How Rundstedt could've repulsed the Allied invasion in 44

[wmaxt]

sys:

the US bomber initiative almost came to a halt after the disaster at Schweinfurt/Regensburg in summer-fall of 1943. It was going through serious growth periods with an ever present thought of not futhering the heavy bomber campagin during the day even with P-47 escorts. the Luftwaffe was bringing it on the US heavies in ever increasing numbers with terrible casualties on both sides.

I repeat the Luftw. intruder program would of negated a pre Normandie buildup on the English coast and everything would of been a shambles.

Until the P-47 with enough fuel and paddle prop the P-47 was limited in its effectiveness. The P-47 escorts at that time, could only go, roughly, to the German border and so were never a serious asset in the long range missions like Schweinfurt/Regensberg.

As for the intruder program, I think the AAF would have moved a few miles further from the coast, beyond the effective range of the intruders. The P-38s were always based at places like Kings Cliff 80 miles or more from the coast. It would have been inconvienient but nothing else.

A major issue was the Germans never had adequate recon on the ground or in the air or they would have been much more formidible - the D-Day buildup is a case in point.

wmaxt

 

[Udet]

While my books and printings on this particular issue are somewhat covered by dust, I recall the essay of an officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel (Podpolkovnik) of the present-day Russian army who is the elder brother of one my best friends.

In his paper, he stated that in fact, Germany had the ground forces to smash the allied invasion. The interference of the OKW and Hitler is a fundamental aspect covered, and in fact, played an essential role in letting the allies form the beachhead.

Not that I recall this with all due accuracy, but it is commented the strenght of the main armored divisions of the Heer in France during those days:

(i) Panzer Lehr (nearly 180 Panzers and some 40 self-propelled artillery)
(ii) 21 Pz. Div. (nearly 100 Panzers)
(iii) 12 SS. Pz. Div. (nearly 170 panzers).


All three VERY powerful units and if i recall correctly, they were the ones closer to the main landing beaches of the allies on June 6th. But when we talk about being an extremely powerful unit, the Panzer Lehr takes the gold medal.

(Not included in my comment are other panzer units, such as the 116 Pz. Div. and several other SS.Pz. units; those who were there on June 6th, as well as those who arrived in the days and weeks that followed)

Refitted and mechanized. He stated that only those three divisions had 450 panzers (!). Such force, he stated somewhere in his paper, would have brought havoc and massive destruction if deployed in the eastern front, against the massed T-34 units...how was it possible they failed to destroy the allied beach head?

The force that has just landed and is trying to form and hold a beachhead is a very fragile lifeform. The fact it might enjoy massive naval and air support goes secondary. If the enemy bursts out attempting to exterminate it, you might want to hold your naval and air support or accept killing your own in high numbers.

Also I recall another interesting fact the guy covered, and that I do not recall seeing on any other publication:

the fact that the allied airborne units dropped during the June 5/6 night, no matter how many paratroopers were landed, did not have the power to achieve anything that significant. By the wat, their landing was a mess, too disperse.

Place the Panzer formations closer to beach areas, annihilate everything that moves there, then you will have the time to look back and go after the paratroopers, they end dead, as POWs or joining the thugs of the French resistance.

Of course, his paper is way more custimozed and comprehensive than this brief comment.

The point is, I agree Germany, although overstretched and overburdened -and overbled-, had the resources to smash the allies in the west in June 1944.[/u]

 

[syscom3]

The allied battleships could begin shelling the Panzers long before they came close to the beachheads. Then the cruisers would join in, and finally the destroyers.

Not counting the aircraft I might add.

A concentrated thrust by the panzers would mean they would be grouped together for fast destruction.

 

[Udet]

Mr. Syscome:

pardon me?

What about advancing at night? Or if it would be necessary to march in daylight, they had camouflage and the French landscape which offered plenty of hideout.

It is recorded, German losses of AFVs to allied planes were minimum during the entire campaign. Other than significant delays in the arrival of German units to critical points of the front, which is already a juicit gain, allied air power achieved little.

 

[syscom3]

Its a proven fact that guns can be fired at night.

Plus a liberal use of starshells to brighten things up for the aircraft.

If its one thing the allies excelled at was indirect fire. All they had to do was tell one of the battleships that a bunch of tanks are located at a certein coordinate, then blamo....... a few salvo's from the 14" guns and no more target.

 

[syscom3]

This is why I dont think the Luftwaffe had much of a chance in trying to disrupt the allied buildup from May 1943 through March 1944. These are the average number of fighter groups under operational control of the 8th AF. Quite simply, the allies would own the air in the daylight and within fighter range. When the fighters got the drop tanks, the range would go deeper into Germany. Plus there were a lot more of them. I know its a rehash of what many people already know, but what the heck. Numbers do look impressive.

I think the RAF would also inflict heavy enough loss's at night to wear out the Luftwaffe into just "nuisance" raids.

May 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 115 sorties per mission.

June 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 130 sorties per mission.

July 1 1943
three P47 groups with an average of 120 sorties per mission.

Aug 1 1943
Four P47 groups with an average of 170 sorties per mission.

Sep 1 1943
Six P47 groups with an average of 200 sorties per mission.

Oct 1 1943
Seven P47 groups
One P38 group
About 300 sorties per mission

Nov 1 1943
Seven P47 groups
One P38 group
About 350 sorties per mission

Dec 1 1943
Nine P47 groups
Two P38 group
One P51 group
About 550 sorties per mission

Jan 1 1944
Ten P47 groups
Two P38 group
One P51 group
About 650 sorties per mission

Feb 1 1944
Twelve P47 groups
Two P38 group
Three P51 group
About 825 sorties per mission

Mar 1 1944
Eleven P47 groups
Three P38 group
Five P51 group
About 900 sorties per mission

 

[Jabberwocky]

In Normandy, the 21st Panzer Division had 127 Mk IVs, 40 assault guns and 127 other tracked vehicles, all of which were deployed ar ound the Caen area before D-day. By June 8 it was down to just 40 tanks.

Panzer Lehr had simialr problems. When ordered to move in daylight on June 7th, from Chartres to the Seulles Valley for a counter attack on Caen, it lost 130 trucks and fuel tankers, 8 tanks and 84 SPGs, half-tracks and prime movers to air strikes. While Allied air power may not of been completely effective against German armour, it was more than powerful enought to annihilate German suppy units and severly damage 'light' support units.

12th SS was perhaps the best stroke of luck for the Allies on D-Day. Instead of being deployed around Caen on June 6th, as originally planned, they were strung out on the road between Liseux and Caen waiting for movement orders which come sometime after noon) for most of the morning of June 6th, and took a pounding from Allied air units as they moved towards the Allied bridgehead. An organised and determined counterattack by the 12th SS was one of Monty's greatest worries, and could of slowed or prevented the initial linkage of the beach-heads.

When you look at the numbers though, its a telling story. The Allies landed around 175,000 troops and almost 20,000 vehicles of all kinds on D-day alone, breaching the Atlantic Wall for the cost of about 5,000 casualties. On D +1 they landed a further 75,000 troops and some 10,000 vehicles. How then, would 3 panzer divisions, even elite formations, bombarded from the sea and beset from the air, hope to decesively defeat a well supported force, 5-6 times their size? Even with air superiority, it would be a tall, tall task.

They would have to be deployed through the 'railway desert' that pre-invasion bombing had created and then operate at the long end of a supply chain being constantly interdicted by Allied airpower. They didn't have the room for manouver that they needed and the terrain, and the Allied supply situation, were favourable for defensive operations. It was infantry, not tanks, that proved the biggest obstacle to offensive operations in the first month of Normandy.

German forces were inadequate for offensive operations on any large scale. At the most they could perform strong localised counter-attacks when Allied forces had expended themselves attempting to gain an objective. Even if all 3 formations could of been deployed, Allied strength was probably enough to fend of their attacks. Manouver warfare in Normandy, without artillery or air dominance, given the advantages the terrain gave to the defender, would of been far more costly to German forces than it would of been to the Allies.

If anything, all out offensive be heavy German formations may have made Normandy a more favourable victory for the Allies. Without these strong formations in key postions to block their advance, British and Canadian units may of had an easier time around Caen, Odon, Caumont and Evercy.

 

[syscom3]

Well put Jabberwocky. In order for the Germans to go on the offensive, they had to concentrate which was not the brightest thing to do. All they could do was disperse and go on the defensive.

I have to read more in depth about the logistics for "Overlord", but I do believe that planners had already factored in a certein number of ships being lost. If they werent lost, great. If they were, it wouldnt disrupt the invasion.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Syscom what do you mean by sorties because a sortie is a mission. Do you mean 120 aircraft on a mission or sortie or 120 sorties per day or what?

 

[syscom3]

I meant to say that on any given mission for the 8th AF as a whole, that was the number of fighters that were involved. That is a rough average.


Oct 1 1943
Seven P47 groups
One P38 group
About 300 sorties per mission

would mean 8 fighter groups would send out on average, a total of 300 aircraft on any given mission flown in Oct 1943.

 

[Soren]

When you look at the numbers though, its a telling story. The Allies landed around 175,000 troops and almost 20,000 vehicles of all kinds on D-day alone, breaching the Atlantic Wall for the cost of about 5,000 casualties.

Jabberwocky, on D-Day the Allies landed around 156,000 troops in Normandy. The American forces numbered 73,000 in total, 23,250 on Utah Beach, 34,250 on Omaha Beach, and 15,500 airborne troops. In the British and Canadian sector, 83,115 troops were landed (61,715 of them British), 24,970 on Gold Beach, 21,400 on Juno Beach, 28,845 on Sword Beach, and 7900 airborne troops.

And Allied casualties were definitely higher than 5,000 ! Total Allied casualties on D-Day was more like 10,000. It is estimated that 2700 British, 6603 Americans and 996 Canadians were the Allied losses on D-day. Total German casualties on D-day was roughly 4,000.

As a side-note, in April and May 1944, the Allied air forces lost about 12,000 men and over 2,000 aircraft in operations which paved the way for D-Day.

On D +1 they landed a further 75,000 troops and some 10,000 vehicles. How then, would 3 panzer divisions, even elite formations, bombarded from the sea and beset from the air, hope to decesively defeat a well supported force, 5-6 times their size? Even with air superiority, it would be a tall, tall task.

German forces were used to such odds, and more often than not defied them. On the western front from 44-45 alone it has been estimated that on average 5 Allied tanks were lost pr. 1 German panzer, and on the eastern front this ratio nearly doubled. And coupled with the fact that in 44-45 on average 3 Allied soldiers would die for each German soldier, stopping a force 5 times their size wouldn't have been unachievable for the Germans had they just deployed their forces correctly.

Now although I place my doubts on whether Rundstedt's plan could've actually repulsed the Allied invasion for good, I am sure that it would've meant a sheer bloodbath for the Allies, one in which they're losses could've very easily been tenfold what they actually were. The Allied forces almost surely would've been brought to a halt, and the actual invasion would have been in jeopardy.

Keep in mind that although the Allies would have air-superiority, their feeble tanks would still have to slug it out with the Panther's and Tiger's of the 12th SS and 21st Pz. Div. as-well as the Panzer Lehr. (A tough task for the Allied Sherman's and Cromwell's)

 

[syscom3]

One of the interesting facets of the hedgerow fighting was that the defender had the advantage. When the Allies moved forward, they were hit. When the germans moved forward, they also were hit.

No matter how the German troops were deployed, the overwhelming air and naval power meant that the German forces were not in any position to oppose the allies on a broad front. Hold the allies up in a couple of locations, quite possibly. Hold up all the allies on the whole front, I would say not.

Note - 9 battleships, 23 cruisers, 104 destroyers were available for fire support duties. Thats a lot of guns the German forces could do nothing about.

 

[Erich]

back a post or two the P-47 groups were outnumbered by the Luftwaffe in October of 43 and into March 44 before being overwhelmed by Allied escotrts

In the fall of 43 you had single engine prop jobs as well as day destroyer twins and night fighter twins, also small batches of twin engine bombers armed with heavy cannons and training staffeln. No doubt the last two did not add up to much, but I am refering to overall numerations which were clearly in the Luftwaffes favour as the P-51 did not make itself present till december of 43 with the 9th AF 354th fg.

the Luftwaffe during spring of 44 was in complete blunder under inept leadership. Will say it again had the Geschwader Kommodores had full reign and able to connect with all mobil groundtrasnportation of fuel, arms/ammo and without hierachy interference, then the forward bases in France would of been manned and a defence would of been established waiting for the oncoming hordes of the Allies.

As a result of total blundership (new word guys), the Luftwaffe day fighter cforce was in process of moving to within the Reich, Jg 26 was to the call, 2 a/c on the beaches with other smaller sorties to follow during the 6th of June. "Wachts auf !" and finally the rest of the Geschwaderen came to the call to kick fanny whipped. Case in point was III./JG 3 wiped out to almost a pilot of the original formation in June 44 during the Normandie slaughter.

Rundenstedt had nothing new to offer

 

[Hunter368]

Rundenstedt had nothing new to offer

I agree, all that could of been done better (not that it would of changed the overall out come) is handling the ground forces better (allied casualties would of been higher and progress would of been slower). But the writing was on the wall and it was clear, the end was well within sight, it was just a matter of time.

Mark

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I meant to say that on any given mission for the 8th AF as a whole, that was the number of fighters that were involved. That is a rough average.


Oct 1 1943
Seven P47 groups
One P38 group
About 300 sorties per mission

would mean 8 fighter groups would send out on average, a total of 300 aircraft on any given mission flown in Oct 1943.

You mean 300 aircraft per mission or 300 aircraft per sortie. A sortie is a mission. It is another word for it.

 

[syscom3]

The source book I used listed the missions chronologically by the official mission number as given by 8th AF HQ.

I then looked to see what fighter groups were available for that mission (he did list which ones did have flying that day and which ones were inactive) and averaged the total numbers put in the air.

It was interesting to see how newly activated fighter groups would be held back for several missions to just patrol. When 9th AF FG's were available, they were used by the 8th AF for escort duties.

 

[Erich]

you will note that depending what 8th AF sources your are investigating that 9th AF 354th fg was performing high altitude escort missions in December 43 with the Mustang, as it was known : the Pioneer Mustang Group, and having the highest number of kills in any ETO fighter group besides. The group is hardly mentioned and their original history book which I have is trash. Osprey did a half way devent coverage of them and 2 web-sites dedicated to the killer group. Have been honoured to know several of the fighter pilots as they live in Oregon, the group itself has it's roots in my wifes hometown of Salem when it first operated the bogus P-39 getting ready for the hot little pony which the crews were very excited about till wars end, and in fact when they had their ponys taken from them in the fall of 44 for a short stint and given to 8th AF groups the 354thfg operated the Jug and hated it. wishing/wanting the P-51 back, and so they got their request as January 45 came upon them with the latest Stangs........

sorry I digressed

 

[delcyros]

I don´t know the details but I cannot imagine how the Luftwaffe could achieve some parity in the airbattles over northern France / Channel transportation. Syscom did correctly showed the sortie´s.
Do we have a statistic how many combat sorties (total) were flown by allied forces on DDay and how many could the Luftwaffe send in respond(both historically and hypothetically if we assume that forces could have deployed in a better way)?
I do think but am not sure, this will underline the general superiority of allied forces.

 

[Erich]

another what if but the Luftwaffe night bomber force should of taken it to the parked Allied shipping and vehicles during the intial days of the Normandie landings. Based too far back and still feeeling the sting of 6 of June. too late to even try to get something going which still causes bewilderment today.

the Mossies were still based in England and the 9th AF P-61 squadrons were still forming up, their first missions were actually to defend England from V-1's.

In essence the Luftw. day fighter force had nothing to stop RAF/US onslaught of a/c

 

[syscom3]

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on June 6
8th AF Mission 394
1805 B17 and B24 sorties

8th AF Mission 395
782 B17 and B24 sorties

Escort sorties (continous all day):
P38 555 sorties
P47 414 sorties
P51 750 sorties
Total = 1719

Fighter Bomber sorties (continous all day):
P47 231 sorties
P51 235 sorties
Total = 466

56th FG had 11 missions. All others between 6 and 10.

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on June 7
8th AF Mission 397
473 B17 and B24 sorties

8th AF Mission 398
575 B17 and B24 sorties

Escort sorties (4 missions)
P38 526 sorties
P51 294 sorties
Total = 820

Fighter Bomber sorties (continous all day):
P47 505 sorties
P51 148 sorties
Total = 653

Some groups had 9 missions.

These are the stats for the 8th AF for sorties on June 8
8th AF Mission 400
1178 B17 and B24 sorties

Escort sorties:
P38 381 sorties
P47 24 sorties
P51 195 sorties

Fighter Bomber sorties:
P47 333 sorties
P51 526 sorties
Total = 1353

Note - These do not count the 9th AF or RAF sorties which would have been just as impressive.
Note - The 8th AF target list for the month of June were airfields and choke points throughout France.