pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
most accounts I've read and overheard conversations indicate that it was quite a bash on most airfields, but I suspect not mamy pilots would pass aobriety tests on New Years DAy 45
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What is the estimate of the total number of fighters over Dieppe? And how does that stack up to the fighter forces on either Bodenplatte or November 26, 1944?
If one reads Lundstrom, there is little doubt that his research was extensive and thorough with massive amounts of backup. In the absence of some other historian's well documented research, which has not been posted on this thread, to my knowledge, it seems to me that his conclusions have a lot of credibility. Since few if any of us were participating in WW2, the only way we can learn about it is by researching the material ourselves or reading something from someone who has done the research. To claim that Lundstrom has a bias and is in error about his conclusions seems not very persuasive to me.
Hi Dg
Am at work so havent access to reference material
However 48 Allied squadrons were committed to the battle, the majority of which were Spit Vs. This included the first substantial US fighter committment to the ETO.....3 squadrons of Spit Vs attached to the 31st Pursuit Gp.
Allied losses were 106 aircraft lost
The Germans committed two JGs (JG2 and 26), almost in their entirety, plus some independant squadrons
The JGs were almost exclusively equipped with FW 190 A-3s. These were measurably superior in performance to the Spit Vs equipping the allied fighter squadrons at that time (there was only one squadron of Spit IXs)
The JGs were assisted by some Zerstorer staffels, some recon elements and some ground attack stafelns. Some of the ground attack formations were equipped with FW 190 FBs which appear to have been pressed into service as emergency fighters.
The outcome was heavily in favour of the germans, who enjoyed perhaps their best aerial victory in the west in over two years, and this day probably represented the zenith in the supremacy of the FW 190. Still, the numbers are misleading, since the timne over the target area for the allied fighters was severely limited. since they had to maintain a constant air patrol over the invasion, they were always limited to about 1/3 their force structure at any given moment. Roughly speaking that probably gave the germans near parity at the times they chose to intercept. Still, the german forces were commanded in a very superior manner.
I am not sure of German aircraft losses, but according to this website: Battle over Dieppe 19th August 1942 the germans lost 48 aircraft to 88 Allied fighters and a total of 106 aircraft alltogether. I know they lost 14 pilots outright and a similar number injured, after being shot down. german loss and victory reports are worth noting....they appear to be very accurate on this occasion. Allied claims and loss reports are not as clear
'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.We have discussed this component before. I was not focusing just on carrier combats. I stated that in all of 1942, there were 4 x one day carrier clashes (in terms of actual exchange of strikes) followed by one sustained campaign that occured over one single base....with the F4F's fighting primarily defensively...over their own base vs. an opponent that had to fly with limited numbers a distance greater than England to Berlin. (I am also aware of the late-campaign development of Buin and Buna as emergency fields/small fields but the main component remained Base Air Force at Rabaul.)
I 'do' tend to focus on 42 as this was the pivitol year for the A6M as a front line fighter as well as the climax of both the carrier engagements and the result of the struggle for Guadalcanal. Missions with F4F's did occur into 1943 but by this point the conflict was decided and the IJNAF had suffered a level of attrition that signifigantly impacted it's efficiency. I understand you disagree on how big an impact this was in 43 but there we've agreed to disagree.
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'Agree to disagree' is appropriate only in matters of opinion. In this case it's a fact that kill ratio's of both USN and British units flying 'early' types v the Japanese didn't change much between 1942 and 1943, or the part of the 1943 that's relevant (in terms of a/c like the F4F being used at all in front line service) so there's really no reason to exclude 1943 results; in fact it's quite illogical to consider the 1943 results for say the Spitfire v JNAF and Hurricane v JAAF/JNAF, and exclude 1943 results for F4F's because 'the Japanese were too attrited by then'. And in fact, results in the Solomons at least in early 1943 were not a lot different than in 1942.
Likewise, many of campaigns among which we would compare *Allied* fighter performance involved the Allied a/c on the defensive near their own bases and Japanese fighters at long range. The defenses of Darwin in 1942 (by USAAF P-40's) and 1943 (by Spitfires) was quite similar to Guadalcanal (distance was 500 miles, with never any emergency or staging bases nearer by). The Philippines, and some Malayan and DEI operations also saw Zeroes at close to max range over Allied fields, and many Army Type 1 operations early in the war (Malaya, DEI, Burma) likewise (considering the Type 1's shorter range even with drop tanks, and the tanks sometimes not available), same. And again, in cases where F4F's were themselves operating further from base (relative to their similarly short range to other Allied fighters pre P-38 ), carrier battles, antishipping escorts from G'canal, Munda strikes, etc their kill ratio also averaged close to 1.
So the basic logic of your argument would apply much better to arguing that the Japanese could have achieved more in the G'canal campaign if their circumstances had been more favorable than arguing that other Allied fighters units would have done as well in the F4F's shoes in the Guadalcanal campaign.
I don't think you've made a convincing point, nor has it been made by others so far, that F4F operations were so non-comparable to other Allied fighter ops that the (pretty widely) differing results don't show they were more effective. So arguments about training and a/c characteristics are about *why* the F4F units were more effective than other Allied fighter units, not if they were.
I was not implying the entire Navy, only those at the point of the spear. Do not misinterpret my lack of clarity for implication.No, what I said was that there were 159 (117 carrier based and 42 land based) of your "fighter slots" in the South Pacific Theater on 17 December 1942, not in the entire USN as, yes, your original post clearly implied.
You can have a hundred men on your football team, but only eleven can play in the game. These players are called "shooters".In the entire USN on 17 Dec 42, and, again, not counting the training commands, where experienced fighter pilots were in great demand - Jimmie Thach at NAS Jacksonville comes to mind; the CASUs, where there were a plenty of fighters to be driven for one purpose or another; the ACTGs on both the east and west coast; and, really, plenty of other reasons to have fighter drivers around for various purposes; no, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:
What carriers? On December 7, 1942, the Navy had three aircraft carriers available for war, the Saratoga, the Ranger and the Enterprise, with maybe 100 fighter billets available. The Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet had all been sunk. The Essex was five months away from appearing in the Pacific with an air wing, the Yorktown seven months and the Intrepid was a year away. I am not sure but I suspect the Independence did not pick up its air wing until July. I am sure most of their aircrews of the sunken carriers were not lost but now did not have carrier billets, except maybe training and land based support/reserve or assigned to air wings for anticipated carriers. Do the lack of deck space, there is a backlog of experienced naval aviators at this stage in the war, all being trained or training others, but not available for combat.6 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 133 billets
There has never been an argument over the quantity of naval fighter billets available during this period. The only issue is that there was a very limited slots available aboard any aircraft carrier. This meant that many naval aviators were getting training and obtaining flying experience and not shooting at the enemy. Army pilots on the other hand, were quickly filling shooter slots. In 1942 Army overseas airfields increased from 31 to 358, while I really don't know, it is reasonable to assume most of these new fields would contain shooter units. Of course, many of these were bomber type fields. During that same period, the Navy went from seven carriers to three. The experience level of the Navy was condensed, the Army's was diluted.7 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 160 billets
15 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 386 billets
28 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 679 (I found where I missed two in my initial count).
By then the Army AF had 559 overseas airfields with 81,000 officers, most of whom were pilots.By 7 Dec 1943 the picture was decidedly different, again, just sticking to designated squadrons with fighter complements therefore a need for "fighter slots" and a standardized number of billets in each:
23 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to, and aboard, operating carriers (at one squadron per carrier); approx 708 billets.
These guys were riding the bench, right? They certainly were not pulling triggers against the enemy.33 squadrons with fighter complements assigned to a carrier (at one squadron per carrier), but operating from stations or bases ashore; approx 786 billets.
28 squadrons with fighter complements not assigned to a particular carrier and either operating from stations or bases ashore or enroute from one location to another; approx 961 billets.
84 squadrons altogether with approx total billets of 2455 (and I found where I missed one the first time through here, too).
Of course not, that is why I included all carrier pilots as shooters.One must always remember that not all carriers, and, yes, that even includes Essex class carriers, were in places such as the South Pacific theater on 7 Dec 1943;
Navy pilots based on forward based airfield and involved in combat, as the Marines were at Guadalcanal, would of course be considered shooters. I don't know enough about land based naval units to identify the quantity involved in combat.any more that all squadrons operating from land were safely ensconced away at NAS Olathe, Kansas.
Am I to conclude from your definition that, say, a fighter pilot who was in on the Lae-Salamaua raid of 10 Mar 42, and went on to score air-to-air credits at Tulagi on 4 May, at Coral Sea on 8 May, and again at Midway on 4 June, by virtue of being assigned to a fighter squadron stationed at NAS Maui, and thus not in combat deployed squadron on 17 Dec 42, was not filling a "fighter slot"? That filling a position in an established fighter organization, does not define a "fighter slot"? Or that a naval aviator of the fighter persuasion might find himself in NAS San Diego as FO in one working up squadron and then a week later find himself as XO of another squadron in action on the other side of the ocean and, yet, was not filling a "fighter slot" in the first, but is filling a "fighter slot" in the second?
shooter assets (fighter aircraft, Patriot, Aegis, etc.), and all the other principal systems resident in a theater that can perform one or more JIADS (Joint Integrated Air Defense System} functions
Really? All of them? Squadron COs, XOs, OpOs, all their flight leaders? Everyone? Admittedly, I don't read much about the Army Air Corps, for (a) I've no particular interest and (b) I worry about the slanted writing one might encounter when reading a work concentrating on the AAF, but I find the concept of all these 2d LT types running around without any leadership a bit hard to believe. Almost enough to stir my poor bones to check out their manning and cross check with the army register . . . well, maybe not, a lot of effort for not much reason.
The reference note is interesting which support my original premise.Far East Air Force (United States) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Since 10 February 1941, FEAF had received 203 new pilots (140 of which became pursuit pilots), but all but 28 were fresh from flight schools and required further individual training, which cut into needed unit tactical training.[33]
Bartsch Doomed, pp. 7, 12–13, 25, 28–29, and 434–440. The AAF decided to use its experienced pilots in the United States as training cadre for newly-created units rather than reinforce overseas units. As a result FEAF pilots were unusually young and inexperienced when war began. The 1941 pilot levies were: 10 February: 24 from Class 40-H; 8 May: 39 from Class 41-B; 24 June: 96 from Classes 41-C and 41-D; 23 October: 16 from Class 41-G. While 22 of the 28 pilots of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, who arrived 20 November, were from these same classes, they had experience flying P-40 aircraft before deployment to FEAF.
How much do you have?
Four pilots reported to Lexington's VF-2 on 11 April 1942, straight from ACTGPac, Ens William Wileman, Ens John Bain, Ens George Hopper, and AP2c Robert Kanze, just in time to depart for Coral Sea on 15 April. And, yes, they all saw action as fighter pilots at Coral Sea three weeks later.
The least experienced pilots in Yorktown's VF-42 (the squadron on which I have the most information on file) at Coral Sea were Ens Harry Gibbs, Ens John Baker, and Ens John Adams, all of whom had joined the squadron on 6 December 1941 upon completion of training. On the eve of the Coral Sea action Gibbs had but 274.4 total hours, including all training hours; Baker, 340.3; and Adams, 396.0. Those compared to the ensign with the most flight hours, Leslie Knox, who had been in the squadron since 14 March 1941 with 811.6. All saw action at Coral Sea; Baker and Knox went MIA on 7 May 42 and declared killed in action on 8 May 1943.
Again in that same time frame Yeager thought he could beat any other aircraft at low altitude.