribal gathering, and extending for over three miles up the river's snaky path. On the south is the Hunkpapa Sioux circle, Sitting Bull's tribe. On the far end of the encampment, unseen because of the twists and turns of the river, reside the Cheyenne.

Custer would like to have attacked at dawn on June 26, surprising the camp. He changed his mind when he realized they had been spotted, and he attacked right away. He was afraid that they would run and scatter, and he wanted a big, name-making victory. This also explains why, against orders, he attacked instead of waiting for Terry and Gibbons.

The Indians, for their part, were feeling quite secure in their fighting ability and the number of their warriors. They had, after all, sent General Crook and his army scampering for home at the Battle of the Rosebud, only a week before. They never dreamed they would be attacked by such a small force.
 
I was wondering when Custer's alleged violation of Terry's orders will be mentioned... I stand firmly in my belief that orders were disobeyed at Little Big Horn, but not by Custer.

Here is an extract from Terry's written instructions for Custer issued on June 22nd, 1876:

"Headquarters of the Department of Dakota (In the Field)
Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River, Montana Territory June 22nd, 1876
Lieutenant-Colonel Custer,
7th Calvary

Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were is not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them..."


In regard of the Washita battle and this "flag waving myth" I think that this has been cunfused with The Sand Creek Massacre that occurred on November 29, 1864, when Colorado Territory militia attacked and destroyed a village of Cheyenne and Arapaho encamped in southeastern Colorado Territory. Indian chief at Sand Creek was also named Black Kettle and he flew an American flag over his lodge since previously he had been assured that this practice would keep him and his people safe from U.S. soldiers' aggression. The Indians at Washita could not been waving any flag since they were attacked at dawn and "caugth while napping".

And on behaviour of Custer and his men at Washita I will quote two historians:

Historian Jerome Greene wrote a book about the battle in 2004, for the National Park Service, concluding: "Soldiers evidently took measures to protect the women and children."

Historian Paul Hutton: "Although the fight on the Washita was most assuredly one-sided, it was not a massacre. Black Kettle's Cheyennes were not unarmed innocents living under the impression that they were not at war. Several of Black Kettle's warriors had recently fought the soldiers, and the chief had been informed by Hazen (General William B. Hazen commanding at Fort Cobb) that there could be no peace until he surrendered to Sheridan. The soldiers were not under orders to kill everyone, for Custer personally stopped the slaying of noncombatants, and fifty-three prisoners were taken by the troops.".
 
Loyalty is a great virtue but I fear imalko has chosen the wrong horse to back in this debate. The issue at Washita is not so much that he may have attacked peaceful Indians but that he attacked without proper intel about his enemy. There was a much larger village downstream that Custer did not know about and it is possible that Custer and his men could have been surprised and overwhelmed while ransacking the first village by the Indians downstream. As for Custer disobeying orders, that is not relevant because everyone knew that if Custer found Indians he would charge them regardless of orders. The man was a headline hunter, did not hold the Indian's fighting qualities in high regard and was arrogant to the extreme. He got his headlines though. The first rule in military intel is to judge your enemy on capabilities, not on his intentions. Custer thought the Indians would always run. Custer's judgment and command decisions were, IMO, criminal.
 
And we return to the issue - was Custer a terrible commander or not? :lol:
Renrich, we both spoke our mind on that question already...

As for Washita... Its true that there was satellite hostile villages downstream that Custer did not know about and actually the 7th was surprised and threatened by warriors from this villages. However, Custer saved himself without combat and returned to his base camp in good order by taking hostage noncombatants from the Black Kettle's village. Warriors didn't attack becouse they didn't wanted to threaten their own noncombatants.

There is one theory that this is exactly what he tried to do at Little Big Horn too. By taking noncombatants hostage while warriors were lured out of the village by Reno's attack, Custer would forced them to break off the fight and maybe return to reservations. Becouse the size of the village Custer needed more men to execute this plan and therefore send orders to Benteen to rejoin the main command. His plan didn't materialized due to the Benteen's failure to join him quickly and Reno's premature and unexpected withdrawal.
I find this theory intriguing. I watched a documentary once, where they spoken about this possibility...
 
Any theory about hostages doesn't take into account the Indian structure. There were numerous bands of Sioux with numerous chiefs plus other tribes. Taking hostages from one band might influence that band but not the others. The warriors fought as individual contractors and only followed a leader if they currently believed in him and his "medicine." How was Custer going to get into the village to take hostages. He never got to the village. There was only one way to handle the situation. Custer needed to wait until Benteen and the pack train came up, establish a secure area where the pack train could be left with guards. Attack the next morning(as was the plan) with his entire command after doing the requisite recon, keeping his command largely together. And be able to retreat to the pack train area and defend if in danger of being overwhelmed. He did not do that and paid the price.
 
You are probably right regarding Indian tribal structure, since this is subject I'm not too familiar with. But even by taking hostages from some of the tribal bands and not all of them, wouldn't that brake the cohesion in Indian combined forces? Maybe even cause some kind of conflict among Indians themselves as some bands would continue fighting while others would be eager to protect their families which were taken hostage.
Whatever Custer's plan was it apparently depended on Benteen's quick arrival and support... And Benteen never came...
 
A hostage plan first depended on getting to the women and children. How is he going to get them if he can't get to the village? If he could have gotten to the village he might have prevailed but there were too many Indians. Even if he had not split his command in the face of an overpowering enemy, he probably could not have kept from being decimated if he charged the village without a plan to withdraw. Benteen did get there but Custer had already left. I have done some packing in the mountains during long hunting trips and a pack train cannot be hurried and will not move as fast as mounted horsemen. Another factor that Custer should have been aware of was that his regiment was a far cry in training, morale and quality of soldier from when he was in the States War. Many of them could barely sit a horse and most were woeful in marksmanship. He was going into battle on tired horses and with poor quality overall soldiers. In fact, the whole US Army in 1876 was not nearly as proficient(or numerous) as it had been in 1865.
 
I'm not sure I understand your point. What do you mean - he couldn't get to the village? Becouse of Indian resistance or becouse you think that it was imposible for him to find suitable crossing point over the river? There were crossing points over the Little Big Horn river. Indians used them and so could Custer. With part of Indian force fighting Reno and with Benteen's support, it was possible for Custer to get to the village and take hostages. But I'm not arguing that he would have been victorious against all odds. I case of the repulse during this flanking attack, Custer with additional troops at his disposal in form of Benteen's battalion could have made a fighting withdrawal to some defendable position from where he could fight off Indian attacks, same as Reno and Benteen eventually did. I'm not sure what would happen with Reno's command in that case, though...

To return to more realistic scenario - after the initial repulse and joining of Reno-Benteen commands,they were obligated to support Custer. More so becouse at that time entire Indian force was fighting Custer and their advance would be virtually unopposed. So the battle would not be victory in that case but it would not be a massacre either.
I have the oppinion of general Miles to back me up on this one... 8)

You also wrote that "Benteen did get there but Custer had already left". And where was that? Benteen never advanced beyond "Weir point" and even this point was reached only after unacceptable delay and wasting of time, so by that time Custer's fight was already over.
 
...his regiment was a far cry in training, morale and quality of soldier from when he was in the States War. Many of them could barely sit a horse and most were woeful in marksmanship. He was going into battle on tired horses and with poor quality overall soldiers. In fact, the whole US Army in 1876 was not nearly as proficient(or numerous) as it had been in 1865.

No arguments against that... I'm sure Custer was aware of weaknesses of postwar army and he knew that his soldiers were tired. That is why he planed the attack for dawn of 26th June and changed his mind only when he was informed that their presence had been discovered by Indians...
 
The reason that Benteen did not join Custer was that Custer ran off and left him and when Benteen and Reno decided to join Custer, they looked at the situation, used good judgment and decided discretion was the better part of valor. Miles was a good friend of Custer's, was similar to Custer and was not there. His opinion means nothing. For goodness sake, think about the situation. Custer in his idiocy split his command into 4 units. How is he going to get into the village to capture squaws and papooses with all those pissed off Indians between him and the village. He nor anyone else got into the village. Even if he had kept all 500 or so men together he probably would have not been able to wade through all the warriors to get into the village. It would have been different if the Indians were surprised but they were not. There were upwards of 2000 warriors there, and they meant to fight. If you think that Reno's charge distracted a bunch of Indians, there were still plenty to take care of Custer, even if he had Benteen's men with him. All this talk about blaming Benteen for being late is BS. Benteen wasn't there when some say he should have been there for a very good reason. He had the pack train to bring along with him. The pack train was vital and it needed protection. The mules could not be hurried. Have you ever tried to get a mule to do something he did not want to do? I have and it does not work. In some ways they are smarter than we are and they a helluva lot stronger. My positon is that Custer had an impossible task but he was too stupid and arrogant to figure it out. Reno and Benteen were not. It is well and good to quote Rosser and Miles(who weren't there) but the official US Army position is that Reno and Benteen did their jobs.
 
One slight advantage the troopers had over the Indians was that the Springfields had a longer range than most of the weapons the Indians had. This advantage was tempered a great deal by the fact that most of the cavalry were poor shots, just as most of the Indians were. However, if the cavalry charged into the village, two factors would emerge. If the troopers were on horseback, they had one shot from their carbine and then five or six from their pistol(and obviously most of the troops would have a hard time hitting a barn at 40 yards with a pistol, particularly from atop a horse) and then they would be harmless. If they came in dismounted, they would be able to discharge their carbine and reload but every fourth man would be a horseholder and unable to fire. In either case the closer the cavalry got to the Indians, the more the range advantage would disappear. Inside two hundred yards, the Indians with repeaters would have a distinct edge and a little closer and the arrows would begin to tell. Those factors would act as a force multiplier for the Indians who already had a big edge in numbers. The fact is that the days of horse cavalry making charges were over with. That was the reason that during the States War, cavalry engagements often resulted in few casualties especially compared to infantry engagements and cavalry was largely ineffective except for recon, raids, etc. The "shock" value against well trained infantry was laughable. An example was(from memory,) at Gaine's Mill in 1862, the Texas Brigade(infantry) was charged by a Union cavalry unit which was decimated by accurate fire while the Texans thought that they were having great sport. That was the reason that Buford had his troopers discard sabers and pistols and had them fight dismounted. He had experience fighting Indians pre war also. I am not saying that the Indians were as well trained as a good infantry unit but their fire power advantage at close range would have been huge along with their numbers advantage.
 
25th June... Today is the 133rd anniversary of the Battle of the Little Big Horn.
To the memory of all who fought and lost their lives on that fatefull Sunday in 1876. :salute:
 

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Typing error...I will edit my post.
And by the way, I have started reading "The official Record of the Reno Court of Inquiry". Don't know when I will finish this read but so far I haven't found anything that would make me change my mind... Still believe that Reno and Benteen are as much to blame for the disastrous outcome of the battle as Custer.
 
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I have enjoyed reading this discussion :)


Custer was lucky most of his career. He was bottom of his class at WP and only got an active field commission because of the war, otherwise he would have some dull frontier post. He got respect from his men by leading from the front and being an energetic and enthusiastic leader.

For me the LBH disaster was a combination of happenings.

It seems he/they knew they would be up against vastly superior numbers, hence the offer of Gatling's and extra companies. Also at this point the arrogance of the Army expected Indians to run rather than fight when against an organized force, so doubtless this was the mindset. Also not forgetting, unlike infantry, cavalry can get out of trouble as quick as they got into it, all things equal. An important thing here,I think, is that a week before LBH General Crook had engaged the Indians that defeated Custer and the result some would say was a draw. Crook was stunned at how large, how fierce and cunning the Indian attacks were. Also he was amazed that the Indians were willing to take heavy casualties.

A few historians say that if it was not for the Indians being tired from riding all night and the early fierce engagement by Indian allies that Crook would have been defeated. This attack lasted 6 hours or so and Crook expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition. Now here is the thing. Crook withdraw back to camp for reinforcements so wouldn't be meeting Terry, Custer etc as planned. However, he never told ANY of them about his engagement. Terry and more importantly Custer, with his little command, had no idea what they were getting into. Crook had an army of 1,300 cavalry, mule mounted infantry and scouts and in 6 hours couldn't defeat the Indians, from what was really a defensive position (although it was a very poor one).

It is certainly possible that Custer intended a personal triumph given his character. He is reputed to have said back at the Fort that he was going to break loose first chance he got. Custer needed this feather in his cap. He had fallen out with President Grant who only let him on the campaign after Custer cried and pleaded with his seniors. Until he resumed command Reno was the man for the job, so despite peoples criticisms the Army must have thought him capable of the job. Custer's career depended on a successful campaign. Grant and others had had enough of the guy. People talk of Benteen ignoring orders....well Custer was arrested for disobeying AND had gone AWOL, while on duty, just to see his wife!! I think it is obvious that the Army back then was not the disciplined tight bunch of guys Hollywood have us believe.

Custer, ignored his scouts, did not know the terrain well enough..he underestimated hostile forces possibly by 60% plus (although if Crook had passed the information on..who knows?) ....and set a battle plan on ground the enemy knew. Not only did he underestimate the numbers but also the will to fight.

So he splits his forces as we all know. I read an account where a Sergeant said that as Reno set up the skirmish the Indians rode in a circle laying on the other side of their horses, so they could not be directly shot at. This maneuver was gradually encircling the lines at about the time the Indians started to break a flank (left?) . At this point they made a withdrawal/run. I think Reno saw 500 plus Indians coming at him, some with repeaters and was genuinely shocked. Reno was engaging with just three companies, Custer had five and asked for reinforcements!!

People say Benteen dawdled towards Custer after he received the "bring packs" note from Martini. Custer was already heavily engaged with the Indians as Martinis' (the messenger) horse had got shot on the way to find Benteen. As I see it, first he had to find Benteen, then Benteen had to find the pack train. Then it is a slow ride with all those mules anywhere. Regarding joining Reno instead of Custer, I think there was a choice, leave Reno (survivors do say that they were saved by Benteen and the pack train turing up) or ride a slow moving pack train through the Indian positions under constant attack. If you look at the LBH maps and see the supposed positions you can see that Benteen would have had an almost impossible task of getting slow moving pack animals to Custer. Whether by accident or design, I think he made the right choice. If Reno stayed his ground he would have been wiped out, followed by Custer.

A lot is said about the weapons. The Indians did have a mixture of repeaters and other arms. The 7th did have the Spencer a few months before LBH but it holds 7 rounds, has less range and accuracy and of course takes longer to reload...while you have your head down putting in seven more rounds, what would the enemy be doing? The Springfield carbine had better range and (provided it was operating OK) could put out more sustained fire...that is it is continually shooting. The problem with the Springfield I gather was the cheap ammunition it was using, causing blockages. Also it had no rod for barrel cleaning, like the Springfield rifle variant...and also...no bayonet!!!! So if it jammed or was up close it was only a club!!

Also there were stories of troopers emptying their pistols and throwing them away because they had no time to re-holster or reload them (this was at the Reno fight). What I had never thought of before was that the Colt the guys were carrying is a gated loader, meaning that you have to open the gate and take out each round individually and put them in individually, not easy on a horse!! I have read that often officers would purchase better weapons than issued and that Custer had several guns. It is possible that he was carrying his Webley RIC at LBH, this weapon breaks to load and is much quicker to do so.

Also I think that the marksmanship of the troops was not good. It is OK having a rifle that can shoot hundreds of yards but the trooper has to be able to use it. After LBH troops had to practice twice a week, I think that says all that is needed lol In defense though it would be hard to judge range in that terrain on a static target let alone moving ones!!!

It is possible weapon failure, tactics, no saber, no bayonet, no Benteen and whatever contributed to Custers' defeat but for me it was splitting his forces that done for him. His brigades were to far from one another to support each other. Sending Benteen off as he did was crazy, I believe he should have been on the other side of the hill in reserve...what commander commits all forces on an unknown number of mobile enemy? But it is all conjecture, the only people who knew what happened to Custer are the Indians and they mostly stayed quiet about the events that day...and what has been said is contradictory. No for me, Custer had enough men to defeat the Indians head on even but splitting his force lost mutual support.

I shudder when I think of Benteen trying to ride his three companies and slow moving pack mules through 1,500 Indians, I have little doubt he would have been lost and the pack train. That would have left the Indians with tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition and all of Benteens carbines, Custer would still have died, but quicker maybe...and Reno Hill would be Reno Cemetery today...

Many thanks.......
 

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