Did the US save Europe in WW2?

[drgondog]

Very interesting though, some complex dynamics here.

Freebird - I think in my scenario that I would far better have Britain as the surviving Ally thyan France in my scenario simply because of the Commonwealth, the technical competence, the tenacity and last but not least, the question of France's ability to hold off Germany in the West..

There is no evidence to support France NOT employing same Maginot Line tactics - but equally unsure whether Germany attacks France absent declaration of war..

And, in my possible universe', there is no iota of evidence that we ally with France.

 

[Gman]

It seems that ego is getting in the way of this topic, rather than objectivity. The US certainly played a major role in the liberation of Europe in terms of manpower, material, money, strategy, tactics, etc. But all Allied combatants played key roles; many of whom go largely unsung (various resistance movements, civilian overt/ passive resistance, etc.). It is argueable that the US actually 'saved' Europe, but hard to argue that nations role in breaking the U-Boat strangle hold on England, the Lend-Lease act that provided much needed war material for Britain and the Soviet Union and the various other overt/ covert contributions both before and after its entry into that conflagration. It seems to me that the point of this topic is moot and probably confrontational for some.

 

[Gman]

It seems that ego is getting in the way of this topic, rather than objectivity. The US certainly played a major role in the liberation of Europe in terms of manpower, material, money, strategy, tactics, etc. But all Allied combatants played key roles; many of whom go largely unsung (various resistance movements, civilian overt/ passive resistance, etc.). It is argueable that the US actually 'saved' Europe, but hard to argue that nations contribution in breaking the U-Boat strangle hold on England, the Lend-Lease act that provided much needed war material for Britain and the Soviet Union and the various other overt/ covert contributions both before and after its entry into that conflagration. It seems to me that the point of this topic is moot and probably confrontational for some.

 

[Freebird]

It seems that ego is getting in the way of this topic, rather than objectivity. But all Allied combatants played key roles; many of whom go largely unsung It seems to me that the point of this topic is moot and probably confrontational for some.

Gman - Hi Gman, I don't disagree that many nations played a part, I don't think that any one nation can say it "won" the war. It seems like the original poll question about "Did the US save" has just about run it's course.

Drgondog posed a hypothetical question about what would happen if the US stayed neutral, would Britain be able to continue fighting? I am suggesting some strategies that they might have used if that was the case. Anyone is welcome to join in on the debate.

 

[Freebird]

I will continue with part 2 of my "12 step plan" for Britain.

Just to clarify Drgondog, I am assuming here that these are measures that can be taken after BoB, say Nov 40, (maybe the isolationists have the majority in Congress) when it becomes clear that the US will not help the UK.

If I went back any earlier there are too many other variables (eg. France doesn't fall, or Sealion succeeds in July of '40.)



#4Maintain Air Superiority over all areas where the British Army Royal Navy are deployed

After the Battle of France, it should be clear that where the Germans control the air, (such as Poland, France after May 17 '40, Holland, Norway, etc.) they are able to roam free with Stuka's bombers, shifting the battle heavily in their favor. Where the Germans failed to maintain clear air superiority, ie. BoB Dunkirk, the Army Navy could still operate.

In Nov of 1940, the Chief of the Air Staff post would be given not to Portal, but the most senior Air Marshal - Hugh Dowding. His directives: 1) maintain air control over British Empire territory, 2) develop better Army support aircraft tactics. (remember the Fairey "Battle's" in France!) 3) Maintain Bomber Command operations, but to avoid excessive losses. 4) Improve Coastal Command A/S operations (as in #1)

The British should build more fighters, at a cost of slightly less bomber production. Dowding would not make the "Trenchard" mistake of putting too much emphasis on heavy bombers at the cost of fighters attack bombers. Also as there is less help from the US, it becomes more important to stay ahead in fighter production, to prevent "Sealion 1941" The British need to concentrate on fighter production, by cancelling poorly performing designs, and having the manufacturers switch to making Spitfires or Hurricanes. From 1940 - 1942 the British aircraft industry is still making approx 30 Battle's 25 Defiants per month, I would have Boulton Paul Fairey switch to producing Spitfires Hurricanes. (Boulton Paul also made "Roc's" under licence!) The Defiant was later successful as a night fighter, but it was not until mid '41 that a small enough radar set was available for it. I would also stop production of the Avro "Manchester" (about 18 per month) and have them wait until the Lancaster was ready for production. I would see if the aircraft companies with available production (Avro, Blackburn etc.) could make the Douglas Boston under licence, or failing that, Beaufighters.


#5 No Ground forces sent to Greece!

The choice to send British ground troops to Greece was a disaster! They sent 56,000 men, 8,000 vehicles tanks to Greece. The British should send some supplies fighters to Greece, maybe even a few squadrons, but the British lost 12,000 men and all their vehicles guns. When the troops were removed from N. Africa, Rommel was able to push the British back and regain the ground lost by the Italians. I would however keep forces on Crete to use as a naval air base. If the NZ troops had even SOME of the equipment that was lost in Greece, they could have easily held Crete. (During the defence of Crete Freyburg had only 35 aircraft and NINE tanks). As it was, it was a very tough operation for the Germans, they very nearly lost the battle.

The Greeks did quite well against the Italians, but could not stop the Germans. However the loss of British troops would not affect the battle that much, as the Greeks had 14 divisions, the British 2.5 I would give the Greeks support by sending arms fighters, and using long range bombers where possible.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the defense of France, I have a slightly differing view.

As for the FR and UK declaration of war against Germany, they were honor-bound to do so by previous treaties with Poland. Hitler himself stated he was surprised that the French and British would actually honor this agreement. Poland's geographical situation prevented any direct aid to affect the outcome. Furthermore, the fact that the invasion of Poland was a COMBINED invasion by Germany and Soviet Russia was more than enough reason for the French and British to be reluctant in attacking Germany directly. Given the strong communist movements in both countries, especially in France in the labor unions, there was a genuine fear of popular upheaval in the event of a war against both the Germans and the Soviets.

As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison. This would never happen. As a result, the French were forced to improvise defenses along the Franco-Belgian border, defenses which amounted to nothing more than a series of trenches, ditches, and fortified ground defenses. Certainly nothing like the Maginot Line. Even with the Ardennes left exposed, had the FULL plan of the Maginot Line been realized, I seriously doubt the Germans would have attempted a two pronged attack in the North AND the East.

Also keep in mind that the Maginot Line troops consisted not only of fortress garrisons, but also of special interval troops between actual forts. These troops were meant to fight off any attack attempting to exploit the areas between the forts. Unfortunately, as the German breakthrough in the Meuse-Sedan region progressed, these interval troops were withdrawn from the line to help plug in the gaps being created by the breakout. Nonetheless, they were effective in inflivting damage on the Germans: One of these gaps was at the hinge of the line, at the Northern most part in a town called Stonne, where the German suffered over 10% of all their casualties of the Battle of France.

In my opinion, the greatest fault in the Allies (FR and UK) lay in the fact that despite the failure of the Norway campaign, they learned nothing from it in terms of joint operations, communications, and in trusting one another. Instead, the failure of the overall campaign only led to more distrust and suspicion of eachother. Also, contrary to post-war myth-making, most French troops along the Franco-Belgian border (1er Armee, Class A troops) and Maginot Line troops were fairly regularly trained and drilled (as opposed to their Class B and reserve troops counterparts in the Ardennes sector.). They also saw the British presence in northern France simply as one taking up space and taking residence in defensive works already made prepared before their arrival.

At which point I'd like to comment on the statements below as hilarious, and with all due respect to drgondog, I must wholeheartedly disagree with his assesment, on a point by point basis:

Freebird - I think in my scenario that I would far better have Britain as the surviving Ally thyan France in my scenario simply because of the Commonwealth, the technical competence, the tenacity and last but not least, the question of France's ability to hold off Germany in the West...

I would say just the exact opposite. What saved the BEF in 1940 was NOT superior technical competence, tenacity, or the question of France's ability to hold off the Germans in the West. The BEF was saved for one reason and one reason only: the envious fact that there is a 21 miles (34Km) moat of cold deep water between England and France. The decision to put General Gort in charge of the BEF was disastrous one for the French and Belgians, particulary for the Belgians. Most European historians view Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF before even the 6th full day of the Blitz as nothing less than cut-'n-run. The premise of the decision to withdraw, that France has already lost the battle, is astonishing since Gort and the BEF had no appreciation yet of what had happened at Sedan. Secondly, given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate. Given that the both the French and the Belgians did everything they could to accomodate Gen. Gort to give the BEF only a small portion of the Dyle Line to defend, a mere 20 km. of it, I find that the British explaination to withdraw was based on their assumption that the French and Belgians had "thrown in the towel" to be nothing less than preposterous. If there was anyone running away as fast as they could, it was the BEF, with the French and Belgians forced to somehow close and defend the gap, which they would not be able to do.

There is no evidence to support France NOT employing same Maginot Line tactics

I can only reiterate what I stated above, that the Maginot Line was to complement the Belgian defenses. If we are to extrapolate, then we can blame the French for not thinking far enough ahead into the furture, as Belgium's neutrality was the obvious sticking point to a coordinated defense by the three main allies.

but equally unsure whether Germany attacks France absent declaration of war...

Now this IS an interesting question. One must be reminded however, that Germany had no problems attacking 3 neutral countries without a declaration of war - Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.

And, in my possible universe', there is no iota of evidence that we ally with France.

I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines. Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

The whole debacle in the North can be summed up, IMO, in an analogy I've created. We have 3 guys in a leaky boat in the middle of the ocean. They're all screwing it up in some way or another, and not one will listen to the other. Before any of the three can determine what the future has in store for them, one decides prematurely that all is lost, and he pulls his plug and dives overboard, being fairly sure he will be rescued. He is, and when he's back on land, he is surrounded by hoardes of reporters asking why the boat sank. What do you think he'll say? Since he's the only survivor, safe bet to say that he'll fault the sinking entirely on his drowned shipmates before taking any blame for himself.

 

[Glider]

The decision to put General Gort in charge of the BEF was disastrous one for the French and Belgians, particulary for the Belgians. Most European historians view Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF before even the 6th full day of the Blitz as nothing less than cut-'n-run. The premise of the decision to withdraw, that France has already lost the battle, is astonishing since Gort and the BEF had no appreciation yet of what had happened at Sedan.

As I understand the time line the decision to withdraw the BEF was taken on the 23rd May after the battle of Arras on the 20th May.
On the 15th May Churchill was told by the French Prime Minister 'We are defeated, the battle in lost'
On the 16th May Churchill flew to France and the French Goverment burning its archives and evacuating the Capital. He was also told by the French High Command that there was no strategic reserves.

That being the case, can you blame him for authorising the withdrawl of the BEF?

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

As I understand the time line the decision to withdraw the BEF was taken on the 23rd May after the battle of Arras on the 20th May.
On the 15th May Churchill was told by the French Prime Minister 'We are defeated, the battle in lost'
On the 16th May Churchill flew to France and the French Goverment burning its archives and evacuating the Capital. He was also told by the French High Command that there was no strategic reserves.

That being the case, can you blame him for authorising the withdrawl of the BEF?

You are refering to the decision to withdraw the BEF from France altogether, via Dunkirk. Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF from the front was his alone, though he was not reprimanded for it. My point is that given the horrible communcation situation at the time, Gort could not possibly have known the overall situation to justify withdrawing the BEF from the front. His decision was made justified after the war by those claiming that Gort "saved" the BEF, though it was based mostly on assumptions.
This decision, combined with the fact that he gave his French and Belgian counterparts the vaguest of notions of what was about to happen was borderline treachery, as there is no evidence whatsoever that Gort fully stated his intentions were to withdraw the BEf should it be warranted.

Instead, we have over 60 years of myth making by mostly British historians of supposed French cowardice, their alledged unwillingness to fight and propensity to run at the first sign of danger. This had unfortunately been swallowed as truth hook-line-and sinker by many here in the US who choose to ignore comparative history. Thankfully, through much comparative study, as well as looking through works written by others than the UK/USA, one quickly realizes that the British share just as much blame for the failure of the Northern front as do their French and Belgian counterparts, and a quick look at the casualties suffered by the 3 main allies in the battle of 1940 supports this.

 

[Freebird]

I must disagree with you on some points, but to preserve continuity I have posted my reply on the "Fall of France" thread, as this thread is "What if USA was neutral.

Instead, we have over 60 years of myth making by mostly British historians of supposed French cowardice, their alledged unwillingness to fight

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

I must disagree with you on some points, but to preserve continuity I have posted my reply on the "Fall of France" thread, as this thread is "What if USA was neutral.

Understood. It confused me at first, by all my following posts concerning 1940 will go there.

 

[syscom3]

I still havent seen any convincing evidence that the Commonwealth could have beaten Germany without US help.

My stament still stands. The US made the differnce in ensuring an allied victory.

 

[Messy1]

I say no. Without the US industry or the involvement of the US miltaries, I do not see a victory. I see fighting to a standstill. But it did take the combined effort of all Allied nations to ensure the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Here is a good article similar to this topic.
Could Germany have Won WW II?

 

[drgondog]

I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the defense of France, I have a slightly differing view.


As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison. This would never happen. As a result, the French were forced to improvise defenses along the Franco-Belgian border, defenses which amounted to nothing more than a series of trenches, ditches, and fortified ground defenses. Certainly nothing like the Maginot Line. Even with the Ardennes left exposed, had the FULL plan of the Maginot Line been realized, I seriously doubt the Germans would have attempted a two pronged attack in the North AND the East.

But a.) it WAS built despite the deficiencies noted, despite the treaty necessary to enable a linkage, and defensive tactics were built around it. What do you think about the amount of French treasure sunk into the construction given no possiblity to complete?


At which point I'd like to comment on the statements below as hilarious, and with all due respect to drgondog, I must wholeheartedly disagree with his assesment, on a point by point basis:



I would say just the exact opposite. What saved the BEF in 1940 was NOT superior technical competence, tenacity, or the question of France's ability to hold off the Germans in the West. The BEF was saved for one reason and one reason only: the envious fact that there is a 21 miles (34Km) moat of cold deep water between England and France. The decision to put General Gort in charge of the BEF was disastrous one for the French and Belgians, particulary for the Belgians. Most European historians view Gort's decision to withdraw the BEF before even the 6th full day of the Blitz as nothing less than cut-'n-run. The premise of the decision to withdraw, that France has already lost the battle, is astonishing since Gort and the BEF had no appreciation yet of what had happened at Sedan. Secondly, given that the BEF was on Belgian's right , their withdrawal insured that the Belgians would be forced with their backs to the sea and no alternative but to capitulate. Given that the both the French and the Belgians did everything they could to accomodate Gen. Gort to give the BEF only a small portion of the Dyle Line to defend, a mere 20 km. of it, I find that the British explaination to withdraw was based on their assumption that the French and Belgians had "thrown in the towel" to be nothing less than preposterous. If there was anyone running away as fast as they could, it was the BEF, with the French and Belgians forced to somehow close and defend the gap, which they would not be able to do.

While you find my reasons for selecting Britain as the survivor you haven't offered any substantiation for selecting France as the preferable survivor. Key in that question is whether France could stand against Germany alone. In my opinion, as funny as it sounds, I don't think so... and you haven't sent any logical reasons why my supposition isn't true.



I can only reiterate what I stated above, that the Maginot Line was to complement the Belgian defenses. If we are to extrapolate, then we can blame the French for not thinking far enough ahead into the furture, as Belgium's neutrality was the obvious sticking point to a coordinated defense by the three main allies.

See my comments above



Now this IS an interesting question. One must be reminded however, that Germany had no problems attacking 3 neutral countries without a declaration of war - Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.




I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines.

And you support your opinion how?

Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

The whole debacle in the North can be summed up, IMO, in an analogy I've created. We have 3 guys in a leaky boat in the middle of the ocean. They're all screwing it up in some way or another, and not one will listen to the other. Before any of the three can determine what the future has in store for them, one decides prematurely that all is lost, and he pulls his plug and dives overboard, being fairly sure he will be rescued. He is, and when he's back on land, he is surrounded by hoardes of reporters asking why the boat sank. What do you think he'll say? Since he's the only survivor, safe bet to say that he'll fault the sinking entirely on his drowned shipmates before taking any blame for himself.

Great creation! but silly.

If that were true why should the French survivors fight with such an 'unworthy and dishonorable ally'?? Or contrary to that, have a large body of defeated soldiers and sailors agree to work with the Axis as Vichy France?

Also in this anology is the central role of the reasonable and logical French commanders whose joint responsibility is to a.) work closely to establish a cohesive strategy or b. Figure out a way to go it alone. Do you suggest either existed?

I really am curious as to your strategy for France a.) defeating Germany, or b.) preventing Germany from defeating and occupying France.

Start with declaration of War by France and Great Britain not honoring the treaty and then go in any direction you wish.

 

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Arsenal VG-33
I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the defense of France, I have a slightly differing view.

I really am curious as to your strategy for France a.) defeating Germany, or b.) preventing Germany from defeating and occupying France.

Start with declaration of War by France and Great Britain not honoring the treaty and then go in any direction you wish.

 

[drgondog]

I've already stated my reasons for France not being able to take the offensive in 1939-40 in previous posts. When it comes to the defense of France, I have a slightly differing view.


As for the Maginot Line, it's primary fault lie in the fact that Belgium's neutrality prevented it from becoming the the real defensive wall it was meant to be. Initial plans were to have it go into Belgium and eventually connect with the fortress of Eben Emael. Not only did Belgium's declaration to remain neutral put a stop to this, it also prevented their French and British counterparts from holding joint exercises and conferences to ensure some kind of unison. This would never happen. As a result, the French were forced to improvise defenses along the Franco-Belgian border, defenses which amounted to nothing more than a series of trenches, ditches, and fortified ground defenses. Certainly nothing like the Maginot Line. Even with the Ardennes left exposed, had the FULL plan of the Maginot Line been realized, I seriously doubt the Germans would have attempted a two pronged attack in the North AND the East.

But a.) it WAS built despite the deficiencies noted, despite the treaty necessary to enable a linkage, and defensive tactics were built around it. What do you think about the amount of French treasure sunk into the construction given no possiblity to complete?


At which point I'd like to comment on the statements below as hilarious, and with all due respect to drgondog, I must wholeheartedly disagree with his assesment, on a point by point basis:

Originally Posted by drgondog
Freebird - I think in my scenario that I would far better have Britain as the surviving Ally thyan France in my scenario simply because of the Commonwealth, the technical competence, the tenacity and last but not least, the question of France's ability to hold off Germany in the West...

I would say just the exact opposite. What saved the BEF in 1940 was NOT superior technical competence, tenacity, or the question of France's ability to hold off the Germans in the West.

You completely missed all points in my comment to Freebird - and went completely off topic. I was commenting on my choice of Allies if only one of the two survived. I chose Britain because it had a better chance of withstanding Germany by virtue of Channel, the Commonwealth was far stronger than the French 'empire' of Viet Nam, Algeria, etc - and yes Britain produced better aircraft, better ships and better radar. France had a better tank - what else besides better wine?

The BEF was saved for one reason and one reason only: the envious fact that there is a 21 miles (34Km) moat of cold deep water between England and France.

Exactly one of the reasons I would have selected Britain - as I stated in earlier posts.


While you find my reasons 'hilariou' for selecting Britain as the survivor you haven't offered any substantiation for selecting France as the preferable survivor. Key in that question is whether France could stand against Germany alone. In my opinion, as funny as it sounds, I don't think so... and you haven't sent any logical reasons why my supposition isn't true.

I can only reiterate what I stated above, that the Maginot Line was to complement the Belgian defenses. If we are to extrapolate, then we can blame the French for not thinking far enough ahead into the furture, as Belgium's neutrality was the obvious sticking point to a coordinated defense by the three main allies.

See my comments above. To most people, one who leads the thinking of a Maginot Line as the answer to a French Maiden's prayer BEFORE starting to pour one yard of concrete would check with the Belgians first! That simple concept seemed to have eluded the great French thinkers of the day! In other words thinking in the 'present' would have been a good thing.

Originally Posted by drgondog
but equally unsure whether Germany attacks France absent declaration of war...

Now this IS an interesting question. One must be reminded however, that Germany had no problems attacking 3 neutral countries without a declaration of war - Belgium, Holland, and Denmark.

All slightly less formidible than France?

Quote:
Originally Posted by drgondog
And, in my possible universe', there is no iota of evidence that we ally with France.

I would argue the opposite. The presence of the BEF gave the Germans no deterence in invading Beglium-France, and did not affect the overall outcome in anyway. I'm of the opinion that the French and Belgians could have improvised a better defense on the go without the BEF suddenly withdrawing and leaving a 20 km. gap in the Allied lines.

And you support your opinion how? and how does your stated thesis imply that we would ally with France?

Thus I would say that, in hindsight, there was no reason for the French and Belgians to rely on the British. The Allied epedition on Norway ended in a fiasco, and France should have made plans to look out after herself first, damned the BEF.

True, France is much better looking after itself than others

The whole debacle in the North can be summed up, IMO, in an analogy I've created. We have 3 guys in a leaky boat in the middle of the ocean. They're all screwing it up in some way or another, and not one will listen to the other. Before any of the three can determine what the future has in store for them, one decides prematurely that all is lost, and he pulls his plug and dives overboard, being fairly sure he will be rescued. He is, and when he's back on land, he is surrounded by hoardes of reporters asking why the boat sank. What do you think he'll say? Since he's the only survivor, safe bet to say that he'll fault the sinking entirely on his drowned shipmates before taking any blame for himself.

Great creation! but silly.

If that were true why should the French survivors fight with such an 'unworthy and dishonorable ally'?? Or contrary to that, have a large body of defeated soldiers and sailors agree to work with the Axis as Vichy France?

Also in this anology is the central role of the reasonable and logical French commanders whose joint responsibility is to a.) work closely to establish a cohesive strategy or b. Figure out a way to go it alone. Do you suggest either existed?

You seem rather "down" on Britain as sole reason for France's defeat -

 

[Udet]

Syscom...and you will not see it for there is none...the debate on this matter is almost over.

I can not believe several of the arguments i can read here that point out some really bizarre idea that even without the entrance of the USA into the war, "Germany would still eventually lose the war"...unbelievable and unconceivable.

Keep the feet on the ground: by even suggesting such a thing you are likewise suggesting it is the Soviet Union and Great Britain defeating Germany. This constitutes a drama far beyond rubbish; the utmost tragedy in the anals of reason. The idea of the Red Army reaching the Channel Coast is as laughable as, say, the idea of the Wehrmacht as a tool for genocide.

It seems like some people forget the fact ~13.5 % of the ENTIRE Soviet population died in a matter of only FOUR YEARS -with USA involvement: Lend Lease + "Front Opening Services" rendered-...and this will not include the millions of wounded and crippled as a consequence of the war. Do you have any idea of the impact of such toll? Not even Mr. Smiley Dzhugashvili and his circle of ruthless hellish thugs have the magical powers to maintain such situation for any longer period of time.

The fact that even with the might of the military industry of the U.S.A. fully and directly involved in Europe the battle was so costly to the allies should serve some purpose in suggesting Germany was too powerful for the UK and USSR to deal with, let alone defeat it.

I stick to my vision: without the USA in Europe, Germany crushes the USSR for good before the end of 1942, then Great Britain seeks peace with Germany.

After finishing off the Soviet Union -with a large chunk of its westernmost areas lost to Germany-, i do not even see Germany turning its eyes back to England with a military purpose in mind.

Without the USA jumping in, and with the bolsheviks taken care of, i see Great Britain losing the bully attitude overnight, becoming strangely willingful to arrange peace.

As for some funny numbers herein provided with regard to the "minimum" figure Lend Lease implied in favour of the soviets, let´s not forget that the Soviets are obssessive about the issue; if it served their statistical (propaganda) purposes, then death -in accordance with medical terminology: a permanent cessation of all vital bodily functions- will definitely not mean what it means across the bloody earth. They´d re-define what "death" means in the case of soviet soldiers shot in the head or torn apart by a German artilley barrage. Zombies did exist during WW2, and they came mainly from the Soviet Union.

 

[Freebird]

I still havent seen any convincing evidence that the Commonwealth could have beaten Germany without US help.

My stament still stands. The US made the differnce in ensuring an allied victory.

If you mean victory as in planting the flag over the Reichstag, then yes without US help the British would not have "Victory" as the troops occuping Germany would be Russian. The question was could The UK Russia defeat Germany? I believe they could. If "losing" is being invaded then Britain would not "lose". Would it be a "win" for the Western world if there is no West Germany, only Communist dominated Europe? You can judge for yourself

None of this discussion can be proved, it can only be backed by the correct evidence to make people think about alternate possibilities. I think that Britain and her Commonwealth could defeat Germany in a war of attrition with the aid of the Soviet Union, and trade with the U.S. In the completely unlikely situation where the U.S decides to cripple her economy by not trading with any of the beligerant nations then Britain would struggle, but defeat would still not be certain.

The Soviet Union should be the most thankful of Western support; it's appropriate to mention that 14% of British tank production was sent to the Soviet Union.

Well put Plan D.

To succeed in this scenario the British need to do 5 things.

1.) Maintain enough shipping keep losses from U-boats to a managable level.

2.) send enough aid to Russia in the first 12-15 months to keep them in the war and prevent Germany from defeating them

3.) Maintain enough air ground strength in W. Europe Africa to prevent the Germans from sending any more to the Eastern Front

4.) Defend her Empire territory.

5.) Keep up the pressure in N. Africa

Syscom...and you will not see it for there is none...the debate on this matter is almost over.

??? The debate is over when we all finish discussing it - what's your point?

I can not believe several of the arguments i can read here that point out some really bizarre idea that even without the entrance of the USA into the war, "Germany would still eventually lose the war"...unbelievable and unconceivable.

Nobody said "Germany would lose" What the question was is it POSSIBLE for the UK Russia to beat Germany -Yes

Keep the feet on the ground: by even suggesting such a thing you are likewise suggesting it is the Soviet Union and Great Britain defeating Germany. This constitutes a drama far beyond rubbish; the utmost tragedy in the anals of reason. The idea of the Red Army reaching the Channel Coast is as laughable as, say, the idea of the Wehrmacht as a tool for genocide.

As laughable as the Japanese thinking that they could put almost all the US capital ships out of action destroying 200+ aircraft at Pearl Harbour, for the loss of 29 aircraft. (against a US military that was pre-warned had radar)

As laughable as the British destroying an Italian army in 1940 that had more tanks, planes was 5 times the size.

Or perhaps as laughable as the Germans thinking they could defeat the French nation in 40 days, considering that the Allies had more divisions, tanks, planes and had a formidible defensive Maginot line along more thn half the border.

So anybody that has an opinion different than your is "Rubbish"?

It seems like some people forget the fact ~13.5 % of the ENTIRE Soviet population died in a matter of only FOUR YEARS -with USA involvement: Lend Lease + "Front Opening Services" rendered-...and this will not include the millions of wounded and crippled as a consequence of the war. Do you have any idea of the impact of such toll? Not even Mr. Smiley Dzhugashvili and his circle of ruthless hellish thugs have the magical powers to maintain such situation for any longer period of time.

The fact that even with the might of the military industry of the U.S.A. fully and directly involved in Europe the battle was so costly to the allies should serve some purpose in suggesting Germany was too powerful for the UK and USSR to deal with, let alone defeat it.

I stick to my vision: without the USA in Europe, Germany crushes the USSR for good before the end of 1942, then Great Britain seeks peace with Germany.

The critical aid for the soviets was in the first 15 months or so, when the British supplied 1,300 tanks 1,700 aircraft, while the US supplied 550 tanks 300 aircraft during this time. Does the loss of a few hundred tanks mean the Russians would be "crushed" - NO. Is victory for the Allies much more difficult? - YES. Is it impossible? - NO

After finishing off the Soviet Union -with a large chunk of its westernmost areas lost to Germany-, i do not even see Germany turning its eyes back to England with a military purpose in mind.

Without the USA jumping in, and with the bolsheviks taken care of, i see Great Britain losing the bully attitude overnight, becoming strangely willingful to arrange peace.

As for some funny numbers herein provided with regard to the "minimum" figure Lend Lease implied in favour of the soviets, let´s not forget that the Soviets are obssessive about the issue; if it served their statistical (propaganda) purposes, then death -in accordance with medical terminology: a permanent cessation of all vital bodily functions- will definitely not mean what it means across the bloody earth. They´d re-define what "death" means in the case of soviet soldiers shot in the head or torn apart by a German artilley barrage. Zombies did exist during WW2, and they came mainly from the Soviet Union.

 

[Glider]

Some very good points there Freebird

 

[syscom3]

I dont know if the British infantry was capable of defeating the Germans in a war of mobility in France.

Lets face it, the Germans had the superior infantry eqmt and tactics compared to the Commonwealth. It was only overwhelming airpower that degraded the Germans to the point where they collapsed. And I don't see the commonwealth having that capability before the LW had the jets.

Plus..... to think Montgomery was as capable as Patton was in fighting a mobile and fluid battle is absurd. Any potential victory the Commonwealth had in a hypothetical victory in an invasion of France, would be stillborne because of the inability of the Brits to fight a fast moving war.

It still stands..... The Russians had the ability to defeat the Germans alone. The Commonwealth didnt have the ability to defeat the Germans without Russian or US help.

 

[Udet]

Syscom, how come it still stands?

Tell me in the briefest form possible how is it that you think the USSR could beat Germany alone -meaning zero USA involvement in Europe-.

The Germans had ~58 divisions deployed for the Normandy campaign plus another 8 divisions stationed in what we call the Western Front. Also there were 11 divisions stationed in Norway during said period of time.

Not to mention the more than 1,000,000 men that were deployed for manning and controlling the aerial defence system of the Reich (courtesy of the increasingly powerful presence of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces). You are not thinking that without the presence of these huge U.S. air fleets in Europe the size of the air defence of the Reich would have remained the same are you?

Without the USA involved, it is more than reasonable to assume the bulk of the forces i am making mention of would instead have been allocated to the fight in the east.

When the British attempted a kind of a return to Continental Europe in the summer of 1942, a time when the USA was an official combatant, the Germans crushed it with the utmost easiness.

Also without USA jumping into the party zone in Europe, "Operation Torch" does not take place as we know it did occur in late 1942...so who knows what the hell happens in the North African/Mediterranean front as well; possibly an extra number of divisions deployed by the Heer in the sector -mainly in Italia- are also brought forward to slam the soviets a bit further and a bit harder.

Throughout 1944 the Heer deployed beteween 22 and 29 divisions in Italia due to the British-Commonwealth/USA gains in the Mediterranean sector...so if you erase the critical contribution and presence of the USA in the sector since previous significant military operations in the area (no Operation Torch, etc.), and again, who knows what happens; one thing for sure those 22-29 divisions deployed -depending on the month of 1944- are unnecessary in Italia and go elsewhere, to where the main fight is: eastern front.