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Of course he believed it. Your point was about Germany being aware of the place and time of the D Day landings, they were but were told it was a diversion, by the time they figured out it wasnt a diversion the Allies had broken out of Normandy. You are just moving goalposts pettifogging and denying. The point is the usefulness of breaking codes and deception which is actually beyond doubt except in the minds of revisionsists with a new theory.If he believed it, why did Das Reich ,located at Toulouse, receive the order on June 6 to go to ..Normandy ?
Why did he transfer 2 PzD (9 and 10 SS ) from the East to ...Normandy ?
Why did he order the second tank battalion of Panzer Lehr that was moving to the East on June 6 ,to return ...to Normandy ?
What he said to the Japanese ambassador ( if we may believe the Japanese ambassador ) was contradicted by what he did .
The German strategy was not dictated by Fortitude,not by the belief of a main attack ( a diversionary attack was as dangerous as a main attack ) but by the FACT that,as the French in 1940, Germany had to defend the whole coast of Western and Northern and Southern Europe .The allies could attack everywhere ,especially where there were no or few Germans .
The Pas de Calais did not receive any reinforcements after D Day,for the simple reason that there was no landing at the Pas de Calais .
The reinforcements were sent to where there was fighting .
If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, Overlord would still be a big success .
And, mostly the enemy is not telling you exactly what they are up to ,because he doesn't know it himself .
Now you're just arguing because you refuse to admit that you are wrong.If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, Overlord would still be a big success .
And, mostly the enemy is not telling you exactly what they are up to ,because he doesn't know it himself .
Operation Fortitude was an exercise in getting into Adolf head with plausible stories and plausible denial. Adolf was told about D-Day but too late to do anything. After that it was all about convincing him that it was a diversion. This was quite easy to do because Normandy hasnt got a harbour, of course no one mentioned Mulberry harbours, flexible fuel pipelines or ships capable of landing a lot of goods on a beach.Now you're just arguing because you refuse to admit that you are wrong.
If the OKW knew that the landings would be at Normandy, they would have had all their assets in place.
You argue that the Germans were at Calais in force and guess what?
They were there BECAUSE they were given false information which they beleived to be true - proving that "Intel" CAN affect the movements of an army.
*IF* the Germans had received factual Intel about Overlord, they would have been there instead.
Regarding that last bit you posted, stating that the enemy doesn't know what they are doing is pure crap.
So the Japanese Navy just happened to show up at Midway Atoll by accident after bumbling aimlessly around the Pacific?
You attempt to be authorative, yet you post a statement like that.
You should actually read a book instead of gleaning wikiwand for factoids...
If the Germans knew the date and time of Overlord, Overlord would still be a big success .
And, mostly the enemy is not telling you exactly what they are up to ,because he doesn't know it himself .
the above were actually quite painful to readKnowing where the opposition is ,is only important if the opposition can do something :and on the average, Doenitz could not do much ,because he did not know where the opposition was .The opposition was hided by the ocean .
I have given the proof that more U Boats does not mean more losses of supplies/of MV, thus the number of lost U Boats is not relevant .Only irrelevant to you because what you consider relevant is only that which supports your idea of the day.
I admit to almost admiring the way you totally ignore the comments raised in the posting you are pretending to respond too, and then raise an equally ignorant statement on a totally different aspect.Less supply losses and less losses of MV do NOT mean more imports : it was not Doenitz who decided how much and what would be imported .
1940 : supply and food imports : 41,4 million ton .
1941 : 29,7 million ton
1942 : 22,1 million ton
1943 : 24,3 million ton
1944 :22,8 million ton .
In 1944 the U Boat danger was lower than in 1941,and the result was that the imports decreased .
In 1941 the losses were lower than in 1940 ,but yet the imports also were lower .
This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports and this means that the importance of the Battle of The Atlantic has been much exaggerated .
No you havent. any more than a bomb falling on London proves the RAF was useless or that a US bomber being shot down proves escort fighters dont work. This attention seeking style of discussion is tiresome.I have given the proof that more U Boats does not mean more losses of supplies/of MV, thus the number of lost U Boats is not relevant .
You haven't proven anything, except that you have zero clues about what you're talking about.I have given the proof that more U Boats does not mean more losses of supplies/of MV, thus the number of lost U Boats is not relevant .
Clearly you still haven't followed up on the research hints I gave you so I will say this one more time.Knowing where the opposition is ,is only important if the opposition can do something :and on the average, Doenitz could not do much ,because he did not know where the opposition was .The opposition was hided by the ocean .
No : he did not keep them away from where they could be bombarded ,but for other reasons ,asHe kept them away from where they could be bombed, the idea being to move mobile forces at the time of any attack. There is no doubt Hitler believed it, no point in discussing it further, or introducing other factoids.
Germany did NOT know where the convoys were exactly, but only where they were roughly .Clearly you still haven't followed up on the research hints I gave you so I will say this one more time.
Germany had broken the UK Convoy codes and knew exactly where the convoys were. In other words using your words
Doenitz could not do much ,because he did not know where the opposition was .
Excellent post additional to ships lost are the number of ships constructed. Emergency Shipbuilding Program - Wikipedia compared to Uboats constructed. U-boat - Wikipedia The main type of U Boat the Mk VII only 709 were made.I admit to almost admiring the way you totally ignore the comments raised in the posting you are pretending to respond too, and then raise an equally ignorant statement on a totally different aspect.
To Sum Up
From the posting you are pretending to respond to
A) Did you research B Dienst on google and confirm that the UK convoy codes had been broken until 1943. Yes/No
B) Did you research the Wolf Pack and discover that contrary to your previous statement that there were simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats Yes/No
C) Did you research the Mid Atlantic Gap and let us know what you find, in particular the importance of aircraft protection to the defence of convoys and that the impact of operating close to shore would increase the risk to the submarines Yes/No
D) Did you research the oil situation in the UK and discover that the UK never had a problem with oil supplies Yes/No
E) We are all still waiting for you to tell us how the German U Boats could pick out the tankers as they cannot be identified by sound, or by sight unless you have penetrated the centre of the convoy which is also suicidal once radar has progressed to the stage that it can be effective against semi submerged submarines
Now the new point you are raising
This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports and this means that the importance of the Battle of The Atlantic has been much exaggerated .
Interestingly the first part This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports. This part is actually partly correct, as it depends on the resources thrown into the conflict. I am taking your figures on trust as being accurate
1941 imports 29.7 million tons, ships lost 1,419 - 4,693 thousand tons
1942 imports 22.1 million tons, ships lost 1,859 - 8,398 thousand tons
1943 imports 24.3 million tons, ships lost 812 - 3,646 thousand tons.
From this you can see that your conclusion is fundamentally wrong. If the 1942 shipping losses had been roughly the same as in 1941 then the imports would have been considerably higher at least equalling the 1941 figure. So it is clear that the damage inflicted by the German submarines did impact the level of imports.
It is also clear that the losses inflicted on the German U Boats also impacted the conflict. In 1943 the losses suffered were such that from April the U Boat arm was largely withdrawn from the conflict to recover and learn the lessons. The turnaround was quite sudden, in March 1943 U Boats hit 131 merchant ships, if they had been able to maintain that pace for the rest of 1943 the situation would have been dire. Instead the losses dropped to an average of 38 ships per month.
If they had been able : IF is not a serious argument .I admit to almost admiring the way you totally ignore the comments raised in the posting you are pretending to respond too, and then raise an equally ignorant statement on a totally different aspect.
To Sum Up
From the posting you are pretending to respond to
A) Did you research B Dienst on google and confirm that the UK convoy codes had been broken until 1943. Yes/No
B) Did you research the Wolf Pack and discover that contrary to your previous statement that there were simultaneous attacks by groups of U Boats Yes/No
C) Did you research the Mid Atlantic Gap and let us know what you find, in particular the importance of aircraft protection to the defence of convoys and that the impact of operating close to shore would increase the risk to the submarines Yes/No
D) Did you research the oil situation in the UK and discover that the UK never had a problem with oil supplies Yes/No
E) We are all still waiting for you to tell us how the German U Boats could pick out the tankers as they cannot be identified by sound, or by sight unless you have penetrated the centre of the convoy which is also suicidal once radar has progressed to the stage that it can be effective against semi submerged submarines
Now the new point you are raising
This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports and this means that the importance of the Battle of The Atlantic has been much exaggerated .
Interestingly the first part This means that there is no causal relation between the losses and the imports. This part is actually partly correct, as it depends on the resources thrown into the conflict. I am taking your figures on trust as being accurate
1941 imports 29.7 million tons, ships lost 1,419 - 4,693 thousand tons
1942 imports 22.1 million tons, ships lost 1,859 - 8,398 thousand tons
1943 imports 24.3 million tons, ships lost 812 - 3,646 thousand tons.
From this you can see that your conclusion is fundamentally wrong. If the 1942 shipping losses had been roughly the same as in 1941 then the imports would have been considerably higher at least equalling the 1941 figure. So it is clear that the damage inflicted by the German submarines did impact the level of imports.
It is also clear that the losses inflicted on the German U Boats also impacted the conflict. In 1943 the losses suffered were such that from April the U Boat arm was largely withdrawn from the conflict to recover and learn the lessons. The turnaround was quite sudden, in March 1943 U Boats hit 131 merchant ships, if they had been able to maintain that pace for the rest of 1943 the situation would have been dire. Instead the losses dropped to an average of 38 ships per month.
If you have broken the codes, you know what the messages say. Using DF you know pretty much exactly where the convoy was when the message sent. Convoys are big and they don't go very fast.Germany did NOT know where the convoys were exactly, but only where they were roughly .
Actually it's an excellent statement as it shows the importance of the Battle of the Atlantic. Now if you could address the other long standing questions included in the posting it would be appreciatedIf they had been able : IF is not a serious argument .
You keep saying this, what do you call "exactly" bearing in mind it is moving, if you know exactly where it is at a certain time it can travel 250 miles in a day. Can you start answering things instead of just making glib sweeping statements. Without a working transmitter that is transmitting all anyone knew about any boat until recently was "last known position"Germany did NOT know where the convoys were exactly, but only where they were roughly .
Are you having a joke? I have passed through the Pas de Calais many times, it isnt the French name for the English Channel (La Manche) it is the name for the departement on the French side. In WW2 it meant anywhere in and around Calais from Dieppe to Brugge and inland as far as places like Douai, anywhere that had military targets that would convince the Germans that the area would be the main point of attack on D-Day. Since the British and Canadian, Commonwealth forces had already landed at Dieppe, it was certainly in the Pas de Calais, thats why there were tanks at Arras.No : he did not keep them away from where they could be bombarded ,but for other reasons ,as
they were concentrated at railway junctions,to make it easier to supply them and from where they could easier advance .By railway . 2 PzD was the only PzD north of the Somme and was concentrated at the region of Amiens, FAR AWAY from the Pas de Calais . Distance Amiens - Dunkirk on roads of 80 years ago : more than 150 km .It would take more than 2 days before the whole division could arrive at Dunkirk .
an other reason was that,if one wanted ( as was Rommel ) to concentrate the mobile divisions at the coast, the only solution was to split them in small battalions and give up their mobility .
The Pz maffia ( Guderian,Geyr von Schweppenburg ,etc ) were hostile to the proposals of Rommel with as argument that it was impossible to prevent a successful landing . They were right,but their proposal: to let the Allied armoured divisions advance to the interior and to defeat them there, was also wrong .
Except for a miracle ,the Germans had no chance .