Foreign perspectives on the Battle of Britain

[Edgar Brooks]

Maybe not a win but a draw perhaps?

Not really; when Speer was being interviewed by the Russians, after the war, they asked him which defeat he considered to be the most important. Thinking that he would say Stalingrad, they were rather taken aback when he replied, "The Battle of Britain." If the man, who was there and saw it firsthand, considered it a defeat, who are we to argue?

 

[Juha]

...What has that got to do with anything? Does it somehow suddenly change the fact that over 90% of the Wehrmacht was deployed against the USSR? That for Hitler and the OKW Britain was seen as a mere sideshow?

It's as though you see all of this as some petty national peeing contest.

You seem to repeat that 90% claim, what is your source? Not even 90% of the Heer was concentrated against SU in June 41. Only grouping of which some 90% was concentrated against SU I can recall was the motorized/mechanized divs (PzDs and Inf.D(mot)s) if we counted the two PzDs which were refitting in Germany but earmarked to be employed later, if needed, in the East to forces emploed against SU, if not then c. 80% of PzDs and mot divs were concentrated against SU in June 41. According to Williamson Murray some 65% of the frontline strenght of the LW was concentrated in the East in June 41.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Maybe not a win but a draw perhaps?

Coral sea was analogous, a microcosm of what happened to Britain. Tactically it was a defeat for the USN.....they lost Lexington (and a few other ships) in exchange for sinking Shoho and damaging the Shokaku. Strategically however, it was an important allied victory, because the Japanese were forced to cancel their invasion of Moresby. A critical victory won at heavy cost....


In the case of the British, defeat of Britain was the only option available to the Germans. Without that Germany could not hope to win her war. For Britain, anything but a defeat was a win, provided she could pull in friends and ensure their survival....she did this in spades.


So even though in tactical terms the Germans had repeated wins over the british, they never amounted to anything, whereas Britains victory (her survival) did amount to something....


so no I dont see it as a draw...militarily, if anything the germans were ahead on points....strategically it was a lay down mezzaire British Victory

 

[Njaco]

Not really; when Speer was being interviewed by the Russians, after the war, they asked him which defeat he considered to be the most important. Thinking that he would say Stalingrad, they were rather taken aback when he replied, "The Battle of Britain." If the man, who was there and saw it firsthand, considered it a defeat, who are we to argue?

Parsifal made the comment.......

In the fighting up to the end of 1942, Britian has to be counted as the overall winner....

That is what my reply related to. No doubt that Britain 'won' the BoB but for the next 2 years I see it as a draw. Britain at least kept Germany from reaching its goal on the Western Front until 1942, whatever it was. Just my opinion.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Apologies for that. But I'm finding his tone a tad patronising and condescending (without much basis).

As does yours as well.

This topic can be discussed without insulting people.

 

[renrich]

Page 448-449, "The Decisive Battles of the Western World" JFC Fuller, edited by John Terraine.

"When Britain, under Winston Churchill's leadership, showed no disposition to capitulate after the Fall of France, the logical next step for Germany was clearly an invasion of the British Isles. Yet as Fuller points out, in all the preparation for such a deed, there was an element of unreality, despite the apparent overwhelming strength of the German Army and LW. The first directive for invasion of England was issued in mid July, under the code name OPERATION SEA LION; Fuller comments:"

"The landing was to come as a surprise on a broad front from Ramsgate to the Isle of Wight and all preparations were to be completed by the middle of August, a palpable absurdity, as 39 divisions were involved-13 in first flight and 26 in support and 1722 barges, 471 tugs, 1161 motor boats and 155 transports had to be fitted and assembled in the Channel Ports."

" By comparison, Fuller notes in passing, the Anglo-American invasion of Africa took well over nine months to prepare-a proof, if any more were needed, that Hitler's project was ridiculous. Equally ridiculous was his deferment of the decision to invade until "after the air force had made concentrated attacks on Southern England for one week." "The truth is" says Fuller, " with the possible exception of Goring, the LW commander, nobody believed in Sea Lion. Certainly the German admirals did not, nor the Generals, nor Hitler himself who, according to General Blumentritt, in July told Runstedt privately that "he did not intend to carry out Sea Lion."

It is pointed out later on page 449-450 that rightly so, the BOB was turned into a great propaganda victory: " yet never were the British Isles in any real danger, nor was Fighter Command ever reduced to it's last cartridge, as was put about in order to magnify the German Peril."

I bring these points up because many during this discussion seem to believe that the BOB prevented Britain from being invaded. The BOB was a victoy, richly deserved for the RAF and a defeat for the LW. It heartened the British Empire and proved that the American Ambassador, Joe Kennedy, was wrong. It proved that the LW was not invincible. It did not keep the British Isles from being invaded by Germany.

 

[Tante Ju]

No doubt that Britain 'won' the BoB but for the next 2 years I see it as a draw. Britain at least kept Germany from reaching its goal on the Western Front until 1942, whatever it was. Just my opinion.

I do not understand how things defeat in Norway, defeat in France, near defeat in the Atlantic, defeat in Greece, defeat in Crete, defeat over Malta and Med, defeat in North Africa, and retreat to the Egypt border, defeat at Dieppe (ie. things that happened until El Alaimein counts a 'draw'.. its a bit like saying everything happening between Normandie and Remagen was something of a 'draw'. Germany until 1942 got the upper hand in every possible campaign against England, getting one step closer every time to total defeat is not a draw in my understanding..

 

[pbfoot]

As mentioned earlier but I think most never picked up on it , the US as a result of BOB figuered out they were lacking in the skills needed to operarate a GCI system so they managed to completely fill the first course of Radar operators offered by BCATP in summer of 41 , I might be mistaken but from what I've learnt they were the first for USN and USAAF

 

[fastmongrel]

I do not understand how things defeat in Norway, defeat in France, near defeat in the Atlantic, defeat in Greece, defeat in Crete, defeat over Malta and Med, defeat in North Africa, and retreat to the Egypt border, defeat at Dieppe (ie. things that happened until El Alaimein counts a 'draw'.. its a bit like saying everything happening between Normandie and Remagen was something of a 'draw'. Germany until 1942 got the upper hand in every possible campaign against England, getting one step closer every time to total defeat is not a draw in my understanding..

Your absolutely right Tante Ju Germany defeated Britain time and time again with 2 exceptions the BOB which I consider a score draw after extra time and the Battle of the Atlantic which the RN and the RCN were not winning but coping reasonably well after the initial Happy Time. Britains policy was not winning or anything remotely like winning but Holding the Line till help from the US arrived. Therefore even a defeat was a draw because the British still were in the fight it didnt matter how many battles the Germans won if the British still existed as a fighting force. Britain couldnt have been defeated by Hitlers strategy simply because it was an island and the Germans werent going to win unless there soldiers and tanks could march on water and probably not even then.

Britains Rope A Dope strategy of taking the blows but not getting badly hurt won in the end because Germany could not deliver the knockout blow. Britain was the itch that Germany couldnt stop scratching.

 

[Siegfried]

Recognised by whom exactly? C'mon name these historians and their works supporting this new theory.

Because the last I heard the established consensus amongst historians (backed by an overwhelming weight of evidence) is that RAF fighter command was held by the knackers by the Luftwaffe before Goring ordered a switch to terror-bombing.

.

I don't think they switched to 'terror bombing'. They started to target the wharfs and docklands (of London) as part of stratagy of support of the u-boat blockade, as well they went for specific targets within cities such as transformer substations. In retrospect it doesn'ty look like a coherant strategy unless they really though they could choke of Britains supply with a combination submarine warfare and damaging of ship ports. Exactly when terror bombing began is debatable: the Baedecker raids which were revenge for the fire bombing of Lubeck's medieval core or Conventry which was an primarily an attack on the machine tool and aviation engine industry but may have had a dehousiong component designed to hamper reconstruction. I say 'may have' as we need real historical evidence, not just a regurgitation of 60 year old propaganda.

 

[pbfoot]

, defeat over Malta
..

huh ... ?

 

[Milosh]

The Germans dropped about 500 tonnes of high explosives, including 50 parachute air-mines, of which 20 were incendiary petroleum mines, and 36,000 incendiary bombs on Coventry (14 November 1940).

may have had a dehousiong component designed to hamper reconstruction

May have?

 

[Tante Ju]

"36 000" incendiary bombs is like 10-20 tons...

 

[RCAFson]

I do not understand how things defeat in Norway, defeat in France, near defeat in the Atlantic, defeat in Greece, defeat in Crete, defeat over Malta and Med, defeat in North Africa, and retreat to the Egypt border, defeat at Dieppe (ie. things that happened until El Alaimein counts a 'draw'.. its a bit like saying everything happening between Normandie and Remagen was something of a 'draw'. Germany until 1942 got the upper hand in every possible campaign against England, getting one step closer every time to total defeat is not a draw in my understanding..

You forgot that Greece and North Africa were mutually exclusive for the UK, but it drew Germany ever deeper into the Balkans and Africa, until finally, the German Army stalled in front of Moscow and Stalingrad, for the want of a few more divisions...

the first defeat for the Luftwaffe was the BofB and the first defeat for the German Army was Operation Crusader.

 

[mhuxt]

Stephen Bungay "The Most Dangerous Enemy"; James Holland "Battle of Britain"; Patrick Bishop "Battle of Britain"; Dilip Sarkar "How the Spitfire Won the Battle of Britain"; plus sundry government files in our National Archives in London..

Dont forget Richard Overy.

 

[Glider]

I do not understand how things defeat in Norway, defeat in France, near defeat in the Atlantic, defeat in Greece, defeat in Crete, defeat over Malta and Med, defeat in North Africa, and retreat to the Egypt border, defeat at Dieppe (ie. things that happened until El Alaimein counts a 'draw'.. its a bit like saying everything happening between Normandie and Remagen was something of a 'draw'. Germany until 1942 got the upper hand in every possible campaign against England, getting one step closer every time to total defeat is not a draw in my understanding..

Take them one at a time
Norway and France were defeats but not ones critical to the survival of Britain
The Atlantic wasn't a near defeat until 1942 when for a short time the UBoat threat was serious. In the Period up til then the situation was in favour of the RN and RCN. Once the tide turned the U Boats were never in the contest again. The German Navy lost that battle.
Crete and Greece were defeats but again not critical ones. Dieppe wasn't a campaign it was a battle and the cost was certainly high but serious lessons learned the hard way that influenced D Day.
North Africa was backwards and forwards for both sides, neither being able to land the knockout blow, but the Germans never achieved their goal.

The critical battles were the BOB and the Battle of the Atlantic, both of which the Germans lost. They were the battles that kept the UK in the war and stopped the Germans from consolidating their victories.
North Africa was a British Victory because at the end of the day they controlled the battlefield and never lost the oilfields which were the the strategic prize.

France was the only strategic battle that the allies lost and has been pointed out the British forces were a small minority of the army and didn't have strategic control.

So it would be fair to say that the British lost most of the less critical battles and campaigns, but they won the big ones and those are the ones that counted.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

I don't think they switched to 'terror bombing'. They started to target the wharfs and docklands (of London) as part of stratagy of support of the u-boat blockade, as well they went for specific targets within cities such as transformer substations. .

Dear God in Heaven, please tell me you don't believe that load of guff; a transformer substation is about 10 metres square, and you really believe that, in the dark and from at least two miles up, a pilot can pick out something that size? I must admit that the idea of Coventry Cathedral being an electric substation is news to me.

Exactly when terror bombing began is debatable:

January 1915, when Great Yarmouth and King's Lynn were attacked, or 31st. of May, when London was first attacked; 550 civilians died at German hands, in WWI, and nobody expected the Germans to act any differently when the second lot started.

Conventry which was an primarily an attack on the machine tool and aviation engine industry but may have had a dehousing component designed to hamper reconstruction. I say 'may have' as we need real historical evidence, not just a regurgitation of 60 year old propaganda

Well, if it didn't, it was lousy bombing, since 4,000 homes were destroyed, together with two hospitals, two churches and a police station. One third of the factories were destroyed or severely damaged, but the majority were on the outskirts of the city, while the Germans went for the centre, so missed them. It seems odd that Goebbels invented the term "Coventriert" for similar levels of destruction, if the Germans didn't mean to destroy living accomodation.

I do not understand how things defeat in Norway, defeat in France, near defeat in the Atlantic, defeat in Greece, defeat in Crete, defeat over M alta and Med, defeat in North Africa, and retreat to the Egypt border, defeat at Dieppe (ie. things that happened until El Alaimein counts a 'draw'.. its a bit like saying everything happening between Normandie and Remagen was something of a 'draw'. Germany until 1942 got the upper hand in every possible campaign against England, getting one step closer every time to total defeat is not a draw in my understanding..

One day you will learn that it's not winning the battles that counts; it's winning the war, which Germany signally failed to do.

 

[parsifal]

Greece and yugoslavia, whilst undeniable tactical defeats, are again examples of strategic victories. Yugoslavia and Greece delayed the start of Barbarossa by 6 weeks, and many have argued that the lost 6 weeks cost the germans the capture of moscow. Moscow lost would have been a terrible blow to the Russians. It was part of that long haul strategy that in the end saved what was important for eventual victory.

In addition the battles in Greece had more immediate benefits for the allies. The fighting in Greece and the continued support being given by Britain led to the defeat of the Italians at Matapan, which in turn had long term effects on the med operations. The battle over Crete cost over 100 trasports and about 6000 highly trained paratroopers gebirgjagers.....the loss of the transports....flown by the LWs bomber instructors had a long term effect on both Germany aircrew training programs and its tranport lift capability....a critical issue 18months later. The losses shocked Hitler, and led him to discount any future airborne operations....a major factor in the defence of Malta.

malta was never a defeat, in any sense. Axis losses exceeded RAF losses, and its continued retention by the british was a major defeat in itself for the Axis.

So whilst the tactical vistories continued to be registered to the Germans in Greece, Crete, Yugoslavia and North Africa, the strategic victories were continuing to be registered to the Allies. Further, the defensive victories, like Tobruk, and Malta were clearly British Victories, whilst the successes at sea were both offensive and decisive.

In Yugoslavia, the German tactical victory proved to be entirely pyrhhic. They defeated the yugoslavian field army in two weeks, and then spent the next four years fighting a most terrible and costly guerilla war, that tied down more than 40 Axis Divisions, and cost them nearly 200000 casualties. That continued resistance was supported and supplied largely by the British, especially at the beginning, so again this "defeat" needs to be looked at in its detail to understand what happened.

 

[buffnut453]

I bring these points up because many during this discussion seem to believe that the BOB prevented Britain from being invaded. The BOB was a victoy, richly deserved for the RAF and a defeat for the LW. It heartened the British Empire and proved that the American Ambassador, Joe Kennedy, was wrong. It proved that the LW was not invincible. It did not keep the British Isles from being invaded by Germany.

I don't think anyone has stated that the BoB prevented Britain from being invaded. However, let's take off the hindsight goggles and try to consider the position in June 1940. The BEF has been evacuated from Dunkirk having gone to France expecting a repeat of WWI and finding a totally different style of warfare. Amphibious operations were largely an unknown discipline on all sides - if the German army could wreak such havoc as they did in France, was it truly impossible for them to sail forces across the Channel? Whilst German invasion might, in retrospect, be seen as impractical, I'm sure there were many at the time who genuinely feared such an event.

That all said, Hitler didn't need to invade. He just needed to knock Britain out of the war. It is a total myth that Britain was united against Germany in May-June 1940. There was a substantial collection of individuals, of all persuasions and many in very powerful positions, who wanted to reach an agreement with Hitler. Groups included supporters who believed Prince Edward should be returned to the throne, senior politicians like Halifax who were interested in appeasement and suing for peace, through to the small minority of fascists epitomised by Mosley.

Had Fighter Command failed in its defence of southeast England from June 1940 onwards, it would have left London wide open to attack and removed any hope of the RAF providing air cover for RN units in the English Channel. The line had to be held by 11 Group. A retreat of Park's squadrons would have sounded the death knell for Churchill's government with every likelihood that it would be replaced by Halifax or someone of his ilk. The ultimate result would be a UK government that increasingly fell under the influence of Berlin, just as Vichy France did, and thus Hitler wouldn't have needed a hostile invasion - he'd have had an open invitation.

 

[Readie]

Had Fighter Command failed in its defence of southeast England from June 1940 onwards, it would have left London wide open to attack and removed any hope of the RAF providing air cover for RN units in the English Channel. QUOTE]

Well said, this is the pivotal point of the BoB. Goering and the LW tried their damnest to destroy the RAF and then to terrorise British cities. The sheer scale of their effort cannot lead one to any other conclusion.
Whether it was the limitations of the LW aircraft at the time, ie no real heavy bomber in the Lancaster/B17 style, no real long range fighter that could stay and fight over England on equal terms with the Spitfire is subjective.
To quote Stanford Tuck 'it was pretty much make or break time' for both sides.
The British resistance showed that the LW was not all conquering, gave Churchill and the free world a massive propaganda gift and message.
Goering and his staff (inc the able Galland) must have realised that they could not win WW2 without first defeating Britain.
Germany failed to beat us in 1940 so , all we had to do was keep punching and dodging, by whatever means we could, until our allies joined in.
Then it was too late for the Third Reich.

John