highest kill ratio

[GregP]

The Hellcat's kill ratio was slightly over 19 : 1, not 13 : 1. It has the highest kill ratio of any WWII fighter, the Finnish Brewsters notwithstanding. To get a kill ratio for type, you don;t pick a single unit or country, you lump all the aircraft of taht type together. If you lump the Brewsters in service with all countries togetehr, they fade into the bottom of the list quickly, and we are left with admiration for the Finns who employed an obsoescent aircraft so well.

The same holds true for the FM-2 Wildcat. It gets lumped in with the other Wildcats.

As for the Ta 152 having only one or two combat losses, I have seen claims of anywhere from one to four losses in combat and from 7 to 10 victories by the Ta-152, making for a kill ratio of anywhere from 10 : 1 down to 7 : 4. If we split the high and low, we get 8.5 : 2 for a kill to loss ratio of about 4.25 : 1. Hardly inspiring to me.

many people take the highest number they can find and throw out all the lesser claims. That is false research.

You must also define kill ratio, and here is where it gets fuzzy. Is kill ratio:

1. The number of air-to-air victories against the number of air-to-air losses in combat with enemy aircraft?
2. The number of victories, including kills on the ground, against losses in combt, including losses to AAA, but not including operational losses such as running out of fuel or blowing a takeoff or landing?
3. The numebr of all kill versus the aggregate number of total losses including air-to-air losses, losses to AAA, operational losses, losses in training, but not including losses on the ground due to being bombed or straffed? What about losses because the fighter was parked next to another auircraft that caught fire and exploded?

There are more definitions, but you get the point. Next, once defined, are the data vailable for all the aircraft you want to compare? If so, where are the data?

I see above that it is purported that there were more P-51s than the Luftwafffe had planes. I might remind everyone that there 1,583 Allison-powered Mustangs built and 13,757 Merlin-powered Mustangs built, including post-war. During WWII, the total was about 12,500 and they were spread out among several theaters of war. That is, not all 12,500 or so made it to Europe. We also had quite a few here in the USA for training and some home defense should we be attacked. There were more than 30,000 Me 109s built during WWII, never mind the Fw 190s, of which there were 21,675 built during the war.

So I'm sure the claims that there were more Mustangs built than aircraft in the Luftwaffe is a false statement.

Of the great fighters, the P-51 is in there strongly, but so are the P-47, the Spitfire, the Me 109, the Fw 190, the Yak-3/9, and the La-5/7. Many would include the P-38 since it did so well in the Pacific. Personally, I am inclined to include the P-51, the Spitfire, the Me 109, and the La-7 as the best of the best, with the La-7 being right near the top. The Soviet fighters were superb from 1943 onward and by 1945, not many German planes could live long in the Russian air. That was mostly due to the Yak-3/9s and the Lavochkins.

 

[Vincenzo]

premise that are all claims rate, if i rememeber right the finnish G-50 in the continuation war get a 22:1 ratio

 

[riacrato]

The Hellcat's kill ratio was slightly over 19 : 1, not 13 : 1. It has the highest kill ratio of any WWII fighter, the Finnish Brewsters notwithstanding. To get a kill ratio for type, you don;t pick a single unit or country, you lump all the aircraft of taht type together. If you lump the Brewsters in service with all countries togetehr, they fade into the bottom of the list quickly, and we are left with admiration for the Finns who employed an obsoescent aircraft so well.

The same holds true for the FM-2 Wildcat. It gets lumped in with the other Wildcats.

As for the Ta 152 having only one or two combat losses, I have seen claims of anywhere from one to four losses in combat and from 7 to 10 victories by the Ta-152, making for a kill ratio of anywhere from 10 : 1 down to 7 : 4. If we split the high and low, we get 8.5 : 2 for a kill to loss ratio of about 4.25 : 1. Hardly inspiring to me.

many people take the highest number they can find and throw out all the lesser claims. That is false research.

You must also define kill ratio, and here is where it gets fuzzy. Is kill ratio:

1. The number of air-to-air victories against the number of air-to-air losses in combat with enemy aircraft?
2. The number of victories, including kills on the ground, against losses in combt, including losses to AAA, but not including operational losses such as running out of fuel or blowing a takeoff or landing?
3. The numebr of all kill versus the aggregate number of total losses including air-to-air losses, losses to AAA, operational losses, losses in training, but not including losses on the ground due to being bombed or straffed? What about losses because the fighter was parked next to another auircraft that caught fire and exploded?

There are more definitions, but you get the point. Next, once defined, are the data vailable for all the aircraft you want to compare? If so, where are the data?

I see above that it is purported that there were more P-51s than the Luftwafffe had planes. I might remind everyone that there 1,583 Allison-powered Mustangs built and 13,757 Merlin-powered Mustangs built, including post-war. During WWII, the total was about 12,500 and they were spread out among several theaters of war. That is, not all 12,500 or so made it to Europe. We also had quite a few here in the USA for training and some home defense should we be attacked. There were more than 30,000 Me 109s built during WWII, never mind the Fw 190s, of which there were 21,675 built during the war.

So I'm sure the claims that there were more Mustangs built than aircraft in the Luftwaffe is a false statement.

Of the great fighters, the P-51 is in there strongly, but so are the P-47, the Spitfire, the Me 109, the Fw 190, the Yak-3/9, and the La-5/7. Many would include the P-38 since it did so well in the Pacific. Personally, I am inclined to include the P-51, the Spitfire, the Me 109, and the La-7 as the best of the best, with the La-7 being right near the top. The Soviet fighters were superb from 1943 onward and by 1945, not many German planes could live long in the Russian air. That was mostly due to the Yak-3/9s and the Lavochkins.

There were less than 20k Fw 190s produced, most likely around 19,4-19,5k. Of which ~12,5k were fighters, 5,6k were attackers (F-series) and 1,3k fighter bombers (G-series). These saw service from 1941-1945, many used in the east. In the late months many saw no service at all because they were either destroyed or simply not delivered. Whereas the Mustang entered late 1943.

 

[drgondog]

There are people on here that know the statistics much better than I, but I can't see how range is one of your major determining factors in making the P-51 the greatest plane the allies had. What does range have to do with firepower, survivability, rate of climb, maneuverability, etc. These are true combat statistics, not how far it can fly.

Also, the P-51 had far greater numbers and better trained pilots than the Luftwaffe, which sure helped the allies gain air superiority.

I do agree with you about kill ratio's not meaning it's the greatest plane, but the two reasons you give, IMO, certainly don't mean it's the greatest either. The P-51 was a fine aircraft and gets all the glory in the ETO, but many members on this board, myself included, believe the F4U was a superior aircraft in most aspects.

Thor - some thoughts and facts to ponder. I have populated and checked my USAF 85 Victory Credits. The Following is a summary by aircraft. I also broke them out by time as many P-47 groups converted to Mustangs as well as all the P-38 groups.

The numbers for ETO/USAAF ONLY 1942-May, 1945 - 8th and 9th AF combined
Spitfire 15.0
P38 452.0
P-47 2,658.4
P-51 4,179.2
P-61 128.0

The 'crossover' point for the transisition from P-47 to P-51 as dominant ETO fighter occurred from Big Week to Big B, February 20, 1944 through March 8, 1944.

Between Feb 20 and Feb 29 the Jug (all 8th and 9th AF P-47s combined) outscored the Mustang 140 to 64.5. From March 1 through March 8 the Mustangs (4 FG's, one with two days experience (355th), two with one and three weeks experience (357/4th) and one with three months (354FG) - outscored all 11 P-47 Groups (56, 78, 352, 353, 355(six days), 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 365) - 108 to 86. This includes the 9th AF Jugs 358, 362 and 365FG's which were flying Penetration and Withdrawal escort along with all the 8th AF Jugs,

By the end of March the tally for P-51s during March was 254 to 176 for the Jugs. April was 322 to 85 Mustang over P-47.

This does not include aircraft destroyed on the Ground by the P-51 in that period. From January through May the P-51 destroyed. count was 529 to 164.5 for the Jug

All in - 8th and 9th AF combined Jan 1 through May 31 leading up to control of the air over Normandy beaches
P-47 Destroyed 764.5 air and 164.5 ground. The P-51 destroyed 1142.3 air and 529 ground

It was the end of May, 1944 when the Mustang passed the P-47 in total cumulative air victory credits in the ETO from the time the P-47 entered combat ops in ETO in March/April 1943 through May 1944.. with P-47s flying nearly 3.5x the sorties.

Apologise for boring you guys with the stats
Regards,

Bill

 

[drgondog]

Another Note - some repetitive - The Jugs (8th and 9th combined including 358th and 362nd) destroyed 244.5 to 71 from January 1 through Feb 19 (all 354FG-9th AF).

The Jugs were credited with 316 from Feb 20 (Big Week) through 3/31, Mustangs in four groups, (three very short term operationally) destroyed 318.5. These P-51 scores included the 4th, 355th and 357th with the 4th and 355th contributing only after March 3.

In summary the Mustangs were greatly outnumbered by the number of P-47s during this period - but destroyed more German aircraft - most deep into Germany

In April, the Jugs were credited with 85 and the 51s were credited with 322.7. It was in April that the Mustang CUMULATIVELY destroyed more ETO a/c in the air than all the P-47 FG's in the 8th and 9th AF during 1944. The P-51 had not yet surpassed the P-47 in air credits counted from beginning of 1943 and does not include RAF Mustang credits.

It was at the end of May when the Mustangs destroyed more than All the P-47s credits for 1943 through May 1944 Cumulatively.

Next, The P-47s weren't killing the 'tough guys' that were killing the B-17 and B-24 crews out of range of the Jug (MOST of the Tough Guys) eastward from the Munster/Hannover line. Having said this, the guys the Jugs were chewing up had defended very well against the RAF and USAAF over Holland, North Sea, France and Belgium as well as western Germany - but the guys in Central Germany where the bombers had to go were crushing the 8th AF BC deep penetrations.

The Jugs were hurting JG26 and JG2 (mostly) during Penetration and Withdrawal Support along with far western Germany based JG3 and JG27, but the Mustang was killing the LuftFlotte Reich guys chartered with defending Brunswick, Berlin, Kassel, Freidrichshafen, Augsburg, Schweinfurt, etc and reinforced by all the reinforcements flooding in from the East and MTO.

Last - while not affecting pilot strength, the Mustangs were chewing up the LW on the ground as well as rail, road and canal traffic on the way home - compounding logistics to and from airfields to bring LW Gruppe's up to strength.

We can agree to disagree which is what these debates are all about and I do respect opposing opinions - I once heldd a similar view until I started diving into the separation of Lowlands battles from Germany battles to get control prior to D-Day.

Last but not least it was the four gun 'lightly armed' P-51B/C that did this damage. The P-51D was dribbling in very late May and AFIK did not have any credits before the end of May.

 

[Thorlifter]

I appreciate the stats, Bill. I kinda figured you would chime in, and hoped you would as I highly respect your knowledge of the war.

Greg, yeah, I didn't state what I was thinking very well at all so thank you for pointing that out. I did know there were many more 109's and 190's than P-51's produced over the coarse of the war. What I was thinking was the later stages of '44 through '45 when the Luftwaffe consisted of ill-trained "rookies" due to lack of oil/gas/time and the allied air forces had air superiority and were basically seeking out targets of opportunity.

 

[JoeB]

To get a kill ratio for type, you don;t pick a single unit or country, you lump all the aircraft of taht type together.

You must also define kill ratio, and here is where it gets fuzzy. Is kill ratio:

1. The number of air-to-air victories against the number of air-to-air losses in combat with enemy aircraft?
2. The number of victories, including kills on the ground, against losses in combt, including losses to AAA, but not including operational losses such as running out of fuel or blowing a takeoff or landing?
3. The numebr of all kill versus the aggregate number of total losses including air-to-air losses, losses to AAA, operational losses, losses in training, but not including losses on the ground due to being bombed or straffed? What about losses because the fighter was parked next to another auircraft that caught fire and exploded?

There are more definitions, but you get the point. Next, once defined, are the data vailable for all the aircraft you want to compare? If so, where are the data?

Good questions with no absolute answers, but IMO it's most meaningful to compare strictly apples to apples as far as possible: a/c downed in air combat on each side. This still leaves some ambiguity in the definition of loss (personally I would include a/c which force or crashlanded away from their bases due to air combat damage as 'downed' by the other side even if, in rare cases, later salvaged and repaired; a/c which belly landed at a friendly base with air combat damage similarly; also a/c known to have landed on wheels at a friendly base but never repaired; and also fuel exhaustion losses *if* related to being chased by enemy a/c). I see no value in comparing AA losses on one side to air combat losses on the other, likewise accidents or ground losses. It's a separate issue whether a particular a/c had a high accident rate, and while some a/c were more vulnerable to AA than others, absolute AA loss rates had far more to do with the employment of the a/c and nature of AA opposition than characteristics of the a/c, and ground losses had almost nothing to do with the characteristics of a/c or pilots.

Also needless to say, a meaningful kill ratio should count kills and losses the same way on both sides. So, the 19:1 Hellcat ratio is essentially meaningless because it counts 'losses' as those recorded by the USN but 'kills' as those claimed by the USN. Any comparison of losses recorded by each side with kill claims by each side in the same combats shows that claims and actual losses are different things; the relationship between them varied widely.

What this leaves us with I think is that in general it's impossible to calculate meaningful kill ratios for a whole type for the whole war. It is often possible though to calculate a meaningful ratio for particular units or fighter arms over particular periods, using the combat reports of both sides. In some cases it's quite easy (smaller more isolated theaters with complete records on each side, for example early Pacific campaigns involving JNAF) though others harder (huge theater like ETO in 1944) or impossible (1945 campaigns with lots of missing Axis records).

Also, in some limited cases it's meangingful to compare kill ratio's of fighters v bombers. For example, it might be for various German fighters against USAAF heavy bombers, which were tough targets, even unescorted. However in general modern WWII fighters could make quick work of most bombers and other non-fighters, and seldom suffer heavy losses doing so, if not seriously interfered with by opposing fighters. The fighter role that separated the sheep from the goats was combat against opposing fighters. So fighter v fighter kill ratios, calculated on the basis given above, are the most meaningful and interesting kill ratio statistic IMO. Calculating the ratio when Bf109E's went after unescorted Fairey Battles, v Hurricanes attacking unescorted Ju-87's, v F6F's attacking unescorted Type 99 Carrier Bombers, is not that interesting or informative IMO. Any modern WWII fighter would 'feast' against any of those targets. Accurately calculated kill ratio against opposing fighters is the statistic that really varied greatly, and which still delivers many surprises as compared to long quoted claims v losses ratio's.

Joe

 

[GregP]

The reason I mentioned operational losses, such as losses to running out of fuel, mechanical failure, pilot got lost, midair collision with a friendly, landing gear failed to extend, etc. is because that on some types, operational losses are almost 10 times combat losses.

In fact, if you include operational losses in the kill ratio, MANY fightgers don't look so good on ALL sides.

Another sticky point is the definition of a "combat loss." If a plane got shot up badly in combat, but made it home, only to be scrapped, is that a combat loss? What about if he got shot up in combat and survived to disengage, but had to bail out on the way home ... is THAT a combat loss? The problem is, Germany considered these to be combat losses and the U.S.A. did not. In the the U.S.A., a combat loss is one that is lost in the heat of combat or in leaving combat in the immediate area, not on the way home after successful disengagement. Those were contained in "operational Losses" whereas some other countries considered them as combat losses.

What about if you are out of ammunition but dive on an enemy, he sees you and bails out! Did you get a kill and is that a combat loss or an operational loss? It happened and some people got credit for kills that way!

Things get pretty fuzzy for "kills" and "losses" when you dig into it.

About you Brewster and FM-2 guys, my argument goes like this:

Does anyone try to break out the Allison-powered P-51 kills from the Merlin-powered ones? Do we differentialte between the Merlin-powered Spitfires and the Griffon-powered ones? What about the DB 601-powered Me 109s versus the DB 605-powered ones? Or the radial versus inline Fw 190's? If we don't differentiate these, then we should not differentiate the FM-2 from other Wildcats or the Finnish Brewsters from the American ones unless you want to looko at national kill ratios for all the planes, not just the Brewsters. If we are looking at kill ratio for a type, then look at the type as a whole. If you want to single out the Finns, how about a partitular P-51 unit operating in Europe for a period of, say, two months? Is that a fair grouping for an individual kill ratio? If not, then group the Finns in the rest of the Brrewsters and let it go. if it is, what are the limits of an individual kiill ratio?

I KNOW I can find SOMEONE who shot down at least one enemy and was never himself shot down. Does he have an infinite kill ratio due to no losses?

In my book, a kill ratio is a fair comparion in the same theater of war, but it is fraught with difficulty to compare a Pacific kill ratio to a European one, and I tend to want to see an aircraft type as a whole for a kill ratio, not a particualr theater of operations. You, of course, have your own particular method of comparion and it is probably as valid in your book as my method is in mine.

Cheers!

 

[JoeB]

Another sticky point is the definition of a "combat loss." If a plane got shot up badly in combat, but made it home, only to be scrapped, is that a combat loss? What about if he got shot up in combat and survived to disengage, but had to bail out on the way home ... is THAT a combat loss? The problem is, Germany considered these to be combat losses and the U.S.A. did not. In the the U.S.A., a combat loss is one that is lost in the heat of combat or in leaving combat in the immediate area, not on the way home after successful disengagement. Those were contained in "operational Losses" whereas some other countries considered them as combat losses.

I mainly agree with the other points, non air combat losses were important. But, I still don't see the point in calculating a ratio of losses including many or most not caused by the other side's fighters, and calling it a 'kill ratio'. A meanigful kill ratio IMO counts kills, air combat losses.

Anyway to focus on the point I quoted:

'Kill ratios' calculated by one side as big totals for types in whole wars or whole big theaters over a long period are generally of limited use, I agree. They might be somewhat indicative. for example the USN calculated fighter v fighter kill ratio's of FM-2, F6F and F4U in Sep 44-Aug 45 period, in "Naval Aviation Combat Statistics" (where the very high FM ratio often quoted comes from). In that case, factors like definition of air combat loss and accuracy of claims would tend to be the same for each type, and thus drop out of the analysis. The FM met a somewhat different cross section of opposition, but still its higher claimed ratio (than F6F/F4U) tends to indicate that its aerodynamic performance, low speed especially, was not that grave a handicap in actual combat. Moreover, it shows that F6F (mainly -5 types in that period) and F4U (mainly still -1 types) ratio's were virtually identical, and those two types faced very similar fighter opposition in that period. Whatever performance advantage F6F or F4U was insufficient to create a noticeable difference in real world fighter combat results v basically the same opposition in the same period. That's a worthwhile insight from the NACS statistics.

However, to stick with this example, those claimed kill ratio's I agree cannot be directly compared to ones of other air arms in other theaters. And needless to say, if we had a Japanese document like NACS for the same period, the results given would be different.

But, if we have complete combat reports for each side for a particular theater and period we can cut not only the issue of claim v actual loss on the other side, but we can also eliminate a lot of the ambiguities of what each side designated an air combat loss in compiling larger totals. For example, fighter operations in New Guinea in 1942 are pretty clear. For much of the campaign only a single JNAF fighter unit was involved, and their detailed combat reports still exist for almost every day's operations, so do those of the other units involved at various times. The fates of a/c are generally clear with relatively few truly ambiguous cases. And though I've never directly studied the RAAF/USAAF records in the campaign (the Japanese ones are online, US/Aussies ones aren't!) detailed books exist based on such study which make pretty clear what the US/Aussie fighter losses were in each day's combat and what caused each, regardless of how they might have been included in larger totals. Calculating that kill ratio to a reasonable band of certainty is not hard, and not subject to vastly different answers among objective researchers, IMO. The main reason for the vast difference between claim v. loss ratio's on each side and loss v. loss ratio using both side's records, is overclaim. Ambiguity of own-loss numbers/causes is a much smaller factor. I think this is generally true.

Also though it's somewhat tangent, because again I doubt any kill ratio calculated 'top down' based on big totals rather than analyzing individual combats 'bottom up', it's not necessarily true that US air arms counted a/c lost away from the immediate combat area as 'operational loss'. That's often said about USAF in Korea for example. But I've studied that closely, and it's not true. A/c abandoned or crashlanded due to known air combat damage in Korea were almost invariably counted as air combat losses no matter where it happened, including B-29's; the ambiguity for B-29 losses in that war was mainly a/c which returned on their wheels but were never repaired (B-29's were mostly scrapped in 1954 anyway, and it's still not a large % of the losses). Although, it seems in WWII 20th AF did often count B-29's which ditched far from Japan as operational losses even though combat damaged; I haven't studied that as closely. I don't know the degree if any USN did this though, and AFAIK loss accounting varied by numbered USAAF and period. So I doubt how broadly your statement actually applies, though it might in some cases. But again, individual records generally allow a standard definition to be applied regardless of how totals might have been tallied at the time.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

The Hellcat's kill ratio was slightly over 19 : 1, not 13 : 1. It has the highest kill ratio of any WWII fighter, the Finnish Brewsters notwithstanding. To get a kill ratio for type, you don;t pick a single unit or country, you lump all the aircraft of taht type together. If you lump the Brewsters in service with all countries togetehr, they fade into the bottom of the list quickly, and we are left with admiration for the Finns who employed an obsoescent aircraft so well.

Actually, I think you'll find the 26:1 ratio is for all Brewsters produced, not just the Finnish airframes. The Commonwealth and Dutch forces in the Far East achieved at least parity in kills to combat losses which leaves the USMC at Midway as the one major kill-loss deficit for the type.

 

[buffnut453]

Accurately calculated kill ratio against opposing fighters is the statistic that really varied greatly, and which still delivers many surprises as compared to long quoted claims v losses ratio's.

But even then the bland statistics are unlikely to tell the whole story. There's an old saying that if you enter a fighter engagement on equal terms then you're doing it wrong, and there are plenty of factors involved in getting fighter units positioned to engage (amount of warning, ability of the command structure to make a decision etc). Even the simple factor of whether the fighter is on the attacking or defending side can make a huge difference in the outcome of a battle. Statistics are a measure but, per your other posts, it's very easy to twist them to suit an agenda.

 

[GregP]

I don't think you will find that for the Brewsters at all ...

 

[wuzak]

So, if you were in a Mosquito bomber, which has no guns, and an Fw190 or Bf109 is chasing you and they run out of fuel should you get credit for a "kill"?

 

[Vincenzo]

Finnish brewster got 478 claims for 23 losses almost for a old site now off line (FAF aircraft)

 

[GregP]

what about all the rest of the Brewsters all put together? Tough to find their combat records, but the Buffalo was not a match for the Luftwaffe in most cases.

Hurray for the Fins! Wonder how they would have done if we had supplied them with good planes? Now there is a "what if !"

 

[Glider]

So, if you were in a Mosquito bomber, which has no guns, and an Fw190 or Bf109 is chasing you and they run out of fuel should you get credit for a "kill"?

I think I am right in saying that a Mk IV bomber was awarded a kill when a 109 collided with it, the 109 went down and the Mosquito made it home.

 

[JoeB]

1. But even then the bland statistics are unlikely to tell the whole story. There's an old saying that if you enter a fighter engagement on equal terms then you're doing it wrong, and there are plenty of factors involved in getting fighter units positioned to engage (amount of warning, ability of the command structure to make a decision etc).

2. Even the simple factor of whether the fighter is on the attacking or defending side can make a huge difference in the outcome of a battle.

3. Statistics are a measure but, per your other posts, it's very easy to twist them to suit an agenda.

1. Kill ratio's in fighter combat are an important indicator of the relative effectiveness of the opposing fighter units or fighter arms involved, including but not limited to the quality of their a/c. There is no way to absolutely disentangle the effects of material and human factors in warfare, aerial warfare or any other kind. 'Counterpoints' which point this out as if it isn't already obvious are just knocking down a straw man.

2. Outcome of a single battle can be anything. But if your contention is that defense or offense in overall campaign was a clear and persistent advantage or disadvantage in kill ratio's, I don't know what your evidence would be. One contentious topic is Spitfire kill ratio over Australia in 1943 on defense, but it was clear in the plane's earlier career that it was more disadvantaged when forced to the limit of its short radius on offense, and more in its element on defense; same for the Bf109 (slightly lower Bf109 fighter kill ratio in BoB than BoF, much higher ratio against RAF sweeps over France later on, pretty effective right over Malta, but even large Bf109F escort forces caused remarkably little trouble for small FAA fighter contingents defending convoys at any distance from Malta). Other fighters (Zero, P-38 ) would not have been affected much by fuel constraints over those same distances. I don't see offense and defense per se as being big factors in fighter success. And 'we had to attack the bombers not worry about fighters' and 'we had to protect the bombers not worry about kills v fighters' were rationalizations, not rational arguments why fighters on offense or defense had any inherent advantage.

Anyway, the most contentious comparisons of kill ratio's we've had around here compare the differing kill ratio's of different Allied fighters/air arms on defense v the Japanese. And many air campaigns of WWII still resembled those of WWI with fighters meeting over a land front w. neither being consistently on offense or defense as far as the air fighting.

Again I think straw men are being bashed around if the idea is that statistical analysis of fighter campaigns typically draws strong conclusions when comparing highly different situations, or draws strong conclusions from small ratio differences even in similar situations. It seems to me it's more usual that the comparison is of fairly similar situations with big ratio differences, then some people stretch credulity in trying to wholly explain large ratio differences w/ relatively more minor situational differences.

3. I didn't say accurately calculated kill ratio's were easy to twist to suit an agenda, but rather that many conclusions have been reached based on innaccurate or meaningless ratio's. Or are you are saying I twist statistics with an agenda? If so please give some examples.

Joe

 

[buffnut453]

Joe,

I wasn't stating that defence or offence was consistently an advantage or disadvantage, merely observing that it makes a difference to the situation. Nor am I saying that you twist statistics with an agenda, simply that statistics can be easily misused - your posts earlier in this thread (back a page or two) agree with this statement.

 

[renrich]

I think what Joe B is saying which seems valid is that "kill ratios" compare the number of EA credited to a certain fighter type in ACM versus the number of that fighter type destroyed by the enemy in ACM.

An example is that USN carrier based Hellcats flew 62240 action sorties in the war and lost 245 to EA in ACM but were credited with 4955 EA destroyed in ACM. Looks awfully one sided but hold the phone. We almost know for sure how many Hellcats were destroyed by EA in ACM but the number of EA destroyed in ACM by Hellcats is problematical. Late research has shown that overclaiming by both sides was endemic so those credits for the Hellcat are almost surely inflated, maybe by as much as 30-40%.

Here is another point. Someone earlier in this thread claimed that the Hellcat was matched against the "flimsy" Zeke which was an advantage over the comparisons with fighters in the ETO. Well, maybe and maybe not but the fact is that the Navy Hellcat is credited with kills of 3568 fighters and 1387 bombers so it did not spend all it's time against Zekes.

In contrast the Marine land based F4U type was credited with 300 bomber kills and 1100 fighter kills so it spent a little more time against fighters than against bombers than did the Hellcat.

One more question to muddy the water and I have no answer is that if a Zeke loaded with a bomb is making a kamikaze attack and it is intercepted and shot down by a Hellcat or Corsair or FM2, is that Zeke a fighter or bomber.

Another point to muddy the water is that the F4U went into action about six months before the Hellcat against probably more experienced IJN pilots. Does that factor in?

 

[Randy]

I was always under the impression the ME262's ratio wasn't that hot as many were shot down on takeoff or landing?

me 262 kill ratio was 4:1 in the air. Almost all bombers protected by allied fighters. ME262 was not a dogfighter it was a bomber interceptor and fighter bomber. ME 262s often operated with FW 190s for protection especially during takeoffs and landings. The 4:1 ratio against escorted bombers was plent good enough for Germany to win the air war over Germany if only they had enough ME262s. They didn't. They had so few that their contribution was close to zero.