How Rundstedt could've repulsed the Allied invasion in 44
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syscom3
Pacific Historian
I'd like to hear more from Erich regarding the Luftwaffe response from May 1944 through the end of June
I am sure he has a lot of info he can provide.
I advise reading Panzer Leader for more information on how the Allied invasion could have been repulsed. Heinz Guderian had many discussions with Rommel and Von Rundstedt in the months and weeks prior to D-Day about the disposition of the German forces. It's an interesting point in the book, and it's unfortunate for the German forces that Von Rundstedt and Guderian didn't have control.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The allies perfectly disquised the location of the invasion. They had the German leadership hoodwinked into thinking the invasion would take place across from Dover.
And Guderian had an effective disposition plan to provide armoured support to any invasion attempt on the French coast. All the panzer divisions were to be concentrated further back, and not on the coastline. Which would have given the Wehrmacht plenty of armoured reserve capable of moving anywhere on the coast with little problem, as they would have been out of range of the Allied naval guns and the only true problem would have been air power. The Wehrmacht would have had more tanks, and a quick reaction had Guderian got his way.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
His quick reaction force would never have gotten close to the beachheads. As mentioned before, the Allied naval forces would have kept him at arms length. Plus, once he was on the offensive, he would have begun to take casualties and loss's in the hedgerows.
There was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the invasion after the first day.
There was nothing the Germans could have done to stop the invasion after the first day.
The Allied navy only caused the massive loss of armoured force because Rommel had his panzers deployed close to the front, in range of the naval guns. This also constricted them to the use of the coastal road which led to the 21st Panzer Division having to go south to get to the beach heads when they'd discovered 6th Airborne had captured the brigdes over Caen Canal.
Had the Panzer divisions been further back, the capturing of that bridge would have meant nothing because the information would have reached the 21st Panzer division and they would merely had to move north another way. They would not have had to go south, then north to attack. This is just one example of the advantages of having the panzer forces further south when the invasion happened.
The first weeks of Operation Overlord were hanging on string, at any moment it could have swung to failure. Don't make the mistake of believing the first day secured victory, the beacheads weren't even effectively linked until June 9th.
A mobile reserve further from the coast would have given the Wehrmacht a more potent striking weapon to destroy the Allied invasion. With command from the front, it would have not been delayed and the Allied invasion could have been thrown back into the sea. At very least, the losses the Allies encountered would have been ten-fold. Make no mistakes, the Allies achieved a remarkable victory in June 1944 - but it was far from a perfect operation and at any moment it could have failed.
Had the Panzer divisions been further back, the capturing of that bridge would have meant nothing because the information would have reached the 21st Panzer division and they would merely had to move north another way. They would not have had to go south, then north to attack. This is just one example of the advantages of having the panzer forces further south when the invasion happened.
The first weeks of Operation Overlord were hanging on string, at any moment it could have swung to failure. Don't make the mistake of believing the first day secured victory, the beacheads weren't even effectively linked until June 9th.
A mobile reserve further from the coast would have given the Wehrmacht a more potent striking weapon to destroy the Allied invasion. With command from the front, it would have not been delayed and the Allied invasion could have been thrown back into the sea. At very least, the losses the Allies encountered would have been ten-fold. Make no mistakes, the Allies achieved a remarkable victory in June 1944 - but it was far from a perfect operation and at any moment it could have failed.
syscom3 said:
You really underestimate the Wehrmacht. They had superior leadership, weapons and the infantry was the best of the war. Even 5 days into the Invasion it was still a undecided event and could have gone both ways.
plan_D said:
That is what my American Grandfather who landed on Omaha Beach always told me also. He said they were very lucky.
syscom3
Pacific Historian
As the German divisions or regiments would mass for offensive operations, they would have been ripped to pieces by the naval gunfire support, that was available around the clock. In daytime, thousands of aircraft were also available to go after them.
Even if they would have gotten breakthroughs in spots, they still had a very difficult logistics situation to deal with in order to support their operations. I could imagine the tanks cutting through the allies in places, getting to the beaches then run out of gas and ammo and have to be abandoned.
The best the Germans could ever have done was bottle up the allies ever tighter. But in the end, it was a war of attrition and the Germans would have collapsed.
Even if they would have gotten breakthroughs in spots, they still had a very difficult logistics situation to deal with in order to support their operations. I could imagine the tanks cutting through the allies in places, getting to the beaches then run out of gas and ammo and have to be abandoned.
The best the Germans could ever have done was bottle up the allies ever tighter. But in the end, it was a war of attrition and the Germans would have collapsed.
syscom3 said:
While I do agree with you, that in the end it still would have ended in an allied victory. You fail to realize one thing that the Germans would not have had such a bad logistical problem as you think because they were still on there own turf. The Allies had to overcome the logistical problem. The Germans did not have the fuel and ammo problems yet as of June 1944. That was not until the winter of 1944 that the problem arose.
I don't think you quite understand what is being suggested, syscom. The concentration and deployment of the reserves would be out of naval gun range. This would save many panzers that were historically destroyed in the opening stages of Operation Neptune and Overlord.
Planes and ships cannot stop an advance alone, they can cause serious damage and give an advantage to the force that has them in superiority. But this would not be enough. A concentrated effort of the Wehrmacht reserves, if properly executed, could have forced many Allied forces back into the sea or capture.
Once a breakthrough in any sector had been made, the Allies would have been in a dire situation. Any if German forces did manage to split any beachhead from the others - a beachhead would be lost.
Take, for example, a concentrated effort on the U.S flank. An assault against the Omaha beachhead (it being the weakest) and forcing it back to the beach with panzer reserves saved due to their deployment out of naval range in the opening stages. This would then detach the U.S forces from the Canadian and British beacheads, leaving Utah on it's own and open for destruction. This could have been achieved with adequete screening of the British forces to the right. This was possible, the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions in France. This was easily enough to crush one beachhead while screening four others. Even with air support and naval support, the Allies would haven't been able to stop the Wehrmacht.
This is easily seen in Italy in the Anzio beachead. Had it not been for the single road and soft soil of the area around the beachead, it would have been crushed. The Allied air and naval support did not halt the German offence on that beach, the surrounding terrain did. The terrain in France is perfect for tank operations, only when in the hedgerows is the going tough ...but they're not around the beaches, they're further inland.
Planes and ships cannot stop an advance alone, they can cause serious damage and give an advantage to the force that has them in superiority. But this would not be enough. A concentrated effort of the Wehrmacht reserves, if properly executed, could have forced many Allied forces back into the sea or capture.
Once a breakthrough in any sector had been made, the Allies would have been in a dire situation. Any if German forces did manage to split any beachhead from the others - a beachhead would be lost.
Take, for example, a concentrated effort on the U.S flank. An assault against the Omaha beachhead (it being the weakest) and forcing it back to the beach with panzer reserves saved due to their deployment out of naval range in the opening stages. This would then detach the U.S forces from the Canadian and British beacheads, leaving Utah on it's own and open for destruction. This could have been achieved with adequete screening of the British forces to the right. This was possible, the Wehrmacht had 10 Panzer Divisions in France. This was easily enough to crush one beachhead while screening four others. Even with air support and naval support, the Allies would haven't been able to stop the Wehrmacht.
This is easily seen in Italy in the Anzio beachead. Had it not been for the single road and soft soil of the area around the beachead, it would have been crushed. The Allied air and naval support did not halt the German offence on that beach, the surrounding terrain did. The terrain in France is perfect for tank operations, only when in the hedgerows is the going tough ...but they're not around the beaches, they're further inland.
wmaxt
Staff Sergeant
DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
I think the truth is somewhere in the middle. The Germans were an occupying force not a real fighting force. The Germans had not completed the 'Atlantic Wall' fortifications nor had they stocked the area with ammo, POL, or men.
On the other hand the Allies had 150,000 men fighting skirmishes as well as local hot spots but whose supplies, ammo, POL, etc were on a shoestring in an area that could not support them without the massive resupply effort - or to put it simply the Allies were in as much danger of collapsing from lack of supplies as by German counter attacks. It wasn't a sure thing until both the breakout of the hedgerows and a port was operational.
wmaxt
Agreed wmaxt.
What I dont think syscom understand however is that if the Panzers had been used as Guderian had suggested, when the allies moved inland there would have been a suitable defense and they could react wherever needed and still been out of range of the Allied naval power. Also by that time the Luftwaffe would have gained strength in the area. The Luftwaffe was far from defeated in June 1944.
What I dont think syscom understand however is that if the Panzers had been used as Guderian had suggested, when the allies moved inland there would have been a suitable defense and they could react wherever needed and still been out of range of the Allied naval power. Also by that time the Luftwaffe would have gained strength in the area. The Luftwaffe was far from defeated in June 1944.
wmaxt
Staff Sergeant
DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
Agreed, if the panzers were used quickly and effectively, the problem is that the first week or so the allies had virtualy the entire airforces of the AAF and Britian over the invasion areas including on two (if I remember right) occasions heavy bombers. The Luftwaffe wasn't decimated but of aircraft in a usable radius they faced almost 2,000 fighters the first few days. The Germans had an impossible task in defending the continent even if the major part of their armies wern't engaged in the east and the Normandy area was especialy vulnerable.
The final analysis is that if the Germans could have gotten the panzers, some men and even some night bombing of the Mulberrys it would have had a terrible effect on the invasion.
wmaxt
Agreed there wmaxt!
Also I am not sure on this but I heard somewhere that the Allied Heavy Bombers on several occasions accidentaly dropped there bombs on Allied positions during the Invasion. Is this true and do you have any info on it if it is.
Also I am not sure on this but I heard somewhere that the Allied Heavy Bombers on several occasions accidentaly dropped there bombs on Allied positions during the Invasion. Is this true and do you have any info on it if it is.
That is what I though. Some bad luck for those guys on the ground!
syscom3
Pacific Historian
On July 24th, 8th AF bombers dropped several salvo's short and 80 casualties resulted. Target area was St. Lo
On July 25th, same thing but this time 382 casualties. St. Lo again was the target.
I might be mistaken, but Gen. Eisenhower and Gen Bradley were mislead about how the 8th AF was going to attack the front lines. They wanted the bombers to travel ina line that paralleled the lines. The 8th AF HQ changed the plans to bomb perpendicular. This lead to "short bombing".
Ike and Bradley were pissed off about what happened and were reluctant to believe in or use heavy bombers in direct support of the infantry ever again.
On July 25th, same thing but this time 382 casualties. St. Lo again was the target.
I might be mistaken, but Gen. Eisenhower and Gen Bradley were mislead about how the 8th AF was going to attack the front lines. They wanted the bombers to travel ina line that paralleled the lines. The 8th AF HQ changed the plans to bomb perpendicular. This lead to "short bombing".
Ike and Bradley were pissed off about what happened and were reluctant to believe in or use heavy bombers in direct support of the infantry ever again.
