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The next step if the Japanese had been able to eliminate the US Navy's carrier force at Midway might possibly have been the invasion of Hawaii. Assuming that the Enterprise, Yorktown and Hornet had been sunk with only light damage to the IJN carriers, how would the Japanese have fared in a subsequent invasion and occupation of Hawaii? Bear in mind that there had been a big build up of US troops and aircraft in Hawaii since Pearl Harbor.
I think their biggest obstacle would be the US Submarine force. That's a long way to travel.
Events soon proved the US submarine force was as close to inept as you can define the word.
So your torpedo issues were across the board, not just the ones being dropped by torpedo bombersIt wasn't the US Submarine Force that was at fault, it was the damn torpedos. This took quite a while to correct because no one wanted to believe the torpedos were faulty
So your torpedo issues were across the board, not just the ones being dropped by torpedo bombers
Within 11 days of Pearl Harbor, the US Subs started sinking ships. Betwteen Pearl Harbor and Midway, the Japanese Merchant fleet lost approx 102 ships or 275,000 tons (only counting ships greater the 500 tons). 57% of them were due to US submarines.
Pig Boats by Theodore Roscoe, pages 447-449
But look at the results. The "dozens of ships" accounted for 57% of the Japanese Merchant fleet losses. The other 43% was due to the thousands of aircraft and hundreds of surface ships of ALL the Allied forces in the PTO. All this while dealing with the problems of torpedoes as you've already pointed out. Not too shabby IMO.
Where exactly do you get that the Japanese felt there was no impact?
Japan had to import most raw materials, oil, and a chunk of their food. During the time period we are discussing, Japan lost more in merchant tonnage then they were able to produce.
From 12/41 to the end of 1942 Japan was only able to launch 111,000 tone of merchant ships Silent Victory by Blair, (pages 360, 552, 816, 878, 970, 975, 977, 979, 980, 982). This vs the 275,000 they lost in roughly the first 6 months of the war. Add another 6 months and count all of 1942, they lost 725,000 tons.
They were not able to keep up.
I have not mentioned their value in re-con, resupplying/evacuating bases or their damage they inflicted on warships (during the same time period they sank 47,000 tons of warships ranging from Submarines to Seaplane Carriers).
Every single naval history on the Pacific war has the same conclusion.
And one other thing .... the US sub performance at Midway was so bad, it nearly caused a complete leadership change in the sub fleet. Nimitz was furious and everything stunk about it.
The US sub effort through mid 1943 was pathetic and had no effect on the Japanese war effort. Since most of the ships sunk by the subs were auxiliaries, the effect was nil.
I have the JANAC reports and looked through them. Hardly any cargo or oilers were sunk, and the losses were well within what the Japanese had planned for.
On the topic of Midway - Of the 25 US Subs there, Task Groups 7.2 7.3 were stationed east of Midway and off of Oahu, another 6 were steaming in from distant patrols, that left 12 boats that could be used. As quoted from Pig Boat, page 133:
"Lack of search radar for night tracking was seen as the primary reason for submarine frustration at Midway."
They were also stationed in defensive positions.
The numbers I've quoted are based on the JANAC. 67% of the Merchant losses were Cargo Tankers and half of the warships were non-auxiliary.
What exactly is your source that the US Subs had no impact until mid-43 and what exactly are the merchant losses Japan planned for?