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Your first source i have not been able to locate a copy of, but I will.
The second source you are misquoting. I happen to have a copy of this report, and relevantly it says on Page 33 that
"The landings at Trondheim encountered less initial resistance than the Germans
experienced at Narvik. The shore batteries guarding the harbor managed only one volley
before the German assault ships dashed by at high speed. The warships of the group
disembarked their infantry at the docks with no interference. The Germans secured the
city by nightfall."
The whole thrust of this article was that the Germans achieved their goals because of the level of unpreparedness and devotes considerable space in the article to the threats posed by the coastal batteries. According to Richardson, the Germans specifically aimed to capture the batteries intact, so as to prevent British penetrations of the ports. So, if Hipper did destroy the batteries in the manner you suggest, they were acting contrary to the operational plan.
If Ash does say that (and I note as a source it is very old) he is making assertions that are contrary to every other source I have ever seen. Hippers consorts ducked past the harbour defences, whilst Hipper engaged them. Hipper did not knock them out, however. They eventually surrendered to German troops from the landing force. .
Once I get a copy of the book in question, I am sure the issue will be cleared up. I am expecting another example of misquoting at this stage.....
It specifically states: "Naval fire silenced the batteries by 1700." If it was not by the Hipper then it had to be by the destroyers.
The correlation I was drawing or was attempting to draw was an amphibious invasion of fortified areas. IMHO regardless if the troops landed directly in front of the fort and took it, or landed to the side and outflanked it. It still was an amphibious operation that took out forts.
Hello
German and Italian Navies had at least some A/S capacity. Germans didn't have ASDIC but had technically very good hydrophones. And RN subs suffered heavy losses in Med.
Juha
A few quick comments. With regard to the Luftwaffe versus the RAF, even though the RAF would be heavily outnumbered, it would still be a Malta like situation, but without Me 109 escort (I think its too far for 109s to reach, unless spanish Morocco is occupied or has its airspace violated...remeber Spain is supposed to be neutral in this scenario)
The problem is not so much the availability of heavy units, so much as the availability of sufficient merchant shipping to support the operation.
This would be an operation around half the size of Overlord, and would therefore require the attentions of about 3.5 million tons of shipping for the duration of the operation. The ground troops could be kept at their home stations for a while, but the Luftwaffe (and its supporting elements) will need logistic support. Very roughly, each 200 aircraft consumes approximately the same amount as a motorized Infantry Division. Thats about 1500 tons per day. If there are 1500 aircraft deployed forward, there are also the logistic support units to consider. Using the Axis expereince in Cyrenaica, every ton of supplied delivered to the front from Tripoli also required the consumption of a further ton of supplies in the rear area support elements....the transport companies, the flak formations, the policemen, the gardeners, and the like.
That means that the 1500 strong air striking force would require 25000 tons per day, just to remain supplied, thats approximately 150000 tons per week. The average displacement of the italiahn merchant fleet was under 3000 tons per hull, which roughly means that each ship can carry about 1000 tons of cargo (this is much smaller than the US and British fleets). This means that the ports of Oran and Algiers (and in a pinch, Tunis) would between them need to be able to handle at least 150 unloadings per week. I seriously doubt this is even possible to be honest. In terms of the merchant fleet, the minimum requirements, in deadweight tons, in order to maintain a continuous flow of supplies has to be placed at atleast 1000000 tons. The Italians only had 2 million tons available to them, and this was hard pressed to keep the units in Libya supplied. So where is the extra shipping going to be drawn from if the french are not co-operating????? And please note, we have not even put a single soldier into a transport, or buiult a single landing craft as yet
Logistically, the operation cannot be done without the French (or someone) providing a massive injection of shipping to the operation. There would need to be massive investments into the capacities of the ports undertaken, as the allies did in 1942. I just see the whole thing as completely impractical, given the constraints the Axis would be operating under. And we have not even started to look at the operational difficulties the two axis navies would be labouring under in this scenario.....
Enough A/S to cover an Axis fleet from sub attack?
Just a note: Axis have access to French territory, but no French military participation, perhaps some merchant shipping in the central med only
Oran is 270 miles from Gibraltar, and Casablanca 200 miles, but the French territory west of Oran would be about 180 miles, while bases north of Casablanca could be about 125 miles away, so if the Germans were to improve some local airfields Me109's could be operational. (Distances measured over water only)
What about using Tunis nearby ports for shipping? It would be about 1/3 or 1/2 the distance Naples - Tunis instead of using Tripoli, and then the Axis units could be supplied by rail through Algeria -> Casablanca. (The railway would need improvements obviously)
Also, could they not use a smaller Axis air group if they had some KM/RM fleet support?
Say only 500 aircraft, not 1500. Perhaps 200 fighters, 100 DB and 200 Ju88/He111?
If the Axis had Bismarck 1 or 2 italian BB's, how well could they blast the Gibraltar guns?
Does anyone know how thick the turrets are for the 9.2" guns?
Has anyone been to see that one in ... Duxford was it?
I agree with a lot of this apart from the last sentence. Italian fire control generally was quite poorTwice at large in the Mediterranean ??
And I think the Italians often had the chance of having a decisive victory. But like I said before, they were too prudent!
The first clash between the two navies was at Point Stilo two squadrons escorting the respective convoys, Italian ships (under the command of Admiral Campioni) were Cesare, Cavour, 14 cruisers and numerous destroyers, British units were battleships Warspite, Malaya, and Royal Sovereign, aircraft carrier Eagle, five light cruisers, and 14 destroyers, commander was Admiral Cunningham.
The result of this match was that only Giulio Cesare was lightly damaged, but it demonstrated the inferiority of the Italian since they were in a more favorable position and they lost a good chance to beat the British more significantly. The battle was near the coasts of Italy and if the cooperation with the Air Force had work properly, Point Stilo would have been a great victory. In addition Veneto and Littorio were almost ready for combat, and his commander, Admiral Bergamini, asked the permission to join the battle, but it was denied by Supermarina.
Italian optical rangefinding equipment was also superior to that of the British.
Kris